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Abstract 
This book investigates the changing nature of US power at the level of world order using US 
relations with the People's Republic of China in the 1990s as a case study. It is argued that US 
hegemony has given way to a period of dominance in which thse neo-liberal policy objectives 
of the US state are increasingly realised via the structural power of global institutions and the 
ideological preferences which underpin them; the cultivation of regional trading blocs; and the 
material power of the US state as conceived in more traditional terms. This neo-Gramscian 
assessment of US power is accompanied by the idea that political agency is required to satisfy 
policy goals under conditions of globalisation. State policy is thereby understood as the 
product of a political process involving US civil society and non-state actors rather than a 
given entity. 
The chapters of the book flesh out the methods by which the US has sought to promote a 
liberal trading order in the light of China's emergence as a global power and the various areas 
of consensus and disagreement between the two nations. This takes the form of analysing 
five major thematic areas of the relationship which include assessments of the historical 
evolution of US-China relations; the political economy of US-China trade; the role of social 
forces (civil society) in US-China relations; environmental aspects of the relationship; and the 
impact of regionalism on US-China relations. Overall, the intention is to problematise the view 
that the relationship can still be broached in conventional state-centric terms which play down 
new structural conditions underpinned by the onset of economic globalisation and more 
multilateral forms of power. 
In many senses, the thesis entails a novel approach to the political economy of relations 
between two of the world's foremost powers by placing analysis within the context of neo-
Gramscian critical theory. It concludes by noting that though US structural power remains 
considerable in the post-hegemonic era of the 1990s and beyond, the rise of China may induce 
moves, for better and perhaps worse, to a more multilateral world order. 
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Introduction 
This thesis investigates the changing nature of US power at the level of world order in 
connection to US relations using the People's Republic of China in the 1990s as a case 
study. It is argued that US hegemony has given way to a period of dominance in which the 
neo-liberal policy objectives of the US state are increasingly realised via the structural 
power of global institutions and the ideological preferences which underpin them; the 
cultivation of regional trading blocs; and the material power of the US state as conceived 
in more traditional terms. This neo-Gramscian assessment of US power is accompanied by 
the idea that political agency is required to satisfy policy goals under conditions of 
globalisation. State policy is thereby understood as the product of a political process 
involving US civil society and non-state actors rather than a given entity. 
The chapters of the thesis flesh out the methods by which the US has sought to promote a 
liberal trading order in the light of China's emergence as a global power and the various 
areas of consensus and disagreement between the two nations. This takes the form of 
analysing five major thematic areas of the relationship which will be discussed towards the 
end of this chapter. Overall, the intention is to problematise the view that the relationship 
can still be broached in conventional state-centric terms which play down new structural 
conditions underpinned by the onset of economic globalisation and more multilateral forms 
of power. 
2 
This introductory chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, we consider the dominant 
approach to the study of US foreign policy but note the changing nature of the debate as 
to how US foreign policy, and particularly the US state, is conceptualised. Secondly, this 
chapter considers the evolving US-China literature noting, where necessary, the ways in 
which the critical theoretical approach developed in our first chapter constructively builds 
upon what has gone before. Thirdly, the chapter sets out the methodology used in the 
writing of this thesis and provides a summary of each chapters content. Let us firstly 
look at some of the dominant approaches to US foreign policy. 
US Foreign Policy 
The most prevalent approaches to the study of US foreign policy have been essentially 
statist in that they have given priority to political agents whether they are Presidents and 
their closest advisory bodies or the wider foreign policy bureaucracy. In the first category 
a sizable literature and sub-discipline of foreign policy analysis based around Presidential 
management in foreign policy has evolved.) Much of the analysis here focuses upon the 
individual style and characteristics of Presidents2 and the impact this has on the 
management of foreign policy crises. Whether a President delegates power (as did 
Reagan) or involves himself in the minutiae of policy detail (as did Carter) is given great 
consideration in this literature. Methodologically, this approach is congruent with both 
I See for example R E Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership, New York, John Wilev, 
1960. For a ~nt appraisal. of Presidential power and particularly the constraints on a president in a . 
post-hegemomc world see Richard Rose, The Postmodern President (second edition), New Jersey, 
Chatham House, 1991. 
3 
liberal and realist approaches to US foreign policy by prioritising the actions of the 
individual president and also by elevating the role of the president as the embodiment of 
the 'national interest.' That said, there can be little doubt that US foreign policy is 
profoundly shaped by the political outlook of the president and his understanding of the 
world - this is not in dispute. However, the role of Congress as well as wider national and 
international factors must also be taken into account if studies of the presidency are to 
avoid charges of reductionism as regards their empirical remit. 
The second literature noted here gives great credence in the making of US foreign policy 
to the vast foreign policy bureaucracy. Halperin has characterised bureaucracies as actors 
within the US state which possess a life of their own and which reach decisions as a result 
of 'pulling and hauling' between competing interests. 3 Bureaucratic actors engage in 'turf 
wars' relating to which agency/department gains control of a specific foreign policy 
initiative. Compromise on US foreign policy decisions are, thus, reached by pragmatic 
means rather than the pursuit of programmatic rational polices. Again, this approach 
accounts for the role of political agency in the making of foreign policy and also provides 
perceptive insights into why the US state so often espouses conflicting and contradictory 
policy positions. Theories of bureaucratic politics also elucidate the extent to which the 
bureaucratic process can hinder Presidential prerogative in foreign policy making. The 
weakness in the two approaches discussed above is their negation of the role of society in 
the making of foreign policy and, more specifically, their negation of the role of material 
2 See for example F I Greenstein, "The Presidential Leadership Style of Bill Clinton: An Early Appraisal", 
Political Science Quarterly, No. 108, Winter 1993-94. pp.592-610. 
3 See M Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Washington DC, 1974. 
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factors. The role of private business in influencing the campaigns of presidents and their 
foreign policy decisions is not taken fully into account. There also exists, with regard to 
the bureaucratic politics literature, a conspicuous failure to ask why certain bureaucratic 
agencies carry more weight than others in the first place. As stressed above, the balance of 
material forces within US civil society as well as issues of identity and class are given 
short shrift. In this sense, the above approaches are contiguous with realist approaches to 
the US state in the sense that they conceive the state as solely comprising the apparatus of 
government. In the realist approach, of course, foreign policy is about the rational pursuit 
of the national interest and defining ways in which US power can be maximised and 
secured in competition with rival states. 4 The vigorous and ongoing debate about the 
changing nature of US foreign policy following the Cold War is downplayed by realists in 
favour of a theory of systemic continuity and thus realists have little to say about the 
impact of domestic economic and social forces in the formation of US foreign policy. 
A more satisfactory understanding of US foreign policy is to conceive it as comprising a 
multitude of interests and identities competing for influence across the state-society nexus. 
John Gerard Ruggie has moved the debate forward considerably by positing an approach 
to which takes account of the disparate groups which compete for influence across the 
state-civil society nexus. For Ruggie this involves a 'multiculturalist' understanding of the 
US nation-state.s Central to Ruggie's view is a new conception of American nationalism 
which is cognisant of plural interests. To quote Ruggie, "there is a certain congruence 
4 See J Chace, The Consequences of the Peace, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992 
5 JG Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1996, p.168. 
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between the vision of world order invoked by American leaders when 'founding' a new 
international order has been at stake, and the principles of domestic order at play in 
America's own understanding of its own founding, in its own sense of political 
community.,,6 Thus at the present historical juncture there is a direct correlation between 
the search for a more multilateral world order and the increasingly contested nature of US 
foreign policy with its own distinct yet, in civic terms, interdependent ethnic lobby groups. 
For Ruggie, "the choice for US policymakers in such an environment is between 
fragmenting relevant areas of foreign policy along and ever-larger number of ethnic lines 
or transforming ethnically defined preferences into multilateral directions.,,7 The 
reconceptualisation of US foreign policy as a product of civic nationhood as opposed to 
organic nationhood means that US foreign policy is constantly in the process of being 
defined in relation to wider US society. Ruggie's approach also gives us a theory of 
agency rather than assuming the state is fixed as in realism or solely the reflection of 
economic structures as in conventional Marxism. As this thesis makes clear in chapter 4, 
pluralism is something which must be taken seriously in US foreign policy. Even if overall 
policy outcomes often reflect powerful economic interests this does not entail the 
dissolution of alternative political strategies. State theory, more broadly conceived, is 
discussed in more detail in chapter one. 
The approach developed in this thesis also ascribes great importance to a structural 
interpretation of US foreign policy as being dominated, though not controlled, by 
6 J G Ruggie, "Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy", in JG Ruggie, Constructing the World 
Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation. London, Routledge, 1998, p.206. 
7 Ibid, p.220. 
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economic interests. Non-reductionist Marxist theories of the state are also valuable in 
explaining US foreign policy. In the structuralist view the balance between class fractions 
in US civil society also reflects upon the pursuit of US foreign objectives with elite 
interests (primarily those representing capital) exerting disproportionate influence and 
stifling democratic debate. As Offe has noted, the capitalist state exerts quasi-autonomy in 
the political sphere (i.e. state personnel are not necessarily affiliated to the ruling class) but 
is functionally dependent on capitalist activity for its own legitimacy. In this sense US 
foreign policy has to satisfy those constituencies which prop it up as well as the 
independent agenda of state managers. 8 This approach dovetails with the neo-Gramscian 
explanation of US hegemonic power outlined in chapter one. The neo-Gramscian view of 
the state, in common with Ruggie's approach noted above, adds the notion of ideas to the 
materialist interpretation of US foreign policy. Thus it makes a huge difference if a 
Presidential candidate is unilateralist in outlook, like Reagan, or internationalist like 
Clinton. At stake is the difference between aggressive and egoistic US foreign policy and 
the cooperative and consensual US of which Ruggie writes approvingly. Politicians are 
not simply what Michel Foucault called 'docile bodies' manipulated by economic and 
social forces beyond their control but cultivators of agendas albeit within fixed parameters 
set by the mode of production. Let us now turn to a review of the existing US-China 
literature. 
US-China Relations 
US-China relations have yet to be examined from a critical-theoretical perspective as 
developed in chapter one of this thesis. Importantly, existing approaches do not tend to 
8 C Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation" in L Lindberg et al , 
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place the relationship within a global context or to raise questions concerning the ways in 
which bilateral relations fit in with the process of structural change in the world economy 
and the set of dominant interests upon which that global economy is premised. Thus they 
miss the crucial interaction between structure and agency so instrumental to the overall 
unfolding of policy. It is this lacunae in the existing literature which our theoretical 
approach attempts to overcome. Lets evaluate that literature in order to illuminate some of 
its deficiencies as well as areas which can be constructively built upon in the context of 
our critical approach. 
An extremely important contribution to the recent US-China literature is Rosemary 
Foot's The Practice of Power: US-China Relations Since 1949. Though Foot does not 
focus upon the contemporary period as such she correlates China's growing participation 
in global institutions with US power and the ability of the US to influence the nature of 
China's participation in global institutions. Particular attention is devoted to the impact of 
US structural power in the global economy since 1979. Bilateral trade rose from $2.3 
billion in 1979 to $17.8 billion by 1989 while, according to Foot, US market power 
became more crucial in facilitating China's application to join GATT from 1986 onwards. 
Equally, US investment became ever more crucial to China reaching $1.6 billion by the 
end of 1988.9 Foot argues that China's absorption into the global economy has legitimated 
the World Bank and the IMF as "truly global institutions, blunting the charge that they 
Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism, Lexington, 1975. 
9 R Foot, The Practice of Power: US-China Relations Since 1949, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1995, 
pp.237-38. 
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were instruments of capitalist exploitation.,,10 In short, China's retreat from isolation and 
desire to enter the international community enhances global capitalism and, by extension, 
bolsters the US position in relation to China. The main problem with Foot's analysis is that 
it remains overtly state-centric and does not give credence to sub-state actors within the 
US state-society complex or take on board that there is much toil within the US political 
system prior to the formulation of China policy. While her analysis explains Cold War 
relations adequately it misses some of the changes which have taken place since 1989 as 
the nature of US hegemony has changed. The role of new social forces is downplayed and 
the US 'state' is viewed as merely comprising bureaucratic actors in Washington who 
deal with their counterparts in Beijing. While maintaining Foot's emphasis on structural 
power in the world economy and the ways in which economic interdependence has eroded 
China's ability and willingness to develop autonomously the thesis which follows also 
attempts expand upon her understanding of the state. 
Robert Sutter and Seong-Eun Choi have developed a study which explicitly looks at the 
role of the US in China's development as a global economic power. They note that 
accommodation with the US in the 1980s ended China's foreign policy of self-reliance - a 
fact reinforced when China entered APEC and attempted to join the WTO in the 1990s. 
Interestingly, Choi and Sutter note that in the 1990s China came to view the world as 
multipolar rather than multilateral - i.e. involving several great powers in a game of power 
brokerage. The authors also bring attention to the distrust which exists among Chinese 
leaders regarding interdependence and the fact that those nations 'setting the agenda' in 
10 Ibid, p.242. 
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multilateral fora are viewed as 'serving their own interests.' 11 Nevertheless, Sutter and 
Choi note that economic modernisation has become the 'linchpin of political legitimacy' 
with 80% of commodities distributed through market channels by the 1990s.12 Overall, the 
approach of the book is multi-dimensional in that it covers areas of US-China relations 
from US missile sales and human rights to the environment. The latter issue is considered 
with brevity and refers only to the environmental malaise in China rather than analysing the 
impact of environmental issues on US-China relations. The main criticism of the study has 
to be that it is devoid of a theoretical underpinning as such though most of the empirical 
material is approached as it would be from a more or less realist position. Unlike Foot's 
work there is no definition of US power brought to bear on the empirical work though 
Sutter and Choi do successfully link the domestic settings of Chinese and US politics with 
global factors. 
Ezra Vogel's recent contribution to the US-China literature provides a largely policy-
oriented take on such issues as human rights, trade, and the role of domestic forces in the 
relationship. Written for the American Assembly the book is aimed at helping "American 
political and thought leaders to create a coherent long-term vision of the policies needed 
to advance America's national interests and values."l3 Most arguments advanced in the 
book support the Clinton Administration's policy of constructive engagement and China's 
fuller participation in multilateral institutions. As such, the book represents something of a 
\I RG Sutter with Soong-Eun Choi, .\,"haping China's Future in World Affairs: The Role of the United 
States, Boulder, Westview, 1996. p.35. 
12 Ibid, pp.60-61. 
13 0 Sharp, Preface, Living with China: CIS-China Relations in the Twenty-First Centurv, New York, WW 
Norton, 1997. p. 13. . 
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confluence between realist balance of power sentiments and liberal internationalist 
arguments pertinent to the intrinsic value of international cooperation. David Lampton, for 
instance, argues in favour of the fact that "international cooperation with China has been 
most productive in instances in which not only is Beijing part of the group making the 
rules (for example, at the World Bank, the IMF, the United Nations Security Council, and 
various environmental undertakings such as the Montreal Protocol), but also where 
resources are made available to help China address problems of concern to the global 
community." 14 Lieberthal's contribution to the volume, meanwhile, goes beyond realist 
evaluations of the relationship and attempts to account for the role of domestic forces in 
the relationship. Lieberthal argues that the US-China debate must be taken beyond "terms 
that imply that each country acts as a unified body with identifiable interests.,,15 Again, this 
takes the study of US-China relations towards a deeper view of the state and the social 
forces that underpin its functioning though Lieberthal operates firmly within a 
pluralist/liberal framework rather than offering any structural explanation as to the 
balance of US policy. Significantly, this volume also contains a contribution on the 
possibility of cooperation between the US and China over environmental matters. This 
again goes beyond realist arguments and looks to the possibility of the two countries 
forging mutual interests in the context of Chinese development policies and the levels of 
pollution which inevitably accompany industrialisation. 16 The argument in McElroy and 
Nielsen's chapter on the environment, however, tends to reflect liberal preferences by 
ignoring the nature of the environmental debate at the global level and particularly some of 
14 D Lampton, "A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing and Global Order", Ibid. p.139. 
15 K Liberthal, "Domestic Forces and Sino-US Relations", Ibid, p.234. 
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the biases of the environmental regimes established at Rio. Nevertheless, the authors 
provide a platform for assessing a new set of issues in the US-China debate which will be 
considered in chapter 6 of our thesis. 
Gordon CK Cheung has set out a novel world-economy approach to the study of US-
China relations. Cheung draws on the concept of Augmented Market Liberalism (AML) to 
explain the unfolding of US-China relations in the post-war period. Cheung defines this 
concept as "a process of assimilation and transformation of a country generated by the 
externalisation effect of market forces.,,17 Thus US-China relations are understood within 
an explicitly international political economy context which takes the post war institutional 
architecture created by the US as its backdrop. IS Moreover, changes in US-China relations 
are linked to the process of structural change in the world economy thereby placing a 
relationship often understood in a diplomatic context within a framework of capitalist 
development. It is argued that market liberalism's main vector in the contemporary period 
has been the WTO through which "market force becomes a point of intersection in US-
China foreign relations.,,19 The WTO issue also ties China's overall development to US 
foreign policy preferences in a deeper sense than in the purely bilateral context. Cheung 
argues that the Clinton Administration's policy of comprehensive engagement is an 
outgrowth of the strategy of tying China to international institutions - the belief that 
'multilateral surviellance' will modify certain domestic Chinese polices as will exposure to 
16 MB McElroy and CP Nielsen, "Energy, Agriculture and the Environment: Prospects for Sino-American 
Cooperation",1bid, pp.217-253. 
17 G CK Cheung, Market Liberalism: American Foreign Policy Toward China. New Brunswick, NJ, 
Transaction. 1998, p.l. 
18 Ibid, p.25. 
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market forces?O There is a risk in Cheung's argument that politics are given rather short 
shrift and genuine areas of disagreement are overlooked. For instance he argues that issues 
such as Taiwan, intellectual property rights disputes and the dispute over MFN may be 
"perceived from other convergent points of view" so long as "we use larger scales of 
measurement such as marketisation and China's involvement in the world economy,,21 
The main problem with Cheung's analysis, then, is that he treats the concept of AML as if 
it were inevitable and fails to ask questions relating to opposition to this trend in China 
and the US. Moreover, he clearly fails to link the concept of AML to the discourse of 
globalisation which, as will be noted in chapter one of this thesis, cannot be understood as 
simply a debate about homogenous free markets. In short, his analysis is ultimately fairly 
conventional in the sense that market liberalisation driven by a powerful US is seen as an 
uncontested phenomena. 
Robert G Sutter has contributed another significant addition to the contemporary US-
China literature which considers the role of interest groups in the relationship. Sutter 
draws on Robert Putnam's "two-level game" approach to US foreign policy in which "the 
US government seeks to maximise [its] own ability to satisfy domestic pressures while 
minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments. ,,22 This leads Sutter to 
examine the role of disparate interest groups involved in the making of US foreign policy 
and again highlights the fact that no single national interest prevails. Particularly important 
19 Ibid, p.97. 
20 Ibid, p.106. 
21 Ibid, pp.124-25. 
22 R G Sutter, US Policy Toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups, New York, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Inc, 1998, p.21. 
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is Sutter's account of the forces which have sought revocation of MFN and their lack of 
internal cohesion in stark contrast to the business community. 
Robert Ross's edited collection of essays on US-China relations after the Cold War offers 
another key contribution to recent scholarship on US-China relations though it offers little 
in terms of novel theoretical insight. Ross's own contribution keeps faith with his earlier 
book which argued that US-China cooperation since 1972 was based on strategic relations 
rather than on any deeper form ofunderstanding. 23 Steven Teles contributes an interesting 
chapter on the role of public opinion and interest groups in the making of China policy. 
This includes discussion of the role of high profile publications and environmental lobbies. 
Again, the book does not follow any specific theoretical line of inquiry. 
The recent edited work of James Shinn offers a policy oriented analysis of relations and 
covers issues from 'economic engagement' to regional security. Like Vogel's 
contribution to the literature, discussed above, Shinn is not overly concerned with 
discussing the ideational and ideological basis of US foreign policy nor why certain 
interests prevail over others within the Administration. Shinn's own contribution argues in 
favour of China's entry to the WTO as a means of defusing ideological disputes and 
setting the relationship within a more pragmatic context while also encouraging the 
selective application of sanctions in order to assure "additional liberalisation" and the 
23 R Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989, Stanford, CA, Stanford 
University Press, 1995. 
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implementation of existing accords. 24 Overall, the book says too little about domestic 
factors in conditioning relations nor does it go into empirical detail about the interaction of 
the two economies. 
Perhaps the most important work to date on trade and economic issues in US-China 
relations is provided by Nicholas Lardy and is drawn upon at some length in chapter three 
of this thesis. Lardy, building upon his groundbreaking analyses of the Chinese economy 
and its relation to the US in the 1980S25 , argues that China should be accommodated into 
the global political economy as speedily as possible and, most importantly, he places 
economic relations within the context of globalised production raising questions about 
bilateral approaches to studying the relationship.26 While agreeing with Lardy's basic 
argument our thesis raises some of the problems with the neo-liberal view that the global 
economy is somehow neutral in the dispensation of benefits as well as some of the key 
obstacles to market opening within China. 
It is just such arguments which are raised by Susan Shirk in her analysis of China's 
opening to the global economy. Shirk convincingly argues that incremental reforms have 
meant China avoiding the 'big bang' which afflicted many Eastern European economies 
causing hyper-inflation and massive unemployment. Shirk also outlines the institutional 
backloth of market opening in China and the willingness and ability of government 
24 J Shinn, Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement of China, New York, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1996, p.59. 
25 See N Larely, China's Entry into the World Economy: Implications for Northeast Asia and the United 
States, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1987. 
26 N Lardy, China in the World Economy, International Institute of Economics, Washington DC, 1994. 
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agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) to 
facilitate foreign penetration of the China market. 27 Particularly useful is Shirk's focus on 
the coalition of export industries and coastal provinces which have lain the path of market 
opening often at the expense of inland provinces. The thesis which follows asks questions 
about the contradictions between the cautious approach to market opening advocated by 
Shirk (now a member of the Clinton Administration) and the US encouragement of 
deregulatory policies which, if implemented, would have exposed the Chinese economy in 
a similar way to Eastern Europe. A more critical approach, then, highlights the frequently 
incongruous nature of polices designed to engender market stability and those concerned 
with market stability. 
There are also several works on Chinese foreign policy which give due weight to US-
China relations from the 1970s onwards and which append a regional and global context 
to their analysis. John W Garver has written a general account of Chinese foreign policy 
which takes on board the importance of China's shift from a quasi-alliance with the US in 
the late 1960s and the 1970s to an 'independent' foreign policy in the 1980s, and the 
breakdown of an "intra-US" consensus in the 1990s following the Tiananmen Square 
massacre.
2
!! Garver's account does, however, play down the political economy of relations 
in the 1970s and 1980s and tends to concentrate on security issues to the detriment of 
trade. 
27 For an early espousal of Shirk's approach see S Shirk, 'The Domestic political Dimensions of China's 
Foreign Economic Relations" in SKim (ed), China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-
Mao Era, Boulder, Colo, Westview, 1984. See also S Shirk, How China Opened its Door: The Political 
Success of the PRe's Foreign Trade and Investment Reforms, Brookings, Washington DC, 1994. 
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David Shambaugh has orchestrated an important collection of essays detailing the 
evolution of US scholarship on China and which contains material highly relevant to US-
China relations. 29 Much of the content is aimed towards China specialists rather than 
anyone using China as a case-study for US foreign policy but certain sections of the book 
are highly relevant. The chapter by Robert Ross and Paul Godwin is particularly useful in 
accounting for the 'international sources of foreign policy' and relating them to China's 
participation in world order. Ross and Godwin note that a literature has evolved since the 
1970s which explicitly attempts to place analysis of China in a global context and, 
specifically, within the context of those global institutions over which the US exerts so 
much power. Of particular relevance is Samuel Kim's work on the attitude of China 
towards world order principles30 and also the work of Michel Oksenberg and Harold 
Jacobsen on Chinese negotiations to enter the IMF and the World Bank.3l As Ross and 
Godwin aver, such work delves into an under-researched area which straddles the divide 
between bilateral and multilateral relations. 
An excellent guide to understanding China's changing political face over the past two 
decades is contained within Andrew Nathan's collection of essays, China's Transition. 
Particularly relevant is Nathan's essay in chapter 5 on Chinese democracy. Nathan 
unmasks some of the illusions of democracy promoters in China who believe that 
28 JW Garver, Foreign Relations of/he People's Republic of China, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey, 1993. See chapters 3 and 4. 
29 D Shambaugh (ed), American Studies of Contemporary China, ME Sharpe, Annonk, New York, 1993. 
30 S Kim, China. the United Nations. and World Order. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1979. 
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democratic polity can take root as a western-style mass movement. For Nathan, "almost 
every [Chinese] political movement tried to garb itself in the mystique of democracy, but 
what they usually had in mind by democracy was a mystical solidarity of state and people, 
in fact a kind of authoritarianism.,,32 Nathan's normative argument is that human rights 
should be judged solely on the basis of international law and should not be conflated with 
"other goals" such as the liberation of Tibet. In this way, he argues, China is more likely 
to ratify the two UN human rights covenants while such an approach will also have the 
effect of bringing pressure to bear on the US to enter the regime more fully itself Nathan 
also advocates US use of the WTO and the World Bank to ensure Chinese compliance 
with human rights as well as making bilateral summits a condition of Chinese progress. 
The main thorn in the side of Nathan's arguments is his downplaying of economic factors 
in the US-China relationship especially ones which consider US dominance at the level of 
world order. Western values are also transferred through the market and, in this sense, 
China already complies with certain basic human rights. The thesis which follows argues 
that they would be strengthened further through more regulation of the WTO with regard 
to environmental and workers rights. 
Conclusion 
31 See HI< Jacobsen and M Oksenberg, China '.'I Participation in the IMP, the World Bank, and GA 1T: 
Toward a Global Economic Order, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1990. 
32 AJ Nathan, China's Transition, Ncw York, Columbia University Press, 1997, p.66. 
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This thesis is largely based upon secondary material though it also incorporates pnmary 
material and a number of semi-structured elite interviews conducted in Washington. The 
secondary material utilised consists of books, journal material, newspapers, magazines and 
so on. The testimony of key political and business figures is also drawn upon as is 
Congressional testimony on US-China relations, the minutes of relevant conferences and 
speeches as well as press releases. Chapter three makes particular reference to the 
empirical work of Nicholas Lardy and though supporting his thesis that US trade with 
China has to be understood in terms of globalisation and the structure of regional trade 
we dispute his neo-liberal conclusion that free trade alone is likely to ameliorate problems 
in the bilateral relationship. Interviews conducted at the US Department of the Treasury 
back up our hypothesis that political intervention by the Chinese government remains 
necessary. Chapter five also builds on themes already introduced by Sutter, above, 
relating to the role of interest groups in the relationship. Our approach is, however, more 
concerned with the structural position of business. Chapter six of this thesis builds upon 
the radical premise set out by Shiva, Newell and Paterson and others that existing 
environmental regimes preclude far reaching cooperation between the US and China on 
this issues. The possibility of enhanced cooperation, however, is not discounted and our 
interviews back up this view. Our basic argument here is that the environment will 
become an increasingly crucial area of bilateral relations given the role of both nations in 
setting the agendas of global environmental regimes. Let us now set out a basic outline of 
the chapters which follow and the themes which they introduce. 
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The first chapter sets out a multi-faceted theoretical framework drawing on four evolving 
areas which, it is argued, overlap in a theoretically useful way. The first section draws 
primarily on Robert Cox's neo-Gramscian theories of international political economy as a 
method of overcoming the dichotomy between structure and agency in the global 
economy. The neo-Gramscian approach also introduces the critical concept of hegemony 
to IPE as a means of assessing shifts in US power at the level of world order. The second 
section utilises state-society theory to account for state action under new and complex 
conditions and gives equal weight to pluralist, Marxist and elitist theories of the state 
within a 'converged' approach. In the third section historical-sociological approaches sre 
looked at as a means of explaining the continued salience of nationalism and cultural 
identity as sources of state power in the world system which, though irrational, can bolster 
the state's geo-political role. Lastly, globalisation theory is discussed in its 'hyper-liberal', 
'skeptical', and 'transformationalist' forms. The transformationalist approach neither 
celebrates nor rejects globalisation but treats it as an ongoing process marked by national 
and regional disparities. This approach corresponds most closely with the line taken in 
subsequent chapters. Globalisation theory thus provides the overarching context in which 
the other theories have to be understood. 
Chapter two of the thesis historicises the relationship between the US and China giving an 
overview of political and economic relations from the Opium War of 1842 until the end of 
the Bush Presidency and the supposed birth of a 'New World Order.' In the first section 
detailed attention is given to America's 'Open Door' China policy which prevailed from 
the beginning of the twentieth century until the outbreak of World War II. The chapter 
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goes on to discuss the relationship in the years 1949 -1971 against the backdrop of 
ideological rivalry, gradual change in the nature of the Communist threat, and the stance 
of US allies with regard to the US trade embargo of China. Finally, a more in-depth 
analysis of relations following the Shanghai Communique is undertaken which gives 
particular attention to the political economy aspects of relations under Carter, Reagan, and 
Bush. 
Chapter three is based on detailed empirical analysis of the economic relationship between 
the US and China under the Clinton Administration. The first section assesses China's 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status and the concomitant dispute over the bilateral trade 
deficit. Evidence is given relating to Hong Kong's role in bilateral trade which undermines 
official US government figures and the political arguments surrounding withdrawal of 
China's MFN; US FDI in China is considered and is viewed as complicating the 
supposedly 'national' character of Chinese exports; China's currency reforms are taken 
into account as contributing to the bilateral deficit. The general argument is put forward 
that the deficit has to be understood in structural terms relating to China's position in the 
Asian regional economy and as the supplier of one of the world's cheapest workforces. 
The second part of the chapter discusses China's entry to the WTO and offers a detailed 
analysis of the outstanding bilateral disputes preventing China's entry - these included 
Intellectual Property Rights disputes; transshipments; market access; US sanctions and 
prison labour. The third section looks at China's structural reforms so far and their 
implication for US policy. In particular it examines China's privatisation of its State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the threat they pose to social and financial stability in 
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China. This section also looks at the Asian financial crisis as a turning point for China's 
reforms and a reminder to the US that state intervention is still necessary in the face of 
external shocks. 
Chapter four examines the role of non-governmental forces in US-China relations and the 
manner in which they have impacted upon the policies of the US state, in particular, but 
also on the way in which China is able to liberalise its economy. The first part of the 
chapter involves a breakdown and analysis of forces supporting the Clinton 
Administration's China polices and those opposing them. The groups looked at include 
human rights lobbies, business groups and overseas Chinese. The second section looks at 
social forces within China and that nation's dearth of a civil society. It is argued that 
without a civil society market reforms are bolstering authoritarian forces in the short-term, 
though the fragmentation of central power may alter this. The final section considers the 
problem of human rights overall and concludes that change is most likely to come from 
within China and that, while US concern with human rights is valid, isolation of China 
would be counter-productive. 
Chapter five seeks to contextualise environmental issues in the US-China relationship 
against the backdrop of the global conferences held at Rio in 1992 and Kyoto in 1997. 
The environmental aspects of the US-China relationship have not featured at all 
prominently in the existing literature on US-China relations. This chapter attempts to 
rectify this situation arguing that, as the two most polluting nations on earth, a cooperative 
basis to US-China relations may well be necessary in preventing further ecological 
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damage. The first section of the chapter examines the respective stances of the two 
governments at the Rio and Kyoto summits and argues that neither has adequately 
addressed the need to compromise on the dual issues of development and consumption 
which dominated discussions. The second part of the chapter assesses the general 
approach of the Clinton Administration towards the environment and problematises the 
contention that market solutions suffice in tackling complex environmental problems 
which require the type of clean air technologies in which the US excels. Some analysis of 
current cooperative ventures in the relationship is undertaken. The third section considers 
China's environmental crisis and the efforts being made by the Chinese government to 
tackle it domestically and at the regional level. 
The sixth chapter places US-China relations within a context of Asia-Pacific regionalism. 
It is argued that APEC is an elite and US-dominated grouping which, as yet, commands 
little loyalty from the Asian powers and towards which China, as yet, has taken an 
ambiguous stance. We also look at the role of Greater China as a regional force and 
alternative to APEC as a transmission belt for regional capital and economic interaction. 
The next section considers some of the outstanding geo-political issues in the region while 
considering the US's approach to this increasingly important realm in US-China relations -
particularly the Taiwan issue which continues to divide the region. However, we argue 
that, overall, China's enhanced trade with the US is likely to deter aggression. Finally, the 
Asian financial crisis is examined as a regional challenge to US hegemony particularly the 
possibility of greater Japanese-Chinese cooperation which has emerged in the wake of the 
crisis. 
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The overall conclusions of this thesis are enframed within a discussion of globalisation and 
the way it changes how we view bilateral relations. We argue that within globalisation 
there is room for differences among states in economic strategy but that the webs of 
economic interdependency it creates give the US and China a mutual stake in securing a 
peaceful and stable world order. US dominance of that order remains extremely important 
and, although China may challenge certain aspects of that power, we argue that US 
structural power continues to be such that China is likely to move towards greater 
pluralism and democracy - at least in terms of the socially empowered of that nation. 
Likewise, US dependence on China's burgeoning market is likely to deter any resort to 
protectionist policies though China's full entry to the WTO is undoubtedly the prerequisite 
to greater cooperation. 
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Chapter 1 
A Critical Theory of International Political Economy 
Introduction 
The ending of the Cold War engendered something resembling shock therapy for academic 
discourses in international political economy (IPE) and International Relations (lR) which 
harnessed theoretical and/or ideological development to that great conflict and the constraints 
and opportunities it imposed. For foreign-policy makers the Cold War provided an invaluable 
source of reassurance in analysing world order, the nation- states and their composite civil 
societies. Most forms of inquiry seemed to stem, in one form or another, from the global 
conflict between opposing international ideologies embodied and ceaselessly promoted by the 
United States and the Soviet Union between 1945-1989. 
The post-Cold War environment, then, allows for the bringing to fruition of alternative 
theoretical interpretations of world order, the nation-state and civil society. This does not 
mean the abandonment of past theoretical traditions. Rather, the significance of any departure 
from past theoretical verities lies in the cross-fertilisation of changing and emerging 
theoretical approaches to international politics. The convergence of IPE with state-society 
theory, and certain strands within the historical-sociological approach to history and the state, 
constitutes the framework of our theoretical section and will be discussed in turn. This 
framework recognises the interplay between structure and agency at both global and state 
levels. 1 The main working premise here is that theories of the state can increasingly be 
transplanted into the body of a 'new' and critical IPE discourse on the nature of change in 
I For a discussion see A Gamble and A Payne (eds), "Introduction" to Regionalism and World Order. London, 
Macmillan, 1996, pp.I-20. 
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international relations and in the global political economy and the manner in which such 
factors relate to the ongoing process of globalisation. QUid pro quo, the emerging IPE 
literature must be incorporated within any viable theory of the state because political strategies 
pursued by the state can no longer be divorced from the global arena and the structural 
constraints of global capita\.2 Moreover, this theoretical framework aims to look beyond both 
the state and the global economy as face-value concepts by disaggregating the former and 
questioning the structures, values, and norms which underpin the functioning of the latter. In 
this way, the theoretical basis is mapped out for an exploration of US-China relations during 
the Clinton Administration which is more appreciative of global/structural factors in shaping 
the relationship and is more attuned to internal social dynamics in both countries as key 
determinants of government policy. Let us now begin by looking at the dominant (mainstream) 
IPE literature which, until the early 1990s, tended to define the theoretical terrain of inquiry in 
the field and which, though providing some useful insights, tended to limit our understanding 
of a changing and increasingly fragmented world order. 
Mainstream Theories of International Political Economy 
The field of International Political Economy emerged In the early 1970s when Charles 
Kindleberger, in his study of international economic relations during the 1930s, expounded 
on the need for a stabiliser in the world economy willing to act as a lender of last resort and to 
maintain global order under conditions of international anarchy. Kindleberger pointed to the 
1930s as a period when no single state was willing to assume the responsibility of hegemonic 
leadership - a state of affairs leading to economic crisis and war.3 Hegemony was, thus, 
2 S Gill and D Law. "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital", International Studies QuarterZv. 
Vol.33, No.4, 1989, pp.475-99. 
3 See C Kindleberger. The World in Depression 1929-39, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973. 
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conceived as a 'public good' provided by a benign superpower and a key ingredient of global 
economic and ideological stability. 
Later in the 1970s, the debate within IPE moved from hegemonic stability theory, and the 
attendant idea of a solitary hegemonic stabiliser in the world-system, to a more edifying 
engagement with the idea of 'complex interdependence.' This theoretical approach, developed 
most notably in the collaborative work of Keohane and Nye, recognised that structural change 
was taking place in the international economy, but continued to focus on exploring ways to 
ensure systemic reproduction congruent with dominant US interests. The interdependence or 
neo-institutionalist school investigated in particular the ways in which global regimes, norms, 
and rules could be recommended to US policy makers as a means of inducing global 
cooperation - between states and non-state actors - so as to sustain US power despite the 
assumed decline of US hegemony at the level of the nation-state. 4 
Towards the end of the 1970s, and into the 1980s, US theorists (who largely defined IPE in its 
infancy) backed away slightly from ideas of complex interdependence and regime theory 
towards focusing with renewed vigour upon the neo-realist problematique of global anarchy. 
This approach entailed viewing the international system as inherently anarchic due to the 
absence of a central authority. States were characterised as 'billiard balls' continually prone to 
collision and conflict - a theme first championed by the prominent International Relations 
theorist Kenneth Waltz. 5 Power has been defined by realist IPE scholars, most notably 
Stephen Krasner, as the accumulation of 'raw materials' and material resources. 6 Neo-
institutionalists largely shared this perception of power in the international sphere by accepting 
4 See R Keohane and J Nyc, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, Little: Brown, 
1977. 
5 See KN Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley, 1979. 
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international power, and the concept of hegemony, as deriving from control over material 
resources - indeed Keohane described hegemony as the "preponderance of material 
resources.,,7 Moreover, the normative purpose of neo-insitutionalist IPE was, again in the 
words of its foremost proponent Robert Keohane, to "facilitate the smooth operation of 
decentralised international political systems.,,8 In this sense the work of American scholars in 
the field was both positivist and system-maintaining. 
In the early 1980s the public goods assumptions and state-centric theories of neo-realism 
were once again brought under scrutiny. Duncan Snidal illuminated the 'limits of hegemonic 
stability theory' and the possibility that collective and coordinated action by ascending states in 
the world system could challenge the neo-realist idea of a solitary hegemon. Snidal argued that 
by pooling resources such states could offer alternative configurations of power. Snidal also 
raised pertinent questions concerning the efficacy of neo-realist public goods assumptions 
given the fact that the US, and other powerful states, were suitably situated to manipulate the 
world's trade regimes to their own unilateral advantage.9 Snidal's useful observations were 
accompanied by the work of neo-institutionalist theorists such as Keohane and Axelrod who 
developed an increasingly prevalent 'cooperation under anarchy' thesis. 10 This argument 
mainly revolved around the proposition that western institutional regimes provided the fora 
for stability as the bipolar Cold War order began to give way to new 'anarchic' forces of 
6 See SD Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials, Investments and US Foreign Policy, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. 1978. 
7 R Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 198~, p.32. 
~ Cited in R Devetak, "Critical Theory", in S Burchill and A Linklater (eds.), Theories of International 
Relations, London, Macmillan, 1996, p.150. 
9 D Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory", International Organisation, Vo1.39, 1985, pp 579-
614 
10 See R Axelrod and R Keohane. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", World 
Politics, Vol. 32, No.2, 1984, pp. 1-
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nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Neo-institutionalist theory, then, differed from neo-
realism only in the d the argument that states are likely to cooperate in the international system 
so as to secure absolute welfare maximisation rather than pursuing the 'relative gains' 
emphasised by realists which, of course, preclude such cooperation. In the assessment of 
David Rapkin, these debates were 'in-house disputes' and failed to explore the 'multiple 
connotations' denoted by the concept of hegemony which will be elaborated upon below. Il 
In short, IPE had, by the beginning of the 1980s, reached something of an explanatory nadir in 
its neo-institutionalist and neo-realist guises. What Crane and Amawi identified as mainstream 
convergence around the study of rational theories of the state, hegemonic stability, and 
regime theory, (viewed as defining the remit of the discipline)12 entailed a very narrow 
interpretation of hegemony and power in the global economy which left most of the key 
questions unanswered; (why hegemony is resisted by some states and not by others) and failed 
to explain the mixture of elements which would actually comprise the rare instance of world-
hegemony. More recently, mainstream IPE has been challenged by 'new' or 'critical theories' 
of IPE which have opened previously foreclosed debates and ushered in more satisfactory 
ways of approaching the question of power in the global domain.13 It is to this evolving 
critical approach that we now turn. 
Critical International Political Economy 
The challenge to mainstream international political economy was thrown down most 
impressively by the work of Robert Cox who, in the early 1980s, identified a lacunae in the 
then existing IPE literature. In essence, existing approaches all conceived the international 
II DP Rapkin, World Leadership and Hegemony, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1990, p.7. 
12 GT Crane and A Amawi, The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy, New York, New 
York University Press, 1991. 
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economic order as given rather than the product of a dominant ideology. For Cox, this 
lacunae could be filled by more critical and historical approaches infused with a better 
understanding of the complex interplay between historical structures and political processes. In 
two seminal articles, Cox set out a critical theory of international political economy which 
both challenged the basis of existing theories and, more broadly, attempted to expose the 
politically situated and fixed perspective of mainstream IPE. Cox drew the distinction between 
what he termed 'problem solving theory' and 'critical theory'. For Cox, critical theory must 
"stand apart from the prevailing order and ask how that order came about.,,14 Critical theory 
thus posits ways of moving beyond realist and neo-institutionalist theories by offering 
alternative hypotheses of world order grounded in existing conditions but based on conceiving 
history as a fluid and open process. IS This is accomplished by asking under what conditions 
institutions and social power relations are brought into existence and, by implication, how new 
configurations of global power can be brought about in the future to form an alternative 
'historic bloc' or form of 'hegemony' - concepts which will be discussed below. Let us now set 
out Cox's theoretical approach in greater depth. 
The key element of Cox's approach to IPE is a methodology which attempts to comprehend 
historical and social change in a multi-faceted way; an approach Cox has characterised as 
requiring the analysis of historical structures. Historical structures are those fundamental 
power-structures which underpin a world-historical order and consist of "material capabilities, 
ideas, and institutions" which interact in a mutually constitutive and reciprocal relationship. It 
is the fit between these three elements which form the basis of hegemonic power in a specific 
13 R Tooze and CN Murphy, The New International Political Economy, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1991. 
14 R Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," Millennium: 




historical era. No "one-way determinism need be assumed" among these three elements while 
the "question of which way the lines of force run is always a historical question to be answered 
by a study of the particular case." 16 In this sense such structures posit both opportunities and 
constraints in that actors can "resist and oppose" even if they "cannot ignore" them. 17 
Crucially, Cox's critical theory views historical structures as containing intersubjective 
meanings of social relations and the collective habits which underpin them. People are not only 
bearers of structures but instrumental in their creation precisely because structures are 
legitimated and reproduced by modes of behaviour solidified over time and eventually taken to 
represent social 'common sense' or a natural order. Crucially, ideological structures are 
viewed, in the critical usage, as being as important as material structures in defining the scope 
of social action and, in the words of Gill and Law, the "way individuals and groups are able to 
understand the social situation, and the possibilities of social change.,,18 According to Cox, 
historical structures interact across three interpenetrating and constitutive domains of social 
power: (i) with regard to the social forces engendered by production forces; (ii) the differing 
forms of state which arise from specific state/society complexes; and (iii) the nature of the 
world order arising from particular configurations of social forces and forms of state. 19 
Importantly, Cox also applies the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci's, conception of the 
extended state and thereby refutes the static view of statehood which forms the basis of neo-
15 R Palan and A Amin, "The Need to Historicize IPE", Review of International Political Economy, Yol.3, 
No.2, 1996, p.12. 
16 RW Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations theory". in RW Cox, 
with T Sinclair (ed.), Approaches to World Order, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.98. 
17 Ibid., p.98. 
IK S Gill and D Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and PoliCies, Hemel Hempstead, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988, p.74. 






realist approaches - "a state was a state was a state. ,,20 It is worth exploring this neo-
Gramscian conception of the state further in order to differentiate it more fully from the 
mainstream appropriation of the term. 
Cox points to the importance of 'forms of state', located specifically in time and space, as the 
premise for social inquiry. For Cox, the state should be conceived as encompassing the state-
society nexus or, in Gramsci's own formulation, "political society + civil society." Indeed, 
Gramsci states that "in concrete reality, civil society and the State are one in the same."21 In 
this vein, any investigation of a state's foreign policy would have to take account of the 
dynamic interplay between three key elements which can be identified as follows: (i) the 
relationship between social forces and the state; (ii) struggles within civil society between 
competing classes or groups; and (iii) competition inside the state apparatus between political 
elites and their respective bureaucracies. 
It is also worth illustrating, if briefly, the neo-Gramscian concept of the 'historic bloc' and its 
centrality to Cox's critical theory. Historic blocs are conceived by Gramsci as coalitions of 
dominant class fractions capable of sustaining a hegemonic project with some degree, larger 
or smaller as the case may be, of popular legitimacy. Moreover, a historic bloc's social basis 
spans the reciprocal relationships between political, ethical, and ideological spheres of power 
and is therefore broader than the economic structure alone. 22 Indeed, historic blocs are 
underpinned by hegemonic classes which forge a consensus within civil society by drawing on 
the 'superstructural' power of ideology and political organisation. Importantly, the 
superstructural power of hegemonic classes entrenches and naturalises the exercise of material 
20 Ibid.. p.127. 
21 Q Hoare (ed). Antonio Gramsci: Selections From Prison Notebooks. New York, International Publishers, 
1971, p.208. 
22 Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations", p.131. 
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power secured vis a vis ownership of the means of production- a fa Marx. Thus, in Gramsci's 
view, a hegemonic strategy, in order to succeed, demands passage from the exercise of 
structural power (power over the economy) into the domain of complex superstructures 
(power over institutions, churches, ideology and so on) which secure much deeper control 
over society in terms of shaping behaviour, norms, and political possibilities. 
Neo-Gramscian critical theory, then, gives us a far more sophisticated way of interpreting the 
interaction between the various dimensions of state power and the way they interact with 
hegemonic world orders (the relationship between social forces, state-society complexes and 
world orders.) Cox provides a methodology which is, in itself, adaptive and self-questioning 
in the face of ongoing national and global structural transformations and manages to build 
upon the best insights of established theoretical forerunners to critical IPE - whilst avoiding 
their more obvious pitfalls. Firstly, Cox utilises the historical insights of world-systems theory 
i; 
but, crucially, breaks with the historical determinism of theorists such as Wallerstein23 who 
have conceived of the international arena as static and prone to returning to a natural 
equilibrium a fa realism. Global and national hegemonies are not pre-determined but viewed 
by Cox as being continually open to challenge from coalitions of states and social forces many 
of which are able to act transnationally. It is important to reassert the fact that neo-Gramscian 
critical theory emphasises both change within global structures (hence the continued 
importance of national strategies and domestic politics) and the potential to change those 
structures themselves (the idealistic contention that alterations in national hegemonies may 
eventually lead to a new form of global politics.) Secondly, Cox's critical theory recognises 
the achievements of historical materialism while rejecting the theoretical dogmas attached to 
structural Marxism. Again, while Cox shares traditional historical materialist concerns with 
23See Immanuel Wallerstein. n1e Capitalist World- Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
33 
social forces as the basis of analysis, he also incorporates Gramsci's specific emphasis on ideas 
and ideologies as sources of power. For Cox, "ideas and material power are always bound 
together, mutually influencing one another, and not reducible one to the other. ,,24 
Crucially, neo-Gramscian critical theory views global hegemony as implying far more than 
simply the hegemony of anyone state in the material sphere. It is worth going into further 
detail here. Hegemony is conceived as containing both consensual and coercive elements. This 
is a key factor in understanding the constitution and maintenance of any hegemonic project. 
Firstly, hegemonic elites have a vested interest in persuading subordinated classes to cooperate 
in the existing order and, as Cox puts it, to couch hegemonic leadership as "serving universal 
or general interests, rather than just serving their own interests. ,,25 A hegemonic group, class, 
or state is most likely to use coercion when its hegemonic position is threatened and less likely 
when its position is strong or unassailable. As we have elucidated, a hegemonic group, class, 
or state has to move beyond the specific interests of that group, class, or state in order to 
legitimise a historic bloc and in order to build institutions and ideologies with some semblance 
of universal validity. The crucial point here is that the construction of hegemonic ideologies 
and institutions involves conceding enough power to subordinate groups so as to secure their 
acquiescence in the status quo. Coercion, however, is always a key facet of hegemonic rule 
which, in the last instance, is principally concerned with maintaining power and control either 
over national society or the functioning of a global civil society and world institutions. 
Another central and often neglected concern for critical IPE is the idea of counter-hegemony. 
For Cox, oppositional social forces - or counter-hegemonic movements - must wage a 
24 R Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, VoI.12, No.2, 19X3, p.168. 
25 Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", in Robert Cox with Timothy 




Gramscian 'war of position' in trying to change prevailing institutions and the ideologies they 
espouse - a task likely to begin "within national boundaries. ,,26 This involves long-term 
strategy, rather than any resort to transhistorical assumptions that prevailing social orders, 
national or global, can be overturned by revolutions of the Marxist-Leninist variety. This 
approach also recognises that counter-hegemony usually begins within communities, or 
national societies, sharing some cultural or material basis for social solidarity. Critical theory 
recognises that hegemonic orders are well adapted to diffusing or downgrading radical 
challenges to the status quo. As Cox puts it, "hegemony is like a pillow: it absorbs blows,,27 , 
thereby co-opting oppositional forces into the prevailing order. Hegemony also absorbs 
counter-hegemonic ideas and "makes them consistent with hegemonic doctrine. ,,28 
It is worth highlighting further that neo-Gramscian theorists are also keen to introduce the idea 
of a global civil society in which hegemonic elites operate as an "international business 
civilisation" promoting free market or neo-liberal ideology through global institutions and 
multinational corporations. 29 Indeed, several neo-Gramscian theorists, such as Gill, Augelli 
and Murphy and Van Der Pijl, have placed global institutions at the centre of much of their 
analysis concerning how neo-liberal hegemony had been maintained and diffused throughout 
the world in the post-war period. 30 In this sense also, a critical IPE approach is more attuned 
26 Ibid., p.l41. 
27 Ibid., p.139. 
2~ Ibid., p.l39. 
29 See R W Cox "Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for Europe", in S Gill (ed), Gramsci. 
Historical Materialism. and International Relations. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993. Cox's use 
of the term international business civilisation avers to the burgeoning corporate elites with world-wide business 
strategies and similar cultural and ideological preferences. Many within this civilisation have more in common 
with each other and more loyalty towards each other than towards members of their own national populations. 
30 See S Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1990; E Augelli and CN Murphy, America's Quest for Supremacy in the Third World: A Gramscian AnalYSiS, 
London, Pinter, 1988; and K Van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class. London, Verso, 1984. 
Additonally, and for a good discussion of the way in which global institutions "socialise" dominant norms and 
," 
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to the changing nature of social polarisation in a globalising world order in which the sites of 
structural economic and political power are multiplying among private actors. 31 At this 
juncture it is worth considering the way in which neo-Gramscian critical theory may be 
applied to the hegemonic world order as it exists and ways in which it may be improved upon 
in explanatory terms. 
For all its enormous strength and subtlety, there are some problems with the neo-Gramscian 
definition of hegemony in that the various elements of power which constitute hegemony are 
not clearly delineated, the relative importance of each is ill defined, and the 'threshold' of 
power which needs to be crossed before hegemony is instated or diminished is not fully 
explained.32 This leads to some confusion about exactly what it is that a world-hegemony 
consists of - ror example, is it military supremacy or economic supremacy? Moreover, this 
lack of clarity creates particular ambiguity in relation to the long running debate about US 
hegemonic decline and whether or not the US remains a hegemonic power capable of ordering 
the international system to its advantage. 33 This problem is remedied somewhat by turning to 
Susan Strange's 'eclectic theory' of IPE in which power is deemed to be located across the 
realms of finance, ideas, production, and security.34 As Anthony Payne asserts, each of these 
values in a subtle way see JG. Ikenberry and A.C Kupchan, "The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power," in 
Rapkin (ed), World Leadership and Hegemony,pp. 49-69. 
31 Though not a Neo-Gramscian theorist Susan Strange's analysis of globally diffuse sites of economic power 
and a diversity of non-state actors is instructive. These include such actors as telecoms, organised crime, 
insurance business, and accountants. See S Strange, Retreat of the State: The DiffUSion of Power in the World 
Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
32 A J Payne, "The New Political Economy of Area Studies", Millennium: Journal of international Studies, 
Vo1.27, No.2, 1998, p.258. 
33This debate was precipitated by Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, London, Harper 
Collins, 1988. 
34 S Strange, "An Eclectic Approach" in CN Murphy and R Tooze (eds), The New International Political 
Economy, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991, pp.33-49. 
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realms are separate but interrelated and, it could be added, may be investigated as empirically 
distinctive, yet always taken to represent part of an overarching global structure.35 
In reference to American power during the post-war period we can see that hegemony has 
given way to domination. Using Strange's definition, hegemony can be seen to have begun 
unravelling when the 'golden years' of the post-war Pax Americana were abruptly ended by 
the Vietnam war - a war in which the US attempted to combine huge levels of expenditure 
with expansionary domestic policies. US leaders refused to fund the Vietnam war by 
increasing taxation at home and this insistence on deficit spending led to the Nixon 
administration's abrupt termination of the Bretton-Woods financial system in 1971. The 1970s 
were punctuated by attempts, on the part of US politicians, to place new limits upon 
America's global role amidst several crises which further undermined US global power - most 
notably the Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) price hikes of the early 1970s and 
growing confidence among Third World nations demanding a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO). In the 1980s the Reagan Administration undertook an ambitious programme of 
policies designed to reassert US hegemony over the global order and reverse this steady 
decline. In the end, however, the Reagan Administration's strategy of national renewal -
massively increased defence spending combined with huge tax cuts - only exacerbated 
previous failures to solve ever expanding trade and expenditure deficits. Moreover, the 1980s 
witnessed the emergence of a newly competitive global economy in which Japan and Western 
Europe were, for the first time, outpacing US economic performance in notable areas. In 
short, from the late 1960s onwards US hegemonic power across the political, economic and 
ideological domains has been diluted and the US reduced to the status of a player, if still the 
most dominant and most successful, in a more complex and multilateral world order. 
35 Payne, The New Political Economy of A rea Studies, p.258. 
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Following the denouement of the Cold War, the US state no longer has the power to forge a 
new Bretton Woods system of currency regulation underpinning global economic relations and 
ensuring global economic stability. Moreover, the US can no longer unilaterally fashion a 
consensus to wage large scale conflicts without assembling a coalition of allied contributors -
a fact demonstrated in 1990-91 when the US was largely reliant on German, Japanese and 
Arab funds to finance the Gulf War. 36 In this sense, it is no longer self-evident that the US is 
hegemonic across the range of elements identified above as constituting a world-hegemonic 
order. Nevertheless, it is important not to be too dismissive of US preponderance in 
fundamental areas of global significance. As stressed, if the US is no longer hegemonic then it 
is certainly still the most dominant global actor in terms of influence. For example, the US 
continues to exert structural/financial and ideological power through global institutions such 
as the IMF, the G7, the WTO and the United Nations while leading the world's most powerful 
military alliance in the form of NATO. The US has no rivals on the global stage capable of 
usurping its military prowess, while the strategic and geo-political outreach of the US remains 
unrivalled. Moreover, the US continues to provide the world's strongest currency and the 
most innovative and robust economy with the largest market for global exports. Importantly, 
the technological supremacy of the US remains beyond question, as does the fact that the US 
is the world's most flexible, adaptable, and experimental economic model always seemingly 
capable of generating new products and shifting the actual basis of world economic 
competition. Equally, US sanctions are capable of single handedly decimating economies 
across the globe, both large and small. In short, though the hegemony of the US state has 
36 Ibid., pp. 259-260. 
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declined the dominance of US ideas and culture, what Joseph Nye has termed 'soft power', 
. I' c: >,7 contmues to pro l1erate.' 
Having discussed, in more detail, the question of hegemony's usage in critical theory it is also 
necessary to consider a few other areas in which the neo-Gramscian critical approach may be 
added to. A notable problem with the critical approach to IPE outlined above is Cox's 
appropriation of production as the 'essence' of international relations. 38 This represents an 
unnecessarily reductionist view of the counter-hegemonic forces at play in an increasingly 
complex world order. Although it can readily be conceded that class is still important, Cox's 
actual use of relatively conventional class analysis plays down Gramsci's emphasis on ideas39 
and underestimates the social reality of a plural world order marked by fissures over ethnicity, 
gender, and ecological issues which offer new critiques of power, domination, and neo-
liberalism while reflecting various forms of hegemonic domination. 
In short, resistance to hegemony is likely to take many forms and manifest itself in many guises 
among groups which cannot afford the luxury of waiting for hegemonic transition at the state 
or global level. Moreover, neo-Gramscian ideas, relevant to the construction of historic blocs 
and the transition to a post-hegemonic world order, are largely based on a reading of Western 
history and western hegemonies as the blueprint for future transitions. In this sense, Gramsci's 
approach cannot always be transposed upon non-Western situations where vastly different 
social forces exist and where institutions, force of law, and civil societies (of the type which 
formed the basis of Gramsci's original analysis of the Italian political order) are often 
37 See J Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York, Basic Books, 1990. 
38 See RW Cox, Production, Power. and World Order: The Role of Social Forces in the Making of History, 
New York, Columbia University Press. 1987. 
39 S Whitworth, "Theory as Exclusion: Gender and International Political Economy", in Stubbs and Underhill 
(eds), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, London, Macmillan, 1994, p.126. 
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embryonic, even non existent - as, for instance, In China. 40 Neo-Gramscian theory can 
profitably engage with many postmodern and post-colonial theories of international relations 
which stress multiple forms of political mobilisation and illuminate additional structures of 
power, besides class, opening up the attractive possibilities of theorising resistance "at the 
everyday, community, neighbourhood, and interpersonal levels" and confronting "those 
processes that close off potential for people to give meaning to their lives.,,41 Significantly, 
Cox has moved to acknowledge the fact that ethnicity, nationalism, religious identities, and 
gender "have in measure displaced class as the focus of social struggle; but like class, they 
derive their force from resentment against exploitation. ,,42 There is an extent, then, to which 
the neo-Gramscian notion of power must be conceived with a certain amount of conceptual 
elasticity in order to avoid the pitfalls of reductionist theorising. 43 This has been stressed by 
many neo-Gramscian scholars, such as Roger Tooze, who have consistently pointed out the 
reflexive and non-dogmatic nature of new IPE and its openness to an array of theoretical 
influences. 44 It should be added, however, that, although such variables as culture, nationalism 
and identity are increasingly relevant, they often appear intangible or difficult to establish 
empirically. 45 Thus, while postmodern and post-Marxist criticisms correctly push us in the 
direction of a broader appreciation of social power and the basis of social order at the micro-
level, they do not detract from Cox's synthesis of structural power at the macro-level and the 
40 LHM Ling, "Hegemony and the Internationalising State: A Post-Colonial Analysis of China's Integration 
into Asian Corporatism", Review oj International Political Economy, Yol.3, 1996, pp.l-26. 
41 J George, "Understanding International Relations After the Cold War". in M Shapiro and HR Alker (eds.). 
Challenging Boundaries, Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p.68. 
42 R Cox "Global Restructuring" in Stubbs and Underhill (eds), Political Economy and the Changing Global 
Order. p.53. 
43 See R Germain and M Kenny. "Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New 
Gramscians", Review of international Studies. vo1.24, No.1, 1998, p.l9. 
44 See R Tooze, "Understanding the Global Political Economy: Applying Gramsci", Millennium: Journal of 
international Studies, Vol. 19, No.2, 1990, pp. 273-280. 
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neo-Gramscian argument that global hegemony rests upon shared understandings by dominant, 
technocratic, political formations which are making fundamental decisions on how social life in 
most of the world should be organised. 
State - Society Relations 
Within this critical-theoretical framework it is important to implant a body of theory which 
concerns itself with conceptualising political agency within the structural context set out 
above. In what has been termed a 'new political economy' approach the false dichotomy 
between structure and agency is overcome and the state is located at the interface between 
society-based political agents and economic forces which exert structural power at the global 
level. 46 With these changes in mind, some of the demarcation lines between established 
theories of the state are blurring, leading to general agreement around a number of shared 
perspectives on how to approach analysis of the state. These constraints on state strategy are 
presently particularly hard felt by any state, democratic or otherwise, attempting to depart 
from the global neo-liberal model of economic development. Thus state theory has had to 
adapt to a global situation which no longer fits easily into the Westphalian model of politics 
based on the autonomous status of the sovereign state. Rather, as markets become more 
integrated and globalised, some of the old distinctions between elitist, Marxist, and pluralist 
theories of the state seem bound for revision. Though Marxism, elitism, and pluralism each 
have their own distinctive historical lineage there are aspects within each approach which are 
now converging. This convergence of state theories has been lucidly and convincingly set out 
45 Following Foucault, the idea of indeterminacy is intrinsic to postmodem thought. 
46 See A Gamble, A Payne, A Hoogvell, and M Dietrich and M Kenny, "Editorial: New Political Economy", 
New Political Economy, YoU, No.1, 1996. pp.5-6. 
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by David Marsh.47 He has put forward six broad areas of convergence which are worth 
discussing at some length. 
Convergence in State TheoI)' 
Firstly, each position outlined by Marsh accepts the concept of 'structured privilege' and the 
accompanying assertion that certain groups and individuals are conferred a privileged status 
resulting from their structural position within a given society. Accepting the importance of 
'structured privilege' has involved a shift in pluralism towards positions already espoused by 
Marxism and elitism and a willingness to concede that modern societies do not simply contain 
a level playing-field of competing interests free of in-built forms of material and social 
privilege. Nevertheless, differences in emphasis remain. Pluralists, overwhelmingly, tend to 
reject "broad social categories", especially ones framed by identity (such as gender and race), 
and continue to emphasise the greater relevance of variables such as "class/status, education, 
knowledge and political interests" which cross-cut these broader categories and constitute a 
more diverse amalgam of interests.4~ For pluralists, it is the conflict between interest groups 
which principally defines politics and determine policy outcomes. Pluralists have come to 
recognise, however, the structurally privileged nature of "policy networks" which 
systematically include certain groups and exclude others from access to government. In 
recognising that structured privilege exists it also becomes clear that favoured groups are 
often incorporated within a policy-nexus conducive to state preferences while forces of 
opposition are systematically excluded. 
The second area of convergence, according to Marsh, centres around "the role of agency." In 
this case Marxist and elitist theories have moved closer to pluralist concerns with the role of 
47 0 Marsh, "The Convergence Between Theories of the State", in D Marsh and G Stoker (eds.), Theory and 
Methods in Political Science, London, Macmillan, 1995, pp.268-287. 
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political agency in defining policies and influencing policy outcomes. In a clear departure from 
the structural Marxism of Althusser49 and other Marxist state theories which viewed the state 
as essentially capitalist50, modern Marxists, such as Jessop, have emphasised that political 
actors are "calculating subjects" operating under conditions of structural constraint. Though 
structures may be innately capitalist entities, actors (operating within those structures) need 
not necessarily act as capitalists at all times. Rather, agents are capable, in Jessop's view, of 
selecting specific strategies which shape institutions and the outcomes of political struggle 
within a system of structured preferences. 5 I 
The third area of convergence identified by Marsh concerns the equal weight now 
appropriated by each theory to the "limited number of structural bases of privilege." The 
overlap here is shared more by elitism and Marxism than by pluralism. Again, pluralists are 
more likely to emphasise the influence of interest groups and policy networks over policy 
outcomes than broad social categories and sites of social inequality such as gender and class. 
These areas of convergence are succinctly delineated by Marsh: (i) economic/property 
resources, an area of social division fundamental to Marxism but also crucial to the Weberian 
tradition; (ii) the issue of gender which has impacted, vis a vis much recent feminist theory, 
upon both Marxism and elitism; (iii) issues appertaining to political resources, control of the 
political agenda, and membership of policy networks; and (iv) knowledge, a category pivotal 
to the Weberian tradition - especially the role of knowledge and power accruing professional 
elites. 52 
48 Ibid., p.271. 
49 For an example of structural Marxism see L Althusser, For Marx, London, Verso, 1969. 
50 R Miliband, The State in Capitalist SOCiety. London, Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1968. 
51 See R Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place. Cambridge, P,olity Press, 1990. 
52 Marsh, "The Convergence Between Theories of the State", p.272. 
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A fourth area of broad convergence is founded on the question of statism. In relation to the 
question of statism both Marxism and pluralism derive their analyses from socially based 
theories - though with differing emphases on the respective roles of class and interest groups. 
Marxists have increasingly come to emphasise, however, the independence of state managers 
though continuing to describe this autonomy within the context of broader capitalist class 
relations. 53 Similarly, pluralists such as Nordlinger have come to acknowledge the autonomy 
of the democratic state and the centrality of conflicts within the governmental apparatus as 
well as those circulating within and between groups in civil society. 54 
David Marsh's fifth area of convergence between theories of the state revolves around the 
question of contingency. The salience of the contingency question stems from the fact that 
most Marxists have now broken with historical determinacy and an immutable theory of 
rational historical development ending in socialism or communism. For modem Marxist 
theoreticians such as Jessop the question of who rules in a capitalist society is "a matter for 
empirical investigation, not theoretical assertion. ,,55 Thus the pluralist emphasis on measuring 
any given dispensation of social power empirically is something to be taken seriously within 
Jessop's reformulation of Marxist thought. Elitists, for their part, continue to accept Weber's 
empirical refutation of pluralism by focusing upon the accumulation of bureaucratic/ elite sites 
of power in order to disprove the pluralist thesis of diffuse power bases within democratic 
society. 
The sixth, and final, area of convergence lies in the fact that all three traditions have moved to 
ascribe "primacy to politics" with, in Marsh's own words, "political outcomes ... viewed as the 
53 See F Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule", Socialist Revolution, No.3, 1977, pp.6-28. 
54 See E Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State, Cambridge, Mass, HalVard University Press, 
1981. 
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product of conflict between interests/social forces for the allocation of scarce resources in a 
context characterised by structural inequality.,,56 The state is now viewed as a site of perennial 
struggle across a newly augmented terrain of social categories and social representations 
which include gender, race and so on. In the perspective of the converged approach modern 
states are viewed as comprising complex civil societies in which fissiparous social groupings 
collide in the process of influencing policy. This new emphasis has been largely foisted upon 
state theory by post-Marxist/postmodern theories of the state. Indeed, according to post-
Marxists, such as Laclau and Mouffe, understanding hegemony and power under increasingly 
complex conditions involves the recasting of political space or, in their words, conceptualising 
politics as "the space for a game which is never zero sum, because the rules of the players are 
never fully explicit."s7 In this view, hegemony exists at the point of political closure and 
exclusion from the political process. Moreover, in this formulation politics is seen to suffuse 
society and to exist in myriad locations concomitant with Michel Foucault's conception of 
the 'microphysics of power. ,5~ Within the state apparatus itself, Jessop's concept of 'strategic 
selectivity' has moved Marxism towards a view of the state which acknowledges the impact of 
various preceding hegemonic and social struggles on contingent state policies, and defines it 
essentially as an institutional complex which adapts in order to accommodate emerging social 
forces which are themselves shaped, and often changed, by those past experiences as regards 
future political strategies. In this way Jessop is able to explain why certain groups, such as 
55 Marsh, "The Convergence in Theories of the State", p.273. 
56 Ibid., p.273. 
57 E LacIau and C Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, London, Verso, 1985, pp. 192-193. 
58 See Michel Foucault in C Gordon (ed), PowerlKnowledge:Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-
1977, Pantheon Books, New York, 1972. For Foucault power is dispersed throughout society and reproduced in 
discourses and self-regulative modes of behaviour he terms technologies of power. These can, however, usually 
be traced back to more generalised modes of power such as the disciplinary functions of capitalism and the 
state which demand widespread social conformity to ensure their own reproduction. 
45 
women, exert more influence in some capitalist states rather than others. 59 Moreover, Jessop 
retains the view, and this is important, that Western state forms continue to reflect 
institutionally and socially embedded class privileges - it is these privileged interests and 
strategies which continue to exert material and political leverage despite the existence of 
alternative strategies open to state managers. 60 
The above theoretical convergence intersects well with the task of analysing the US state and 
the highly complex civil society of the US. A variety of cross-cutting interest groups, policy 
networks and NGOs functioning within the US political system often contribute to 
governmental gridlock and political entropy which has arguably undermined the US's 
competitive position in the global economy and its ability to fashion a coherent state strategy.61 
The US system is also uniquely characterised by countervailing sites of institutional power 
underpinned by a binding constitution. Moreover, the Congress, the Executive ( and the 
competing bureaucracies within the Executive branch), the Supreme Court, and individual 
state legislatures (with significant budgetary and taxation power) are all capable of confusing 
and frustrating state policy and manifestly undermine the concept of a singular national interest 
at the institutional - or elite - level. The incoherent nature of the US state has been exposed 
more emphatically by the ending of the Cold War and the disappearance of an anti-Soviet 
ideology which served as a political adhesive and prevented the type of political 
fragmentation which has occurred with increasing obviousness in the 1990s.62 In some 
59 Jessop, State Theory, p.W. 
60 Marsh, "Convergence of Theories of the State", p.273. 
61 P Cerny, 'Global Finance and Governmental Gridlock: Political Entropy and the Decline of American 
Financial Power,' in R Maidment and] Thurber (eds.), The Politics of Relative Decline, Oxford, Polity Press, 
1993. 
62 See A Schlesinger, The Disuniting of A merica, New York, w.w. Norton, 1992. Schlesinger gives a good 
account of the reasons for (and potential damage flowing from) America's post- Cold War descent into political 
factionalism and identity politics. 
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respects, however, American capitalism has thrived under new conditions of political 
uncertainty which have allowed many private actors, especially multi-national corporations 
(MNCs), to develop their own individual foreign polices and to undertake research and 
development (R&D) and technological innovations unencumbered by state-sponsored political 
regulation or strong labour unions. 63 Moreover, tendencies towards what Cerny has termed 
'Madisonian entropy.164 also reflect endemic anti-statist tendencies within the US political 
system. They can, in this sense, be seen as part of the US's strengths as well as an intrinsic 
weakness. In short, theorising the US state is and always has been a complex and messy 
process unlikely to be captured by any single theory. 
The convergence in state-society theory also recognises the fact that states are not simply 
domestic bureaucracies but also internationalised bureaucratic networks capable of 
functioning in a quasi-autonomous manner across national boundaries. States are permeated 
by sub-state actors such as NGOs and business in a flotsam and jetsam of social interaction 
which established theories of the state often fail to capture due to their singular focus upon 
classes (as in Marxism), interest groups (as in pluralism) and state bureaucracies and 
politicians (as in elitism). Most importantly the state, in this converged approach, is 
reconfigured as a site of social power to be empirically investigated and institutionally 
disaggregated, rather than theoretically asserted a priori. Recognising the merits and 
deficiencies in each approach moves us towards a more thorough understanding of the state 
and the social forces which undergird it. Moreover, under conditions of globalisation, such an 
approach supplies the conceptual tool kit to investigate new and emerging political variables in 
a more satisfactory way. The state theories discussed above do not, however, explain all state 
63 This point is made convincingly by Susan Strange in S Strange and J Stopford (with J Henley), Rival States, 
RivalFirms: Competition for World ,\larket .\'hares, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
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action nor do they take on board certain historical factors which may determine state action. 
They do not tell us why, or in what manner, states use key resources such as nationalism, 
identity and culture as political resources. We will now look, if briefly, to historical-
sociological theories of the state to provide some insights into these questions and to consider 
the ways in which this approach complements the overall theoretical framework being put 
forward. 
Historical Sociology 
Historical-sociological theorisations of the state dovetail nicely with the approaches to the 
state set out above while containing a number of key considerations which can be taken on 
board by both IPE and state theory. The insights provided by Michael Mann and Andrew 
Linklater go some way in deepening our view of the state as a historical and geo-politcal 
actor. Let us look at aspects of Michael Mannis state theory first of all. Michael Mann sees 
pluralism as correct in highlighting the dynamic force of party democracy in Western states 
and as rightly drawing attention to the fact that interest groups represent more than class 
interests alone65 Within Mannis framework the state is made up of "multiple, sprawling, 
fragmented administrations,,66 and he sees "state elites as plural not singular,,67, and thus 
capable of acting in a variety of complex ways. Again, Mann's approach is neither simply 
elitist nor realist in that the state is seen as a porous political formation, neither divorced from 
society nor a unified and cohesive actor. In this vein, elitism, pluralism, and Marxism all have 
something to bring to state theory though, taken alone, they are insufficient explanatory 
models. It is worth quoting Mann at some length: 
64 See P G Cerny, "Gridlock and Decline: Financial Internationalisation, Banking Politics, and the American 
Political Process" in Stubbs and Underhill, Political Economy and the Changing Gobal Order, pp. 425-438. 
65 M Mann. The Suurces o[Sucial Power: "o/.l. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1986, p.47. 
66 Ibid., p.53. 
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States are both actors and active places. land] these places have many mansions and varying degrees of 
autonomy and cohesion, yet also respond to pressures from capitalists, other major power actors, and more 
general expressed social needs. But much of the empirical work on state administrations does not stress any of 
the actors privileged by these theories - a state elite, the interests of capital, or the interests of society as a 
whole. Rather states are portrayed as chaotic. irrationaL with multiple departmental autonomies, pressured 
intermittently by capitalists but also by other interest groups. Under the microscope states "Balkanize," 
dissolving into competing departments and factions.6~ 
Although the importance of classes and interest groups, as well as the influence of state actors, 
wax and wane with the course of events, the one historical constant in Mann's theory is the 
'infrastructural power' of the institutional state and its generation of ever enlarging 
bureaucratic and rationalised sites of social power. For Mann, only in this sense can the state 
be conceived as singular or unitary - as part of its tendency, as originally argued by Weber, to 
rationalise and naturalise bureaucratic control throughout society.69 It is worth stressing again, 
that this is an overall historical feature of the modern state as an institution rather than an 
indicator of the cohesiveness of state actors in any given period. Again, the activities of the 
latter must be empirically established. 
Mann's theory adds to the theoretical framework of this thesis in the way he accounts for the 
state as a historically and territorially defined entity which draws on historically moulded 
identities in order to act geo-politically. It also builds upon Marxist and pluralist state theories 
by accounting for the role of the state in waging war and raising war finances. 70 States, in 
short, derive enough social power from society to prosecute violence on behalf of national 
populations for reasons as diverse as territory, religion, and ethnicity. Importantly, however, 
67 Ibid., p.51 
~ Ibid., p.53. 
69 Ibid., p.61 
10 Ibid., p.49 
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Mann rejects the realist and elitist view that the state's geo-political role reflects national 
interests, while also repudiating pluralist and interdependence theory approaches which view 
state action as emanating from shared plural, material interests. Rather, "calculations of 
interest were always influenced by all of the entwined sources of social power, and always 
involved norms - sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent - emanating from complex 
attachments to the 'imagined communities' of class and nation.,,7) 
Mann's historical-sociological perspective intersects fruitfully with certain theories within the 
broader field of International Relations and, most notably, with the innovative work of 
Andrew Linklater. 72 Within Linklater's international relations theory (which could also be 
termed a historical-sociological approach) emerges a useful conceptualisation of the state. For 
Linklater also, history demonstrates that states have been able to draw on nationalism and 
culture as if they were material resources while both nationalism and culture have, historically, 
been as important in defining social allegiances as class. Within Linklater's theory of 
international relations the intention is to move 'beyond realism and Marxism' by combining 
elements from both within one conceptual framework. 73 Drawing heavily on the critical 
sociological approaches of Giddens 74 and Mann, the argument taken up by Linklater is that the 
development of human history (and by inference the state) has, in part, been determined by 
class struggle, but also by state-building, war and developments in the realm of culture and 
ideology75 - Linklater stating that "there are no grounds for arguing that state-building and war 
71 Ibid., p.50. 
72 See A Linklater, Beyond Realism and .Harxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, London, 
Macmillan, 1990. 
73 Ibid., p.165. 
74 See A Giddens, The Nation-Slale and Violence: Volume 2 of the Contemporary Critique of Historical 
Materialism, Cambridge. 1995. 
75 Linklater. Beyond Realism and MarXism. p.167. 
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have been less important than class conflict and the evolution of the forces of production ..... " 76 
The purpose of cross-fertilising Marxist and realist theories is that of "acknowledging the 
significance of realist themes for critical social theory rather than any defence of state-
reductionism.,,77 Importantly, Linklater's critical approach goes some way towards explaining 
why, under conditions of globalisation and in a supposedly post-ideological period, conflicts 
continue to proliferate with regard to ethnicity and territory even when there is no obvious 
material motivation. 7& This leads us into a brief discussion of the nascent globalisation 
literature and its transformative impact upon each theoretical debate covered so far. 
Globalisation 
The globalisation debate feeds into all aspects of the above theoretical framework in that 
globalisation is already dramatically shifting the grounds of theoretical debate in the post-Cold 
War period. Globalisation roughly entails changes in the role and function of the state 
concomitant with the growing structural power of transnational markets and new 
developments in technology, informational flows, and the dispensation of global power to 
private actors. It is not our intention to explore the vast globalisation literature here, only to 
acknowledge the extent to which such a process has impacted upon debates within IPE state 
theory, and historical sociology. There are, broadly speaking, three schools of globalisation 
theory. The first has been termed a 'hyper-globalisation' school which propagates the argument 
that global markets are perfectly integrated, that finance is free of significant regulation, that 
technology and consumerism now transcend national borders and, consequently, that the very 
76 Ibid., p.167. 
77 Ibid., p.168. 
7M For a discussion see A Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State", European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol.2, 1996. pp. 77 -103. 
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idea of a national economy has become something of an anachronism. 79 In this view, adopted 
by both neo-liberals and many neo-Marxists, the nation-state is little more than a transmission 
belt for global economic forces as the levers of real power are handed over to transnational 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Trade Organisation llO Hirst and Thomson have 
provided a valuable corrective to this thesis of unfettered globalisation by stressing the 
continued role of national governments, but probably go too far in denying that significant 
shifts are taking place in the global economy - many of which are more qualitative than 
quantitative and which supersede analysis of trade figures alone. 81 David Held et al have 
characterised this debate as "the sceptical thesis" and point out that the sceptics underestimate 
globalisation at the conceptual level by relying on a wholly economistic approach and 
"equating it primarily with a perfectly integrated global market. ,,82 It may well be more 
apposite to regard globalisation as an ongoing process existing at various different levels with 
states reacting to the demands of increased competition in specific ways but, most importantly, 
finding their room for manoeuvre curtailed by the need to attract and sustain inward 
investment. Within a context of enhanced global competition states are encouraged to remove 
barriers to the free flow of capital while the rights of consumers and labour are often 
subjugated by governments to the allure of large corporate investors. Held et al have 
described this third debate as "the transformationalist thesis." According to Held et al 
"tranformationalists make no claims about the future trajectory of globalisation; nor do they 
seek to evaluate the present in relation to some single, fixed ideal-type 'globalised world', 
79 J Perraton, D Goldblatt, D Held, and A McGrew, "The Globalisation of Economic Activity", New Political 
Economy, Voi.2, No.2, 1997, p.257. A defining study in the hyper-globalisation lexicon was Kenichi 
Ohamae's, The Borderle,\'s World, London, HarperCollins, 1990. 
80 D Held, A McGrew, 0 Goldblatt and J Perraton, Global Tranformations:Politics, Economics and Culture 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999, p.5. • 
81 P Hirst and G Thomson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of 
Governance, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996. 
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whether a global market or a global civilisation. Rather, tranformationalist accounts emphasise 
globalisation as a long-term historical process which is inscribed with contradictions and which 
is significantly shaped by conjunctural factors."~' Thus tranformationalists concede the advent 
of a new global phase of historical development but maintain that the process is multi-layered, 
contested, and open-ended. 
A neo-Gramscian Approach to Globalisation 
A broadly neo-Gramscian approach to the question of globalisation has been set out by 
Amoore et al in which the inevitability attached to the process by neo-liberals is brought 
under scrutiny. In this view, the neo-liberal portrayal of a globalising logic is rejected and the 
process is placed within a more materialist understanding of globalisation as a strategy of 
capital accumulation. For Amoore et ai, "it may be more clarifying to talk about logic in terms 
of processes of capital accumulation, for example, as opposed to the logic of capital 
accumulation,,84 In the neo-Marxist tradition, this view sees globalisation as a social process 
capable of being rejected and resisted - a task which can be met both by "elaboration of an 
alternative political economy" and via "concrete strategies of resistance. ilKS More specifically, 
Amoore et al outline a definition of economic globalisation in its neo-liberal manifestation in 
an attempt to overcome much of the "conceptual fuzziness" surrounding the current debate. 
The four 'defining' characteristics from this more critical perspective are as follows: 
(i) to protect the interests of capital and expand the process of capital accumulation (if this is viewed as 
occurring within and because of a structural crisis in capitalism or a long-term economic stagnation, then 
neoliberal economic globalisation is essentially a strategy of crisis management or stabilisation); (ii) the 
82 D Held et aI, Global Transformations, p.5. 
83 Ibid., p.7. 
84 L Amoore, R Dodgson. BK Gills, P Langley. D Marshall and I Watson, "Overturning 'Globalisation': 
Resisting the Teleological. Reclaiming the 'Political', New Political Economy, Vol.2, No.1, 1997, p.lSO. 
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tendency towards hOlllogenisation of state policies and even state forms in the direction of protecting capital 
and expanding the process of capital accumulation, via a new orthodox),. i.e. market ideology (wherein even 
the state itself becomes subject to marketisation while simultaneously being deployed instrumentally on behalf 
of capital); (iii) the addition and expansion of a layer of transnationalised institutional authority above the 
states (which has the aim and purpose of penetrating states and re-articulating them to the purposes of global 
capital accumulation): and (iv) the exclusion of dissident social forces from the arena of state policy making (in 
order to insulate the new neoliberal state forms against the societies over which they preside and in order to 
facilitate the socialisation of risk on behalf of the interests of capital).M6 
The crux of this argument, then, rests in the fact that globalisation is a political process 
brought about by active agents, rather than a teleological process naturally constructed by 
technological and economic change and impervious to being reversed or challenged either by 
national politicians or social forces acting at the sub-state level. Thus changes in the role of the 
state should not be conflated with its total emasculation or ability to direct state resources in a 
direction which would mitigate some of the worst excesses of economic globalisation. It is to 
the changing nature of the state as conceived by globalisation theory that we now turn. 
The Competitive State 
The process of globalisation has brought what Cerny terms the 'competitive state' to the 
fore. 87 This form of state retains strong nationalist tendencies, as governments strive to make 
their populations seem attractive to international capital investors searching for low cost 
and/or flexible labour markets, while also involving a more managerial than interventionist 
approach to economic policy - maintaining low inflation and restricting public spending being 
key features. In this sense, states are finding it almost impossible to devise serious 
85 Ibid., p.ISO. 
~6 Ibid., p.IS!. 
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redistributive policies or a social compromise akin to the Keynesian welfare state which began 
to unravel in the West during the late 1970s. It is wrong, however, to view the state as merely 
the localised limb which reacts to every twitch of the global body. As John Dunning asserts, 
states are still the "initiators and supervisors of the system through which ... resources are 
created and clcployed"S8 and, in this sense, are complicit in devising strategies which 
complement globalisation. Moreover, a key point in the globalisation debate is the need to 
distinguish between state sovereignty and state autonomy.89 The former often entails ascribing 
bounded identities regarding who does/does not belong within a given territory, negative 
forms of nationalism, and harsh immigration policies (another feature of globalisation), while 
the latter denotes the right to pursue democratic policies and national social projects without 
interference from the structural power of global capital. In sum, globalisation is occurring in 
so much that perceptions of politics and political possibilities are radically altering, the 
functions of the state are changing, and new forms of transnational politics (involving NGOs 
of various kind~ and multinational corporations) are being forged. All of this is taking place 
against a backdrop of economic restructuring, burgeoning technological innovations outpacing 
political and social changes, and new forms of information and communication which look set, 
over time, to altl'l" global politics as it exists presently. 
Summary 
The above frame\\ork, then, constitutes a multi-faceted approach to what can be broadly 
termed a nel\ i'lliitical economy framework. It draws on the best insights of 'new' or critical 
87 The term \\as .. : :,1 brought to the fore in P Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics, London, Sage 
1990. 
88 J H DUlllli I,,'. 1m Crlunents and the Macro-Organization of Economic Activity: An Historical and and 
Spatial PerspccI i\ c". j(('l'iew of International Political Economy, Vol.4, No.1, 1997, p.49. 
89 D Held alld :\ ;., icGrew, "Globalisation and the Liberal Democratic State", Government and Opposition, 
Vo1.28, No.2, 1 'J'J J. p.2()5. 
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international p'llilical economy (especially the neo-Gramscian model), recent developments in 
state-society theory, key insights provided by historical sociology, and recent developments in 
globalisation theury, By way of summary let us briefly consider the utility of each approach 
for the thesis \\hcil follows, 
Firstly, critic(l: heories of international political economy as developed by Robert Cox, Critical 
IPE allows us t l) consider the relevance of state action within a context of global structural 
change whik ;, ' 'ilogating underlying structures themselves as they relate to dominant modes 
of power and II kology, Most importantly, critical IPE raises questions as to how the existing 
world order 111:1\ be in the process of changing while stressing a normative commitment to a 
more egalitnri:lI1Jispensation of power at the global level. Many of these changes are likely to 
be brought at, "It by political agents at the state-society level and thus state-society theory 
helps in identi:\illg the relevant agents and the way in which they act politically - though 
within the structural constraints highlighted by critical IPE, 
As has been ":rllled, state-society theory elucidates some of the complex sites of power 
which constitl' ,the modern state in its extended formulation - as an entity both constitutive of 
society and ,'{)I,stituted by society. Most significantly, global changes have brought a 
converged api' 'tell to state theory to the fore, In this approach, the relative merits of elitism, 
pluralism, anci, Llr.'\ism are accorded equal weight but no single theory is seen to dominate, 
This convergellce of approaches is reinforced by the external force of globalisation which is 
changing the f ',' and function of the capitalist state and which fundamentally alters the part 
played by sp !':l' actors within its institutional ambit. This approach does not, however, 
always capture \ ill' partially external role of the state in its control over military intervention 
and notions 1< ,tillnhood. 
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Historical-slh 1 ,gi\.:al approaches to the state dovetail with state-society theory to a large 
extent (see i\\a, !l'S approach above) but offer a useful insight into the manner in which culture 
and nationali:\111 .Ire utilised as resources of the state, This allows us to examine often irrational 
historico-cul t I " h, mds of identity and notions of the nation-state without falling into the 
realist trap I )!','ating the state as a unified actor divorced from society, It does, however, 
maintain till' ill!'ortant realist view that state bureaucracies continue to control the finances 
and physica I II! III resources deployed in conflict. In this sense historical sociology challenges 
some of tl1l' ,.jgcrated claims made in globalisation theory which completely negate the 
state's cont i I1lW i military role and the continued presence of conflict and national rivalries 
under globali<: conditions, 
The final S',', rl'viewed the burgeoning globalisation literature in a necessarily conCIse 
manner. Tk' t' ~e views of globalisation summarised elucidate the contested nature of this 
ongoing t I: '\,' a I and empirical debate, The view taken in this thesis concurs with the 
arguments a~i . eed by Amoore et al and Held which contend that globalisation is a multi-
faceted pn)L"l'~ ,ather than an economic jail accompli, Moreover, the process is capable of 
being resislL'<i . , d restrained by both state and non-state actors, Particularly apposite is the 
view taken I, '. lH lore et al that globalisation as popularly represented tends to reflect the 
narrow ideo I \ l' al predilections of neoliberalism and transnational capital. In conclusion, it is 
hoped that 1!1: ,lo\e theoretical framework, by blending overlapping theoretical debates, can 
offer a OlWI1': I'i:ltform for understanding a complex post -Cold War order in which the sites 
of social aIH', :tural power are more diverse, 
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The Historical Evolution of US-China Relations 1842-1992 
Introduction 
This chapter offers an historical overview of the evolution of US-China relations up until 
the election of the Clinton Administration in 1992 and, in line with the critical IPE 
approach of Robert Cox, aims to place US-China relations within a historical context. 
The first section takes the form of a general historical narrative tracing America's opening 
of relations with China during the 19th century until the onset of the Cold War. The second 
section offers a similarly general account of US-China relations during the Cold War 
which were marked by animosity and ideological rivalry, for the most part, and which 
culminated in the retreat of Mao's China into a position of international isolation during 
the Cultural Revolution's most intense phase between 1965-69. The third section 
considers in somewhat greater detail the unfolding of the US-China relationship from 1972 
onwards when the two nations forged a conditional reconciliation officially sanctioned by 
the Shanghai Communique. Changes in the Cold War and the global political economy 
transformed the US-China relationship during the late 1970s and 1980s as the two sides 
became more interdependent in trading terms and as China's economy began its startling 
trajectory of double digit economic growth initiated by Deng Xiaoping's rolling program 
of economic modernization and market reforms. In the 1990s, as we shall discuss 
extensively below, the bilateral US-China relationship has been complicated by both the 
onset of new regional blocs in the world economy and by the symbiotic process of 
globalisation. Thus towards the denouement of the Bush administration what had been a 
geopolitical relationship in 1972 was fast returning to one which revolved around 
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geoeconomics and trade - though the terms of the trade relationship in the Clinton era 
have not been as one way as it was during the 19th century. Additionally, China policy in 
the 1990s has become more contested within the US with issues such as the environment 
and human rights playing far more prominent roles (than during the colonial era and the 
Cold War) as the consensus undergirding US foreign policy has gradually unravelled. 
US-China Relations in the Colonial Era 
Though the role of history should not be overstated in the context of contemporary 
political analysis neither should it be wholly ignored. Indeed, contemporary relations 
between the US and China across a whole spectrum of areas have been shaped by 
historical experience. Most notably, the historical foundation of modern relations between 
the two countries has been shaped by colonialism and imperialism and the enforced terms 
of trade and political SUbjugation these forces brought with them. China's initial 
relationship with foreign traders was founded upon the tributary system and the underlying 
supposition of Chinese racial supremacy to the "barbarians" from the West. The structure 
of the tributary system tended to favor Chinese traders selling silks, porcelain, teas, and 
chinaware and it was in order to alter the balance of trade in Britain's favour that British 
traders began selling vast quantities of opium to the Chinese populace. Despite the 
obviously damaging social effects of the opium trade the British policy was portrayed in 
terms of defending a liberal trading order throughout the world against a backward and 
unequal tributary system.! In 1842 the Chinese Emperor, Ch'i-ying and British envoy, 
Henry Pottinger, signed the Treaty of Nanjing which abolished Chinese monopolies of 
foreign trade at Canton, promised a fair trading system (i.e. the abolition of the tributary 
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system) and opened Chinese ports to British residence and trade (paving the way for other 
western countries). Three other treaties, including the American treaty of 1844, came to 
be known as the 'unequal treaties'. Significantly, the treaties introduced the concept of 
extraterritoriality (so crucial to contemporary globalisation) to China in that European and 
American citizens trading there were subject to the laws of their own state and exempted 
from Chinese jurisdiction. Notably, the American treaty extended upon the British 
provisions for extraterritoriality and gave the US all of the privileges for which Britain had 
fought. 2 Chinese nationalist leader Sun Vat-sen would later refer to China's status 
following the unequal treaties as that of a 'sub-colony' - a country of lower status than a 
colony in that its territory was controlled by a clutch of imperialist powers. 3 The US role 
in China's treatment by the imperialist powers in the nineteenth century is somewhat 
ambiguous. The US supported the British defence of free trade during the Opium War 
though denouncing the opium trade itself on moral grounds. Moreover, the US took full 
advantage of the outcome of the war and the subsequent treaties by demanding the same 
rights and privileges accorded to the European powers under most-favoured-nation status. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the United States government initiated a new 
phase in its relationship with China by advocating an Open Door trade policy which was 
aimed at preventing the imperialist powers from carving China into 'spheres of influence. ' 
Again, in one sense the United States was inextricably embroiled in European 
expansionism by taking full advantage of Britain's upkeep of a free trading global order 
I JK Fairbank, EO Reischauer and AM Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Tramjormation, Boston, 
Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1989, p.456. 
2 Ibid, p.460. 
3 E Fung, "Chinese Nationalism in the Twentieth Century", in C Mackerras (ed) East and Southeast Asia: 
A Multidisciplinary Survey, Boulder, Colorado, 1995, p.179. 
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without sharing in the military responsibilities required to guarantee that order's smooth 
running. The Open Door policy derived, in no small part, from America's need to find 
foreign markets due to the rise of industries producing cheap products at home, the 
gradual eclipse of America's frontier, as well as a missionary tradition which combined 
religion and commercial zeal. Also in that year manufactured products began to account 
for more than 90% of American exports to China, while the absolute volume of exports 
rose from $3.2 million in 1895 to $13. 1 million in 1899. As Arnold Xiangze Jiang points 
out, "these statistics bolstered the widespread expectation that, given an open door to 
China's market, the United States could become economically dominant.,,4 Also during 
this time a broader interest in the China market began to take root within the US business 
community. In 1898 the American Asiatic Association was founded with the express 
purpose of lobbying for government initiatives on behalf of US commercial interests in 
China. As Michael Schaller notes, "although no coordinated policy yet existed, a broad 
concern with East Asia had developed among policy planners and business leaders."s The 
US government and business community were as keen to take advantage of the 1895 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, imposed on China following the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, as 
the other powers. The Treaty abolished several internal taxes, granted foreigners the right 
to set up autonomous industrial enterprises within China, and extended the market for 
merchandise and investment.6 Yet in many respects the US had little choice in altering its 
behavior since, during the period 1870-1900 the liberal world order was beginning to 
4 AX Jiang, The [inited States and China, Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1988, p 19. 
S M Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century. New York, Oxford University Press. 
1979, p.26. . 
6 Jiang, The United States and America, p.20, 
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crumble and fragment into what Cox describes as "conflicting national ambitions.,,7 In this 
sense, the US can be seen as attempting to promote a limited form of liberalism in China 
under severe constraints imposed by the increasingly neo-mercantilist strategies adopted 
by Britain and the imperial powers in the post-liberal era. 
Open Door to Free Trade 
In 1899 US Secretary of State, John Hay, issued his first Open Door notes "to preserve 
the tradition of equal opportunity, an open door for trade, in the face of imperialist spheres 
of influence." In 1900, a second Open Door note was enunciated and elaborated on the 
US desire for a solution that would bring "permanent safety and peace to China, preserve 
Chinese territorial and administrative entity, and safeguard for the world the principle of 
equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."K Thus, although the US's 
policies were driven by commercial criteria they did not seek direct territorial advantage 
and augured the beginning of America's liberal internationalist ascension as Britain became 
bogged down by the politics of the Empire. Nevertheless, the United States' economic 
interest in China was not deemed vital at the beginning of the twentieth century and the 
US was unwilling to take military action should any of the imperial powers have proven 
recalcitrant over the US push for an Open Door policy. 9 The operations of the Imperial 
powers in China were, however, provocative enough to induce the Boxer Uprising in 1900 
in which anti-foreign groups targeted western traders and missionaries. Ultimately, 
however, the uprising only consolidated the position of Russia, France, Britain and 
7 RW Cox, Production, Power. and World Order: Social Porces in the Making of History, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1987, p.163. 
K Hay's Open Door notes, cited in Fairbank et ai, East Asia: Tradition and TransjiJrmaliol1, p.456. 
~ WI Cohen, America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations, John 
Wiley and Sons, New York, 1971, p.65. 
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Germany who collectively imposed a harsh settlement on the Qing rulers for supporting 
the insurgent factions. This settlement required China to pay large indemnities and 
succumb to the stationing of greater numbers of foreign troops. j() More importantly, the 
uprising very nearly destroyed America's carefully cultivated China policy and 
compounded the anti-colonial feeling in China stemming from the unequal treaties. 
US-China Relations in the Early Twentieth Century 
During the period leading up to the First World War the United States interest in China's 
market sharply declined. Between 1900 and 1910 cotton exports to North China and 
Manchuria (which had seemed to be prospering in the 1890s) were curtailed. This was, in 
the main, due to China's lack of political stability, its weak government and the negative 
experiences of US businessmen. US exporters became aware of the dearth of purchasing 
power among China's consumers as well as China's weak communication and 
transportation infrastructure 11 - an endemic feature of China's economic interaction with 
the global economy which continues unabated to this day in respect of most of the 
country. Moreover, US business became more internally focused during the first two 
decades of the twentieth century as the domestic economic downturn of the 1890s 
subsided and the quest for overseas markets abated. In this sense, the US was less inclined 
to become embroiled in imperial disputes, notably the Japanese- Russian conflict over 
Manchuria in 1904, and US business tended to be more motivated by accumulating profits 
at home. This stance towards China also reflected the more European focus of US policy 
under Theodore Roosevelt. Attempts were made under the Presidency of William 
Howard Taft to resurrect US interest in China, fearing Japan's potential exploitation of 
10 Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century. p.29. 
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Manchuria as a springboard to economic expansion. In 1911 Taft and his Secretary of 
State, Philander L Knox, embarked upon the policy of 'dollar diplomacy' in an attempt 
to augment US trading relations as a liberal alternative to the aggressive policies 
undertaken by the European powers and Japan. In a direct attempt to counter Japanese 
activities in Manchuria Taft and Knox tried, though ultimately failed, to stimulate a new 
round of US private investment in China in 1911 and 1912. This failure was hardly 
surprising given the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and the uncertainty over China's 
new national government. As Michael Schaller points out, most US investors were 
disinclined "to sink funds into a disputed region of questionable value with no promise of 
firm government protection.,,12 Again, these issues have resurfaced in the contemporary 
period due to China's undeveloped legal structure and opaque economic system. 
Relations Post-World War I 
After the First World War China remained in a state of virtual anarchy and, following the 
death of nationalist leader, Yuan Shikai, in 1916, China had no effective central 
government. Until the late 1920s China's regions were in the hands of warlords. Thus, 
China was in a very weak position when the Treaty of Versailles was concluded by the 
victorious allied powers in 1919. Under the treaty Japan was allowed to maintain the 
territory of Shandong which had been wrested from Germany following an agreement 
between Japan and the United States. The main consequence of the Versailles Treaty was 
that it instigated the beginning of a more cohesive anti-imperialist movement in China 
initially characterised by the May Fourth Movement and ultimately consolidated by the 
II Cohen, America's Response to China, p.67. 
12 Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century, pp.31-n. 
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emergence of Soviet Russia which gave support to the nationalist cause. \.1 The broader 
significance of the movement for the US was that it was the first nationalist cause which 
had mobilised mass support and which registered disillusion with liberal democracy among 
China's political classes. This disillusion was underscored when, at the Washington 
Conference of Pacific powers held in 1921-22, there was no undertaking to rescind the 
unequal treaties or to curtail foreign domination of the Chinese mainland despite a pledge 
not to interfere with China's political and territorial integrity under the Nine Power Treaty 
which followed. 14 The United States, it has to be said, was largely forced to relinquish 
Woodrow Wilson's liberal idealism in order to preserve a commitment to the Open Door 
policy in China - though the US was clearly committed to maintaining free trade and a 
treaty advantageous to itself. 
From the Depression to the Communist Victory of 1949 
The Wall Street Crash of 1929 threw the US-China relationship back into a state of 
profound uncertainty and, moreover, exposed the fledgling Guomindang (KMT) 
government (which had forged a nationalist government in 1927) under Chiang Kaishek to 
the global repercussions of a capitalist crisis. The main implications werethat the closure 
of western markets to Japanese exports once again induced an expansionist Japanese 
foreign policy and, in 1931, the Japanese intervened militarily in Manchuria creating the 
artificial state of Manchukuo. The US response to this incident was crucial and reflected 
the Hoover Administration's preoccupation with the depression at home. Secretary of 
State, Henry L Stimson, announced a Non-Recognition Doctrine aimed towards territories 
taken by Japan but, notably, there was no move to assist China's nationalist government 
1.1 Fung, Chinese Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, p.183. 
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nor to Impose economic sanctions on the aggressor. 15 The situation in China was 
complicated by the internal war between the Communist forces of Mao Zedong and the 
KMT which raged between 1931 and 1937 when, under pressure from the Soviet Union, 
a United Front was formed in the war against the Japanese invasion of that year. The 
collapse of the United Front in 1940 raised serious problems for US policy in China given 
the growing threat of Japan. US actions during the Civil War were, however, pivotal in 
determining China's stance in 1949 with the establishment of a Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) government. The basic thrust of US policy between 1938 and 1944 was that of 
aiding the KMT economically and militarily in the war against Japan in the full knowledge 
that large amounts of US aid were being hoarded in order to fight the Communists 
following Japanese defeat - despite significant KMT defections to the Japanese cause. 
Indeed, following American entry to the war in December 1941, Chiang Kaishek' s 
nationalist forces even threatened to join with Japan in an "Asiatic Solidarity" should US 
economic aid be refused. In 1942 the KMT was given some $500 million in loans, much of 
which was used in a domestic bond issue to keep inflation under control or to fight the 
Communists. 16 Towards the end of World War II the United States sought a compromise 
in the ongoing Civil War between the KMT and the CCP, fearing that Soviet entry to the 
war against Japan, which was broadly welcomed by the US, would bolster Communist 
forces in China and enhance the geopolitical position of the Soviets following the war. It 
was for this reason that the US continued to champion the cause of Chiang1s Kuomintang 
forces following Japanese defeat. In essence, this entailed the support of a bureaucratic 
J.1 Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth ('enlury, p.37 
I' Ihid, p.4l. 
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capitalist elite at the expense of an increasingly popular Communist Party which had 
consistently sought US support and which had fought the Japanese with greater resolution 
than the KMT. This strategy had its roots in nascent designs for US hegemony in the 
region and the assumption that the key feature of the new Asian order would be anti-
Communism. US aid to the KMT between 1945 and 1948 totaled some $1, 432 million 
and, on April 3 1948, Congress passed the China Aid Act authorising the dispensation 
$463 million to the nationalists. J7 However, despite persistent efforts by the US to prop 
up Chiang the Communists came to power on October I, 1949, declaring a People's 
Republic and signalling both the defeat of America's long-term strategy and the delivery 
of a potentially huge market into the socialist camp. 
US-China Relations During the Cold War 
Following Communist victory in China the domestic landscape of US politics changed 
considerably. The McCarthyite atmosphere of political persecution drew great succour 
from the Truman Administration's supposed loss of China and pressure mounted to isolate 
China politically and economically. Moreover, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 
and China's swift engagement "suggested that Mao Zedong could be induced to follow 
Soviet orders with just enough enthusiasm seriously to endanger America's Pacific 
interests and allies." 1~ A key feature of US-China relations throughout the Eisenhower 
presidency was the imposition of a trade embargo by the capitalist world and primarily 
enforced by the US. According to Breslin, only 8% of Chinese trade in 1949 was with the 
I) Ibid. p.130. 
IX N BernkopfTucker, "Cold War Contacts: America and China. 1952-56" in H Harding and Y Ming 
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Communist world; by 1952 this had risen to 87%.19 It was under such economIc 
constraints that China declared its intention to 'lean to one side' and support the Soviet 
Union despite serious reservations. The fact that the Soviets had consistently supported 
Chiang's KMT during the Chinese civil war and Stalin had cast aspersions upon the 
efficacy of China's rural-based Communist experiment demonstrated that the Sino-Soviet 
relationship was marked by tensions from the outset. As again Breslin puts it, "if the 
Americans took a hostile stance towards the Chinese because they thought China was part 
of an international socialist bloc, then their actions became a self-fulfilling prophecy. ,,2() 
A key feature of the US trade embargo (achieved by extending the allied Co-Ordinating 
Committee (COCOM) restrictions on trade with the Soviets to China and North Korea in 
July 1951) was the fact that it engendered a great deal of resentment among America's 
allies in Europe and with Japan. Britain led these protests, claiming that the embargo 
increased dependency on the resource-rich US and fearing the repercussions for Hong 
Kong as well as the unease which would arise among Commonwealth countries such as 
India, Ceylon and Pakistan. As Bernkopf Tucker points out, "the British and Europeans, 
generally, wanted a minimal control system prohibiting only the sale of goods with clear 
war potential, whereas the Americans desired broader prohibitions that would hinder 
development on the Communist bloc's industrial base."21 
The United States also feared Japan's enthusiasm for augmenting its trading relationship 
with China in the belief that any resultant economic dependency on China's market could 
pull Japan towards the Communist bloc. It was for this reason that CHINCOM was 
I') S Breslin, Mao. Longman. London, 1998. p.15l. 
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formed, as a semi-autonomous sub-committee of COCOM, following European objections 
to an entirely separate agency to regulate Asian trade. CHINCOM's express purpose was 
to regulate trade to China and entailed China's trade being subjected to rather more 
scrutiny than other Communist countries. 22 The United States continued to support 
nationalist Taiwan and, in 1954, concluded the Mutual Defence Treaty following the first 
Formosa Straits Crisis of September 1954 when the Chinese shelled the offshore islands of 
Quemoy and Matsu in order to signal the Communist commitment to reunifying all of 
China. This action was repeated in 1958 as Chinese foreign policy became ever more 
revolutionary in reaction to Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and his promotion of 
revisionist doctrines. More importantly, from 1956 onwards the reality of a Sino-Soviet 
split became ever more apparent as the Soviets distanced themselves from China over the 
bombing of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958 and failed to support the Chinese invasion of 
Tibet in 1959. The shifting ideological position of the Soviets was compounded by a 
geopolitical switch in 1962 when Khrushchev supported India in a violent border dispute 
with China that year. The split also had economic dimensions in that the Chinese were 
increasingly perturbed by the conditions attached to Soviet aid and the unsuitability of 
Soviet industrial plants in the Chinese context. It was in these circumstances that China 
embarked upon the ultimately disastrous Great Leap Forward programme of agricultural 
reform in 1957 in which as many as thirty million Chinese would perish. 
It is in the context of China's isolation from both the US and the Soviet Union that we 
have to seek to understand US-China relations in the early 1960s. Significantly, both the 
US and the Soviets were keen to entice non-aligned India into their camps and both had 
2~ fhid. p.243. 
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been alarmed by China's revolutionary soundings in the previous decade. Though the US 
trade embargo remained in place, changes in the perception of Communism as a monolith 
did begin to occur among US policymakers and the Kennedy Administration briefly 
considered supplying China with food as the Great Leap Forward came to an abrupt end 
in 1962. Again, a key feature of the US-China relationship during the 1960s was the 
extent to which US allies were departing from COCOM trade restrictions. Indeed, 
between 1963 and 1967 Japan's trade with the PRC amounted to $2.03 billion making it 
China's premier trade partner. Australia, meanwhile, built up a market in China based on 
wheat sales which amounted to some $256 million by 1963. Similarly, Canada entered into 
agreements for the sale of barley to the PRC amounting to some $362 million between 
1960 and 1963.23 
Much more significantly, France shattered the Western consensus on China policy by 
establishing full diplomatic contacts with China in 1964.24 Despite such economic contacts 
with the West, China embarked upon the Cultural Revolution between 1965-69 and some 
of that revolution's most fervent proponents in the CCP, notably Lin Biao, encouraged 
the export of Chinese revolutionary ideals and the creation of global upheavals likely to 
weaken the capitalist nations?5 Much of this anti-Western rhetoric, however, concealed 
China's deep-seated need for Western economic assistance and growing alienation from 
the Soviet Union. In March 1969 the Sino-Soviet split was transformed into open conflict 
as troops from each nation clashed along the Amur and Ussuri rivers and the prospect of a 
Soviet nuclear strike on China began to appear a possibility. It was this breach between 
2) R Foot, The Practice of Power: U.\' Relations with ChinG ,\'ince 1949. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
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the two Communist powers combined with US involvement in the Vietnam War that 
persuaded the incoming Nixon Administration to pursue a policy of rapprochement with 
China in the hope of playing upon Communist divisions and using China to elicit a 
favorable settlement to the war. 
Reconciliation 
At a deeper level, the US rapprochement with China has to be understood within the 
context of structural changes in the Cold War and institutional changes relating to China's 
participation in the global community. Firstly, from the early 1970s onwards the Vietnam 
war was placing a huge burden on the US economy, reinforcing gradual disillusionment 
with policies of global containtment within the US establishment. Moreover, the Sino-
Soviet split encouraged a re-evaluation of the dominant notion that the Communist bloc 
was somehow monolithic. Recognition of the PRC, then, also ran side by side with a wider 
reassessment of US power symbolised most potently by the fact that, in 1971, the US 
government had been forced to jettison the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates 
due to the spiralling deficits incurred during the Vietnam war. This move, almost instantly, 
removed the cooperative rationale underpinning economic relations among the countries 
of the western capitalist world. Thus, the US desire to cultivate relations with the PRC 
must also be viewed in a longer term perspective motivated by lithe allure of a boundless 
Chinese market. 1126 This point seems particularly pertinent given the fact that several of the 
advanced capitalist countries had cultivated trading relations with the Chinese during the 
1960s (see above). Perhaps, even more significantly, the US and China forged friendly 
25 JD Spence, The S'earch Jor Modern China. London. Hutchinson. 1990. p.o27. 
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relations during a period when revolutionary forces seemed to be gaining confidence in the 
Third World inspired by the Brezhnev doctrine of 1968. China's anti-Soviet foreign policy 
had led its leaders towards the "intermediary" capitalist powers of western Europe in 
search of trading partners, to right-wing western political forces for political support vis a 
vis the Soviets, and towards supporting authoritarian Third World countries such as Iran, 
Ethiopia, and Pakistan. As Chesneaux points out, this led to a decrease in the aid China 
gave to revolutionary movements in the 1960s.27 Secondly, China was admitted to the 
United Nations in 1971 just prior to official reconciliation with the United States. As 
Rosemary Foot notes, "if we focus on US structural co-optive power, we might note that 
China entered into the United Nations at a time when Beijing had visibly become a 
strategic ally of the United States, of presumed value in the task of containing a more 
assertive Soviet Union. ,,2M Moreover, the co-option of a nation formerly viewed as a 
champion of the Third World had serious ramifications for the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) project in the early 1970s and which derived most of its support 
from within the UN. Indeed, from 1971 onwards China's behaviour became far more 
conservative on the international scene. Though helping less developing countries in such 
causes as supporting the regulation of multi-national corporations, obtaining fairer terms 
for technology transfer from the advanced nations and favouring the rescheduling of 
foreign debts, the Chinese did not join the non-aligned movement nor OPEC (despite 
being an oil exporter). Moreover, moving nearer to the present, China has gone on to join 
2(, D Lampton, "America's China Policy: Developing a Fifth Strategy," in R Macchiarola and R Oxnam 
(cds), The China Challenge: American Policies in East Asia, Academy of Political Science, New York, 
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the IMF, the World Bank and to seek membership of GATT and the WT029 China's 
initial entry to the UN was hugely influenced by the impact of the economist and 
revisionist tendency in China as well as the new emphasis being placed on economic 
progress. Jean Chesneaux argues that the UN facilitated economic and technical contacts 
with the West and the purchase of factories and patents in the advanced sectors'O In 
short, China's entrance into the international order has to be seen against a backdrop of 
US structural power over global institutions in terms of shaping norms, rules, and 
behaviour conducive to broader US economic interests. This has meant that since 1972 
China has become more involved with the global economy and the global community at 
various levels. The US, meanwhile, has been able to use its structural largesse in order to 
"facilitate or retard the pace of that involvement,,31 at both the bilateral and multilateral 
levels. Importantly, the US is not the sole beneficiary of economic engagement and China's 
leadership has undoubtedly used international recognition and contacts with the US to 
develop the Chinese national economy's infrastructure and lay the foundations for 
economic growth and prosperity. At this juncture it is worth giving a brief account of the 
bilateral dimension to US-China relations since 1972 in a more specific manner. 
On February 28, 1972, and following highly secretive contacts between US national 
security adviser, Henry Kissinger, and his Chinese counterpart, Zhou Enlai, an agreement 
to resume full diplomatic relations between the two countries was officially declared in 
the form of the Shanghai Communique. The agreement was viewed by both sides as a 
~~ J Teufel-Dreyer, China's Political System: Modernisation and Tradition, London, Macmillan, 1996, 
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springboard to the full normalisation of relations following over two decades of 
estrangement. In short, the Communique was an agreement to recognise mutual points of 
difference and, notably, the status of Taiwan was confirmed within the Communique as a 
"long standing and serious dispute.,,32 Nevertheless, the Communique adumbrated the 
intentions of both governments to "facilitate the further development of contacts and 
exchanges" as well as to facilitate "the progressive development of trade" and "stay in 
contact through various channels. ,,33 A key backdrop to this new phase in US-China 
relations, however, was the implicit commitment to develop a new counterweight to 
Soviet power and, in the American case, to capitalise upon the Sino-Soviet split briefly 
discussed above. In the view of David Lampton, this new phase in America's approach to 
Chinese communism denoted the demise of a policy which had long "misjudged the degree 
of solidarity between the Soviet union and China, misread Chinese objectives in Asia, 
misunderstood why Mao Zedong and his Long March colleagues won the revolution, and 
overestimated American capabilities. ,,34 It is in this sense, as outlined above, that changes 
in US-China policy were part of a major rethinking of US foreign policy and the 
conventional Cold War wisdom. 
A major dynamic in this rethinking was the new salience of China as a potential recipient 
of US exports and the emergence of a previously downplayed political economy element 
to the relationship. Indeed, from the starting point of virtually zero trade contacts 
}1 Foot, The Practice of Power, p.19. 
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between the two nations, the US was China's third largest trade partner by 1973 with 
trade amounting to some $803 million. Indeed, between 1972 and 1979 (the year relations 
were officially normalised) China imported a total of $1.94 billion in goods from the US 
and exported $887 million worth of goods to the US. 35 As Foot notes, however, "high 
expectations regarding the China market remained unfulfilled, America accounting for 
only 2.6% of China's imports and 2.5% of its exports in 1977.,,36 The United States 
remained some twenty years behind Japan and its western European allies in cultivating 
trading relations with China and also had to contend with a ramshackle legal and 
institutional context largely inimical to the coordination of trade on a significant scale. 
Moreover, several factors within China's political milieu precluded a wholesale 
commitment to foreign trade and outside influences until Deng Xiaoping's assumption of 
the leadership of the CCP in 1978. These factors were both ideological and economic. 
Firstly, it was felt that contact with the West was likely to undermine the authority of the 
Communist system and create a systemic dependency on the US and other advanced 
capitalist countries. As Foot notes, this was compounded by China huge trade deficit 
which, in 1974, amounted to some $1.2 billion. 37 
Viewed in terms of the Cold War system, the goal of the US was "to draw ... formerly 
closed systems towards the world-economy and in this way erode their planned, autarchic 
character.,,3M It was the recognition of this fact which generated heated debate within 
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China between hard-line Marxist ideologues (such as the Gang of Four led by Mao's 
widow Jiang Qing) and moderate forces led by Zhou Enlai and, following Zhou's death in 
1976, Deng Xiaoping. The form of economic policy vis a vis foreign powers favoured by 
those espousing a Maoist foreign policy prioritised the view that imports should be 
covered by volume of exports while the utilisation of foreign credit should be kept to a 
minimum. Reformers favoured the root and branch modernisation of the Chinese 
economic infrastructure and a move away from the celebration of politics over economics 
characteristic of the Cultural Revolution and Mao's later years. In short, these domestic 
disputes centered on nothing less than the future of China in the global economy and, quite 
naturally, stalled full progress in trade relations with the us. The views of those opposed 
to further interaction with the US were reinforced by widespread disillusion with 
America's policy of Detente towards the Soviet Union - a process which reached its 
apogee with the Ford Administration's conclusion of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. The 
Chinese leadership felt that the US had "stood on China's shoulders" in order to bring the 
Soviets to the negotiating table and fiercely resisted the closer relations which unfolded 
between the Soviet Union and the US between 1972 and 1979.39 US foreign policy during 
this period was greatly influenced by the Trilateral Commission and nascent ideas 
concerned with growing interdependency in the global economy. In the trilateral view, 
cooperative rather than conflictual relations with ideological rivals were more conducive 
to overall US interests. Cooperative relations were entrenched by tying countries to 
international regimes and institutions likely to moderate their behaviour and to result in 
their respect for norms and values consistent with stability within a liberal world order . 
. ,9 M Oksenberg, "A Decade in Sino-American Relations," Foreign Affairs, Vo1.61, No.1, 1982, p.180. 
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Significantly, global stability outweighed concerns with democracy at home and abroad in 
the light of an ever more competitive and turbulent global economy. Thus, the Communist 
nature of the Chinese regime became gradually less important than its willingness to enter 
the United Nations or the World Bank for, in the long term, such institutions were bound 
to promote both capitalism and liberal democracy40 Moreover, these ideas had a great 
deal of influence over the Carter Administration as it attempted to adjust the US to 
changes in the world economy41 
Normalisation 
The Carter Administration initially placed China fairly low on its list of priorities given the 
internal power struggles within China and the concentration upon ratitying the Panama 
Canal treaty, reaching SALT II with the Soviet Union, and elevating human rights 
concerns as the central plank of Carter's post-Vietnam and post-Watergate emphasis on 
US moral leadership. Moreover, events in Central America, notably the victory of Daniel 
Ortega's socialist movement in Nicaragua, forced the Administration to undertake a new 
appraisal of socialism as a democratic force in world politics. This marked a key, if brief, 
departure from established Cold War policy and enhanced the position of those pushing 
for closer relations with both China and the Soviet Union. In time, however, the Carter 
Administration became divided between supporters of a traditional Cold War policy who 
sought to use China as a strategic ally against the Soviets (represented by National 
Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski) and those favouring Detente and the conclusion of 
SALT II with the Soviet Union (a faction led by Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance.) In 
40 See MJ Crozier, S Huntington, and J Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the (Jovernahilitv 
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many respects, it was the former bureaucratic constituency which prevailed in the 
arguments surrounding the normalisation of relations with China. However, this severely 
understates some of the broader economic factors involved in normalisation and China's 
incremental journey towards the global economy. 
The Carter Administration's China policy was genuinely different from that of Nixon and 
Kissinger in that Carter himself placed a strong emphasis on cultural and scientific ties and 
the placement of the relationship on a deeper economic and political footing which moved 
beyond the narrow realpolitik of Kissinger42 Carter believed strongly in the promotion of 
US values and technocratic expertise as a means to alleviate poverty in China and, perhaps 
implicitly, as an indirect method of achieving long-term human rights objectives beginning 
with basic economic provisions to the world's largest national populace. This approach to 
China, then, had both moral and technocratic components - dual traits personified by 
Carter himself Moreover, this broader emphasis on the political economy aspect of US-
China relations largely dovetailed with Deng Xiaoping's consolidation of power in 1978 
following his prolonged struggle with leftist and reactionary forces in Beijing since Mao's 
death in 1976. It is worth going into some detail here. 
Deng's consolidation of power engendered both political and economic stability - in 1978 
US-China trade tripled and China's trade with the global economy rose by some 40%4, -
and, more importantly, signaled a new path in China's approach to development. Market 
incentives came to replace revolutionary zeal in economic policy and Deng's 'Four 
Modernisation's (agriculture, science and technology, industry, and military capability) 
41 For a discussion see J Dumbreli, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation. Manchester. Manchester 
University Press, pp.lll-12. 
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took their place as the new national policy framework. Key domestic reforms included the 
Joint Venture Law of July, 1979, which clearly signaled China's desire to attract foreign 
investment overturning the pattern of reticent engagement with the global economy prior 
to 1978. As Jeffrey Conklin points out, "the investment which followed not only 
introduced the first large quantities of foreign capital to the Chinese economy, it brought 
with it new technologies, management 'know-how' and export channels for China's 
fledgling industrial sectors.,,44 This law permitted foreign partners to hold a stake of 25% 
to 100% of a joint venture and subjected companies to 30% tax rates as well as a 10% 
local tax rate. Much of the production was required to take place in the advanced 
capitalist countries in order to secure the repatriation of profits in foreign currency. 45 The 
Joint Venture Law was accompanied, in 1980, by a new open door policy - only now 
China was the initiator. The Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act of August 1980 
introduced a series of market reforms (primarily the decollectivisation of agriculture) in 
designated areas in China's coastal regions and encouraged the local populace to produce 
for profit as well as the inflow of foreign capital. Perhaps most significantly, China 
embarked upon a series of structural reforms aimed at stabilising rates of growth; 
reforming economic management; reorganising enterprises; and improving productivity, 
technology, and management. 46 
These reforms were particularly important In that they saw China adopting 
macroeconomic policies in the fiscal sphere similar to those utilised in the advanced, often 
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more social democratic, capitalist countries. Indeed, the Chinese government was able to 
keep inflation at a sufficiently low level to make China attractive to foreign investors from 
the outset. 47 Also, as Susan Shirk makes clear, China was able to take full advantage of 
the expansion of international finance in the 1970s and to make use of foreign capital to a 
far greater extent than its Asian neighbors had in the 1960s. This combined with an influx 
of capital from overseas Chinese communities to entwine China with the global economy, 
particularly financial markets, much more quickly than even the Newly Industrialising 
Countries (NICs) of East Asia4~ At the bilateral level the procurement of US technology 
became a firm priority as did the importation of scientific expertise. The official 
normalisation of US-China relations in January 1979 speeded up this process as did Deng's 
visit to the US in mid 1979 which portrayed an image of a China open to western contacts 
and capital investment. Bilateral ties were consolidated by the setting up of a Joint Sino-
American Economic Commission and a Joint Sino-American Scientific Commission in 
1979, again illuminating the new breadth at work in the relationship. Between 1978 and 
1979 bilateral trade increased by some 200% (worth some $2.3 billion).49 At the 
multilateral level, meanwhile, China became more embroiled in the global economy by 
entering both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (lMF) as it became 
clear that the key to China's modernisation lay in Washington, both in itself, and as 
gatekeeper to the institutions of the global political economy and international 
46 J Tsao and J Whisler, China Briefing Paper, Office of Economics Working Paper, US International 
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community. 50 However, several bilateral issues continued to preclude an entirely 
predictable US-China relationship many of which emanated from right-wing elements 
within the US Congress. 
The main thorn in the side of the normalisation process was a wealthy and well organised 
Taiwan lobby within Congress which garnered support from those outraged by Taiwan's 
treatment during the normalisation process. Ideological conservatives found some 
common-cause with humanitarian liberals perturbed by the PRC's little-mentioned human 
rights record. The Congressional lobby opposed to Carter's China policy pointed out the 
supposed hypocrisy involved in the Administration's downplaying of human rights in the 
light of an ever more hostile stance towards the Soviet Union. Moreover, in 1978 
Congress had passed the Dole-Stone Amendment which instructed the Administration to 
consult Congress over any change in the status of Taiwan. The Administration, however, 
failed to inform Congress of the specific terms involved in the normalisation agreement, 
thereby inciting the powerful Taiwan lobby to mount a direct challenge Carter's entire 
China policy. Indeed, Senator Barry Goldwater mounted a successful legal challenge, 
later overturned, in the federal courts contesting the constitutionality of Carter's 
revocation of the Mutual Defence Treaty of 1954 pledging the US to the defence of 
Taiwan. 51 Worse was to follow. America's entire China policy was thrown into schism as 
the Congress approved the Taiwan Relations Act in February 1979 which reaffirmed the 
US's role in the defence of Taiwan and which the Chinese initially viewed as a 'two China' 
policy incompatible with normalised relations. The Act threatened to provide Taiwan with 
Sf! See H Jacobsen and M Oksenberg, China's Participation in the JAI['~ the World Bank, and CIA 7T: 
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"such defence articles and defensive ... services as may be necessary" and to "preserve" and 
"promote" US-Taiwan relations across a wide spectrum of issues. 52 This apparent 
bifurcation of US China policy left the Chinese leadership rather incredulous and confused 
as to where power lay in the US, exposing, as it did, the self-undermining and 
contradictory tendencies of the US political process. 
In spite of the sticking point of Taiwan, and anger over substantial US arms sales to 
Taiwan in both 1979 and 1980, the Chinese appetite for capital and technology superseded 
disputes over security issues. In short, the political economy aspect of US-China relations 
clearly overrode often exaggerated disputes over Taiwan. Moreover, the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in December 1979 acted as the catalyst for political forces on both sides, 
particularly within the Pentagon and the NSC in the US, to push for the augmentation of 
the military relationship as a response to perceived advances in Soviet power. The Carter 
Administration remained largely quiescent when the PRC invaded Vietnam in February 
1979 (which proved a disastrous mistake for the Chinese military) while US Defence 
Secretary, Harold Brown, visited China in January 1980 to discuss military cooperation, 
informing the Chinese of US preparedness to sell a range of "non-lethal" military 
equipment. 53 In April 1980 the US Commerce Department, under Juanita Kreps, 
reclassified China's export status from that covering Warsaw pact Countries (Category Y) 
to Category P, thus placing China outside the ambit of COCOM restrictions on military 
sales to Communist countries. The result was over four hundred advanced-technology 
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items being cleared for export by September 1980 with, at least, minimal potential for 
military application. 54 
In January 1980 Congress approved a Trade Agreement between the US and China 
drafted by the Commerce Department. Implicit in the agreement was the conferral of full 
most-favored nation (MFN) status on China - something denied to the Soviet Union at 
that time. The reaching of a bilateral agreement on trade was about far more than 
economics in that it signifies the abandonment of the notionally 'even-handed' balance 
being maintained between China and the Soviet Union. In effect, the Act confirmed 
China's anomalous position within US foreign policy - a special case towards which 
previously accepted standards of engagement failed to apply. 55 
The conclusion of the trade agreement with China and the initiation of a new phase in US-
China relations occurred against a backloth of anti-Soviet sentiments and the revival of a 
'second Cold War' in which the Soviet Union was portrayed as the root cause of 
America's problems in the world. 56 For hard-liners China was, indeed, simply a 'card' to 
play against the Soviets in the pursuit of geopolitical superiority. 57 
As we have seen, however, the trade act takes its place alongside several other 
developments (notably China's entry to the World Bank and domestic economic reforms) 
as part of a deeper process of China's progressive absorption into the global economy. 
53 HN Kim and 1L Hammersmith. "US-China Relations in the Post-Normalisation Era. 1979-1985". 
Pacific Affairs. Vol.59. No.1, p.73. 
S4 Ihid. p.74. 
:is Under the provision of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act conferral of MFN upon 
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ironically, Senator Henry Jackson, the Democratic architect of the legislation, voted for the 1980 Trade 
agreement with China. 
,(, See F Halliday. The Making of the Second Cold War. London. Verso. 1984. 
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Importantly, reforms in China made China fertile enough economically to encourage the 
first shoots of US private sector activity gradually to expand, compounding nascent US 
business activity in 1978. During that first year of Oeng's reform program, the Fluor 
Corporation (dealing in copper plants), Boeing, US Steel and Pan-American Airlines, 
among others, had made early inroads into the China market. 5X This was buttressed by the 
opening of US Export-Import Bank (EXIM) facilities and guarantees as well as the 
provision of loans and insurance from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC) under the auspices of the US-China trade agreement. 59 The trade agreement 
sought to establish "all necessary facilities for financial, currency, and banking 
transactions", encompassing patent, copyright and trademark protection. GO This, in turn, 
combined with China's domestic reforms in laying the foundations for multi-national 
company investment and the incremental inroads made by global finance during the 1980s. 
Again, China's continued growth became inexorably bound up with the granting of World 
Bank and IMF loans guaranteeing Chinese liquidity, the provision of technology and 
expertise, and a willingness to sell military equipment. 
The Political Economy of US-China Relations in the 1980s 
The election of the Reagan Administration is almost coterminous with the advance of New 
Right economic policies and, more specifically, a neo-liberal economic agenda with great 
global significance. Reagan's domestic policies of deregulation, privati sat ion, and the 
slashing of social welfare were combined with strong arm tactics to bring organised labour 
5~ T Qingshan, The Making of US-China Policy: From Normalisation to the Post ('old Ifar Era. Boulder. 
Lynne Rienner. 1992, p.62. 
,~ T Williams. "First National Bank of Chicago has made Two Small Loans". Far f~'astern l~'con()mic 
Nevlew, March 7, 1980, p.66. 
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into line with state policies which were unapologetically laissez-faire it is against this 
backdrop that America's staunchly anti-Communist foreign policy during the 1980s has to 
be understood. Communist regimes were not only the enemy of freedom but also the 
enemy of free markets. Indeed, highly interventionist states were also deemed enemies of 
individual enterprise and economic prosperity during this period. Thus it is fair to say that 
as a Communist country undertaking market reforms China fitted rather awkwardly into 
the Reagan Administration's view of the world. On the one hand, China was curtailing 
individual rights and free enterprises as understood in the New Right lexicon while, on the 
other, China was a country implementing a sweeping program of economic reform and 
was showing signs of becoming a lucrative market for American companies in the near 
future. It is the contradiction between these two factors which seems to have characterised 
US Policy during the 1980s. 
It is also the case, as will be discussed below, that some analytical distance has to be 
maintained between America's China policy as it related to specific issues and the overall 
structural implications of neo-liberalism during the 1980s as its influence came to 
dominate trends in the world economy. 
The election of Ronald Reagan as US President in 1980 initially appeared to rupture the 
relative stability in relations which had accrued during the Carter Administration. As a 
presidential candidate Reagan had denounced the Carter Administration's China policy as 
"totally unreliable and capricious" in the manner it had condemned Taiwan to the sidelines 
of US foreign policy.61 Indeed, Reagan had served on the advisory board of Jack 
60 JA Cohen, "Building Up a Joint Economic Framework", Far Eastern Economic Review, March 7, 1980, 
p.42. 
(,J Cited in Kim and Hammersmith, US-China Relations in the Post-Normalization Era, p.75. 
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Buttram's neo-conservative lobby group 'Friends of a Free China' and played to the right-
wing gallery during the election campaign, promising specifically to re-establish full 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, it soon became clear that Reagan's China 
policy in praxis did not reflect the bluster of the campaign and was, indeed, to be 
conducted on a remarkably pragmatic basis. Reagan's toning down of pro-Taiwanese 
rhetoric in large part reflected his Administration's pre-occupation with the Soviet Union, 
with particular attention focused upon events in Poland in 1981 and the prospect of a 
Soviet reassertion of power in Poland where Lech Walesa's Solidarity movement had 
been gaining increasing support. 
Though resolutely anti-Communist the Reagan Administration was characterised in 
general by bitter divisions, and Reagan's 'hands off style of political management allowed 
disputes to run interminably within the bureaucracy. China policy was certainly no 
exception and the battle lines were drawn initially between Alexander Haig's State 
Department, espousing a realist synthesis of world affairs, and Richard Allen's National 
Security Council (NSC), which adopted a rigidly neo-conservative ideological standpoint. 
Haig thus urged the constructive engagement of China as a strategic ally while Allen 
advocated a pro-Taiwanese policy which, if put into practice, was likely to reverse the 
achievements made under the Carter Administration. During 1981 and 1982 the Haig 
position prevailed, though the Administration tended to deal with China on a reactive basis 
determined by issues rather than an overall policy approach. Again, this reflected the 
disputes which raged within the Administration during the early 1980s. Indeed, Reagan's 
China policy in the early phase of the Administration was largely dominated by the Taiwan 
issue, with the Chinese government continuing to protest US arms sales to the government 
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in Taipei. Significantly, however, the Chinese government did welcome Reagan's bellicose 
posture towards the Soviet Union only to conclude, by 1982, that Reaganism was a 
largely symbolic venture devoid of political commitment. In large part, this emanated from 
Reagan's realisation that the practical implications of his Administration's often hysterical 
rhetoric were too cataclysmic to contemplate in a nuclear world. Thus by 1982 the 
Chinese government began criticising the developing US stance as constituting a 'passive 
position. ,62 In 1982 Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, declared China to be "the most 
important country in the world" for US strategic interests representing the linchpin, as it 
were, in the complex geo-political matrix between East and West, North and South63 
Haig's resignation in June 1982, however, was followed by a qualitatively new approach to 
China policy enunciated by his successor at the State department, George Shultz. The new 
US approach was more concerned with the Asia-pacific as a region. Shultz stressed that 
the US's policies would be increasingly harnessed to Japan's dynamic economy and its 
technologically advanced, though lean, naval and air power trajectory. In short, the new 
Asia policy recognised Japan's role as a regional economic leader and concentrated far 
less on anti-communism as a rationale for policy. Shultz's shift in policy was especially 
prescient in that it foresaw the increasing impotence of Soviet power as well as the 
fundamentally economic foundation upon which US national interests and US foreign 
policy would be predicated in the future. Increasingly, China was viewed as a regional, 
1>2 Chinese official, cited in R Ross, "China Learns to Compromise: Change in US-China Relations, 1982-
1984", China Quarter~v, No.128, 1991. p.747. 
63 H Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p.119. 
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rather than global, power broker and a "passive ... counterweight to Soviet power.,,64 This 
'new reality' in US foreign policy thinking, then, also marked, in the words of Garrett and 
Glaser, "a new appreciation of China's poverty, backwardness, and preoccupation with 
economic modernisation. ,,65 
As briefly mentioned above, the Taiwan arms sales issue had caused some serious tensions 
and internecine exchanges between the US and China's leadership which demanded an end 
to all US sales during the early years of the Reagan Administration. This issue was defused 
somewhat by a Joint Communique announced on August 17 1982 in which the Reagan 
Administration once again reaffirmed its commitment to the Shanghai Communique and 
the recognition of one China as well as the principle of non-interference in matters relating 
to the unification of Taiwan with the mainland. More importantly, the Communique also 
contained a US pledge to IIreduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over time 
to its resolution. 1166 A second contentious issue emerged concerning China's application 
for membership of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in February 1983. The Chinese 
government demanded that Taiwan be expelled from membership of the bank given 
Taiwan's non-sovereign status. This elicited a US response in which threats were made to 
withdraw all US contributions to the ADB should Taiwan be ousted from membership. 
Following three years of stalemate the issue was successfully resolved when, in march 
1986, Taiwan agreed to desist using the name Republic of China during meetings of the 
ADB while consenting to the removal of the Taiwanese flag from the ADB's headquarters. 
M BN Garrett and BS Glaser, "From Nixon to Reagan: China's Changing Role in American Strategy". in 
KA Dye, RJ Lieber, and D Rothchild (eds), Eagle Resurgent: The Reagan Era in AmericGn Foreign 
Policy, Boston, Little Brown, 1987. p.270. 
(''i Ibid. p.271. 
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The strong irredentist sentiments expressed by the PRC over this matter were indicative of 
increasing nationalism concomitant with Deng's modernisation program, economic 
growth, and a new found national confidence embodied by China's political elites in the 
Between 1982 and 1989 China pursued an 'independent' foreign policy, so called because 
the leadership straddled the line between maintaining constructive relations with both the 
US and the Soviet Union. In some respects, however, the idea of China's independent 
foreign policy, which has become common parlance in commentaries upon China in the 
1980s, masks the extent to which China continued to become embroiled in the global 
economy and the way in which the Chinese state's modernisation policies were dictated by 
the increasingly neo-liberal expectations of global lending institutions. Though Japan was 
China's largest creditor in the 1980s (ironically Japan was also buying up large swathes of 
the American economy in government bonds and large swathes of America in real estate 
during this period) China received some $7.4 billion in loans from the World Bank 
between 1980-89, making it the bank's largest borrower. 6x China also accrued standby 
credit from the IMF for the first time and began raising funds on the Eurodollar bond 
market.69 Bilateral trade also grew substantially during the Reagan era and was worth $14 
billion by 1988 - up 40% from the previous year. 70 The US had become China's second 
largest export market while, importantly, US investment was becoming an increasingly 
salient factor in the relationship. Chinese officials contrasted the US approach to 
investment with that of Japan which they viewed, probably unfairly, as simply plying the 
67 Ross, China Learns to Compromise, pp.751-53. 
6~ Jacobsen and Oksenberg, China's participation in the IA1F, the World Bank, and GA 71'. p.IIS. 
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Chinese with exports in order to retain long-term leverage in China's economy and the 
Asia-Pacific region. 7l By 1988 US companies were investing in some 630 projects with 
$3.5 billion having been poured into the Chinese economy, making the US second only to 
Hong Kong as a supplier of foreign direct investment (FDI).72 
Accompanying developments in US-China relations during the Reagan years was, of 
course, the rapid Soviet decline, the retreat of socialism and the onward march on neo-
liberalism. This fundamental erosion in the main tenets of social and economic 
organisation in nations treading divergent paths from the Anglo-Saxon economic model 
further undermined the ostensibly socialistic traits of formerly closed economies like 
China's while it, at least temporarily, sounded the death knell for overly demand oriented 
economic strategies world-wide. This included social democratic governments pursuing 
state-led Keynesian policies in the face of the restructuring of the global economy and 
was exemplified by France's inability to pursue independent economic policies of reflation 
and nationalisation in the early 1980s. Thus it was not simply Communist countries which 
were on the defensive and, ironically, it may have been slightly easier for China to adapt to 
a new economic model given the fact that the old Communist system had never really 
delivered in economic terms in the first place. What it had done, however, was to 
centralise power and create a strong enough state to oversee economic reforms of the 
economy. It was in this context of deeper relations with the global economy that China 
limited its attacks on the US to criticism of US 'hegemony' in the Middle East and Central 
America, while intermittently posturing on behalf of the Third World. Moreover, renewed 
~() W Lord, "China and America: Beyond the Big Chill", Foreign Affairs, Vo1.68, No.4, 1989, p.20. 
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overtures towards the Soviet Union, which many commentators see as evidence of China's 
free hand in foreign policy in the 1980s, had ceased to concern the US by 1985 or so, as 
Mikhail Gorbachev embarked upon Perestroika and Glasnost and introduced market 
mechanisms into the Soviet economy to improve resource allocation. China itself during 
this period became more immersed in the new international division of labour concomitant 
with the onset of globalisation in production and dictated by the liberalisation of global 
financial markets. Chinese exports became increasingly concentrated in labour-intensive 
goods such as toys and in 1986 China began running its first significant trade deficits with 
the United States. The deficit that year surpassing $1 billion for the first time. In short, 
China's importance was fast becoming that of an economic competitor in the capitalist 
world-economy rather than a Cold War enemy, as in the 1950s and 60s, or a Cold War 
partner as in the 1970s. The 1980s bore out the fact that China's development had long 
comprised a complex mixture of ideology and national economic development and it was 
clear by the mid 80s that economic development was a priority and participation in the 
global economy a necessary part of sustaining stability and growth. As Funabashi el at 
point out, "the policies of the Deng era .... made China more economically interdependent 
with the world than is usually imagined." Between 1980 and 1991 export volumes grew at 
an average annual rate of over 10% and, by the early 90s, were comparable to the export 
volumes of the west European economies. Moreover, the 1980s also witnessed the 
emergence of a consumer market in China as the emphasis changed from the import of 
large industrial plants early in the decade to the importation of major consumer goods, 
72 Lord, America and China: Beyond the Big Chill. p.20. 
telecommunications, and services. 73 Again, the most significant part of China's interaction 
with the US and the West was the official commitment to the import of foreign capital and 
technology. These policies were embodied in the sixth five-year plan (1981-85) which 
entrenched the concept of a socialist market economy stressing the new importance of 
quality control and consumer needs. 74 Also, from 1986 onwards the Chinese government 
has been attempting to join GATT (now the WTO) though it has been prevented from 
doing so by the US in a political tussle which has pitted neo-Iiberal norms at the global 
level against an incremental and state controlled reform process. It was these disputes, 
along with the issue of human rights, which carried over into the Bush Presidency and the 
collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
US-China Relations in the Post-Cold War Period 
In 1989 US-China relations transmuted into an entirely new scenario as the collapse of 
Communism irrevocably altered America's role in the world. Without an anti-Communist 
foreign policy many members of the American political establishment sought a new raison 
d'etre binding national policy together. For many, democracy and a commitment to human 
rights filled the vacuum left by Soviet demise while, for others, greater concentration on 
global markets seemed to signal the way forward. It is fairly safe to say that these 
contending visions were not satisfactorily resolved until the election of the Clinton 
Administration in 1992 and, even then, continued to generate controversy. The obvious 
pre-cursor to immediate changes in the tone and dynamics of the Bush Administration's 
relationship with China, following the relative calm of the period 1982-89, was the events 
at Tiananmen Square on 4 June, 1989. Equally, the shooting of Chinese students in their 
n Funabashi et al. An Emerging China in a World qfl nterdependence, p.35. 
thousands cannot be abstracted from the 'people power' revolution which was unraveling 
bloodlessly in Europe at that time. However, China's leaders, unlike their East European 
comrades, resisted democratic reform and placed priority upon maintaining order and 
preventing political entropy in the face of the collapse of authoritarian Communist 
ideology. The Chinese leadership's position also reflected a historically rooted fear among 
Chinese elites of China becoming atomised and ungovernable as it had been during the 
period of foreign domination. 
The events at Tiananmen square were relayed across the world and, unsurprisingly, 
generated an inexorable momentum for tough action by the Bush Administration from 
both the US public and the Congress. However, Bush chose not to sever links with China 
in a comprehensive manner likely to make the relationship difficult to repair but did, 
nevertheless, suspend all government to government military sales and exchanges while 
pledging to treat visa extension applications by Chinese students resident in the US 
sympathetically. A host of other areas within the relationship were left open to review 
dependent on subsequent developments. These measures were, in short, extremely 
minimal and intended to suspend certain aspects of interaction rather than retaliate against 
China. Behind the scenes, moreover, Bush sought to reassure the Chinese leadership that 
the US was unwilling to act hastily and he dispatched National Security Advisor, Brent 
Scowcroft, and Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, to Beijing as soon as 
July 1989 in a covert attempt to maintain dialogue between the two governments. Indeed, 
only three weeks after the events at Tiananmen Square Secretary of State, James Baker, 
made it clear that human rights alone could not be allowed to dictate the US-China 
74 Tsao and Whisler, China Briejing Paper, p.S. 
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relationship, declaring that "the dismantling of a constructive ... relationship built up so 
carefully over two decades would serve neither our interests nor those of the Chinese 
people.,,75 The main reason for maintaining relations on a sound footing was, of course, 
China's burgeoning importance as a market for US exports and the need for the US to 
ensure China's role in global economic stability be safeguarded from short-term political 
factors. 
The Geo-Economic Agenda 
In 1990 the US-China relationship came to be dominated, as it would be for several years 
thereafter, by the mainly Congressional penchant for using China's MFN status to elicit 
favourable Chinese progress on human rights and, more significantly, as a way of 
registering disapproval with an ever growing trade deficit between the two countries. In 
1990 the deficit stood at $10 billion and rose to $12 billion in 1991. 76 Indeed, during the 
latter half of the Bush Presidency a toughening in attitudes towards China began to take 
place reflecting a gradual realisation by the Bush Administration that the old order was 
giving way to a new era in which expanding US market share was displacing the national 
security concerns of the Cold War. Thus the Bush Administration began raising such 
bilateral economic issues as China's alleged use of prison labour to cut the costs of 
Chinese exports; China's incipient trade surplus mentioned above, general matters of 
market access for US products including Chinese over-use of quotas and licensing 
regulations; and matters relating to abuses of copyright and intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) by Chinese manufacturers. Much of this new found antipathy towards China was 
7, James Baker, cited in D Xinghao, "Managing Sino-American Relations in a Changing World", Asian 
Survey, VoUl, No.12, 1991, p.1158. 
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fueled by the US press which was in turn feeding off and creating an increasingly populist 
concern with relative US decline purportedly fed by anti-competitive practices elsewhere -
first in Japan and now China. 77 In mid 1991 the Bush Administration went so far as to 
threaten trade sanctions should the Chinese authorities fail to address IPR abuses. In 
October 1991 Section 301 of the 1988 Trade Act was invoked, permitting a US 
investigation, carried out by the Office of the United States trade Representative (USTR), 
into China's trading practices.7l! According to Business Week, illegal copying of CDs and 
computer products had cost US companies $400 million in 199079 It was also significant 
that the US regained an interest in Chinese human rights conditions in the period following 
the fall of the Soviet Union. The main reason for this was that China's leaders viewed 
human rights as intimately tied in with China's ascension as an economic competitor and 
proof of protectionist tendencies within the US government. In April 1991, for instance, 
met with the Dalai Lama and raised human rights concerns with Chinese premier, Li Peng, 
at considerable length in 1990. The main purpose of Bush's human rights emphasis was 
probably symbolic, however, in the face of pressure from Congress to withdraw China's 
MFN trading status. The Administration, overall, was keen to push the agenda of 
economic engagement combined with tough negotiating on bilateral issues and China's 
entry to GATT. The emergent factionalism over US-China policy in the post-Cold War 
period will be addressed in Chapter four of this thesis as will the broader issue of human 
rights. 
7h N Lardy, China in the World Economy, Washington D.C., International Institute of Economics, 1994, 
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The decline of US hegemony was well illustrated during the 1990-91 UN vote on 
intervention in the Gulf following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. China's abstention in the 
vote on Resolution 678 authorising the use of force was crucial in that any vote against 
the motion would have, at the very least, delayed US intervention. China's decision also 
reinforced the argument that China could not be isolated in a more multilateral world 
order where the US could no longer act unilaterally. Indeed, during the Bush 
Administration China agreed to adhere to a host of multilateral actions and agreement 
favored by the US. China adhered to a UN boycott on arms to Iraq; participated in efforts 
to bring peace to Cambodia and to defuse tensions on the Korean peninsula; agreed to 
observe the principles of the Missile and Technology Control Regime (MTCR); and joined 
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992. This occurred against a backdrop of 
intermittent threats by the US to rescind China's MFN status due to human rights abuses. 
Bush's election campaign of 1992, for example, was sensitive to candidate Bill Clinton's 
claims that the president had 'coddled up' to dictators and Bush took the highly 
controversial decision during the 1992 campaign to sell F -16 Fighter jets to Taiwan to 
both appease his own right-wing and to neutralise Clinton's criticism.~o 
Regionalism 
During the Bush years China also emerged as a pivotal regional actor which had two 
major implications for US foreign policy. Firstly, China's growing power dovetailed with 
the Bush Administration's growing interest in regionalism as a means of securing US 
influence and open markets in the post-Cold War and post-hegemonic era. More 
specifically, attempts have been made to incorporate China with the Asia Pacific Economic 
~(I Faust and Kornberg, China in World Politics, p.142. 
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Cooperation (APEC) forum set up in 1989 to encourage free trade within the Asia-
Pacific region. Along with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A) signed in 
1993, and largely the result of diplomacy during the Bush Administration, APEC 
represented a new commitment to economic multilateralism in the regional sphere 
underpinned by neo-liberal economic rules consecrated by the Uruguay round of GATT -
also signed in 1993. In short, APEC regionalism extended US economic policies of free 
trade and market economics by multilateral means in an attempt to provide a new rationale 
for US power and influence in the region following the collapse of communism. Implicitly, 
US involvement in APEC also sought to promote a specific model of Anglo-Saxon free 
market capitalism and to challenge state interventionism and protectionsim still rife in the 
region. Secondly, China's growth as a regional actor has also been important in terms of 
the power vacuum left in the region by the decline of US hegemony. The emergence of 
Greater China (China, Taiwan and Hong Kong) as an economic bloc has been extremely 
significant as has China's economic links with Japan. This second form of regionalism, 
then, is more indigenous to the region and is formed by local institutions and traditions. 
Moreover, it may otTer an alternative to neo-liberal models of economic development 
recognising Asia's more distinctive state-led form of capitalism. These issues will be 
discussed further in chapter four. 
Environmental Issues 
Another issue to emerge on the global agenda in a senous manner during the Bush 
Administration was the issue of the environment and ecological sustainability. The 1992 
Rio Conference on the World Environment represented the first major attempt to 
ameliorate outstanding issues of global concern such as greenhouse gas emission levels 
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and population control. As the two most polluting nations in the world the bilateral and 
multilateral understanding reached between the US and China holds great weight in terms 
of the future of the environmental debate and possible forms of environmental 
cooperation. Moreover, some of the key points of difference between the US and a still 
developing China polarise many of the North-South divides on the environmental issue. 
This topic will be addressed at greater length in chapter five. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has, essentially, sought to historicise the US-China relationship thereby 
placing the analysis contained in subsequent chapters in a wider and more long-term 
context. The first section of this chapter is particularly important in this respect in terms of 
understanding America's long-term links with China's colonial past and the economic 
domination which the imperial powers imposed. As stressed above, US complicity in 
Europe's fairly shabby treatment of nineteenth century China is undeniable but it purpose 
was rather more complex than that of the other powers. From the outset, the US was 
more concerned with open markets than territorial advantage and, as we have seen, 
distanced itself from European polices designed to create 'spheres of influence.' Rather, 
the US promoted an Open Door policy which, we have argued, was consistent with 
America's emergence as the gatekeeper of a liberal world order as the former hegemon, 
Britain, turned towards neo-mercantilist policies in China and elsewhere. Nevertheless, 
America's interest in China's market did lead to its acquiescence in policies following 
World War I which contributed to the emergence of Chinese nationalism on a serious 
scale. During the 1930s and 1940s, moreover, the US supported the forces of Chiang 
Kaishek's Guomindang largely because of the fact that Chiang guaranteed the maintenance 
of open markets and espoused a resolutely anti-Communist line favorable to the US. This 
has to be placed in the context of an emerging post war order increasingly likely to be 
delineated by a Free World- Communist divide in the eyes of the Roosevelt 
Administration. US support for the KMT during the Chinese Civil War resulted in a 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which was more anti-American than it may otherwise 
have been upon assuming power in 1949. Moreover,US support for the KMT and 
enduring links with Taiwan have had a lasting impact on US-China relations which 
continue in the contemporary period. During the 1950s China became an enemy in more 
than just ideological terms when Mao's troops entered the Korean War in 1950. As we 
have seen, the subsequent US trade embargo of China sowed the seeds of discord among 
Western European allies who, in the 1960s, began forging their own relations with China 
despite US hostility. This fact, along with the Sino-Soviet split and US difficulties in 
Vietnam, convinced the Nixon Administration that a reconciliation with China was 
desirable. This, we argue, was driven both by strategic and economic factors and must be 
viewed in accordance with key structural changes in the Cold War and the world-economy 
in the early 1970s - namely the breakdown of the US containment policy in Vietnam and 
the Nixon Administration's eschewal of a global fixed exchanged rate in 1971. The latter 
measure, in effect, turned allies into economic competitors and goes some way in 
explaining a new concern with retrieving lost ground in trade relations with China. 
Moreover, the 1970s also marked China's entry into global institutions such as the UN 
and its resolution of key ideological arguments about the role of the market in Chinese 
society following the death of Mao and the demise of his distinctive socialist ideas. This 
process of drawing China closer towards the global economy was compounded at the 
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bilateral level by the normalisation of relations during the Carter Administration. The 
normalisation process also revealed, however, tensions within the US political system over 
engaging China and the issues of Taiwan and human rights can be seen to have 
complicated matters and continue to be highly relevant in the context of the contemporary 
debate. 
The 1980s, we argued, must be understood in the context of the rise of neo-liberal 
ideology at the global level. China's participation in the World Bank and IMF from 1980 
onwards, combined with domestic market reforms and increasing reliance on financial 
capital, made China more and more susceptible to the activities of global markets and the 
policies of trade liberalisation promoted by global institutions and the US. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the retreat of socialism more generally have meant that China's 
modernisation drive has increasingly moved away from Marxist economic policies, though 
state intervention at the macroeconomic level has been marked as has state control over 
society. What has also emerged is the extent to which the US enjoys key structural 
advantages over China in dictating the timetable for China's entry to GATT (now the 
WTO) and in terms of possessing many of the hi-tech exports and technologies pivotal to 
China's further development. In short, we argue that during the 1980s the underlying 
political economy of US-China relations has been characterised by China's growing 
interaction with the global economy and the new importance of the China market to 
domestic US constituencies. 
Into the 1990s both the US and the Chinese state can be seen as having to play two hands 
simultaneously. Firstly, the Janus-faced US state has been coming to terms with its role in 
the post-hegemonic world in trying to satisfY various domestic pressure groups while also 
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trying to devise a coherent state strategy in Washington. Similarly, the Chinese state has 
been attempting to balance integration with the global market and domestic economic and 
social stability. These factors lead to severe contradictions in US-China relations as 
regards the relationship between deregulated free markets and social stability which will be 
discussed further in subsequent chapters. What did emerge during the Bush years, 
however, was a clear re-prioritisation of China's importance from that of a strategic ally to 
that of an economic competitor. Ironically, then, China's Communism has become more of 
an issue in the post-Cold War era than during the 1970s and 1980s precisely because all 
over the world diverse forms of state intervention in the economy have come under attack 
from neo-liberals promoting a specific model of capitalism. It is this clash between 
capitalist models which provides much of the backdrop for subsequent chapters as they 
relate to economic relations, regionalism, and environmentalism in the context of US-
China relations in the contemporary era. 
Finally, this chapter gives some evidence of the historical continuity of US policies 
directed towards prising open China's markets since the nineteenth century. The 
contentious nature of current disputes have much to do with the manner in which Chinese 
sovereignty was violated at the hands of colonial powers. In this vein, we could see certain 
aspects of the WTO agenda as attempting to compromise the Chinese state's jurisdiction 
over its chosen economic and social policies. Similarly, we can see that America's attempts 
to secure an Open Door to China's market has solid historical foundations. In this sense 
the Cold War was something of an aberration and the post-Cold War period has seen a 
return to America's historical preoccupation with including China within the family of a 
liberal trading order. 
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US-China Trade Relations 
Introduction 
Although this thesis is focused upon the political economy of 'US-China' relations during the 
contemporary period it also seeks to counter the view that there is such a thing as a 'national' 
economic policy in an era of global markets. This is not to say that national economic 
strategies do not exist but that they are formed and implemented within the parameters set by 
the global economy. Nowhere is this clearer than in any analysis of the political economy of 
US-China trade relations as they relate to both bilateral and multilateral issues. In this chapter 
we argue that the debate over US-China trade must be placed within the wider context of 
globalisation, particularly the manner in which factors relevant to trends in the global economy 
cut into ostensibly bilateral disputes. In this crucial sense, the US can be seen as pushing the 
neo-Iiberal agenda of trade liberalisation and the opening of markets upon a China which 
continues to seek a viable national economic strategy within the constraints of globalisation. 
An adjunct of this argument is that the strategy of US trade negotiators carries within it major 
contradictions. On the one hand, there exists the fairly remorseless attempt to remove Chinese 
trade barriers and restrictions on capital flows while, on the other, there also exists the wish to 
promote an economic and social stability which would be threatened by any hasty departure 
from China's successful strategy of incremental reform. In this sense, the practice of American 
policy recognises the severe limitations of market resolutions to many of its bilateral trade 
problems with China. Drawing on the theoretical framework advanced in chapter one, a neo-
Gramscian conception of hegemonic power can be used to explain China's general 
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compliance with trade reforms while US hegemony over global institutions goes some way in 
explaining China's attempt to enter the GATT and its successor, the World Trade 
Organisation. 
The arguments in this chapter are organised as follows. Firstly, the chapter sets out the 
underlying political economy of the Clinton Administration and the centrality of China's 
expanding market in relation to US trade policy. Secondly, it explores the highly contested 
nature of America's China policy in particular relation to China's Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) status and other related trade issues. The argument here being that there is no single 
China policy. Rather, an ongoing struggle has been taking place within the US state reflecting 
the division of powers within US foreign policy.l Also relevant here is the skewed nature of 
the debate over the trade deficit which, in its bilateral form, seriously downplays key statistical 
disparities between the two governments as well as structural reasons why the deficit exists. 
Thirdly, this chapter assesses, using recent evidence, the issue of China's accession to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the various sectoral disputes which have suffused 
these protracted negotiations. Fourthly, the chapter assesses China's ability to comply with US 
demands for trade Iiberalisation and explores some of the contradictions between the US push 
for market opening on the one hand, and the optimal concern of both Chinese and US elites 
with financial and social stability on the other. This argument is taken up in relation to China's 
reform of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the unemployment problems which result. 
This section also discusses the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 as a possible turning point in 
US-China relations and particularly the neo-liberal reforms being encouraged by the US at 
both the bilateral and multilateral levels. 
t J Shinn, .. The Risks of Engagement" in J Shinn (ed), Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with 
('hina, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1996, p.88. 
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The Clinton Administration's Big Emerging Market (OEM) Strategy 
At its inception the Clinton Administration advanced a fairly clear agenda which stressed that 
its overarching priorities were those of asserting US competitiveness within a highly globalised 
economy. As Martin Walker puts it, "Clinton's central insight into the way the world was 
changing" was "that the Cold War system of geo-politics and geo-strategy was giving way to 
an era of geo-economics and geo-finance.,,2 This strategy was characterised by a shift away 
from the state's minimal role in promoting US business interests and towards the active 
construction of a working partnership between government and industry3 One of the overall 
tasks of this new partnership was to identify key Big Emerging Markets (BEMs) and then to 
set about making sure US companies captured as great a portion of global market share as 
possible, so as to sustain US economic domination of the world market into the next century. 
Built into this strategy was the assumption that there existed an "unfair playing field" in that 
economic intervention by governments in Japan, China, and Germany gave rise to market 
restrictions that were disadvantageous to US firms more used to government apathy in global 
trade. Jeffrey Garten, Clinton's first term Assistant Secretary of State for Commerce and the 
intellectual force behind the BEM strategy, talked of government and business as being part of 
the same "team" and as sharing the same interests in shaping America's post-Cold War foreign 
policy.4 China was foremost among the ten BEMs targeted by the Commerce Department -
the others being Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, South Korea, Mexico, Brazil and 
Argentina. It was estimated that by the year 2000 US trade with these ten countries would 
supersede trade with Japan and Europe - though such claims have since been exposed as 
" M Walker, Clinton: The President They Deserve. London, Fourth Estate, 1996, pp. 286-287 . 
. l M Cox, liS Foreign Policy After the Cold War.' Superpower IVithout a Mission, London, Roval Institute of 
International Affairs, 1995, p.24. . 
1 J Garten, "Competing to Win in the Global Marketplace", The China Business Review, July-August, 1995. 
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exaggerated and can be seen as part of the Commerce Department's attempt to enhance its 
own position within the Administration. It is worth bearing in mind that in 1994 China 
represented a mere l.8% of global US exports. 5 Moreover, around 44% of non-US growth in 
global imports was thought likely to be attributable to the BEMs by 20 I 0 6 These percentages 
as they relate to China perhaps overestimate its real economic importance to the US. BEMs 
were also viewed as "regional engines" of growth - hence their economic importance 
intersected with the emerging emphasis of US foreign policy on regional free trade blocs such 
as APEC. 7 The emergence of the competitive state in the post-Cold-War era has also been 
intimately bound up with economic globalisation and the transnational character of US firms. 
In this sense, economic activity at the bilateral trade level has often been complicated by the 
'who is us?' problematic identified by Robert Reich in relation to 'national' conceptions of 
economic policy vis a vis the global economic strategies of transnational companies. x As will 
be demonstrated below with regard to Hong Kong's role in US-China trade, economic activity 
no longer conforms to the interaction of purely national entities due to profound changes in 
the global structure of trade and production (pointed out in our opening chapter.) Thus from 
the outset the idea of bilateral trade has to be qualified with reference to regional and global 
shifts in the composition of production. In this sense, inter-company and intra-company trade 
can often tell us more than simplified statistics relating to supposedly national economic 
interactions. That said, the concept of bilateral trade remains politically crucial in the context 
of domestic US politics. This is particularly the case in relation to trade with China. In the 
political sphere China is seen as a potential geo-political competitor in future years and as a 
, RG Sutter with Seong-Eun Choi, Shaping China's Future in World A.ffairs: The Role of the United .'-I'tales, 
Boulder, Westview, 1996, p.l14. 
(, Cox, .'-,'uperpower Without a Mission?, p.34 . 
. J Stremlau. "Clinton's Dollar Diplomacy", Foreign Policy, No.97, 1994-95, p.24. 
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possible regional and/or global hegemon. These political factors, though often irrational, do 
impact heavily on the trade debate and the way it is manipulated for political purposes. Let us 
now briefly outline initial estimations as to the importance of the China market as they were 
manifested at the beginning of Clinton's two terms in office and the way awareness of this 
coincided with a broader strategy of developing policies based on geo-economics. 
China's market quickly assumed overall priority for US policymakers for reasons of sheer 
economic scale, consumer demand, and potential infrastructural investment. Indeed, Clinton's 
first Commerce Secretary, Ron Brown, called the China market "the pot of gold at the end of 
h . b ,,9 t e ram ow. In 1993 estimates suggested that China would spend $560 billion on 
telecommunications, airports, highways, water and sewage treatment and power generation -
economic modernisations requiring high value-added goods and thereby making China 
particularly attractive to the US private sector. By 1993 it was estimated that there existed 
some 300 million consumers in China, an increase from just 60 million in 1978.10 By 1992 and 
Clinton's election to the White House, US foreign investors were the second largest source of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China with an estimated 2,800 projects worth over $6.3 
billion finalised in 1992. In 1993 US firms invested around $3 billion in China. I I By 1994 US 
companies had made investment commitments worth $26 billion in China involving over 
20,000 projects. 12 Indeed, since the beginning of China's economic reform process US firms 
~ See R Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21"-Centurv Capitalism, New York, Alfred A 
Knopf, 1991. 
'J Quoted in M Weidenbaum, "China's New Economic Scenario: The Future of Sino-American Relations", 
Orhis, Vo1.43, No.2, 1999, p.226. 
III IC Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, New York. Oxford University Press, 1994, p.955 
" X Vi, "China's US Policy Conundrum in the 1990s: Balancing Autonomy and Interdependence", Asian 
."'urvey, Vo1.34, No.8, August 1994, p.676. 
I:' E Vogel, "Introduction: How Can the United States and China Pursue Common Interests and Manage 
Differences?", in E Vogel (ed), Living With China: US-China Relations in the Twentv-First Century, New 
York, WW Norton, 1997, p.46. . . 
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had, by 1995, invested some $175 billion in the Chinese economyD In terms of America's 
exports China had also become an increasingly indispensable consumer of US products. In 
1991 and 1992 US exports to China grew by 54% while in the first three quarters of 1993 they 
grew by 21.5%. As Lardy notes, "in 1992 alone, US exports to China grew almost 20%, more 
than 10 times the average rate of US exports to developed-country markets and almost half 
again as rapidly as the average growth of US exports to all developing counties." Again, 
according to Lardy, "the cumulative rate of expansion of US exports to China over this period 
is roughly twice that to Mexico, Taiwan, Singapore, or Hong Kong." 14 The ascendancy of 
China's role in the world and its new position at the apex of US economic strategy served to 
generate a new debate as to the nature of engagement and whether political and moral 
interests should outweigh commercial and other interests concerned with China's military 
potentiaI. 15 The political focus for this debate came to revolve around the renewal of China's 
MFN and the bilateral economic issues it raised - particularly those pertinent to human rights 
and the US-China trade deficit. It is to this issue that we turn first. 
MFN 
On 28 May 1993 President Clinton enunciated an Executive Order which bound China's MFN 
status to "overall significant progress" made by China on human rights issues and which would 
come under review the following year. As Wendell Wilkie has noted, this position represented 
11 P Tarnoff, "Building a New Consensus on China", US Department of State, February 20, 1997. 
II N Lardy, China in the World Economy, Washington D.C., Institute for International Economics, 1994, 
p.117. 
I' For differing views of China at the outset of the Clinton Administration, see R Ross, "US Policy Toward 
China" in R J Art and S Brown (eds), l/,\' foreign Policy: The Search for a New Role, New York. Macmillan. 
11)91, pp.338-356; R H Munro, "Awakening Dragon: The Real Danger in Asia is from China". Policv Review, 
No.62. Fall 1992, pp. 10-16: RC Bush, "Clinton and China: Scenarios for the Future". The Chin~ Business 
Rel'iew, January-February 1993, pp.16-20. 
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a continuation of the Congressional position on MFN under Bush. 16 In the interim, however, 
the US vigorously pursued a number of high profile trade missions and the managed trade 
strategy of the Administration's economic agencies soon began to pay dividends. During 1993 
Boeing captured an $800 million deal with the Chinese government involving the purchase of 
21 jet liners. The Chinese government ordered 4,600 vehicles each from General Motors, 
Ford, and Chrysler, worth $160 million. Over $200 million of oil drilling and exploration 
equipment was purchased from companies in Texas, Louisiana and Washington, while $800 
million of satellites was purchased from Hughes Aerospace. AT&T, meanwhile, expected to 
install half of the 15 million telephone lines in China each year, having secured several years of 
contracts. 17 Importantly, a fierce political debate sprung up during 1993 in which advocates of 
a human rights position were brought into conflict with the new largesse of Clinton's 
d . . IK restructure economic agencies. 
This conflict took three forms. Firstly, it involved conflict between the Treasury department 
under Lloyd Bentsen, Commerce under Ron Brown and the National Economic Council 
(NEC) under Robert Rubin on the side of delinking human rights from MFN with Anthony 
Lake's National Security Council and Warren Christopher's State Department pushing 
strongly for a China policy underpinned by human rights concerns. 19 Secondly, the Congress 
splintered into various China factions, from those advocating free trade to those taking a more 
protectionist line or advocating a firm stand on human rights. The US-China Act of 1993 
1(, W Wilkie, "MFN in the Spring of 1994" in W Wilkie and J Lilley (eds), Beyond AfFN: Trade with China 
ami American Interests, Washington DC, American Enterprise Institute, 1994, p.141. 
17 Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, pp.966-67. 
I x By restmctured it is meant that economic agencies had been given new impetus and business much greater 
access to government strategy. 
I') For good discussions of the bureaucratic wrangling over MFN within the Clinton Administration see. 0 
Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister: Clinton Ends Linkage", The China 
Quarterly, No.139, 1994, pp.597-621. 
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accepted the Clinton Administration's waiver of MFN sanctions for another year but required 
that China undertake a number of reforms: (i) mandatory compliance with the 1992 US-China 
prison labour agreement (relating to imports which relied on prison labour; (ii) significant 
progress with respect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and (iii) releasing and 
accounting for Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the non-violent expression of 
political and religious beliefs, ensuring humane treatment of prisoners by international 
humanitarian and human rights organisations, permitting Tibet's religious and cultural 
heritage, and permitting international radio and TV broadcasts into China20 Thirdly, a 
massive lobbying campaign was waged by corporate America and many within the 
Administration stressing the cost of MFN withdrawal for US jobs. In 1993 nearly 300 
corporate leaders, representing companies that exported $7.5 billion to China in 1992, sent an 
open letter to Clinton opposing "withdrawing or placing further conditions on MFN" which 
could "terminate the large potential benefits of the trading relationship." Significantly, 
corporate lobbying was accompanied by a Chinese decision to enter the fray shortly before the 
MFN renewal deadline in 1994. A Chinese government delegation visiting the US purchased 
$200 billion of oil drilling equipment in Texas and Louisiana, $160 million of automobiles in 
Detroit, and $800 million in aircraft from Boeing in Seattle?l 
Early in 1994 Clinton devised a policy of "inclusive engagement" which sought both to 
persuade China to improve human rights but also to enhance trade links - a stance which 
already augured the new policy of engaging China economically while paying rhetorical 
attention to human rights issues. In January 1994 Clinton dispatched Agriculture Secretary 
Mike Epsy and Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen on trade missions. Significantly, during 
2" VN Pregelj, "Most Favoured Nation Status of the People's Republic of China", CRS Issue Hrief fHY7039, 
Congressional Research Service, 1997, p.3. 
11 1 
Secretary of State Christopher's February 1994 visit to China to promote human rights the 
200 business leaders who accompanied him sided with the Chinese government in rebuffing his 
demands that China comply with human rights standards. As Hsu notes, the Chinese 
government deployed a "divide and rule" tactic serenading US corporations while allowing 
them to take the Chinese case to the US government. 22 There was also a widespread belief 
among Chinese elites that the MFN-human rights linkage policy was simply a ruse to thwart 
China's economic growth (an average of 9.2% between 1978-1993), to impose America's 
cultural values on the Chinese people, and to dress US protectionism in the language of 
political rights. In short, the policy was seen as both hegemonic and as evidence of a 
continued unilateral approach to trade issues with global significance. 23 This is also evidence 
of the Chinese propensity to view foreign economic relations in starkly realist terms and, 
wrongly, ascribes the US state and US values as somehow holistic. For all that, this view 
carries great weight in Chinese political debate. 
Amidst these trade wrangles, not only were US corporations siding with the Chinese 
government, but also during Christopher'S visit, the US Ambassador, Stapleton Roy, 
contradicted him pointing to the export opportunities of the China market and stressing the 
socially liberalising side effects of economic modernisation. During Richard Gephardt's (the 
House majority Leader) visit to Beijing in 1994 he acknowledged the mixed signals being sent 
out by the Clinton Administration on where its priorities lay and the confusion of such a 
cl R Bernstein and R Dicker, "Human Rights First", Foreign Policy, No.94, 1994, pp.44-45. 
cc HSll, The Rise of Modern China, p.970. 
23 M Wan, "Human Rights and Sino-US Relations: Policies and Changing Realities", The Pacific Review, 
VoI.lO, No.2, 1997, p.240. 
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prominent US political figure further highlighted schisms over trade policy within the US state 
as a whole. 24 
In May 1994 President Clinton decided that the linkage policy was no longer sustainable and it 
was eschewed in favour of a policy of 'comprehensive engagement.' One of the main reasons 
for this was the fact that European competitors were far less concerned about human rights 
than the US congress. In November, 1993, a German delegation, headed by Chancellor Kohl, 
secured $2.8 billion worth of contracts for German firms just as China came under increasing 
pressure from the US State Department. In this sense, it was European corporations which 
were undermining any multilateral effort towards securing better human rights standards in 
China and enhancing the argument of US corporate lobbies that US failure to capitalise on 
China's market would simply mean losing out to competitors. 25 The economic stakes came 
into stark relief when the US airline giants McDonnell Douglas and Boeing engaged in a 
fierce competition with Europe's Airbus for a twenty year contract with China worth US$66 
billion?6 The economic stakes in disengaging from the China market in the form of MFN 
withdrawal are also underlined by the impact such a move would have on import duties. 
A 1996 report by the Congressional Research Service states that the average MFN duty rate 
on all 1996 imports from China, both dutiable and nondutiable, was 5.5%. The withdrawal of 
MFN treatment would raise import duties exponentially to 45%. The overall cost of products 
imported from China and, covered by MFN tariffs, would increase by over one-third and in 
most individual cases by between 25% and 65%.27 Between 1991 and 1996 US imports from 
China increased by a massive 171.4% mainly consisting of such goods as toys, plastic 
2·1 R P Cronin, "The United States and Asia in 1994", Asian SunJey. Vo1.35, No. I. 1995. p.Il3. 
2' HW MaulL "Reconciling China with International Order", The Pacific Review, Vol.lO, No.4, 1997, p.470. 
2(, L Kaye, "Trading Rights", Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 March, 1995. 
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tableware, sporting goods, apparel, footwear and electronics at the low end of the US market. 
These goods were estimated to account for some 70% of US imports by 19972x tn short, the 
economic evidence clearly demonstrates surging demand for products 'Made in China' and it 
is these demand side factors which suggest that Chinese exports are part of a structural trend 
in US consumption patterns. 
On May 26, 1994, President Clinton announced that MFN would be renewed despite China's 
failure to meet human rights standards stipulated in his 1993 Executive Order. A number of 
sanctions imposed by the Bush Administration under Congressional duress were, however, 
maintained. These were as follows: (1) the suspension of weapons deliveries under both US 
government and commercial programmes; (2) the denial of export licences for dual-use civilian 
technology items for the Chinese police or military; (3) the suspension of consideration of 
export licences for US Munitions List items; (4) the suspension of participation in the grant 
programmes for feasibility studies under the Trade and Development Agency and in relation 
to insurance and loan programmes of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); 
and (5) the withholding of US support for World Bank and other multilateral development 
bank lending to China except for projects meeting basic human needs. 29 It is worth noting that 
the latter two sanctions have played a significant role in handicapping the Administration's 
trade policy and will be discussed in more detail below. The Administration did commit itself 
to maintaining the high profile of human rights issues, announcing that it would urge the 
private sector to devise voluntary principles for US business firms operating in China; that it 
would intensify support for the Chinese transmission of Radio Free Asia and Voice of America 
~- Pregelj, Most Favoured Nation Status (~fthe People's Republic (?fChina, p.6. 
~~ US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 17 June 1997, "The Trade Deficit with China", at 
htl p: /iwww.state.gov/www/regions/eap/f.~-trad-defchina-9706J7.htm/. 
~" US Department of State, Dispatch, Yol.5, No.22, May 30,1994, pp.346-347. 
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(YOA); and, finally, that the UN would be pressurised into monitoring China's human rights 
record more closely. Significantly, an August 9 resolution disapproving of the MFN extension 
was (defeated by 356-75) setting the scene for the new China policy. Also in August 1994 the 
Chinese government agreed to acquiesce in human rights talks - which had broken down in 
March that year. It is no surprise that this softening of policy on the Chinese side dovetailed 
with Commerce Secretary, Ron Brown's, trade mission in China that same month involving a 
sizeable trade delegation and which signed nearly $5 billion in contracts. 30 
Following the 1994 renewal of MFN the Administration continues to pursue what Winston 
Lord called a "nuanced" policy meaning a balance between competing concerns. 31 Perhaps 
Lord was being more loyal to the State department's vanquished China policy when he urged 
business leaders to lobby the Chinese government on human rights "as effectively as they are 
lobbying the Congress and the President.,,32 The consequence has been that from 1994 
onwards then US bilateral trade policies on China have been dominated by the yearly wrangles 
over renewal but, broadly speaking, no serious threat to the 1994 policy of 'comprehensive 
engagement' has emerged. The Administration has successfully pressed the case that 170,000 
US jobs depend directly on US-China trade, highlighting the fact that US consumers would be 
hit by higher prices for products such as clothes and shoes should MFN be revoked - costing 
as much as half a billion dollars per year. Moreover, it is worth noting that, if MFN were 
indeed withdrawn, it would be very unlikely that human rights groups would be able to 
maintain their influence within China at all as they are very often part of a broader American 
111 Cronin, The United States and Asia in 1994, pp. 114-115. 
11 Lord, cited in R Foot, The Practice of Power: US-China Relations 1949-1995, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1995, p.255. . 
12 Winston Lord, cited in Bernstein and Dicker, Human Rights First, p.47. 
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presence primarily consisting of members of the US business communityD As Laura 
0' Andrea Tyson argued, in an article which appeared in the Wall Street .Journal, MFN 
revocation would "slow the flow of information about western culture, ideas, business 
practices, and perspectives that accompany foreign investment.,,34 In short, human rights have 
been usurped with greater frequency with China closed off from the world and regressive 
steps on free trade may, over the long term, be likely to lessen China's willingness to 
cooperate. 
At the political level, the Clinton Administration has argued that Congressional revocation of 
China's MFN status would "slash" Hong Kong's trade by $20-30 billion, lead to as many as 
85,000 job losses, and undermine democratic forces on Hong Kong. The Administration has 
also made forceful arguments that departing Governor, Chris Patten, and Hong Kong's 
Democratic Party leader, Martin Lee, both supported China's MFN status. 35 US firms now 
have over 1, 100 offices and 400 regional headquarters in what became, after the handover, a 
Chinese "Special Administrative Region. ,,36 Most significantly, the MFN debate bears 
testament to the fact that geo-economic factors have assumed priority in the relationship and, 
in the last analysis, competing concerns tend to be subordinated to the pursuit of lucrative 
contracts by US transnationals. As already stressed, MFN has been renewed with relative ease 
by the Clinton Administration each year since it came to power, again attesting to the 
structural power of capital over state policy but also to China's increasing ability to defy US 
.11 J S Conklin, F;'orging an East Asian r;'oreign Policy, Lanham, Maryland, University Press of America, 1995, 
pAr). 
31 L D' Andrea Tyson, "Beyond MFN", Wall Street Journal, May 28, 1997. 
Vi US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "China: Why Continuation of Normal Trade status is in 
the National Interest of the United States", http://wwwstate.gov/wwwlcap!f.·Chinawhycont9706J7.htlll/. 
June 17, 1997 . 
. 11. W Morrison, "China- US trade Issues", CR.)' Issue Brief !B911]1, Congressional Research Service Librarv 
of Congress, Washington D.C.. p.l. ' . 
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human rights demands in the knowledge that there is no shortage of global competitors willing 
to export to China given any precipitous withdrawal of MFN. However, there are few rivals 
able to invest in China on the scale of the US or which provide China with such a grandiose 
export market. In this sense the US economic relationship with China has an extremely broad 
basis in which questions of market access are crucial. The bilateral trade relationship has, as a 
consequence, been increasingly characterised by technical negotiations relating to the further 
liberalisation of the Chinese economy and, most notably, by disputes over the bilateral trade 
deficit. 
The Bilateral Trade Deficit 
It is worth going into some detail here about the vexed question of the US-China trade deficit 
and the way in which the issue has dominated economic relations since Clinton's election 
victory. Put simply, China has been running extremely large deficits with the US throughout 
the 1990s and there is more than a kernel of truth in former US Ambassador to China 
Hummel's observation that "China is trying to export like a capitalist and import like a 
Communist.,,37 China has largely followed the Japanese strategy of erecting myriad barriers to 
foreign trade using such measures as restricting the availability of foreign exchange, using 
secret rules to manage imports and most emphatically failing to develop a legal infrastructure 
apposite to globally recognised trade norms.3~ China's import tariffs remain among the highest 
in the world though they fell from 43% in 1992 to 17% by 1998. 39 These arguments will be 
developed further in our discussion of China's accession to the WTG. Here, it is important to 
1" Cited in W Overholt. The Rise of China: How Economic Reform is Creating a Superpower, New York, WW 
Norton, 1993, p.381. 
1X /hid, p.381. 
1Y S Breslin, "The Politics of Chinese Trade and the Asian Financial Crisis: Questioning the Wisdom of 
Export-Led Growth", Third World Quarter~v. Vo1.20, No.6, p.1188. 
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challenge the fundamental premises and the political motivations of Congressional obsessions 
with China's trade deficit. The argument which has been taken up by trade negotiators and 
Congress is worthy of some discussion at this point. China's trade deficit is seen to be 
unacceptable and has been a major obstacle to China joining the WTO while also giving much 
impetus to those opposing MFN on economic grounds. While overall trade between the US 
and China stood at $42.5 billion in 1993 the bilateral deficit stood at $17 billion; by 1997 this 
had risen to $44 billion - a 15% increase for the second year running. ,,40 Many within the 
Congress and, indeed the Administration, have made great political capital out of the deficit 
and it has been a major component of the USTR's trading stance with Chinese negotiators 
The trade deficit is, however, an integral part of trading with a developing country such as 
China and was described by one Commerce Department official as "inevitable" and the 
"consolidation of an existing problem" with Asia as a whole. 41 Robert Ross has noted that 
"the cumulative US trade deficit with China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan 
had not appreciably grown since 1988; only the distribution among the markets had 
changed ,,42 Little calculation is made of the new international division of labour where re-
locating and outsourcing the manufacture of key components for re-assembly overseas, and 
then re-importing from low-cost labour markets such as China's changes the way 
manufacturing occurs. Nor has adequate consideration been given to the fact that China has a 
significantly higher rate of national savings than the US (30-40% domestic household savings 
ratest3, a manifestly poorer population with less disposable income, and industries producing 
the low-tech and mass-produced consumer goods which cater to the American market. The 
·111 PT Bangsberg, "Open to US Trade, China Hints at a Pre-Summit Foray", The Journal of Commerce, 9 
October, 1997. 
II Interview, US Department of Commerce, October 1997. 
Ie R Ross, "Why Our Hard-liners Arc Wrong". The Nationallntere.l't, Fall 1997. p.48. 
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US, meanwhile, has been exporting high-value added goods still largely unaffordable to most 
Chinese. Again, the trade deficit was inevitable given the move by the latter economies into 
high technology sectors and the gradual move away from the manufacture and export of cheap 
products by economies such as Malaysia's and Singapore's among the Newly Industrialising 
Countries (NICs). Nicholas Lardy point out that as China's share of world exports of clothing, 
toys, sporting goods, and footwear rose from 14% in 1984 to 39% in 1994, the share 
produced by the four Asian tigers fell even more, from 55% to 24%. He also argues that the 
combined market share for China and the four tiger economies has actually fallen for these 
goods. In this sense, Lardy sees the argument that the loss of US manufacturing jobs is 
attributable to an augmenting trade deficit with China as misplaced - China has simply filled 
the vacuum left by other Asian nations at the labour-intensive end of the regional economy.44 
Similarly, Bosworth Vlews the MFN debate as somewhat spunous In the way Congress 
contrives to present China's trade surplus with the US as contributing to economic problems in 
the US. The significance of Bosworth's argument is that he even questions whether market 
barriers in countries such as China have the kind of impact on the US economy which is 
commonly suggested. According to Bosworth, "if the unwillingness of others to accept US 
exports were a significant problem, the domestic economy would be plagued by 
unemployment, and the monetary authorities would be seeking to lower domestic interest rates 
in an effort to stimulate demand.,,45 Bosworth argues that, conversely, the US economy is 
operating at full capacity, while the Federal Reserve is raising interest rates in an effort to hold 
1.1 J Shinn, "Economic Engagement" in Shinn (ed), Weaving the Net, p.36. 
1-1 N Lardy, "Accommodating to China as an Economic Giant", in SS Harrison and C Preslowitz Jr (eds), Asia 
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Unit. 1998, p.188. 
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down demand pressures and curb inflation. Moreover, US export performance has, for a 
number of years, outperformed the US economy as a whole. Bosworth concludes that "the 
United States simply does not fit the profile of an economy plagued with insufficient demand 
for its products; instead it runs trade deficits because of a persistent desire to spend more than 
it earns. ,,46 Bosworth's arguments perhaps underplay the extent of China's domestic barriers 
but offer a valuable corrective to the political arguments concerning MFN and the nature of 
the trade deficit. The real source of the US trade deficit with China is, as noted above, US 
levels of domestic consumption which outstrip those of any other country. As mentioned, this 
is compounded by low rates of national savings. In short, a deeper look at the US trade deficit 
with China must focus upon structural economic trends and differences in economic behaviour 
among national consumers as well as the key differences in the way trade is calculated. The 
latter point is particularly pertinent as it relates to the role of Hong Kong as a third country in 
US-China trade. 
The Role of Hong Kong 
Another salient feature relating to the structure of the US-China trade deficit is the fact that 
Hong Kong, in the post-1997 period, continues to maintain the status of a sovereign economic 
territory for trade purposes. Hong Kong is America's 13th largest trading partner with over 
1,000 US companies operating there and $15 billion in US investments located there as of 
1997. 47 Exports to Hong Kong, much of which is re-exported to China, totalled over $14 
billion. All of this tends to be omitted from calculations relating to the overall trade deficit and 
thereby distorts the political picture. Nicholas Lardy points out that China is the only country 
.1(. Ihid., pp.105-6. 
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currently maintaining a trade deficit with the US that does not also have a global trade surplus. 
Lardy also points out that Japan has a global trade surplus of $120 billion and that China, 
unlike Japan, has not adopted systematic macro-economic and exchange-rate policies designed 
to prolong a global current account surplus. In this sense, "China is already more open than 
Japan. ,,4K Lardy has also elaborated on the complexity of the US-China trade deficit and offers 
an analysis which selVes as a counterweight to those who simply argue that China has been 
flooding the US with imports. Firstly, the trade deficit is hardly something new in that China 
has been running significant deficits with the US since 1983. He argues that the main problem 
arises from the fact that US figures accumulated by the Commerce Department and widely 
utilised by Congress during debates over MFN tend, as briefly mentioned above, to negate the 
role of Hong Kong. By the early 1990s over two-fifths of all Chinese exports were first sold to 
Hong Kong and then re-distributed for sale to the United States and several European 
countries. In compiling figures pertinent to the overall trade deficit both China and the US 
record the country of origin relating to goods entering the country. It is for this reason, argues 
Lardy, that in 1990 both China and the United States claimed to be running bilateral trade 
deficits with one another- the US claiming a $10.4 billion deficit with China and the Chinese 
claiming a reverse deficit of $1. 7 billion. 49 The differential in Chinese and US perceptions of 
the trade deficit, then, is primarily attributable to the far greater role Hong Kong plays in the 
export of Chinese goods to the US than the export of US goods to China. Lardy stresses the 
differences in commodity composition as a factor here. Most US exports are sophisticated 
products such as aircraft and are thus sold directly to Chinese companies without the 
participation of Hong Kong firms as intermediaries. Conversely, low-end of the market goods 
such as garments, footwear and toys manufactured in China, very often pass through Hong 
1~ Lardy, Accommodating to China, p.187. 
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Kong for re-export to the US - even though the Chinese authorities, utilising the country of 
destination principle, label such exports as having been sold to Hong Kong 50 Using adjusted 
figures, obtained from Hong Kong sources, Lardy has demonstrated the extent to which 
official US trade figures relating to the bilateral trade deficit are askew. In 1993, for example, 
the adjusted US trade deficit ran at $12.5 billion while the Administration's trade deficit, as 
estimated by the Commerce Department, was running at $16.7 billion. In short, the Commerce 
department figures overestimated the bilateral trade deficit with China by as much as one-
third. 51 It is these figures which have been adopted by the US-China Business Council in their 
argument against the revocation of MFN on behalf of US businesses and which, perhaps 
ironically, put them at odds with the Administration. For its part, the Clinton Administration 
adopted the contradictory strategy of arguing for MFN renewal yet endorsing a combative 
trade strategy based on questionable economic data which plays into the hands of its 
ideological and protectionist adversaries in Congress. 52 
A second factor to be taken into account when assessing the bilateral US-China trade deficit 
is, according to Lardy, the role played by internationally mobile capital. According to Lardy 
the movement of labour-intensive manufacturing production to China has two fundamental 
implications for any analysis of the bilateral trade deficit. While the US trade deficit with China 
may have been expanding the US deficit with Taiwan and Hong Kong (the other territories of 
Greater China) declined by around $13 billion between 1987 and 1992. Over the same period 
the US deficit in trade with mainland China grew by some $15.5 billion. By 1992 Greater 
China accounted for some 30% of America's global deficit of around $96 billion. In essence, 
I') Lardy, China and the World E'conomy, pp. 74-75. 
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this reflected structural changes in the balance of the Asian regional economy and, indeed, 
wider trends towards the globalisation of production. In relation to arguments about the 
bilateral trade deficit the main point to be extrapolated is that the deficit had more to do with 
the growth oflabour-intensive manufacturing in China than with Chinese import restrictions as 
claimed by the US government. As Lardy avers, a more important cause may well be the 
liberalisation of China's foreign investment regime (discussed below) which induced a huge 
volume of FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan.53 Another factor is that a significantly high 
proportion of profits resulting from Chinese exports actually falls into the hands of foreign 
firms. Moreover, a high proportion of Chinese exports contains foreign components, most of 
which are supplied by Hong Kong but which originate in the advanced industrial countries. 
Thus China's processed exports have an import content of around 77%, thereby undermining 
the assumption that they are, in anything but the 'Made in China' label which adorns them, 
Chinese products at all. 54 
Recent research by Breslin also puts the question of the US-China trade deficit into a broader 
perspective which ties in with both regional and global economic factors. Again, Breslin has 
shown the extent of disparities in the way statistics are compiled in both the US and China. In 
1998, for example, US government sources estimated the deficit to be somewhere in the 
region of $57 billion, while Chinese data put the deficit at $21 billion. Again, Chinese sources 
claimed that around 60% of exports to the USA pass through Hong Kong en route. Crucially, 
goods leaving China receive an extra 40.7% value-added in the third country, while, in the 
case of toys and textiles, the value added can be more than 100% - this according to Breslin's 
use of Chinese statistics. Again, the practice of the US authorities of counting exports in Hong 
'c Interview, US-China Business Council, Washington DC, November, 1997. 
'.1 Lardy, China in the World Economy, p.78. 
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Kong as purely Chinese in origin "misses the huge value-added that occurs once the goods 
leave China. ,,55 Breslin goes on to explain the surge in Chinese exports during the mid-1990s 
(an increase of 60% between 1993 and 1995 - a figure which doubled between 1995-97) as 
emanating from two significant factors. Firstly, a massive increase in FDI into China took 
place in 1993, and secondly China restructured its foreign exchange rate system in 199456 The 
first point relates directly to the way in which foreign companies operate in China. Let us go 
into some detail here about the nature, extent and implications of FDI in China before 
returning to Breslin's second point and looking at the implications of China's restructured 
exchange rate. 
The following is drawn from research by Tsao and Whisler of the US International Trade 
Commission. Tsao and Whisler put total FDI in China in 1993 at $108.4 billion which was 
almost as much as the cumulative amount of investment accrued during the period 1979-1992. 
US contracted investment in China totalled $14.4 billion during 1979-1993 with the value of 
contracts signed in 1992 alone accounting for some 21.6% of this total while the value of US 
contracts signed in 1993 amounted to some 44.3% of the total value. Meanwhile, US utilised 
investment in China (the amount which is actually made good in terms of capital inflow) 
amounted to $2.1 billion in 1993 - 40.2% of the funds contributed to China over the period 
1979-1993.57 The surge in FD I in China can best be explained as a consequence of Deng 
Xiaoping's much publicised tour of China's south-eastern coastal regions in 1992. Deng was 
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sufficiently impressed by the prosperity created by FDI in these regions that he ordered a new 
phase in the opening of China's market to the world economy. This primarily involved opening 
previously closed regions to FDI and lifting a range of restrictions in key economic sectors. 
Moreover, a number of investment incentives were announced. 5~ A key element to this policy 
of creating new development zones was that they were extended to inland provinces 
previously ostracised from the global economy and foreign investment. Susan Shirk notes that 
during the first nine months of 1992 as many as 2,000 development zones were set up under 
the direction of then economic chief Li Pengo Most important was the resultant increase of 
foreign capital which found its way to the inland provinces - the inland provinces increasing 
their share from 7% to 10% in 1992 alone. 59 As Shirk further notes, a large proportion of 
investment in the Chinese interior came from South Korean and Japanese investors 
"broadening the geography of support for the open policy."c,o What is significant here is that 
intra-Asian investment was gravitating towards inland areas of China in need of long-term 
investment and unlikely to yield quick profits. This type of investment can be seen, then, as 
infrastructural investment committed to China's development overall. Conversely, US 
investment as well as that of Europe has tended to focus on the coastal regions where 
investment is more short-term and return on invested capital is expected to occur far more 
quickly. This elucidates some of the differences between Asian capitalism of the Japanese 
variety and the neo-liberal policies being encouraged in ChinJ's coastal regions by both 
Chinese and certain sectors of US business. As Tsao and Whisler demonstrate in their research 
for the US International Trade Commission, these new levels of FDI again complicate the 
supposedly 'Chinese' character of Chinese exports and, indeed, Chinese GOP. For instance 
'X Ihid.. p.39. 
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there is a an intimate linkage between the expansion of foreign-funded firms and the growth 
of Chinese exports as a whole. For instance, foreign-funded firms' industrial output rose by 
48.8% in 1992 and 46.2% in 1993 and China's total industrial output increased by 20.8% and 
21.1 % during these respective years. This is brought into even clearer relief when we consider 
the fact that, by 1993, the exports of foreign-funded enterprises increased by 45.4% to $25.2 
billion accounting for a staggering 27.5% of China's total exports. 
A similar story is true for the role of foreign-funded firms in the volume and composition of 
Chinese imports. In 1993, for example, the activities of foreign-funded enterprises were 
responsible for China's first deficit in merchandise trade since 1989. The imports in question 
resulted from the contracts forged with foreign investors as part of their equity stakes in 
Chinese projects and involved the importation of materials and semi-finished goods to be 
processed for export. The materials and equipment imported as part of equity contracts 
amounted to some $17 billion in 1993, while the import of those semi-finished goods 
reprocessed for export amounted to $25 billion. In short, the activities of foreign funded firms 
accounted for more than 40% of China's total imports in 1993 and "grew more than twice as 
fast as its imports overall. ,,61 These statistics reinforce Breslin's point that "to understand the 
politics of export-growth, it is essential to distinguish between 'domestic' Chinese exports, 
and foreign-funded Chinese exports.,,62 The surge in FOI into China in 1993 represents then a 
pivotal structural change in the nature of China's development, but also irrevocably alters the 
way in which the bilateral trade deficit between the US and China should be perceived. Not 
only is the line between imports and exports blurred by global production chains (in that 
imported components are used in what subsequently counts as a Chinese export) but the 
1>11 Ihid, p.42. 
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significance of a state-centric approach to trade statistics is fatally undermined. Again, the US 
propensity to count imports depending on the last country in the production chain completely 
negates the phenomenon of FDI and transnational webs of production. As again Breslin notes, 
"the final stage in the production chain is usually labour intensive component assembly and/or 
finishing semi-finished produce - in other words, areas with low value added.,,63 It is also the 
case that many of the components which foreign investors source originate from other 
production sites within Asia. Only then are they sold on by China as finished goods to western 
markets. Again, it is in this sense that the deficit is part of an overall structural problem with 
Asia as a whole and which explains why China has a huge trade surplus with the United States 
while running significant deficits with manufacturers of components such as South Korea and 
Taiwan. 64 
It is worth going into some detail at this juncture about the most prominent types of US FDI 
in China at the present time. Tsao and Whisler have shown that US companies have tended to 
prefer equity joint ventures in China as opposed to contractual joint ventures and wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises. Between 1979 and 1992 around 60% of US investment in China 
took the form of equity joint ventures, while contractual joint ventures accounted for 22% of 
investment and wholly foreign-owned enterprises for 18% of total investment. By 1992 equity 
joint ventures accounted for 71 % of US investment, while the share represented by wholly-
owned foreign enterprises had increased to 23%.65 Equity joint ventures comprise a mixture 
of manufacturing, assembly, and processing enterprises which include products such as 
automobiles, computers, food and beverages. However, and this is significant, US 
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manufacturing investment has tended to hone in on high-technology products, speciality 
chemicals, construction materials, and medical supplies. Among the top ten joint equity 
venture investments were Beijing Jeep Corp funded by Chrysler at number two and Gold Cup 
Jinbei Vehicle Company at number three and funded by General Motors as well as a Bermudan 
registered company66 As stated, US investment, along with the investment of Japan, is 
particularly important in terms of China's long-term technological development. Though 
western investors at the low end of the market are often crowded out by webs of overseas 
Chinese investment, this investment tends to be in smaller low-technology sectors67 As 
Breslin points out, it was the "desire to encourage such technology imports that was one of 
the main reasons that the Chinese authorities encouraged such investment in the first place. 11 6M 
It is worthy of note that the Chinese government has proven more than adept at securing FDI 
in high-technology sectors on its own terms. Due to the fact that China maintains tariffs that 
range from 30% and run as high as 100% on automobiles, foreign companies are often left 
with no choice but to construct factories in China in order to guarantee market access for their 
products. As Chang-Bloch notes, a tactic here has been to play companies off against one 
another. In 1995, General Motors competed with Mercedes Benz to see which company 
would give China the most technology in return for the right to manufacture and sell cars in 
the China market - in the end both companies "committed sophisticated technology to design 
and build new models. ,,69 Moreover, investors have been given significant tax exemptions on 
high-tech imports which, in the eyes of the Chinese government, are likely to strengthen 
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China's technological base. 70 A significant factor in the race to capture the market for large-
scale infrastructural investment in China seems to have been Japan's quite different approach 
from that of the US. Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) is now the 
largest foreign lender to China providing it with more funds than either the World Bank or the 
Asian Development Bank. Moreover, Japanese loans take the form of concessionary credits 
repayable over a thirty year period. Since 1979 such loans, which have financed transportation 
projects, telecommunications and electric power, have amounted to $10 billion. This form of 
long-term investment reflects what Ronald Dore has characterised as the Japanese willingness 
to "foreclose their options by making long-term commitments from which, they accept, they 
can only disengage themselves with great difficulty.,,71 This approach stands in marked 
contrast to most forms of US FDI which are more often reliant upon investors seeking quick 
returns and are more susceptible to financial speculation. In this sense, the race to supply 
China with high-tech products may favour Japan in that it is more congruent with long-term 
social and economic prosperity and less vulnerable to financial shocks and capital flight. A last 
feature of US foreign investment in China has been the opening of new sectors of the 
economy to FDI. This has particularly benefited US firms which lead the world in the 
provision of services. The service industries opened to FDI in 1992 have included banking, 
insurance, accounting, tourism, and retailing. In 1992 the American International Group 
(AIG), the world's largest insurance group, was given a licence to sell insurance products in 
Shanghai, while Sino-American joint ventures in retailing have been given the right to import 
directly the commodities they sell.n In retailing China's Ministry ofInternal Trade announced 
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in late 1996 a plan to open all provincial capitals to joint venture department stores which 
would be accorded full trading rights. 73 
In sum, the 1993 increase in FDI flowing into China has directly contributed to the growth of 
America's trade deficit with the PRC primarily because China has become the final port of 
entry for manufacturing firms seeking to cut labour costs in a regional and global network of 
production. The role of foreign investors and foreign firms in producing China's exports is 
significant enough to undermine the concept of a simple bilateral trade deficit between two 
national governments. It is also worth noting that brand names may tell us more about the 
extent to which US influence lies behind Chinese imports than the simple composition of 
goods. 
The second reason, outlined by Breslin, why Chinese exports have surged since 1993 is due to 
China's restructuring of its exchange rate system in 1994 which greatly enhanced the global 
competitiveness of Chinese products and, as we will discuss later in this chapter, played a 
prominent role in the cycle of events which culminated in the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. 
Moreover, and relevant to the immediate discussion, China's restructuring of its exchange rate 
is a key structural reason for the continued proliferation for America's trade deficit. 
China's Exchange Rate Reform: Implications for US Policy 
China's decision to reform its exchange rate in 1994 contains an overriding irony in that strong 
US pressure for such reforms was followed by denunciation of the resultant increases in the 
bilateral deficit. Moreover, the growth in the bilateral deficit flowing from exchange rate 
"1 US Department of State, 1996 Country Reports: "On Economic Policy and Trade Practices: People's 
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reform merely reflected China's new structural role in the Asian regional economy. A 1993 US 
Department of the Treasury Report concluded that China was manipulating its exchange rate 
and contravening the 1988 US Trade Act. Under the auspices of the act the US Department of 
the Treasury is obliged to make annual assessments as to whether US trading partners are 
manipulating their exchange rates in order to obstruct realistic balance of payments adjustment 
or to gain an unfair competitive advantage in international trade74 On 25 May 1993 Under 
Secretary for International Affairs, Lawrence Summers, informed a Senate Subcommittee on 
International Finance and Monetary Policy that China's long-term manipulation of its 
exchange rate and its currency reserves was indeed having an adverse impact upon US exports 
to China thereby worsening the trade deficit. The US Treasury was particularly critical of 
China's multiple exchange rate system whereby official rates controlled by the government, 
market (or swap) rates, and black market rates ran alongside one another creating a three tier 
financial system viewed as inimical to China's full participation in GATT or the WTO. 
Following a great deal of pressure from the IMF, the US government and foreign investors (as 
well as Chinese provinces and exporting enterprises), the Chinese government decided to unify 
the swap market rate and the official rate at the lower swap market rate of 8.7 Yuan to the 
dollar on January I, 1994. The unification of rates represented a 50% devaluation of the Yuan 
with far reaching consequences for the regional economy. Convertibility, however, was limited 
to trading activities and a great deal of administrative control remained in place, while the 
swap market (where foreign funded companies buy and sell exchange) continued to exist due 
to a lack of confidence among foreign investors in China's opaque banking system. 75 
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While marking a significant liberalising measure and a further opening to international markets 
there still remained a number of controls over the domestic Chinese market and even stricter 
controls over the capital account. Before considering US Treasury criticisms of China's large 
accumulation of foreign exchange rates and China's new round of currency liberalisation in 
1996, it is worth taking on board some key criticisms of the US Treasury view of the Chinese 
government's role in currency manipulation. Nicholas Lardy does not dispute that the Chinese 
government has long fixed the official exchange rate and has intervened to manipulate the 
swap market rate. However, most interventions in the swap market have been made to prevent 
a depreciation in its value. Moreover, the unification of the two rates in 1994 at the higher 
swap market rate illustrated the fact that the official exchange rate had significantly overvalued 
the Chinese currency and, as a result, imposed higher costs on Chinese exporters while 
subsidising Chinese imports. In short, "the interventions and manipulation would likely have 
the opposite effect of that postulated by the US Department of the Treasury. ,,76 The Chinese 
government has sought to balance foreign investment with foreign exchange reserves held by 
the Central Bank, the People's Bank of China. This has been done primarily so that any 
expedient capital outflow following full convertibility can be offset by usage of the estimated 
$100 billion in foreign exchange reserves and to cover any surge in imports. These reserves 
have been acquired due to the legally binding obligation of Chinese enterprises to sell their 
foreign exchange earnings to Chinese banks. In the view of the US Treasury this leads to an 
artificially high level of reserves. This money, according to the Treasury, would be better used 
to finance Chinese imports and thus has a detrimental effect on US exports. 
Nicholas Lardy also contests the US Treasury view on the grounds that it negates the 
"heterogeneity of what IS referred to as China's international reserves." In short, the 
C(, Lardy, China in the World Economy, p.86. 
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government has control over foreign exchange reserves held by the Central Bank, yet, by 
1992, less than half of these reserves were actually held by the Bank. 77 Lardy shows that even 
though the government curtailed its foreign reserve holdings in 1992 exporters and individual 
holders of foreign exchange held on to their holdings and moved large amounts off shore for 
fear of a Chinese government move to full convertibility and a subsequent depreciation in the 
value of the currency. 7K The Chinese government intervened mainly to shore up the value of 
the Chinese currency by selling officially held dollars despite the fact that this affected Chinese 
export-trade in a negative way over the short-term. The crucial point here is that long-term 
stability and assuring investor confidence overrode the short-term gain of allowing the 
currency to continue its downward trajectory. 
Also in 1993 the Chinese leadership pledged itself to what the World Bank described as 
"China's first real attempt at formulating a clear, coherent, and comprehensive blueprint for 
making the transition to a full market economy. ,,79 The reforms announced in February 1993 
included those mentioned above, but also the decision to float the exchange rate in 1996. On 
I December 1996 the renminhi became fully convertible for all current account transactions 
with a UN report estimating that the reforms were likely to sustain capital inflows of over $42 
billion that year. 80 Again, this would indirectly enhance China's export position in relation to 
the US. This was accompanied by the granting of trading rights to foreign companies and, for 
the first time, equal status and rights of legal redress in Chinese law - measures which 
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enhanced the macro-economic conditions for renewed levels of FDI. MI That said, China still 
does not possess a foreign exchange market where foreign exchange dealers can interact 
directly with international markets and the Chinese government continues to control interest 
rates on a non-market basis. More importantly, China continues to maintain controls over its 
capital account in the belief that any prospect of significant capital outflows would be ruinous 
to the overall reform strategy. In sum, we can see that China's reform of its currency has been 
advantageous to Chinese exports overall in that it has encouraged increased FDI but not 
always in the way expected. The devaluation of the currency in 1994 was largely a result of 
pressure for a unified currency by the IMF and the US Treasury. It should not be seen as a 
unilateral attempt at a competitive devaluation. As stressed above, Chinese interventions with 
regard to its currency can be seen as part of an overall attempt to secure long-term economic 
stability rather than a simple strategy of expanding its trade surplus with the US. As Lardy has 
shown, if this had been the strategy then the Chinese government would hardly have propped 
up the swap market exchange rate at the cost of hurting Chinese exports. It would seem that 
China's exchange rate reforms again highlight the contradictory nature of US economic 
strategy. On the one hand the US urges Chinese reforms along neo-liberal lines, and on the 
other, the consequences of such reforms - increased FDI in China and growing export-levels -, 
are politically equated with China's import barriers which, though significant, are not the root 
structural cause of the US-China trade disparities. 
The US and China's Disputed Entry to the World Trade Organisation 
This section of the chapter discusses China's entry to the World Trade Organisation and the 
protracted nature of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. China's accession is seen as both 
~I Ihid.. p.39. 
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central to cementing a working bilateral trading and, more importantly, as tying China to a set 
of rules and norms which have broader repercussions for the future of world trade - especially 
labour and human rights standards. Gerald Segal has dubbed this approach 'positive 
conditionality' where "China can be told that its continuing access to the benefits of the WTO 
depend on meeting WTO rules, however these are phased in."~2 Bringing China within an 
interdependent world-economy also serves to promote a more stable world order and, from a 
US perspective, would undoubtedly be key to shaping the underlying political economy of the 
twenty-first century.M3 In large part, it is the United States which controls the agenda as to 
whether or not China enters and on what terms. Segal was undoubtedly correct when he 
asserted that "because China is likely to be a long-term importer of high technology from the 
developed world, the West will have major leverage over what China does with its own 
technology exports."l!4 The US decision to accede to China's entry at the time of writing, 
November 1999, bears testament to this view in that China has agreed significant further 
Iiberalisation of its market. 
The Chinese government has been attempting to join the GATT since 1986, but its application 
was held up because of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 and due to the protracted 
nature of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations finalised in 1993. The multilateral GATT 
working group reconvened its work in 1992, undertaking a fresh assessment of China's 
economic reforms in relation to GATT rules for entry. At this stage negotiations entered the 
phase of addressing outstanding bilateral disputes between individual WTO member countries 
and China in the hope of reaching mutually acceptable protocols for accession. For the US 
X2 See G Segal, "Tying China into the International System", Survival, Vo1.37, No.2, 1995, p.71. 
X.1 Y Funabashi, M Oksenberg, and H Weiss, An Emerging China in a World uf Interdependence. New York, 
Trilateral Commission, 1994. 
X1 Segal, ""Tying China into the International System", p.71. 
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there remained a number of disagreements precluding support for China's entry. These 
included disputes involving the trade deficit ( discussed above), intellectual property rights 
(lPRs), prison labour, textile transhipments, trade barriers and generic questions of market 
access. Overall, however, it has been China's continued insistence on protecting key infant 
industries that has been seen as flouting the WTO's commitment to free trade and 
Iiberalisation. 
In May 1993 the Chinese government took the fundamental decision to continue, allowing the 
State Office for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Imports (SOEMEA) to use 
its discretion in determining when policies of import-substitution were needed and to 
recommend them if necessary. A report by the SOEMEA in 1993 stated that those machines 
and electronic imports "which, if. .. excessive, can seriously jeopardise the development of the 
relevant industries in the PRC or can directly affect the adjustment of the industrial structure 
and product mix will be subject to import quota control according to international practice. ,,115 
This type of protectionism raises the central question in the dispute over China's accession to 
the WTO. It is commonly accepted that most countries involved In a project of national 
development deploy limited forms of protection while creating a viable industrial and 
technological infrastructure. For instance, the South Korean government used protectionist 
measures in the early 1980s to safeguard its indigenous electronics industry!l6, while Japan 
deployed a host of protectionist measures during the Cold War which were tolerated due to 
US strategic interests. Moreover, rates of protection must be related to stages of development 
as well as the specificity of a national and historical context. As Hobson notes, the United 
States, during its initial phase of industrial development, "levied the highest tariff rates in the 
K' Shirk, How China Opened its Door, p.70. 
KI, J Henderson, The Glohalisation of High-Technology Production, London, Routlege, 1989, p.66. 
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world, bar Russia"~7 It is against this backdrop that the Chinese government has designated 
itself a developing country deserving of special treatment in respect of its entry to the WTO. 
The justification for this position is also based on Chinese government arguments that it should 
be judged on its low per capita income of only $780 per annum compared to $38,000 in 
Japan. KK The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) argues that developing 
status only applies to nations that need special treatment to help them succeed in international 
trade. In the US view, as articulated by one USTR China trade negotiator, "it does not matter 
if China is rich or poor, it only matters if China is competitive."K9 This highlights the 
enormous complexity of China's uneven development in that the coastal provinces tend to 
produce growth levels which are then taken to represent China as a whole. As Hirst and 
Thomson note, "China has a dual economy, part rapidly modernising Asian NIC, part semi-
stagnant state socialist system, and with every variant of rural economy from prosperous 
capitalist farms to grinding peasant poverty. ,,90 In short, China is both a developed and 
developing country, while "the sheer size of the country exaggerates China's real wealth 
obfuscating the fact that certain parts of the country are still riddled by astonishing levels of 
poverty and death from hunger.,,91 
Funabashi el al have identified two basic approaches to China's entry to the WTO which are 
as follows: 
X- JM Hobson, The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociologv of International Economic and Political 
('!lange, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.ISO. 
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September. 1997. 
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That China is allowed to enter on comparatively easy terms and that WTO members are 
permitted to use normally illegal safeguards against potential market disruptions carried out by 
China. 
That China, as part of its accession agreement, commits to "a firm phased- in programme to 
achieve full WTO standards within a fixed period,,92 
Perkins elaborates on these two points at greater length, arguing in favour of granting China a 
'modified' form of developing country status. For Perkins, "insisting on developed country 
rules within a short time frame is tantamount to vetoing China's entry."9~ He further argues 
that China should be allowed to carry out a limited industrial policy applied to automobiles and 
electronics "until its per capita income rises significantly above mid-1990s levels." This 
approach allows "China to live within the rules of the world trading system, but will give 
China ample room to carry out its economic development programmes. ,,94 It is worthy of note 
here that European Union also has serious reservations about China's entry to the WTO. 
Nearly a quarter of all EU anti-dumping duties from 1988-95 were targeted towards China 
and in 1997 China was subject to sixty-nine anti-dumping investigations relating to 20% of 
Chinese exports to the EU. Moreover, the European Commission has reserved the right to 
enforce quantitative restrictions on Chinese imports even after its entry to the WTO. 95 Thus 
objections to China's entry are not solely American even if it is the case that the WTO largely 
reflects neo-liberal norms emanating from US economic practices. It is noteworthy that 
government level discussions between the US and China on this issue, in April 1999, broke 
'12 Funabashi et ai, An Emerging China in a World of Interdependence, p.43. 
'I.l D Perkins, "How China's Economic Transformation Shapes its Future", in Vogel (cd), Living With China, 
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down due to a failure on the part of both sides to agree on the implementation of WTO rules, 
on a timetable for provisions governing dumping and product safeguards, and on rules 
regulating the textile trade. 96 
This breakdown in WTO negotiation was exacerbated by political tensions following the 
NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy during the crisis in Kosovo in April 1999. It was, 
therefore, highly surprising when the two sides agreed upon conditions for China's entry to 
the WTO on November IS, 1999. The WTO agreement, still subject to China reaching 
bilateral agreements with Canada and the European Union, is subject to a six year phase-in 
period but opens up the Chinese market to the global market in a comprehensive manner. The 
agreement cuts duties on a wide range of products, gives foreigners the right to distribute their 
goods within China, and allows foreign auto-makers to provide car financing while also 
increasing imports of foreign films.97 Most significantly, tariffs on imports will be brought 
down to between 14.5% and 15% while new sectors of the economy, such as banking, 
insurance, the internet, telecoms, and electronics will be opened up to the world precipitating a 
new phase in China's economic development which will hugely benefit the US as global 
leader in these sectors. 9H Significantly, Congress will be pressured by the Clinton 
Administration to pass a Permanent Normal Trade Relations Act in May 2000 lifting 
restrictions on US exports to China. 99 
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Up until November 1999, negotiations between the US and China had never really become 
fully multilateral in that the key disputes continued to revolve around outstanding bilateral 
issues which the US had insisted on resolving prior to approving China's WTO membership. 
The five fundamental bilateral conditions stipulated by US negotiators at the outset of the 
Clinton Administration were as follows: (i) a single national trade policy common to all 
provinces and regions of the country; (ii) full transparency of trade regulations; (iii) continuing 
gradual removal of non-tariff barriers; (iv) a commitment to a full market economy; (v) the 
acceptance of a safeguard system to protect GATT IWTO members from possible surges in 
Chinese exports until the transition to a market economy is complete. lOO China's entry to the 
WTO has been viewed as a way of taking US-China trade relations out of the quagmire of 
domestic US politics and the annual debate over MFN and also giving China's reformers a 
strengthened position from which to promote trade liberalisation. 101 There has been a 
suggestion that the US applies Article XIII of the WTO to China allowing US negotiators to 
continue applying MFN conditions (which they are bound to do by law) despite China's WTO 
entry while the possibility that the US is shut out of final WTO negotiations on China has also 
been mooted by other members which accord China full MFN status in bilateral relations. 102 
This is, however, very unlikely to come about given the US's dominant position in the global 
economy. Let us now turn to some of the bilateral disputes which have dominated 
negotiations and involve general questions of market access as well as key sectoral disputes. 
Market Access 
I"" Tsao and Whisler. China Briefing Paper, p.85. 
1'01 S Harris, "China's Role in the WTO and APEC" in DSG Goodman and G Segal (cds). China 
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On 10 October, 1992, one month prior to Bill Clinton's election victory, the US and China 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in which China's leaders pledged themselves 
to open China's markets to US imports and, more pertinently, to undertake a series of 
structural reforms of the Chinese economy congruent with GATT. These reforms were to take 
place in the four areas stipulated by a USTR investigation which had taken place one year 
earlier under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. The reforms to be implemented were as 
follows: an end to import prohibitions and quantitative restrictions~ an end to restrictive import 
licensing requirements; an end to technical barriers to trade, including standards, testing, and 
certification requirements without a scientific basis, especially in the agricultural area; and an 
end to unpublished or unclear laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings 
governing China's imports. 103 Thus China's leaders committed themselves to the fairly rapid 
and time-tabled phasing out of market barriers on specific products beginning on 31 December 
1992 and continuing, on a yearly basis, until 31 December 1997.104 Importantly, around 75% 
of the import restrictions specified above required elimination within a two year time frame. 
Unsurprisingly, China's leadership have found it all but impossible to meet the aforementioned 
criteria in their entirety, given both the exigencies of domestic Chinese politics - where 
rudimentary compliance with US demands is often frowned upon - and the need to maintain 
import-substitution developmental policies in order to safeguard pivotal infant industries, such 
as autos, from the vagaries of the global market. Accordingly, during 1993 the Office of the 
USTR, under Mickey Kantor, continued to protest against China's ongoing enunciation of 
regulations and directives such as those requiring the registration of electronic and machinery 
10.1 Tsao and Whisler, China Briefing Paper, p.85. 
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products or those relating to the import of medical equipment - all of which were adjudged to 
contravene the MOU as well as WTO principles. 105 
Despite such shortcomings in Chinese compliance with US stipulations, it is, nevertheless, 
quite clear that Chinese officials were taking the demands seriously. On 31 December, 1993, in 
line with the requirements of the MOU timetable, China eliminated 258 import restrictions on 
industrial imports such as iron and steel products, heavy machinery, machine tools, textile 
machinery, rail locomotives, helicopters, scientific instruments, and commercial aircraft. Also 
in 1993, and significantly in advance of the agreed timetable, China lifted non-tariff barriers on 
integrated circuits and selected chemical products whilst also removing a regime of 
administrative controls safeguarding the domestic manufacture of 171 machinery and 
electronic products. 106 By 1997 China had eliminated some 1,000 quotas and licensing 
requirements on high-tech US imports leading to a rise of almost 200% ($640 million in 1996) 
in US exports of telecommunications equipment. 107 The result of this was that by 1996 US 
exports to China had grown at a rate of 61.4%, compared to a growth of only 39.4% with the 
rest of the world. Also in 1996 China had spent some $1.7 billion purchasing US civilian 
aircraft. Overall, between 1992 and 1997, US exports to China have doubled and, in 1996, 
stood at around $12 billion. lOX 
In December 1994 the USTR estimated that China had failed to remove non-tariff barriers on 
some 155 products stipulated by the MOU. As outlined above, China's recalcitrance in certain 
product areas was retaliation against continued obstruction by the US of GATT membership, 
\1,) Office of the United States Trade Representative, People's Republic ojChina: Issues Summary, 22 October 
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but it has to be admitted that there were also genuine logistical problems with implementing 
agreements as well as growing concern in the country's political leadership that only state 
control over the allocation of resources could prevent the disparities in wealth afflicting the 
former Soviet Union and many of the East European economies. Indeed, in 1996 the World 
Bank defined China's "challenges over the medium term" as including the task of "reducing 
poverty and maintaining a relatively egalitarian distribution of income and wealth." 109 For its 
part, the US government agreed as part of the 1992 MOU to liberalise the export restrictions 
that limit Chinese access to technology. This would manifest itself in three ways. Firstly, China 
would benefit from any liberalisation of export control lists and procedures administered 
through the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). Secondly, 
China would be eligible for liberalised treatment of computer export for civilian end users. 
Thirdly, the US agreed to liberalise controls on the export of telecommunications equipment 
I 110 and techno ogy. 
Transparency 
An issue which very much ties in with that of market access is that of generic economic 
transparency. Some steps were made to improve this when China agreed in 1994 to publish 
trade regulations more regularly. Several new national laws have been written which by 
assuring certain levels of financial disclosure and providing the framework for economic 
accountability improve market access for US firms. These include laws such as the Foreign 
Economic Contract Law and the Administrative Litigation law. Similarly, as James Shinn 
notes, there has been "a burst of progress in the standardisation of accounting" since the 
beginning of the 1990s. Shinn lists three major steps which have been taken between 1992-
III') World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies, p.106. 
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1993. The Chinese government has revised the Accounting System for Foreign Investment 
Enterprises, enacted a new Accounting System for Joint Stock Companies and introduced a 
General Accounting Standard for the People's Republic of China. In Shinn's words, "these 
three acts, plus subsequent refinements, brought the rather rudimentary accounting of Chinese 
enterprises closer to international practice. "Ill Shinn goes on to emphasise the role of the 
stock markets in forcing the issue of public disclosure by the Chinese authorities. The 
domestic stock market exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen, the Hong Kong exchange and 
even the New York exchange are all now subject to participation by Chinese firms. He notes 
that the market capitalisation of listed firms in China was roughly equivalent to 10% of GNP 
in 1995, while "the value of listed Chinese firms could well increase tenfold over the next 
decade, thus driving even more standardised reporting and public disclosure.,1112 Such laws 
denote the growing prevalence of liberal practices within China and the move from centralised 
control to one founded upon the rule of law. Significantly, they make it easier for the US and 
other foreign governments to assess the level of Chinese protectionsim more systematically. 
The majority of disputes since 1994 then have been highly specific sectoral disputes which 
continue, nevertheless, to fall within the ambit of market access. 
Sectoral Disputes 
From 1994 onwards, then, the question of market access has been suffused by highly specific 
disagreements relating to Chinese market barriers in several key sectors, with the Chinese 
having undertaken a decidedly less than cooperative stance. In the agricultural sector, the 
USTR showed particular anxiety over the imposition of what the US side labelled 
1111 Lardy, China in the World Economy, p.82. 
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"scientifically unjustifiable sanitary and phyto-sanitary conditions" \l3 In short, agricultural 
standards and tests were viewed as unfairly impeding the export of US fruits, wheat, and 
tobacco while also contravening WTO principles in that such rigid regulations were not being 
applied to China's domestically produced agricultural products. 114 Another key area of dispute 
took place in the pharmaceutical sector where there are twelve US companies operating in the 
China market, representing 14% of this $6.1 billion industry which is bound to become 
. . I I . US fi 115 Increasmg y ucrattve to trms. The USTR raised complaints over the dearth of 
"administrative protection" provided for certain US products in this sector resulting in the 
erosion of exclusive marketing rights for US companies. A series of price controls introduced 
by the Chinese government in 1996 are viewed by US negotiators as discriminating against US 
pharmaceutical exports. 
In April 1996, an angry exchange took place concerning what was, and is, a highly pertinent 
issue, given the ever expanding role of the media and communication in the global economy. 
On April 16 1996, the Chinese leadership granted the state-owned Xinhua news agency 
regulatory control over all foreign news agencies involved in the financial information sector 
within China. Xinhua would thus gain access to business information and technical knowledge 
accrued by western companies. Importantly, US negotiators felt this would allow China to 
manipulate product price and market access statistics. The USTR objected most strongly to 
the prospect of Xinhua assuming the role of "competitor and regulator" with the ability to 
"control consumers and contracts, and regulate prices" or, in the extreme case, "damage and 
11.1 Office of United States Trade Representative, Issues Summary. 
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destroy the industry's business in China and elsewhere." 116 It lodged a complaint through the 
US embassy in Beijing and, in September 1997, Xinhua allowed Dow Jones and Reulers to 
continue market operations without state interference. The dispute's successful resolution has 
given impetus to US negotiators involved in ongoing talks aimed at securing Chinese 
compliance with WTO rules on financial information services. There is a broader issue at stake 
here revolving around the creation of a freer media in China. The Chinese government's 
allocation of Xinhua's domestic monopoly on economic news has, as we have seen, run into 
fierce US opposition, but this is part of a broader trend towards informational liberalisation in 
China. In 1978 Xinhua's share of book sales was 95%, but, by 1995, it had fallen to 30%. As 
Shinn notes, "the government would have to clamp down on several key growth sectors, 
including telecommunications, computers, information services, and the entertainment 
business" in order to maintain centralised control of information. For Shinn, market access in 
areas such as media and news is symptomatic of the way in which capitalism incrementally 
corrodes the authoritarian system in China - a process which appears inexorable if China is to 
hold its own in the information-driven global economy which is largely antithetical to 
authoritarian forms of power. 
Another source of US grievance in the general area of market access has been China's 
proclivity to contravene bilateral textile agreements by transhipping Chinese products 
surreptitiously whilst using counterfeit country of origin labels, by misclassifying textile and 
apparel products, and by exporting them through third countries. The US has threatened to 
severely reduce US quotas on textiles and was able to elicit Chinese concessions which were 
sealed by an agreement signed in January 1994. Despite the agreement, the US has 
nevertheless reduced China's textile quotas three times since 1994 due to continued violations 
lit. fhid. 
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reported by the US Customs Service. The import categories found to contain the largest 
volume of transhipped goods were those covering knit shirts, sweaters, underwear, cotton 
trousers, and shop towels. 117 Between 1991-93 it was estimated by US Customs that about $2 
billion in transhipped Chinese textiles and apparel was entering the US market. 11M A February 
1997 agreement was successful in convincing Chinese negotiators to accept reduced quota 
levels in categories where abuses have occurred as well as to grant further access to US textile 
and apparel products. 119 It should be noted, however, that the problem of transhipments must 
be understood, at least since the mid 1990s, in the context of China's, and Asia's, excess 
industrial capacity and an incipient 'glut' which may lead to a flood of cheap exports lowering 
prices and profits in the US and the West as a whole. China's reversion to this tactic in trade 
perhaps demonstrates signs of panic amongst China's new capitalists in the face of what is a 
quintessentially capitalist problem. 120 
A related problem has been that of overshipments. Under current law all merchandise entering 
the US which is in excess of a specified quota must be held in a customs warehouse until the 
commencement of the next year's quota. Between 1990-93, however, around 50% of the 88 
categories of Chinese goods subject to quotas were being overshipped into the US market 
causing significant market disruptions. Again, this has to be seen in global terms due to the 
fact that the products in question were sent to the US by transit countries allowing goods 
'Made in China' to fill unused portions of their bilateral quotas with the US I21 The Chinese 
government has argued that it is powerless to curtail illegal textile exports which enter the US 
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via third countries and in 1993 recommended that the task of enforcing quota restrictions be 
shared by third countries outside China's control. The US rejected this approach and in 1994 
threatened to impose unilateral reductions of 25-35% on 88 categories of Chinese textile and 
apparel products amounting to some $1 billion overall. However, an agreement in mid-
January 1994 averted this action and imposed an agreement in which access to the US market 
was significantly restricted by freezing quotas at the 1993 level and reducing annual increases 
from 4.4% to only I % in 1995 and 1996. 122 
Intellectual Property Rights 
The questions ansmg from the thorny issue of intellectual property rights in US-China 
relations strike at the very heart of the role of knowledge in the global economy, as well as 
raising fundamental questions about the private/public separation of politics and economics at 
the heart of neo-liberal political economy. The neo-liberal view of IPRs was enshrined in the 
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) reached during the final 
Uruguay round of GATT negotiations in April 1995. Broadly speaking, the US approach to 
IPRs has been to bring China into line with a bilateral agreement reached in January 1992 
under the Bush Administration with the TRIPS provisions agreed at the multilateral level of 
GATT and the subsequent WTO. The agreement also took the form of a bilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in which China agreed to join the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the Geneva Phonograms Convention 
while also agreeing to embellish patent, copyright, and trade secret laws. Chinese negotiators 
also pledged to take proactive measures in order to protect intellectual property, particularly in 
122 Lardy. China in the World Economy, pp.85- 86. 
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relation to software, agrichemicals, and pharmaceuticals. m Despite complaints against USTR 
demands on IPRs in the years preceding the 1992 agreement, China has been fairly compliant 
with the fundamental principles of IPR protection. Though logistical problems have arisen 
China's foreign trade minister in 1994, Wu Vi, claimed that these simply reflect China's "vast 
territory and large population. ,,124 Susan Shirk notes: "the Chinese have been as compliant on 
the intellectual property rights issue as anyone could expect. ,,125 Chinese difficulties in 
implementing IPR agreements does, however, raise the question of the difficulties which will 
arise when China joins the WTO and has to implement a much broader set of regulations 
auguring a new spat of clashes over trade. Specifically, the Chinese government produced a 
White Paper on IPRs and set up IPR courts in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, 
Xiamen and Haikou to adjudicate over alleged violations. 126 In 1992 China amended its 1984 
patent law to give greater protection to US inventions - protection of inventions with a time 
limit of some fifteen years from the time of invention. Regulations were enunciated to extend 
new levels of administrative protection to pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals. In July 1993 the 
Chinese government announced the activation of strengthened trade mark laws, while in 
December of that year an Anti-Unfair Competition Law was enacted which ensured added 
. d 127 protectIOn to tra e secrets. 
It was China's enforcement and implementation of these laws, however, which soon rankled 
with US trade negotiators and, in April 1994, the USTR's "Special 301" Review of China's 
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progress on IPRs concluded that unacceptable levels of IPR violations continued to occur in 
China. A specific criticism centred on the fact that China was concentrating its crackdown on 
retail outlets, rather than the sources of production which often escaped unpunished. On 30 
April 1994, Ambassador Mickey Kantor gave China sixty days to meet US demands and halt 
the rising level of abuses perceived to be occurring. The USTR cited the opening of 26 new 
factories in China selling pirated CDs as evidence of ongoing negligence or complicity on the 
part of Chinese officials. Having placed China on a 'priority watch list' as early as November 
1993, the US negotiators called for immediate measures, including raids on CD producers, the 
creation of a border enforcement regime to prevent the export of pirated goods with view to 
the long term, and the implementation of a copyright verification system, along with access to 
IPR courtS. 128 Unsurprisingly, China was reticent in complying with measures likely to 
infringe its sovereignty in any way, and as a result was subsequently designated by the US as a 
"priority foreign country" under "Special 30 I" provisions of the 1974 Trade Act. The 
significance of this move is that China was thereby officially labelled as a violator of US IPRs 
and thus susceptible to a range of sanctions. 
In February 1995 the USTR announced a series of products which would be subjected to 
100% US tariffs amidst growing tensions relating to the general direction of the US-China 
relationship. China's government counter-attacked by threatening retaliation, including the 
prevention of US audio-visual products from entering the Chinese market. An agreement was 
reached on February 26 1995, in which China's government pledged itself to strengthening its 
short and long-term commitment to an enforcement strategy and to removing import and 
investment barriers on US intellectual property products, including the removal of import 
quotas on US audio visual products and the extension of marketing rights to US record 
I"H Morrison. The China-US IPR Di.'pute, p.3. 
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companies. 129 The International Intellectual Property Alliance (lIP A), a group consisting of 
mainly US film, recording, software and book producers, had estimated losses of $866 million 
in 1994 and $1.1 billion in 1995130 In 1995 Mickey Kantor echoed these figures, reporting 
losses of, on average, $1 billion yearly (according to USTR figures) since the signing of the 
MOU in 1992. 131 
In 1996 China was again appropriated Special 301 pariah status by the USTR for failing to 
comply with the 1995 agreement and threatened with $2 billion in US sanctions targeted 
specifically against Chinese products made in Guangdong province (the primary source of 
pirated goods) should China fail to make progress by June 1996. The US record industry 
remained particularly perturbed at the undercutting of its competitive position in the global 
market, citing the fact that even after the 1995 agreement China continued to produce 100 
million CD units annually, selling only 5-7 million units within China, while exporting the 
remaining products to overseas markets. 132 By 1997 the USTR could note with pleasure that 
china had closed 58 CD/CD-ROM factory lines and had eliminated quotas on foreign sound 
recordings. 
Prison Labour 
The issue of prison labour has been a prime source of contention within the context of the US-
China trade relationship. In August 1992, the US and China signed another Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) in which China pledged not to export products manufactured by prison 
labour to the US. Allegations that China has flouted this agreement in order to enhance its 
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competitiveness have not resulted in concrete action from the US administration which tacitly 
accepted that 'progress' had been made when, in March 1994, it signed a Statement of Co-
operation on the Implementation of the MOU. Moreover, it has been claimed that the Chinese 
use of prison, or forced, labour in the manufacture of exports is negligible. The economist 
James Seymour of Columbia University has claimed that "prison labour is largely a 'non issue' 
because the amounts involved are so small." He goes on to affirm that "prisons produce less 
than one-fifth of 1 % of China's GNP, citing the fact that "federal and many state prisons in the 
US export the products of inmates working for a small fraction of the minimum wage." 133 The 
prison labour issue has been omnipresent in US-China relations but it has never been elevated 
to the status ofIPR abuses or market access. The American Federation of Labour-Congress of 
Industrial Organisation (AFL-CIO), however, has striven to bring attention to the 
contravention of workers rights, claiming, for instance, that "more than one half of China's 
vulcanised rubber, one third of its tea, one fourth of its asbestos" and "one fifth of its mercury" 
are among the goods produced by forced labour in China and subsequently exported to the 
US. 134 There seems little way of ascertaining the extent of abuses occurring in China, in part 
due to restricted foreign access, but it does seem imperative to recognise that technical 
arguments which view prison, or forced, labour merely as economic vices to buoy up China's 
comparative advantage are irrelevant as compared to some of the fundamental social issues 
raised. The prison labour issue dovetails with a broader debate on labour standards, bearing in 
mind that some 70% of foreign-funded firms were found to be violating worker's rights in 
1.1.1 Jamcs Seymour cited in Carl Riskin, "Behind the Silk Curtain: We Need summitry Not Sanctimony", 'l1,e 
\'alion, 10 Novcmber 1997. 
1 ,1 AFL-CIO representative Larry Fishkin, quoted in China and MFN Trade Slatus: A Public Hearing 
I'ealuring U5,' Government, Academia, and Human Rights Representatives: , .... 'ummary and Findings, 
Washington College of Law, American University. Washington D.C.. May 20,1994, p.4. 
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China in 1994. 135 It is apposite to note that these issues would be solved more easily at the 
global level, threby averting charges and counter-charges by both sides relating to anti-
competitive practices and protectionism. 
US Sanctions on China 
A pivotal component in the political economy of the US-China trade relationship revolves 
around the issue of sanctions. In 1989 a number of sanctions were placed on China following 
the Tiananmen Square massacre and amidst burgeoning anxieties over China's nuclear 
proliferation. While sanctions relating to weapons exports and the granting of export licences 
for Munitions List items have maintained support, those relating to the suspension of 
feasibility studies by the Trade and Development Agency, those forbidding the use of OPIC 
loans and insurance programmes, and those preventing Eximbank loan guarantees are seen to 
be thwarting the US private sector in China and undercutting the Administration's concerted 
push for trade liberalisation. More specifically, they have directly contributed to the more 
successful strategies of US rivals in the China market. The Treasury Department, largely 
charged with seeking to improve conditions for US financial services in China as well as to 
facilitate market operations by promoting easy access to credit and liquidity, has been 
particularly frustrated by Congressional insistence on maintaining such measures, which are 
largely a response to the trade deficit as well as China's one party system. 
Nicholas Lardy has identified trade sanctions and other political controls along with America's 
dearth of export credits, as being a key element within US structural disadvantages in the 
China market. According to Lardy, "American firms need access to export credits comparable 
11' Shirk, How China Opened lIs Door. p.84. 
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to those offered by their competitors.,,136 Though the Clinton Administration recognised the 
need for a more proactive and interventionist strategy in terms of financing exports through 
the National Export Strategy (set up in 1993), there have been many restrictions on the budget 
and on the operations of the US Eximbank. Lardy notes that the National Export Strategy 
only proposed $150 million to finance major capital projects overseas. This amount is less than 
the average amount provided in loans by the Japanese Eximbank in China alone during the 
years 1990-91. Lardy notes that the Japanese OECF package (discussed briefly above), 
provides $1 billion in aid to China annually, much of which is used to finance the sale of 
Japanese goods to China. 137 From the US perspective, the worrying trend here is that Japan's 
export aid packages may give Japanese firms a structural foothold in the China market, while 
US firms are hampered by unilateral sanctions and Congress's systematic underfunding of the 
Eximbank and OPIC operations in securing market share. Moreover, Japan has shown little 
concern with China's human rights record when devising trade policy and has avoided the 
bureaucratic in-fighting between economists and moralists so intrinsic to the US-China policy 
debate. One Treasury official claimed the Department's 'hands were tied' and the US's 
broader economic policy in China was severely undermined by domestic US legislation. m 
Once again, this goes against the idea that the US pursues policies wholly based on economic 
rationality or self-interest. 
New sanctions on technology exports in 1993 banned the sale of $1 billion worth of high-tech 
goods to China for over two years, cutting such companies as Hughes Aircraft, Collins 
Il(, Lardy, China in the World Economy. p.l3!. 
I.l' Ibid.. p.132. 
Il~ At an interview conducted at the US Department of the Treasury a senior China specialist claimed the 
Treasury's "hands were tied" in terms of encouraging key financial reforms by the Chinese government. 
Interview, US Department of the Treasury. Washington D.C., 12 December 1997. 
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Avionics and Rockwell International out of the bidding. 139 According to Chang-Bloch, 
sanctions have also prohibited the sale of the steam generators and turbines to China required 
to facilitate China's burgeoning electricity needs. US firms such as Westinghouse and General 
Electric lost sales in a market estimated to be worth $200 billion over the next ten years - 25% 
of which would consist of energy supply from foreign suppliers. 14o The Chinese foreign trade 
minister, Wu Li, has argued that the US trade deficit is accentuated by sanctions applied to 
strategic goods and high technology items, claiming that China wants to buy at a far greater 
level but is prevented from doing so by US law. 141 Indeed, with the US-China trade deficit's 
meteoric rise over the last few years very much in mind the US has moved to relax controls, 
reaching a deal with China in October 1997 designed to allow greater access for US 
corporations. The deal lifted the ban on nuclear trade and was worth some $100 billion over a 
twenty-five year period. It has given US companies some 60% of the Chinese nuclear power 
market. 142 This compounded the Administration's decision in February 1996 to allow Hughes 
Electronics, Lockheed Martin, and Loral to tap into the lucrative satellite market in China by 
permitting contracts running into hundreds of millions of dollars. 143 
Thus China's growmg economy is resulting in increased political leverage over the US, 
especially with the trade deficit so high. In this climate we can expect increasing pressure from 
transnationals within the US to dispense with sanctions in the belief that restrictive political 
measures have no place in the economic domain. Moreover, the fact that a whole raft of 
sanctions remain, especially those blocking Eximbank and OPIC financial activity in China, 
1.1~ Chang-Bloch, Commercial Diplomacy, p.205. 
11" Ihid., p.202. 
III Bangsberg, Open to US Trade, China Hints at Pre-Summit Foray. 
11: "US-China Pact Should Unlock Nuclear Trade", Journal (~lCommerce, October 21 1997. 
111 Chang-Bloch, Commercial Diplomacy, p.205. 
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demonstrates that political decisions have not yet been surrendered to the market even when 
such decisions are seen to blunt the sword of US competitiveness. In this sense, trade policy 
cannot be said to be merely the preserve of the business community but a contested issue 
dominated by no single interest. 
US Policy and China's Structural Reforms 
China's SOE Reforms and Contradictions in US Policy 
This section of the chapter evaluates the contradictions between the push for Chinese 
economic reform by both US and Chinese elites and the way in which such a push is likely to 
disrupt social stability and possibly long-term economic transition. It is also argued that the 
Asian financial crisis represents a turning point in China's long march towards reform. Often 
the question of the physical trading relationship between the US and China in goods and 
services obscures the centrality of financial reform in ensuring market discipline and 
generating self-sustaining market norms. It is China' reform of key institutions and their 
market operations which is truly the litmus test of whether China is becoming more integrated 
with the world economy and whether US policies are succeeding in promoting liberal reforms. 
Let us firstly look at some of the deeper financial reforms undertaken by China thus far and 
encouraged by the US and multilateral lending institutions. As mentioned above a 1993 report 
from the US Department of the Treasury alleged that China was manipulating its exchange 
rate through government interference in foreign exchange markets. At this time the US 
Treasury also called for several financial reforms along neo-liberal lines including the 
simplification of the tax rate and its structure, currency convertibility, and reform of China's 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). It is the latter demand that we focus on here in that China's 
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proposed reform of its SOEs not only represents a potential turning point III the reform 
process but also illuminates major contradictions In the political economy of US policy 
towards China. 
The SOE reform process correlates with the growing marketisation of the Chinese economy as 
well as China's efforts to enter the WTO. In 1995 Zhu Rongji, China's chief economic 
minister, declared that the Chinese government would retain 1,000 of the largest enterprises 
while the rest would be "thrown out to sea" - meaning diversification, divestiture of assets, 
mergers, leasing, joint ventures, conversion to collectives, and extinction. 144 One financial 
analyst in Beijing has dubbed the process as "an almost Thatcherite programme,,145 in that it 
has resulted in a great deal of labour unrest and job losses likely to precipitate industrial unrest 
in the near future. Again, the US Treasury has supported China's privatisation drive in the 
state sector while, at the same time, Treasury department officials claim they fully support 
China's incremental strategy and believe that any hasty dismantling of China's state sector 
would be a great mistake and likely to precipitate economic instability detrimental to foreign 
investment. 146 Thus, there are clear fault lines between advocating orthodox neo-liberal 
reforms and the pragmatic pursuit of policy when social factors are taken into consideration. 
According to the United Nations, around 20% of employees in the SOEs are thought to be 
underemployed labour liable for redundancy under market conditions. This comes on top of 
the 110 million rural workers already estimated to be loss-making and unnecessary in a free 
market context. 147 The World Bank has estimated that around 80 million Chinese have 
111 World Bank, Trends in developing Economies, p.106. 
1-1' "Asia's Next casualty: Bad Banks Could Clobber China", Business Week, December 15, 1997. 
11(, Interview, US Department of the Treasury, 12 December. 1997. 
I·l~ United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey, p.38. 
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remained in 'absolute poverty' during the reform period overwhelmingly living in rural areas. 14X 
These figures would suggest that rapid reforms could broaden inequality and thereby threaten 
stability in China. 
It is against this backdrop that US economic policy towards China and China's own reform 
process must be understood. The reform process entered a new phase in 1997 when Zhu 
announced a new phase in reform of the state sector likely to result in the shedding of 10 
million jobs in two years and which dampened demand in the Chinese economy due to 
widespread fears in China over imminent jobs losses. The upshot of this strategy has been a 
fall in Chinese exports to Japan of 11.5% combined with a decline in exports overall. As 
Breslin notes this, decline in overall exports has dovetailed with "an increase in both exports 
and the trade surplus with the USA and creates new challenges in the bilateral relationship.149 
The whole question of China's monetary strategy is, indeed, a moot one with the US and 
financial institutions urging China's leaders to keep a hold on inflation and introduce market 
principles in most sectors of the economy. In 1993 Zhu famously stated that "what we want is 
a soft landing while the growth rate is gradually lowered. If we drastically reduced the growth 
rate, we would have to pay the cost of social stability." 150 Zhu was speaking after the manifest 
failure of a government austerity programme that year which aimed to redress the spiralling 
growth rate with the introduction of lower inflation targets and cuts in public spending. 
There is something of a twist to the entire debate on the trade deficit in that foreign leaders 
and companies tend to emphasise short-term growth at the expense of macro-economic 
stability and long-term social cohesion in China which encourage intermittent surges in 
11~ World Bank, Trends in Develuping Ecunomies, p.106. 
1·,'1 Breslin, 'The Politics of Chinese Trade", p.1190. 
1,0 Funabashi et a1. An Emerging China in a World of Interdependence, p.39. 
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Chinese exports as well as inflation and, thus, run contrary to the supposed aims of neo-liberal 
reforms. Interestingly, this point is forcefully articulated by a joint study written by Y oichi 
Funabashi, Michel Oksenberg and Heinrich Weiss on behalf of the Trilateral Commission. 
Funabashi et al argue that there is a "get rich quick" mentality among many Chinese and 
foreigners doing business in China" and that "this mentality emphasises short-term profits and 
'exploitation' in the worst sense of the term, rather than responsible and sustainable 
development." 151 Funabashi et al further argue that "the Trilateral governments have also been 
atlected by this approach; the visits of political leaders usually focus on stimulating economic 
interaction without sufficient regard to the longer-term implications." 152 An example of this 
short-term tendency is illustrated by an article which appeared in Business Week In 1997, the 
president of the Chinese Construction Bank set up an International Investment Bank with US 
firms, Morgan Stanley, Dean Witer, and Discover and Co, to undertake joint deals in China 
and overseas. However, within China the Construction Bank's president, Wang, planned to cut 
100,000 jobs and close 25% of his banks.153 Thus the whole process of market reform, 
elucidated most forcefully by the privatisation of the SOEs, raises key questions as to who 
benefits from the process. In the example just given foreign investors and wealthy elites in 
China are the prime benefactors of short-term strategies which show little concern for the 
long-term development of China's infrastructure. The US Treasury Department has blamed 
China's inability to reform the state sector on China's concomitant banking crisis characterised 
by over-investment, inadequate tax collection and the creation of reserve money to stimulate 
failing industries which, by the mid 1990s, lead to an inflationary crisis. This situation was 
exacerbated by $200 billion in non-performing bank loans lent to SOE's by China's banks. 
1\1 Ihid.. p.42. 
1\2 Ihid., p.42. 
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However, similar practices in other Asian economies were fuelled by international lending 
institutions and by foreign investment in the hope of reaping short-term dividends. It is most 
likely, that such sources would have done the same in China had restrictions on capital flows 
not existed, causing China's currency to collapse in tandem with Asia's other vulnerable 
economies. Indeed, according to Nicholas Lardy, $116 billion of China's state debts are 
external despite capital account restrictions. 154 This leads us to consider the implications of 
the Asian financial crisis for US-China relations and the extent to which it impacts on Chinese 
reforms required to join the WTO. 
The Asian Financial Crisis 
The Asian financial cnSIS has impacted on the US-China trade relationship in several 
significant ways. Firstly, it puts into question China's continued trade liberalisation strategy 
encouraged by the US and eagerness to join the WTO. It also illuminates America's weakened 
position in the regional economy when it comes to financial markets. Secondly, it brings into 
question China's export-led growth strategy which was shown to be vulnerable to sudden 
changes in the global economy. The last point dovetails with the US-China trade deficit and 
China's reliance on the US market for the export of labour intensive products. 
The events which conspired to create the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 suggest that had 
China's economy been as porous as others in the region, particularly as regards its overvalued 
currency and structural problems with non-performing bank loans, then it would have been 
"washed away" in the words of a US Treasury Department official. 155 This puts the US in the 
complex situation of having advanced reforms of China's economy which it now admits may 
1 \·1 Lardy quoted in "China Stands on the Sidelines of Asian Financial Chaos", Los Angeles Times, November 
25. 1997. 
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have escalated the Asian financial crisis and, indeed, spread the so-called 'contagion' to the 
west in the event of any collapse in Chinese demand. It was for this very reason that President 
Clinton argued strongly against any devaluation of the Chinese Yuan during a meeting with 
China's leaders in 1998. 156 In many respects, this signifies an enhanced structural position for 
China's currency in the global economy and a chip with which to barter in negotiations with 
the US over entry to the WTO. It also demonstrates the level of US impotence in controlling 
the crisis despite the much vaunted neo-liberal restructuring packages foisted upon Indonesia 
and other Asian economies by the IMF with strong US support. In short, China's currency 
had assumed a new weight in the global economy magnified by the crisis and the fact that it 
was China's competitive devaluation of the Yuan in 1994 which undercut the competitive edge 
of other Asian economies and had a devastating impact on their exports. Significantly, China's 
1994 devaluation was part of a restructuring policy strongly encouraged by the US and the 
IMF as part of a move to liberalise China's currency and move to a market responsive 
exchange rate. 
In November 1997 the Los Angeles Times appeared to be in no doubt as to why China seemed 
to be weathering the storm which had paralysed Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea, stating 
that "the main reason the world's most populous country has so far avoided the fall is that 
China does not share one thing with its Asian neighbours: an easily convertible currency." In 
the same article Laurence Brahm, the managing director of Beijing-based venture and capital 
investment firm, NAGA, said "China is probably the safest place to have your money because 
its currency is not fully convertible and therefore is not exposed to the kind of speculation 
I" Interview, US Department of the Treasury, 12 December. 1997. 
1'(, J Gray. "Bill in a China Shop". The Guardian, 28 December, 1998. 
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which has sparked the crisis in South East Asia. ,,157 Moreover, in 1997 new contracts for FDI 
in China dropped by 39% and US investors alone withdrew $3 billion from mutual funds in the 
Asian region generally in order to steady the nerves of shareholders. 15M We should note that 
although liberalisation of China's current account and dismantling of trade barriers can still be 
viewed as beneficial it is the liberalisation of China's capital account and its foreign exchange 
which would expose China to speculative capital and financial shocks. In this sense China is 
almost certain to persevere with policies which encourage high rates of domestic savings 
among Chinese consumers. The World Bank has estimated that "if China's savings rates 
persist at their high levels (42% of GDP in 1994), China will not have to significantly increase 
its reliance on foreign finance to meet its growth target of 8% as proposed for the ninth five 
year plan.,,159 This is, of course, not to argue that China can or should move away from global 
trade but that over-reliance on exogenous financial capital could store up future problems and 
detract from longer term investment needs. In this context the US Treasury's criticism of 
China's foreign exchange reserves has to be taken into account. The US Treasury has argued 
that China's "over-investment and accumulation of reserves" is detrimental to US exports and 
free trade and that China's leaders should be "using its huge reserves to develop 
infrastructures" and should be curtailing a level of reserves inappropriate to "a still poor 
country." 160 This can be seen as part of an anxiety that China is creating something of a butTer 
zone between its domestic reforms and the global economy. For its part, complete financial 
liberalisation would likely, at the current juncture, further erode China's leaders control of the 
reform process and leave them with only macro-economic levers, primarily interest rates, with 
l'i' "China Stand on the Sidelines", Los Angeles Times. 
I ,xSamuelson, The Asian Connection. 
I ,'I World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies, p.to8. 
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which to control the economy. In this sense the Asian financial crisis my have compounded the 
Chinese leaderships declaration in October 1997 that it was reluctant to open China's financial 
markets any further for the foreseeable future. 161 
The second factor to consider emanating from the Asian financial cnsls relates to the 
continued efficacy, or otherwise, of China's export strategy which has deterred domestic 
investment in the economy. Over reliance on exports has illuminated the fragility of China's 
reforms and the potential for disaster as foreign demand drastically declines. China lost its 
regional export markets in 1998 while, simultaneously, international investors tended to keep 
out of the region due to a collapse in market confidence. Consequently, China sutTered much 
reduced growth and price deflation in 1998 combined with threats to employment. This 
compounded problems of severe undercapacity in the Chinese economy with half of Chinese 
industry running at 60% capacity in 1996. 162 As stressed, the collapse of regional markets 
fuelled the bilateral US trade deficit with China despite China's falling rate of overall exports 
with the world economy. In short, the crisis again structurally skewed bilateral trade dispute 
with the US while alerting China's leaders of the overall risks in relying solely on exports as a 
strategy for growth. Breslin has stressed the need for China to look to a more Keynesian 
strategy of domestic expansion combined with investment in Chinese human capital and high-
tech sectors of China's domestic economic base. The risks in failing to do so are that an 
economy producing cheaper low value-added goods than China may soon come along 
decimating China's competitive edge while leaving it out of synch with the advanced capitalist 
economies already innovating in new technologies at a rapid pace. From a US perspective this 
would, of course, alleviate the bilateral deficit while providing new opportunities to 
1(>\ R Sutter, "China's Changing Conditions", CR .. \' Issue Brief IB 97049, Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress, Washington D.C., October 1997, p.lO. 
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manufacturers of advanced technology within the US. It would also encourage longer term 
investment opportunities more attuned to China's overall development. It may also solve issue 
such as prison labour exports and abuses of IPRs in that these contraventions of WTO rules 
are intimately bound up with China's position as an exporter oflabour-intensive goods. 
Conclusion 
In this final section we consider what US-China trade relations imply for American dominance 
in the world order. We broadly agree with Gill and Law's view that "fears that a decline in 
American dominance will lead to a breakdown in the liberal international economic order are 
largely misplaced, especially when the importance of economic interdependence among the 
major capitalist states, and the open door to foreign direct investment are recognised." 163 
Despite the many disputed areas in US-China policy the fact remains that China's leaders want 
to bring the country within the liberal world trading order. The main outstanding arguments 
are about the type of capitalism China will adopt and the pace at which it reforms the 
economy. It is true, that disputes such as that surrounding MFN have been politically 
important but it often tends to reflect either outdated Cold War ideology or human rights 
concerns which were hardly mentioned during the Cold War when China's human rights 
record was far worse. Indeed, during the Cultural Revolution many western radicals were 
lauding Maoism despite human rights abuses which dwarf those currently taking place within 
China. In short, China's reliance on the US market for growth and particularly advanced 
technology is likely to temper it behaviour in other realms. Moreover, China's increasing 
imbrication with global institutions suggest that the broad appeal of consumer freedoms is 
II,c Breslin, ''The Politics of Chinese Trade", p.lln 
1,,1 S Gill and D Law, The Global Political Economy: Perc\peclives, Problems and Policies, Hemel Hempstead, 
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likely to enhance China's reform process. This again suggests American dominance, if not 
hegemony, at the level of world order which makes the US an indispensable partner. At the 
October 1997 summit between and President Clinton and Jiang Zemin China indicated its 
reliance on US information technology by committing itself to full participation in the 
Information Technology Agreement while, as part of ongoing WTO negotiations. President 
Clinton has also stressed that China's WTO entry is his last great foreign policy aim as US 
President which suggests that the US may be moving towards a modified form of entry for 
China as described above. 
\1uch of this chapter has focused upon the bilateral complexities of the US-China relationship 
particularly the question of the bilateral deficit and the way trade statistics have been 
manipulated for political reasons. The MFN debate in the US is extremely important as the 
locus for discontent with the US trade deficit overall. One of the key reasons that China is 
singled out for criticism is because of China's structural role in international division of labour 
rather than any peculiarly protectionist path followed by China's leaders. Thus while US 
policymakers support tough bilateral action on economic issues such as the trade deficit this 
must be seen in the context of the Clinton Administration's attempt to keep Congress in line 
with the policy of engaging China. In short, it is part of the price paid by policy makers of 
having to compromise with a Congress in which there exist strong protectionist tendencies. 
This is borne out by the fact that the trade deficit is seen as inevitable given China's export 
policies and the nature of demand in the US market. 164 This is not to say, however, that the 
US is necessarily wrong to demand China's lowering of tariffs in certain areas where they are 
prohibitive to free trade given the extent to which the US market has facilitated China's 
growth throughout the reform years. Again, this is borne out by the fact that China maintains 
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a trade surplus with the US while running sizeable global trade deficits. It is also worthy of 
note that even Japan imposed anti-dumping penalties on Chinese steel production in 1994- its 
first ever resort to such penalties. 165 Thus, China's trade strategy is not simply causing 
problems for the US - indeed the EU refuses to acknowledge China as a market economy. It is 
also the case, however, that much of China's problems with bilateral trade accords and WTO 
demands relates to what Oksenberg and Lieberthal term" fragmented authoritarianism." 166 As 
power moves from the centre to the myriad provinces and locales central control becomes 
more difficult as a series of bargains and compromises with disparate agencies holding fast to 
disparate policy preferences have to be struck by the centre. This is particularly the case with 
intellectual property rights and prison labour issues which easily escape central government 
control. In short, capitalist reforms encouraged by the US somewhat ironically make trade 
liberalisation more difficult to enforce while, of course, threatening social stability and, in turn, 
market confidence. 
American leverage over China is also much in evidence if we look at PDt Despite a great deal 
of restrictions on US firms due to government sanctions on China (see above) US firms are 
moving, along with Japanese investors, into high technology sectors which make them 
indispensable to China's overall development (see the above discussion of General Motors). 
We did argue that the US government's inability to support US firms in the way the Japanese 
have through the OECF has hindered the US capture of the market in these areas and, as 
Lardy argues, may mean that several long term projects escape the grasp of US firms. The 
issue of FDI also clouds the 'national' character of the trade deficit debate in that many firms 
11,1 Interview, Department of Commerce, October, 1997. 
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are operating on a transnational basis importing components from within the Asian region 
while also exporting goods manufactured by predominantly US companies which 
subsequently count as Chinese exports. In short, FDI is gradually pulling China towards the 
global economy and is necessary to China's future development as well as crucial to US 
foreign economic policy. Nevertheless, it does involve the employment of cheap and easily 
exploited labour with few rights though the best way forward may be a code of conduct for 
US firms rather than an insistence on human rights standards which are often seen in China as 
protectionist. It is also worthy of note that investment in China has, on the whole, been 
extremely uneven gravitating towards the coastal regions. In the long-term this trend may be 
counter-productive for both the US and China in that it leaves the vast interior with systematic 
under-investment and creates huge social problems of urban migration. We noted above 
China's 1992 reforms which opened new areas of the country to FDI and which have attracted 
Japanese long-term infrastructural investment. Similar US investment may well foster both 
long-term social and financial stability and help in capturing parts of the Chinese market which 
may grow in the future. In this sense, the fostering of a stable civil society can only come 
about through widening the geographic scope of investment. 
The question of China's entry to the WTO has engendered major divisions in US policy much 
of which, yet again, hark back to the MFN debate. Yet a broad consensus has emerged 
supporting China's inclusion in the belief that this will foster a more cooperative China in the 
international community. Lardy, for instance, sees multilateral engagement as strongly 
preferable to bilateral disputes on IPRs, textiles, market access and so on. According to Lardy 
unilateral sanctions "impose a higher cost on US exporters than they do on the Chinese 
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government" and in this sense are non-sensical and counterproductive. 1!>7 The only viable 
policy in this view is to "systematically integrate China into the world economy.,,16K As we 
outlined in Chapter 2 this policy has a rich historical lineage halted only by the Cold War. The 
only alternative may well be a nationalistic or protectionist US policy of isolating China which 
seems completely unviable. As Lampton notes there is alway the argument of "who wrote the 
rules" and who benefits from the WTO with China wishing a more proactive role in setting the 
terms of trade. 169 In a Gramscian sense, then, the WTO could be seen as co-optive and as 
socialising China into accepting neo-liberal norms. While this may be the case it would seem 
that China's entry to the organisation will make it more likely to implement certain labour 
standards and other social standards by mutual consent and on the basis of global cooperation 
which averts protectionsism and the disastrous mindsets it can engender. This will require US 
leadership in pushing short-term bilateral issues to one side in order to secure China's entry 
into a multilateral forum. Moreover, reform of trade under globalisation needs to occur at the 
global level for, as we have seen above, the national character of US-China trade is, in any 
case, highly questionable. The WTO is more likely to address questions such as the role of 
third parties in textile transhipments and the part played by various nations and firms in 
contributing to trade disputes which often fall outside the national jurisdiction of the parties 
involved. Thus, globalisation changes the way US-China trade relations should be conceived. 
Our last section discussed the impact of the Asian financial crisis and, more specifically, its 
impact upon US-China trade and China's economic liberalisation. In terms of American 
financial hegemony the cnSlS did reveal the importance of China's currency and growth 
1(,' Lardy. China in the World Economy, p.139. 
II,X fhid., p.140. 
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strategy on a global level. Not only did China's devaluation of the Yuan in 1994 precipitate the 
crisis by undercutting regional export competitors but China's policies during the crisis were 
also crucial. Any devaluation of the Yuan during the crisis may well have broadened it and this 
was evidenced during President Clinton's 1998 visit to Beijing. The crisis also raises questions 
about China's reliance on exports in the future as opposed to constructing a high-tech 
economy based on Keynesian policies of managed growth and investment in the populace. As 
noted above such policies may prevent China from becoming vulnerable to market slowdowns 
elsewhere - particularly in the US where the vast bulk of China's low-end of the market 
consumer products are consumed. In sum, US-China relations can still be understood within a 
Gramscian framework of hegemony. US dominance of multilateral institutions, namely the 
WTO, remains sufficient to draw China towards more liberal policies. However, China's room 
for manoeuvre within these constraints remains fairly large and the Asian financial crisis has 
highlighted the importance of state intervention and regulation to China's economy as well as 
the fact that US policymakers broadly recognises this when confronted by the alternatives. 
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Chapter 4 
Moving Beyond State-Centred Analyses: The Role of Social Forces in US-
China Relations 
I" trod uctio" 
This chapter investigates two separate but interrelated sets of questions and, in essence, seeks 
to overcome traditional reductionist views of the state, culture and the state-society nexus. 
Firstly, it seeks to examine the social forces involved in determining US foreign policy towards 
China and to investigate the roles of transnational actors, such as business and NGOs, which 
often can, and do, wield more power than states in the new global political economy. This 
applies particularly to the US but also to China as centrifugal forces are now structurally 
altering the Chinese state and opening up social spaces for new political and economic actors. 
Secondly, this chapter attempts to shed light upon the debate on human rights and the widely 
differing concepts of rights which exists between and within both nations. Again, this applies 
most obviously to the highly plural political culture of the US but increasingly to China where 
'Asian values' are being redefined in relation to an increasingly market oriented society where 
class, regional and cultural divergence is occurring in response to economic reform. Applying 
a critical approach, then, we attempt to reflect the emergence of new social forces 
concomitant with the process of the internationalisation of the state in which, in Jessop's 
words, "there is a movement from the central role of the state apparatus in securing state-
sponsored economic and social projects and political hegemony towards an emphasis on 
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partnership between governmental, para-govermenta1 and non-governmental organisations in 
which the state apparatus is often only first among equals. "I 
The Making of US China Policy in a Post-Hegemonic World 
Without fully accepting the pluralist assertion that the state is an unbiased filter of competing 
socio-economic interests it is true that the US state is unusually weak and permeable, open to 
diverse lobbying interests and often unable to fashion coherent state strategies as a result. The 
impact of lobbying groups on US China policy has been immense and, in many senses, goes to 
the heart of debates about the nature and role of American democracy which of course have a 
rich historicallineage. 2 In this sense, it is more appropriate to view America's China policy in 
the plural sense of an evolving and contested activity swung to and fro by an eclectic amalgam 
of groups, lobbies and political actors. 
The domestic backdrop to America's China policy involves a capital versus labour element but 
one which traverses left and right in that it pits the interests of free trade against a diverse set 
of interests promoting environmental issues, human rights, workers rights, religious rights, 
abortion rights and unilateral policies of an often reactionary nature. 3 Cleavages over China 
policy, we argue here, elucidate the current effort in America to reimagine foreign policy in a 
post-hegemonic world of multipolarity which reflects both the inward pluralism of US society 
and the diversity of the emerging post-Cold War world order. For Ruggie, this involves "more 
than modifying the scope and intensity of specific commitments to fit with narrow, case-by-
1 R Jessop "Capitalism and its Future: Remarks on Regulation, Government, and Governance", Review oj" 
international Political Economy. Vol.4, No.3, 1997, pp.574-575. 
: The continuing debate over American exceptionalism goes back to the political conundrums which vexed 
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. These debates highlight both the tensions between 
republican and popular notions of democracy and political pluralism and stable government. 
1 Pat Buchanan described Deng Xiaoping as a "chain smoking communist dwarf' at the 1992 Republican Party 
convention, "How America Sees China", The Economist, October 25, 1997. 
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case strategic assessments." It requires that a " framework of policy be devised that makes 
sense to the American people and which specifies milieu goals that they will aspire to."4 
For Ruggie, and others, this would require a political project in which the US uses its still 
considerable structural power at the global/institutional level to enhance multilateral 
institutions and, by divesting certain unilateral privileges, takes a moral lead in forging a more 
egalitarian world order undergirded by self-determination, autonomy and institutional 
mechanisms to ensure international cooperation prevails. Following Ruggie's view, we can see 
that a move to "collective security" in a post -territorial era would provide the basis for a 
moral consensus currently absent from US-China relations and would accommodate China's 
new found global power in a co-operative manner. Such an approach would also place less 
emphasis on the zero-sum economic competition which currently undermines the prospect of 
new global regimes of regulation and governance. Importantly, in the context of the argument 
which follows, a more socially grounded US foreign policy would not necessarily be 
antithetical to free trade. Rather, free trade would be grounded in a set of socially responsive 
regulatory mechanisms at the global level covering issues such as labour, human rights and so 
on. In this vein, we argue that some of the arguments from both left and right which favour the 
withdrawal of China's MFN status are over-simplified and would be detrimental to the global 
community. Rather, such groups, certainly of the progressive left, would be better arguing for 
international re-regulation of the global economy than any myopic retreat into protectionism 
or trade wars.5 Let us now appraise these social forces using China policy as an outlet to 
express competing visions of US foreign policy. 
1 JG Ruggie "Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy" in J Ruggie Constructing the H'orld }>olifv, 
London, Routledge, 1998, p.226. . 
, Arguments stressing the counter-productive nature of protectionism in a globalising economy arc well made 
ill P Hirst and G Thompson, G/ohalisation in Question: The International Economy and the Possihilities 4 
( ;ol'f!rnance, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p.138. See chapter 6 for a full discussion. 
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The Executive Branch in the Making of China Policy 
During the period 1992-1994 human rights were seen to have gained ascendancy in the US 
government bureaucracy with Winston Lord's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs setting 
the agenda on China policy. Lord's peronal committment to human rights, along with that of 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, brought China policy into conflict with business 
interests as well as the trade strategy of the Clinton Administration overall. These disputes 
were illuminated when Bill Clinton set up a Senior Steering Group (SSG) to coordinate China 
policy in 1993. Then Secretary of State for the Treasury, Lloyd Bentsen, Ron Brown at the 
Commerce Department, Robert Rubin of the National Economic Council (NEC) and Clinon's 
cheif economic aide, Thomas 'Mack' McClarty, effectively circumscribed bureaucratic 
resistance from Christopher and Lord arguing that isolating China undercut the basic premises 
of Clinton's foreign policy. In an age of geo-economics, it was argued, US idealism had to be 
tempered with a heavy dose of economic realism and a realisation that surrendering the China 
market to competitors was not a policy option. This argument was bolsetred by the fact that 
both Brown and Rubin had strong support from big business and Wall Street - constituencies 
whgich publicly intervened in the deabte and helped swing Clinton away from a strong human 
rights caucus in the Democratic Congress The reversal of the policy linking human rights to 
MFN can thus be seen as a defeat for Lord's bureaucratic constitutency and marked a definite 
shift towards strategies emanating from the Treasury and the Commerce Departments. 
Stanley Roth, Clinton's second Assistant Secretary of State for the Asian region, appointed in 
August 1997, is far more attuned, however, to geo-political and geo-economic priorities in 
contrast with the moral emphasis of Lord. It is also worthy of note that the National Security 
Council (NSC), under Sandy Berger in Clinton's second term, is assuming a more active role 
in defining the second Clinton Administration's China policy and there are signs that US policy 
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IS movmg further towards a realpolitik in which regional security and China's growmg 
military strength are increasingly framing the debate. Berger has talked of the need for a 
"clear-eyed approach" to China "based on our national interest"& despite critical ambiguities 
and various levels of contestation as to what such a concept might entail in the post-Cold-War 
world. This view also underestimates the extent to which US foreign policy has always been 
reliant upon an idealist dimension.? Nevertheless, the second term has witnessed the 
consolidation of the 'comprehensive engagement' policy and the view that political change in 
China towards greater pluralism is likely to be a long-term process involving multilateral 
institutions, NGOs and the private sector rather than being forced upon China using 
outmoded, and state-centric, bilateral mechanisms. K The new approach to China was 
confirmed in October 1995 when President Clinton and Jiang Zemin met in New Yark and 
agreed to schedule a series of summit-level meetings based on a continual dialogue between 
the two leaders. Clinton himself was anxious to move away from the image of Cold War 
summitry which tended to encapsulate the mood of China summits and to treat China in the 
same way as most other countries. 9 This dialogical process has been further marked by major 
summits in Washington in October 1997 and in Beijing in June 1998. 
/, T Lippmann, "Effect of Visit on Support of US-China Ties Awaited", The Washingtan Post, November 2. 
1')')7. 
Ruggie, Interests. Identity. and American Foreign Policy p.206. Lobbying support for US foreign policy has 
always been reliant on providing more than an economic rationale for engagement. 
x J Shinn. "The Risks of Engagement" in J Shinn (ed), Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China. 
New York. Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996. p.91. 
'J f hid.. p.90. 
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The Role of Congressional Forces 
During the first and second Clinton Administrations, however, what has been termed a 
"horseshoe"lo alliance has emerged in the Congress and the wider US polity which objects to 
US engagement of China along both purely economic and realpolitik lines. This horseshoe 
circumnavigates the political centre to take in the Republican right and the Democratic left and 
is antithetical to an agenda symbolised by the political hegemony now enjoyed in Washington 
by the Treasury Department (which increasingly defines the policies of most other 
government bureaucracies) in coalition with US business, a broader class of investors, and 
their Congressional allies. II From the right, the neo-conservative,William Kristol, saw the 
issue of whether to renew China's MFN status as an opportunity to undermine the bipartisan 
status quo -"the object of attack must be both the Clinton Administration and the mandarins of 
the Republican foreign policy establishment." 12 From the left, it was seen as an opportunity, in 
House Minority Leader Richard Gephart's words, "to link capitalism with values and 
standards. ,,13 Both rightwing Republicans and leftwing Democrats were, in effect, 
repoliticising a relationship previously defined solely in terms of trade, stability and 
management while objecting to a pro-China lobby which these strange bedfellows, 
representing opposite poles of US political spectrum, "increasingly came to vIew as an 
unprincipled, mushy alliance of the Republican and Democratic party centres." 14 These 
manifestations of dissent, unsurprisingly, have arisen in the more populist and democratic 
\I, This term was used during an interview with Douglas Paal, former Reagan advisor on China, and now 
Chairman of the Asia- Pacific Policy Centre. Interview, Washington DC., October 31, 1997. 
II Sec "The Treasury v the People" The Economist, May 16, 1998. 
I ~ W Kristol, "Time for Insurrection", The Week~y Standard, March 10, 1997, pp.16-17. 
1.1 Gephardt cited in S Pearlstein, "On Trade, US Retreating into Globaphobia", The Washington fJosl, 8 
December, 1997. 
11 D Lampton, "China and Clinton's America in 1997: Have They learned Anything?", Asian ,"'urvey, Yol.37, 
No.12, 1998, p.Il15. . 
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House and represent an important new force in US-China relations and the wider redetinition 
of the US foreign policy debate. In certain senses, they must also be seen as challenging the 
'inevitability thesis' expounded upon by Clinton with regard to economic globalisation. 
Underpinning such a backlash in the Congress, however, are forces rooted in US civil society 
which bring pressure upon their politicians for a new China policy. It is to civil society and 
non-state actors that we now turn. 
US Labour and China Policy: A Plea for 'Fair Trade' or Back Door Protectionism? 
The AFL-CIO has consistently opposed the renewal of China's MFN status and the Clinton 
Administration's policy, post-l 994, of "comprehensive engagement." However, the AFL-CIO 
position is reflective of the organisation's own internal fissures and, thus, its stance rests on 
both insular and protectionist sentiments and values of international progressivism. These 
fissures were neatly illuminated in a statement made by the AFL-CIO Executive Council on 
the matter of US-China policy in 1996: "These companies" [those operating in China] "do not 
care about human rights abuses or prison labour - they make ~illions of dollars by exporting 
goods from the protected Chinese market to the United States using the cheapest and most 
exploitative labour resulting in record US trade budgets."ls The point at issue here is whether 
the AFL-CIO's overall strategy has been primarily based upon objections to "the protected 
Chinese market" or to "human rights abuses." Often the AFL-CIO has been broadly supportive 
of US managed-trade strategies, including quotas, and the Administration's attempts to 
liberalise the Chinese economy through the WIO - especially through the aggressive bilateral 
trade agenda of the USTR. In the words of the AFL-CIO's David Kameras, "diligent 
l' 0 Kameras, "June Boycott of Chinese Goods Called: Unions Oppose Extension of Special Trade Status, 
AFL-CIO News, May 16, 1996 at http://www.ajlcio.orglnewsonline/96may/6/trade.html. 
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monitoring and aggressive enforcement of all US trade agreements by the USTR are critical 
steps in the right direction. ,,16 
The AFL-CIO also presents a domestic agenda built upon the premise that US-China trade 
means the loss of US jobs. It has argued that every $1 billion of the deficit with China leads to 
20,000 job losses in the US. This line of attack has been largely protectionist calling for the 
raising of tariffs and the exclusion of exports made by the People's Liberation Army (PLA).17 
In this sense, the AFL-CIO position can be conflated with that of business and the push for 
deregulation, market access and trade liberalisation. It forms a producer interest stressing the 
importance of jobs and wages, on the one hand, and profits and open markets, on the other. 
In both cases the trade deficit is seen as a consequence of 'protectionism' in China, rather than 
the structural factors outlined in Chapter 3 and the existence of huge US demand for Chinese 
exports. Thus, the AFL-CIO negates deeper changes in the global economy connected with a 
new international division of labour, in which US firms seek lower labour costs in economies 
such as China's. It also neglects the fact that US job losses emanate from the internal 
restructuring of the US economy away from low-value added products. In other words, US 
labour face the arduous task of repoliticising US-China labour issues in correlation with global 
economic shifts. 
The globalisation of economic activity and the mobility of US capital entail the AFL-CIO 
moving beyond a narrow and short- term strategy to the point where it can effectively place 
US-China relations within a broader, more globally aware, context where Chinese economic 
conditions are viewed as the symptom of global trade standards rather than the underlying 
it'D Kameras. "Trade Deficit Still Moving on Track For Record Red Ink", AFL-CIO News. Febmarv 16. 1996. 
at hltp://www.aflcioonlineI96fehJ6/trade.html. . 
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cause of domestic inequities. Barbara Shailor, of the AFL-CIO's International Affairs 
Department, has set out a strategy more apposite to the current conjuncture of global 
capital/labour relations and less inclined simply to bolster nationalist or protectionist 
sentiments. Firstly, Shailor makes clear that, "if working people are to have any response to 
globalisation - other than as horrified observers and victims, our first job is to strengthen 
ourselves at home." Secondly, she posits the fundamental question: "who is doing the 
global ising?" Shailor goes on to affirm that "the champions of globalisation are the captains of 
American industry", meaning that "we must literally follow the Boeings, GEs and A TTs to 
their outpost around the globe." This involves a willingness to "commit..to cross-border 
organising" in order to work towards "multinational codes of conduct" which define the abuse 
of "basic worker rights" as "the unfair trading practice that it is." IN Put simply, deregulation of 
economic activity tends to boost productivity, especially in low-value-added sectors, despite 
the social costs which accompany any diminution of workers' rights. The global regulation of 
labour standards, through the WTO or the International Labour Organisation (ILO), would be 
the alternative to this. 
The AFL-CIO position offers a valuable corrective to the 'capitalism equals greater 
democracy' arguments propounded by the Clinton Administration. Indeed, Phil Fishman of the 
AFL-CIO has directly challenged the notion that foreign business involvement is spawning 
democracy, highlighting, rather, the complicity of foreign firms in subjugating workers. During 
a 1994 debate on MFN Fishman alleged that 62% of Chinese workers employed by foreign 
companies work "seven days a week without time off'. Of 15,000 workers surveyed in China 
\" A Abrash (cd), China and MFN Trade Status: A Public Hearing Featuring US Government. Academia. and 
Ilulllal1 Rights representatives: Summary and findings. Washington College of Law, American University, 
Washington DC., May 20,1994, p.14. . 
\X Barbara Shailor, Director of AFL-CIO International Affairs Department, "Remarks before the International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers", at http:;lwww.iamaw.orgmboutiamISpeech7.htm. 
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42% were working for ten hours per day and two thirds were being paid less than they had 
been working in their home regions for state-owned firms. 19 
The AFL-CIO has also forged important alliances within Congress and within the US 
government which have served to place US-China relations within a social context. In the fight 
against child labour in China and the developing world, Democrat Senator, Tom Harkin, 
introduced a Child Labour Deterrence Act which would have strongly curbed certain Chinese 
imports, except that the bill was rejected by Congress?O The AFL-CIO- backed Child Labour 
Coalition has won support from international groups such as the South Asian Coalition on 
Child Servitude illuminating the importance of forming cross-border coalitions in influencing 
the actions of governments under conditions of globalisation. Meanwhile, important links were 
forged with former Clinton Labour Secretary, Robert Reich, who presided over an influential 
report on child labour. 21 A campaign against Wal-Mart's importing of toys allegedly made by 
Chinese child labour also witnessed Department of Labour support for AFL-CIO activity 
during Reich's tenure at the Department and continued into the second Clinton Administration. 
Reich stated that "consumers will reward the national chains that are doing their very best to 
attack the problem." The Department also published a list of retailers and manufacturers 
committed to wiping out garment sweatshops, entitled Trend-Setters, and designed to give the 
US consumer the information needed to make an ethical choice. 22 
Cynically, we may view such campaigns as neo-protectionist, but this would undermine the 
very real political efforts being made to establish global labour standards among certain 
I'} A Abrash (ed), China and MFN Trade Status. p.14. 
,t, S Shirk, How China Opened its Door: The Political Success of the PRe's Foreign Trade and Investment 
Ne/imns. Brookings Institution. Washington D.C., 1994, pp. 84 - 85. 
el "By the Sweat and Toil of Children: The Use of Child Labour in US Agricultural Imports and Forced and 
Bonded Labour," US Department of Labour, Washington D.C., 1995. 
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sections of the AFL-CIO, the Congress, and in the US government. US idealism is not entirely 
moribund and a strong current of anti-corporate sentiment, if channelled properly, has been 
taken beyond debates over China's MFN status and concomitant issue-oriented debates and 
towards a serious movement for a new global compact on labour standards. 
The Human Rights Lobby 
The campaigns for various human rights related causes in China bear all the hallmarks of the 
pluralistic nature of the US system with certain lobbies, notably the Christian Coalition, 
selecting issues for ideological purposes more pertinent to domestic social, political and 
cultural divides. In turn, a broad coalition against the Clinton Administration's China policy 
which tends to place business interests above human rights will be difficult to sustain in the 
long term without an overarching political riposte to global neo-liberalism which connects the 
infringement of human rights and rising social inequality in China with the spread of a certain 
brand of unrestrained capitalism. However, we argue that such forces do serve to politicise 
and socialise a relationship often approached with little regard to its human context. 
Firstly, there exists the traditionally left-leaning or liberal human rights constituency which 
protests the infringement of individual liberties but also decries the economic logic which 
facilitates and implicitly encourages such abuses by placing the priorities of US firms and their 
profits above China's human rights record. This position is spelled out by Human Rights 
Watch Asia's Washington Director, Mike Jendrzejczyk, who asserts that, "when it comes to 
moving China to respect its international human rights obligations, the Administration has yet 
to develop a credible and effective strategy, analogous to its stance on intellectual property 




rights and the use of the threat of sanctions to obtain results. ,,23 It is worth briefly elaborating 
on Jendrzejczyk's criticisms. The Administration has made great play of the fact that its 
adversaries advocate protectionist policies and yet, as we saw in chapter 3, it has itself 
resorted to protectionist measures with great enthusiasm when dealing with China on trade 
matters. The reason for this is that China is still outside the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and no recourse to multilateral arbitration is sought over bilateral disputes. With China inside a 
WTO and subject to social regulation a whole raft of issues from human rights standards to 
quotas could be subjected to multilateral scrutiny, thereby removing the threat of unilateral 
protectionism and drawing China closer to acceptable behaviour. 
The NGO lobby has supporters within the State Department which collates information from 
groups such as Amnesty International to deliver its yearly assessment of China's human rights 
record which has been consistently deemed unsatisfactory and has itself spurred on the 
activities of human rights advocates. In 1994, the year the Administration del inked human 
rights and trade, a State Department human rights report bluntly confirmed "widespread and 
well-documented human rights abuses in China, in violation of internationally accepted 
norms. ,,24 Indeed, John. Shattuck, head of the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights, 
Democracy, and Labour is former Director of Amnesty International (USA) and much of the 
argument forthe adoption of a more ethical stance has come from an alliance between the 
Bureau and human rights NGOs. 2S 
"' Jcndrzcjczyk cited in M Wan "Human Rights and Sino-US Relations: Policies and Changing Realities" Thl:' 
j'acijic Review, VoI.lO, No.2, 1997, p.245. 
~1 US Department of State, China: Human Rights Practices. 199-1, Washington DC, 1995. 
:' At an interview at the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy, and Labour it was made 
dear that an "open door" relationship exists between the Bureau and NGOs. Interview conducted November 
1997. 
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One of the main problems, however, for human rights NGOs concerned with China is their 
lack of a clear strategy. They seem to be unsure whether to highlight the plight of individual 
dissidents, such as Wei lingsheng or Wang Dan26, at the expense of broader socio-economic 
problems flowing from development in China today. This forms part of a broader difficulty on 
the American left with formulating an overarching critique of neo-liberal economics. Often, 
the fact that the Clinton Administration is perceived as being culturally liberal masks the extent 
to which trade liberalisation has become an uncontested dogma with its most convinced 
supporters unwilling to countenance the fact that reforms in China have been socialised in such 
a way as to undercut basic social and economic rights while passing on the deleterious effects 
to China's poor. The focus upon individual human rights cases has tended to mean 
overwhelming time and resources being concentrated upon dissident intellectuals while failing 
to offer serious insights into broader social polarisations and mass inequalities engendered by 
the type of economic reforms encouraged, quite explicitly (see Chapter 3), by the US 
government. 
A serious logistical problem stems from the fact that Western-type NGOs are relatively non-
existent in China or exist only if they renounce political activity. This is compounded by the 
fact that China's own NGOs, like the Trade Unions, have been subsumed into the state 
structure. China is also anomalous in the sense that, as yet, no civil society really exists in an 
oppositional sense which works to impede the growth of human rights groups on the ground 
acting in synergy with US and other Western NGOs in a systematic fashion 27 
C/' These high profile cases came to a head when both Wang Dan and Wei Jingsheng were detained prior to a 
visit to Beijing by Warren Christopher in 1994. See Wan. Human Rights and Sino-US Relations, p.240. In 
1 ')1)7 Wei Jinshellg was released prior to the October US-China summit and now lives in the US where he 
continues to campaign against the Jiang regime. 
2- Some of these ideas were extrapolated from conversations with human rights activists in Washington DC 
and their frank admission that China presents a number of unique and vexing problems due to its closed 
political stmcture. 
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In terms of human rights strategy and the policies of the US government, there seems to be a 
grudging acceptance by both politicians and activists that the US cannot exert moral, or any 
other, power over China in the same way it can with, for example, Burma or Indonesia. As 
Emmerson notes, Burma's isolation from the world economy (Burma and the US have a 
meagre $50 million worth of two-way trade) has been a key factor in the US's sustained 
l11oralpo/itik approach to that country which culminated in sustained sanctions in 1992-93. For 
him, "Burma did not matter compared with Clinton's domestic agenda or America's relations 
with more important countries" and, thus, "responsibility for US policy towards Burma 
could, in effect, be delegated to the human rights lobbies and their patrons in Congress. ,,2K 
Similarly, Indonesia was subject to sanctions and a vigorous Asia Watch and Amnesty 
International lobbying campaign in 1992-93 in which democracy and human rights criteria 
outweighed those of economic relations. 29 Though the advent of a Republican Congress in 
1994 enhanced business interests (encouraging Clinton to del ink human rights and economic 
policy), China is, in any case, so large a country with such specific and complex problems that 
the Clinton Administration has been unwilling to delegate to Congress or human rights lobbies 
• in framing overall policy. As again Emmerson notes, the administration "failed to see how 
punishing China for its crackdown on dissidents could help make this vast, dynamic, and 
politically dangerous state a cooperative partner for East Asian security and prosperity.,,30 As 
we saw in chapter 3, broad engagement with China and the myriad interlinkages which 
attenuate globalisation have been viewed as tempering China's domestic human rights 
situation and civilising the regime. That said, human rights lobbies continue to hold great sway 
~~ DK Emmcrson, "US Policy Thcmes in Southeast Asia in the 1990s", in D Wurfcl and B Burton (eds), 
,",uII/heast Asia in the new World Order:T hePolitical 8conomy l!f'a f)ynamic Region, New York, Macmillan. 
}l)l)(), p.ll8. 
~'I Ihid. , p.1l9. 
"'Ihid. , p.121. 
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and the Administration can ill afford to ignore entirely the moralpo/itik constituency in the 
Democratic Party and beyond. Emmerson further points out that such acknowledgement of 
ethical/moral interests is all part of the foreign policy symbolism which has long defined the 
US role in the world. For him, "policies meant to punish undemocratic regimes do not have to 
succeed abroad to be domestically successful. To denounce evil is to feel good; actually doing 
good as well need not occur.,,3J 
Diane Mauzy suggests that a particular source of controversy in China and other Asian states 
is the apparent willingness of the US government to encourage anti-government sentiments or 
what is sometimes termed 'constructive instability' at the behest of domestic lobbies. The view 
that a transition from 'bad' to 'good' government can be induced by encouraging internal 
dissent is, moreover, highly unpopular among other Asian states worried about their own 
authoritarian rule and the rise of genuine democracy movements. 32 As we pointed out in 
chapter 3, the basic contradiction of US foreign policy towards China is rooted in retaining the 
balance between supporting China's stability and integration with the global economy and 
promoting immediate economic and social concerns emanating from within the US political 
system. Thus there are limits to democracy promotion just as there are limits to trade 
. 
liberalisation and, so far, the Clinton Administration has managed to maintain a long-term view 
and to resist the often impossible demands of human rights lobbies while keeping the issue of 
human rights firmly on the table in bilateral meetings. 
II Ihid. . p.IIH. 
cD K Mauzy, "The Human Rights and' Asian Values' debate in Southeast Asia", The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, 
No.2.1997,p.214. 
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The Far Right China Lobby 
The US far right's agenda on China has, broadly speaking, been ideological and nationalist, 
viewing China as the next Soviet Union and a pernicious global force to be contained 
economically and territorially - what one former Bush official called a case of "enemy envy. ".'~ 
This constituency, rooted on the Republican right, has identified human rights as an 
ideological weapon to assert US moral supremacy. It supports punitive action in the trade 
sphere combined with a raft of Congressional legislation on China's human rights record 
especially where it involves the violation of religious (usually Christian) rights. This lobby also 
lambasts China's one-child policy which infringes upon the Christian Right's radical anti-
abortion stance and, in so doing, elucidates the highly selective nature of the far right's 
internationalism .. 
In 1997 several right-wing Senators formed the Senate Religious Persecution Task Force 
which has given considerable attention to clamp-downs on Protestant and Catholic 
communities in China. 34 In case we underestimate the force of these single issues peculiar to 
the US system, it is worthy of note that, in 1996, 120 members of Congress were estimated to 
have voted against China upon almost all issues due to the Beijing government's stance on 
abortion, threby proving that Christian fundamentalism, as a very real US cultural force, does 
not stop at the water's edge. 35 In 1994, for instance, right-wing Senator Jack Kemp 
introduced an amendment blocking US contributions to the US Agency for International 
Development so long as it supported the United Nations Family Planning Agency (UNFPA) 
and its work on population control in developing countries such as China. In 1995 Republican 
\1 Interview with D Paal, Asia-Pacific Policy Centre, Washington DC, 31 October, 1997. 
II K DUll1baugh, "Religious Practices in China", CRS Report for Congress, 97-8821': Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., p.4. 
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Sam Gejdenson cited China's blocking of the National Endowment for Democracy's (NED's) 
Voice of America (VOA) as a reason for withdrawing MFN in the belief that, until China 
becomes fully Americanised, it remains a potential enemy -"a country that violates the most 
basic rights of its citizens is likely to ignore its treaty obligations and to have precious little 
concern for maintaining peaceful relations with its neighbours. ",6 Such anti-Chinese 
sentiments are compounded by the fact that powerful members of the Taiwan lobby in 
Congress assumed influential positions in the House and the Senate following the Republican 
landslide of 1994. Jesse Helms became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
and Benjamin Gilman became Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Both men 
were renowned for their pro-Taiwanese sentiments, stemming from their ties with Taiwanese 
business interests and their unreconstructed Cold War ideologies. 
House Speaker Newt Gingrich further raised the political stakes when, in 1995, he called for 
the re-establishment of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, thereby undercutting a twenty-year 
consensus on the efficacy of a "one China" policy.:;? In November 1997 Republicans 
launched a further "Policy for Freedom" which involved the introduction of nine bills in 
Congress to "promote and maintain friendly cultural ties with a free China" and to offer an 
alternative to the Clinton Administration's "carrots only" approach. The bills included such 
measures as the expansion of Radio Free Asia, several pro-Taiwanese measures (including 
Taiwan's admission to the WTO before China) and voting against World Bank subsidies for 
Chinese industries in the state sector. ,K This Reaganite constituency seeks an ideological and 
" K Lieberthal "Domestic Forces and Sino-US Relations", in E Vogel (ed), Living with China: (fS-Chin(J 
He/a/ions in the TH'enty-jirst Century, WW Norton and Company, New York, 1997, p.260. 
,t, "China, Human Rights and MFN", statements before the House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign 
Amlirs. 24 March 1994, US Government Printing Office, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 1994. 
,- Q Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 1t)96, p.21t). 
IX J Pomfret,"Congress vs China", The Washington Post, October 3 L 19lJ7. 
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unilateral US foreign policy aggressively promoting US values and interests which correlate 
with the agendas of Christian fundamentalism and right-wing nationalism. In sum, in the 
jaundiced mindset of the parochial far right China is clearly and passionately viewed as the 
new Soviet Union and a cultural, economic, and military threat to American values and 
unfettered free markets. 
US-Based Chinese Dissident Groups 
The US has a long tradition of championing individual dissidents - a tactic used to contrast US 
civil liberties with Communist totalitarianism during the 1945-89 period. Many NGOs (see 
above) have tended to focus upon individual cases of oppression at the expense of deeper 
structural factors and, thus, have obfuscated the full complexity of what constitutes freedom -
particularly in developing countries with more collective traditions and values. Thus Chinese 
dissident groups in the US, or what Baogang labels Overseas Opposition Movements 
(OOMs), represent a hybrid social force in terms of articulating Chinese political aspirations 
within a liberal and plural political culture. They represent both a US and Chinese socio-
political force lobbying the US Congress whilst also forging links in their homeland. For 
Baogang, such groups "reflect the process of political globalisation" in which OOMs are 
"incorporated into a transnational civil society" taking "China's politics beyond the national 
boundary. ,,39 Indeed, it reflects the diaspora of global Chinese networks which influence 
socially, politically, and economically China's modernisation and which, despite differences 
with Beijing, are part of a new class which is often affluent, mobile, and globally oriented. 
The US political establishment is less enthusiastic about championing political dissidents since 
the announcement of the 1994 'comprehensive engagement' policy given the primacy of 
1'1 H Baogang. "Chinese Political Opposition in Exile" in G Rodan (ed) Political Oppositions in Industrialising 
.1sia, London, Routledge, ]996, p.209. 
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maintaining a sizeable share of Chinals market and a smooth relationship with the Jiang 
leadership. Thus US-based OOMs are forced more than ever to function within US civil 
society (as opposed to being paraded by the State Department as symbols of US political 
freedom as with Andrei Sahkarov ), principally by forging linkages and alliances with like-
minded groups. The need for linkages in civil society means that patriotic OOMs committed to 
a unified China are having to interact with groups committed to Tibetan independence or 
Taiwanese groups seeking international recognition for their island independent of the PRe. 
All of this results in the formation of highly unususal coalitions. However, the elitist structure 
and nationalist persuasions of such groups as the Front for a Democratic China (FDC), the 
Chinese Alliance for Democracy (CAD) and the Chinese Liberal Democratic Party (CLOP), 
which talk of a "Great China" and which appeal to the patriotic elements among overseas 
Chinese, entails a very narrow conception of democracy. Such groups seek to create "fair 
competition at the top layer of the hierarchy II in Chinals government with "mass participation II 
something of a "side issue. II As Chan puts it, the prevalent image of Chinese dissidents as 
champions of democracy are often a "westyrn media created image. II Many studentlintellectual 
groups wish to IIcordon themselves off from ordinary people, so that their elite ... movement is 
not .. contaminated. 1I40 For Chan, lI one has yet to find a faction among them that openly 
advocates universal suffrage, though much homage is paid to the abstract idea of 
democracy. 1141 
Such groups have also come to reflect the fractious pluralism of the US political system and 
their agendas have tended to correlate with the wishes of their financial backers.42 Both the 
III A Chan."China: the Changing Ruling Elite" in Rodan (cd), Political Oppositions in IndustrialisinR Asia. 
p.17!). 
11 Ihid , p.lHO. 
Ie Ihid . p.l92. 
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governments of Taiwan and of the mainland have attempted to win the loyalty of overseas 
Chinese in their quest for legitimacy.43 Newspapers printed in the US, such as the China 
})ress, have played an important role in disseminating pro-Beijing information, while the World 
.Journal takes a pro-Taiwanese line whilst also attracting those Chinese mainlanders 
. d 44 supportmg greater emocracy. 
In short, the US political process has, in a sense, exposed the differences between elitist and 
technocratic groups, such as FDC, CAD, and the CLDP, and the agenda of groups like 
Human Rights in China (HRlC), which is a non-profit and independent organisation 
committed to highlighting and documenting generic human rights abuses in China. HRIC 
lobbies Congress in conjunction with Western groups such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch! Asia and is less motivated by assuming power in China, following the 
demise of the CCP, than with publicising the human cost of a one-party authoritarian state 
which it believes to be bolstered by the current US policy of "comprehensive engagement. ,,45 
US Human Rights Campaigns For MinoritylReligious Rights in China 
The championing of religious and cultural freedoms in China, campaigns involving both the 
lett and the religious right as well as dissident groups in the US, has been channelled most 
publicly through the issue of Tibet and the Chinese suppression of Tibetan Buddhist religion 
and culture46 Though often seen as marginal issues to those used to studying parliamentary 
democracies or centralised foreign policy making, minority issues, or what we could even 
11 C Yu-hsi, "The Dual Role of the Chinese Press in the United States", Bulletin of Concerned Asian ,"cholars, 
Yo1.27. No.1. 1995, p.43. 
II Ihid . pp.40-41. 
1\ Ihid . p.191. 
II, The role of Hollywood as a political/social force here cannot be downplayed. Martin Scorsese's hunt/un 
being one example of a film which has been critical of China and ilJuminated the plight of Tibet. Interestingly. 
the corporate makers of the film, sensitive to their interests in China, reneged on the promotional activities 
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term postmodern identity issues, have played and still do play a large political role in 
mobilising US public opinion and Congressional action. This must be attributed, at least 
partially, to the fact that the US is a multi-ethnic state and projects values of tolerance and 
integration beyond its borders in order to reflect this fact. 
Tibet has undoubtedly suffered greatly at the hands of China's leaders for over 50 years and 
Tibet's culture is viewed by technocratic elites in Beijing as increasingly anachronistic in the 
light of capitalist reforms. According to Human Rights Watch! Asia, 80% of China's political 
prisoners were Tibetan in 1993. The official stance of the US Administration has been to 
insist that any settlement of this highly complex issue must result from compromises between 
the Dalai Lama and Beijing. However, many US supporters of Tibet favour the position of 
Tibetan exiles in India who have been campaigning for independence and secession from China 
in contrast to the Dalai Lama's call for moderation and negotiations with view to attaining 
cultural autonomy within the context of continued Chinese sovereignty47 Right-wing 
Republicans such as Jesse Helms have joined with US groups, such as the Washington-based 
Campaign for Tibet, in pressuring the Administration to recognise Tibetan aspirations. In July 
1997 Secretary of State, Madelaine Albright, announced the appointment of a "special co-
ordinator" for Tibet following moves in the Congress with considerable support to legislate for 
an envoy to Tibet - a move likely to inflame US-China relations. 4K The Republican Congress 
has increasingly come to view issues like Tibet as key sources of leverage over both China and 
the Clinton Administration, while the Administratioin itself has viewed the appointment of a 
Special Co-ordinator as likley to defuse more radical demands on human rights issues. 
which accompany all major Hollywood films. Buddhism is currently extremely popular in the US and, along 
with Tibetan exiles, helps to fonn a highly vocal lobby. 
r M Oksenberg , "Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong in Sino-American Relations" in E Vogel (ed), LivinR With 
('lIina: liS-China Relations in the Twenty- First Century, New York, WW Norton, 1997. p. 85. 
·IX T Carter. "US to name Tibet Liaison. Albright Says", Washington Times, July 31. 191)7. 
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Neo-liberals have moved to discredit such coalitions as have the realpolitik advocates of the 
foreign policy establishment in the belief, which has some merit, that minority issues cannot be 
allowed to dictate or obfuscate the overall priority of stable relations with China. 49 However, 
campaigns on behalf of religious rights and minority rights do serve the crucial purpose of 
refocussing the debate on the human cost of putting economics first. This point was clearly 
demonstrated when, in the early 1990s, Chinese authorities launched an initiative against the 
Tibetan independence movement called "Cutting off the Serpent's Head" (the metaphorical 
snake being Tibetan activists). This initiative included a clamp-down on all protests (both 
economic and political), restrictions on the spread of Buddhism and the display of religious 
artefacts, destroying the religious and political standing of the Dalai Lama, and, most cynically, 
a policy of high speed economic growth intended to encourage a greater influx of Han Chinese 
migrant workers and entrepreneurs. Like the native Americans of the nineteenth century, 
Tibetan culture is viewed as an ideational, as much as physical, threat to the ideas of scientific 
and rational progress. China's reform programme for Tibet bears all the hall-marks of a 
postcolonial legacy in which the growth of industry and technology, though crucial to overall 
development, is allowed to efface or destroy alternative social models and identities while 
denying Tibetans a legitimate forum for dialogue. 50 Given the fact that modern US society is 
particularly sensitive to cultural pluralism and that US foreign policy has long sought to 
safeguard persecuted minorities as part of its, admittedly paradoxical, anti-imperialist tradition 
it is no surprise that China's actions in Tibet have induced political protest. 
1'1 The head of the China desk at the State Department jokingly dismissed the Tibet lobby as a "growth 
industry" and called human rights reports "snapshots which don't really give us a perspective on what is really 
happening." Remarks made by Director of State Department China Desk, at the School or Advanced 
International Studies, John Hopkins University, Washington DC, 12 November, 1997. 
", See Human Rights Watch/Asia Report, "Cutting Off the Serpent's Head: The Cost of Putting Business First", 
Washington DC, 1997. 
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The Uighurs of East Turkistan have also faced attacks upon their culture and environment, a 
fact which has, thus far, received little recognition in the wider world probably due to the 
vogue for Buddhism currently sweeping the USA which ensures higher profile coverage for 
Tibet. Nevertheless, policies of forced abortion and Han Chinese migration are serving to 
alienate the people of this, one of China's poorest, regions. Natural resources (including oil, 
coal, and minerals) are being siphoned out of the region to help fuel economic growth in 
China's Southern and coastal regions, leaving East Turkistan's people, both politically and 
materially, at the mercy of a central government more interested in placating the new 
business culture. According to Anwar Yusef of the US-based East Turkistan Centre, the 
region is also being used for environmental dumping and nuclear tests in the knowledge that 
the population has little means oflegal or political recourse 51 
Human Rights Watch! Asia has also noted that, in April 1996, China's government launched a 
"Strike Hard Against Crime" campaign, ostensibly to combat violent gangs and drug 
syndicates. It is claimed, however, that this was largely a ruse to disguise a harsh crackdown 
on all forms of dissent and opposition to Beijing control, particularly among ethnic and 
religious groups.52 Particularly hard hit were Muslim separatists who have, between 1995-97, 
become more active, organised, and violent and who have sizeable populations in Xinjiang, 
Ningxia, and Yunnan provinces in north-eastern China 53 This is, of course, a complex 
political issue given the precedent of the former Soviet Union where the US supported Islamic 
separatists only to be faced with repressive anti-Western theocracies following the break up of 
the Soviet empire. Moreover, it is quite possible that any diminution in China's control over its 
provinces could be replaced with more virulent forms of authoritarianism and leaderships less 
'I Huschle -Delobel (ed), Focus on China, pp. 18-19. 
,~ Human Rights Watch/Asia, The Cost (~r Putting Business First. 
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open to the world than China's reforming government which is, at least to some extent, bound 
by international law. 
The China Business Lobby: A Social Movement For Global Capitalism 
US transnationals share few of the scruples afflicting US labour and human rights groups nor 
many of their ambiguities in terms of strategy. Transnationals represent what Sklair terms a 
"social movement for global capitalism" operating via "elite social movement organisations" 
(ESMOs) made up, in Sklair's schema, of "TNC executives, globalising bureaucrats, 
globalising politicians and professionals, and consumerist elites (merchants and the media.)" 
As Sklair further notes, ESMOs are the "peak business associations and organisations that 
connect business with other spheres (government, global politics, social issues, etc). ,,54 
Certainly, the private social forces diffusing the business agenda in US-China relations display 
just such characteristics and have fostered an array of interlinkages with the Administration 
and the broader political process. 55 
A certain single-mindedness has kept the incessant agenda of US multinationals in China at the 
forefront of the policy debate and has been characterised by the forging of close links with the 
trade lobby in both the Democratic and Republican Party. The business lobby is characterised 
by tight-knit organisational structures differing in important respects from the human rights-
NGO lobbies which traverse the spectrum of US politics and can find little common ground on 
which to fashion a coherent response to the agenda of transnational capita\. lhe i'.;collomis/ 
"Durnbaugh, China's Treatment of Religious Practices, p.7. 
'·1 L Sklair, "Social Movements For Global Capitalism: the Transnational Capitalist Class in Action", Review 
u{/nlernalional Political Economy, Vol.4, No.3, 1997, pp.524-525. 
" The Clinton Administration's China strategy for 1998, for instance, was announced before the Asia Societ,' 
which is primarily an elite grouping of businessmen and Washington foreign policy establishment insider~. 
During the address Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific. Stanley Roth, stated that the 
Administration's aim for 1998 is that "China plays by the rules enough so as not to disrupt trade and FDI." 
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summed this up neatly when appraising the role of the US-China Business Council which 
represents over 300 US companies claiming a stake in the China market: "its rivals are too 
often divided to be effective. Human Rights groups and the religious right are a world apart on 
most issues; so are the trade unionists and right wing anti-Communists .... even though the anti-
China brigades make a lot of noise, they do not usually manage to win critical votes in 
Congress. ,,56 
The US-China Business Council played a key role in mobilising pro-China and pro-free trade 
sentiments during the MFN-Human Rights debate of 1994 in which the Clinton Administration 
changed policy direction. A similar role was played by the Emergency Committee for 
American Trade (ECAT) which represents 55 large US corporations with world-wide sales of 
$1 trillion. 57 Nearly 300 corporate leaders from companies which exported $7.5 billion to 
China in 1992 sent an open letter to the Clinton Administration which claimed that 
"withdrawing or placing further conditions on MFN" could "terminate the large political 
benefits of the trading relationship. ,,5M 
The Jiang-Clinton Summit of October 1997 was, notably, dominated by business figures 
invited to informal White House dinners in order to secure new deals with the Chinese 
government. 59 Again, China's leaders attempted to display their new economic power by 
announcing, during Jiang's summit visit, that the government would procure 50 Boeing 
Stanley Roth, The Asia Strategv for the Second Clinton Administration, Speech before Asia Society, US 
Department of State, 12 December, 1997. 
", " How America Sees China", The Economist, October 25, 1997. 
" See D Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister: Clinton Ends Linkage", The 
('hina Quarler(v, 139, 1994, p.605. 
'" R Bernstein and R Dicker, "Debating China: Human Rights First", Foreign Policy, No.44, 1994, p.44. 
"J The point was made to me by a prominent NGO human rights lobbyist that if one wished to truly decipher 
which groups were exerting most influence over China policy one only had to look at the guest list for the US-
China Summit official dinner which was dominated by representatives of corporate America. 
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airplanes at the cost of $3 billion. 60 Such gestures seem to be enough, in the current climate, to 
assuage both the Administration and US business of China's long-term value in global 
economic terms. Proactive political measures designed to influence China's behaviour are to be 
confined, by the US government, to WTO negotiations and bilateral trade sanctions within an 
overall context of dialogue (see chapter 3). 
Key political figures, now betrothed to the private sector, are personal recipients of lobby 
cash, as was well documented by an article in the right-wing, though populist, Washing/oil 
limes in May 1997. Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig, traditionally pro-Chinese figures, 
were reported as playing major roles in the lobbying world. Kissinger's political consultancy 
has included offering services to The American International Group (AIG). This insurance 
giant was instrumental in setting up the Business Coalition for US-China Trade with the 
former targeting some of its $26 billion in resources towards funding this multi-million dollar 
lobbying group which includes many of America's corporate giants including Boeing, 
Motorola, General Motors, General Electric and IBM among its number. As noted in chapter 
3, the AIG was the first insurance group which has been allowed to sell services in the China 
market, opening offices in Shanghai. For his part, Alexander Haig has played a major role in 
securing Joint Venture contracts for United Technologies in China while also functioning as a 
syndicated news columnist usually writing pro-Chinese columns. On Capitol Hill the law firm 
Jones Day Reavis and Pogue, registered as the Chinese Embassy's foreign agent, has given 
$108,168 to candidates in both parties; Dorsey and Whitney, a Washington firm representing 
the Chinese chamber of Commerce, has given $56,263 and Hogan and Hartson, representing 
the US-China Business Council, has given a total of $339, 824 to candidates in both parties.C.1 
(,II L W Pye, "The United States and Asia in 1997", Asian .'l'urvey. Vo1.3!{. No.1. 199!{, p.104. 
(01 G Archibald. "Big Deals in Beijing Bring Billions to US: Famous Names Well Paid to Support China", 
Washington Times, March 25, 1997. 
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An added twist to the influence of economic interests on the Administration's policy, and 
indicative of the transnational nature of politicking in the 1 990s, came in 1997 when 
allegations were made that Chinese sources had helped fund Clinton's re-election campaign 
for the presidency in 1996 in return, presumably, for a more pro-Chinese foreign policy and 
the further dilution of human rights commitments. 62 In 1997 six corporations launched a 
$750,000 per year public relations campaign to boost China's image through the Internet, 
schools, and community organisations. It was set up by Edelman Public Relations World-Wide 
and also involved the inauguration of an Education Foundation promoting US firms dealing 
. h Ch' 63 Wit mao 
The effectiveness of such campaigns are hard to measure but illuminate the fact that large 
corporations which have the financial muscle to project their message onto screens across the 
US at leisure. Moreover, the pro-China lobby representing private business and corporate 
America has made it clear that it is not well disposed to any regulatory restrictions on the 
conduct of US firms operating in the China market. They were supported by the 
Administration which opposed a Bill in Congress based on the Sullivan Principles laying down 
a code of conduct for US firms operating in South Africa during the 1980s.64 In 1995, 
moreover, the Administration pledged itself to an "honour code of conduct" for US firms 
operating in China, but then proceeded to hollow out this commitment by making the code 
voluntary and thus acceptable to the business community as an empty and symbolic gesture 
unlikely to be taken up in practice. Nor was the latest proposal given any logistical support 
(,2 Lampton, "China and Clinton's America", p.1116. 
1,1 Archibald, "Big Deals in Beijing". 
/,1 Bernstein and Dicker, "Human Rights First", p.47. 
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from the Commerce Department, the diplomatic missions of which often secure key business 
contracts. 65 
Promoting Civil Society in China 
President Clinton's overall structural synthesis of America's role in the world following the 
end of the Cold War was essentially one of hard-nosed economic realism. It was always 
bound to sit rather uneasily with Anthony Lake's espousal of "democratic enlargement" as 
central to US foreign policy and particularly applicable to China as the last major bastion of 
Communist ideology, however diluted in form. Yet perhaps we are missing the point here as 
well as underestimating the sophistication of US strategy. There was, and is, an 
unacknowledged symbiosis between the two duelling priorities whereby the pursuit of neo-
liberal economic goals is veiled by the rhetoric of human rights and democracy promotion. As 
Brinkley notes, "as a politically viable concept, democratic enlargement had to be aimed at 
primary US strategic and economic interests. ,,66 Authoritarian political structures have 
increasingly come to be viewed as anachronistic by neo-liberals due to the intensity and scope 
of information flows necessary to facilitate global markets as well as what Robinson calls the 
"expansive social intercourse associated with the global economy.,,67 With financial stability 
and the confidence of investors paramount in safeguarding dominant US interests world wide, 
the prospects of political instability associated with repressive regimes are now viewed as 
threatening the global financial system. An adjunct of this concern with authoritarian 
governments is concern with the potential activities of radical disenfranchised groups at the 
margins of the new global economy who may infringe upon its smooth functioning by asserting 
I,' Wan, "Human Rights and Sino-US Relations", p.243. 
/,/, D Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine" Foreign Policy, No.JO(), 1997, p.1 \(i. 
I,· WI Robinson, Promoting Po~varchy: Globalization, US IntenJention, and Hegemony, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996 p.38. 
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popular control over their social and economic environment. Thus the US has sought to 
encourage the emergence of "low intensity,,6~democratic institutions and structures which both 
neutralise radical forces extant in civil society and defuse the push to assert local democracy 
and autonomy or to reverse market inequities through state intervention, but which, equally, 
disavow arbitrary one party government. Such "polyarchical" structures "lead to political 
disaggregation and apathy, rather than authoritarianism, which can lead to political 
aggregation and mobilisation against visible targets such as dictatorships. ,,69 It is in this vein 
that, in April 1997, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
Jeff Bader, emphasised US support for new criminal and civil laws enacted by China's 
government, as well as rural village elections and increased freedom of movement, travel, and 
access to information, while, at the same time, framing overall US policy in terms of the need 
for China's stability?' A certain degree of power diffusion enhances capital accumulation 
processes and allows legal recourse for consumers and those in ownership of economic 
resources. However, popular democratisation would threaten vested interests and would 
probably also contain an agenda of economic redistribution and social justice. 
The goal here, and we must not lose sight of this, is to compound and extend the scope of 
pro-capitalist (not necessarily liberal or democratic) institutional forms which, in turn, require 
a degree of popular legitimacy in order to function - they especially require an element of 
freedom for the economically empowered most likely to determine their fate ,We argue, 
however, that China represents an anomaly where the strategy of augmenting this brand of 
f,X See B Gills, 1 Rocamora and R Wilson (eds), Low Intensity Democracy, London. Pluto Press, 199J. The 
term "low intensity democracy" denotes the existence of formal democratic structures which grant legal and 
civil rights (in theory) but which fail to redistribute economic and social power. 
/." Robinson, Promoting Po~varchy, p.378, 
" J Bader, "Statement Before the House International relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs: Sino-American Relations and US Policy Options", US Department of State Press Release, 2j 
April. 1997. at http://\vww.state.gov/www/regio/1.\·/eapl. 
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democracy is concerned in that there has been a relative lack of fluidity in the Chinese political 
situation since the end of the Cold War, certainly by contrast with Eastern Europe. Thus we 
see, in a more polarised manner than normal, the Clinton Administration's clear decision to opt 
for open markets over democracy and to placate corporate actors rather than human rights 
NGOs, the labour unions or anti-communists. For Hughes, this serves to highlight the fact 
that, "if there are priorities for Washington, they are increasingly presented in terms of 
promoting liberal economics rather than liberal politics" in China71 Authoritarianism, then, is 
still deemed preferable to a transition to democracy likely to engender market instability and to 
threaten shareholder interests, though, as noted above, the situation in China is extremely 
complex and a hasty move to democracy could, quite conceivably, create unnecessary social 
cleavages. 
The Nature of the Capitalist/State Hegemony in China 
The US has attempted to foster civil societies in the developing world which will act as 
counterweights to the state and complement the Clinton Administration's push for trade 
liberalisation by freeing capital from regulation and bureaucratic forces. This is often achieved 
through the structural adjustment packages (SAPs) of the World Bank and IMF. However, 
this simplistic state/society dichotomy is misleading for it ignores "the balance of power 
relations within civil society, within the state and between the state and civil society.,,72 In 
short, the neo-liberal view denies that non-Western countries have a social structure at all, 
leaving them no room for state policies designed to forge a social compromise or provide 
social protection - no Western society would contemplate following a purely neo-liberal 
-\ C Hughes. "China and Liberalism Globalised". Millennium: Journal of lnternational.\'ludies. Vo1.24. No.1. 
PNS. pA19. 
-, J Howell. "An Unholy Trinity? Civil Society. Economic Liberalisation. and Democratisation in post-Mao 
China", Government and Opposition, Vol. 33, No.1, 1998, p.72. 
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model of development. Put simply, there is a middle way between the minimal state and the 
overbearing state - or the authoritarian state which exists in China. 
Here we identify the social forces which the US supports in China and affirm that such forces 
are both antithetical to comprehensive democracy and are symbiotically interwoven with a 
state apparatus upon which they rely to provide social stability and conditions conducive to 
unfettered capital accumulation. Following Robert Cox, then, it is imperative that we 
disaggregate the Chinese state and examine critically which class and social fractions enjoy 
hegemony within China and, in a global context, which forces are supported by the US neo-
liberals. As described above, sections of the US government, the US private sector and even 
large sections of the NGO community are ideologically pre-disposed towards supporting 
China's emerging capitalist class and the activities of the private sector. Such a class, it is 
predicted, forms the nucleus of a consumerist middle class which will, in time, begin to 
organise itself within civil society through independent social organisations and campaign for 
greater autonomy from the state, especially greater individual, or civil, rights. 
This view, Jude Howell argues, is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of what IS 
happening in China at present. Howell argues that "the relationship between the party/state 
and the new intermediary sphere" in China is best seen "as one of incorporation rather than 
corporatism. ,,73 The proliferation of "semi-offical social organisations" (the Chinese 
government's name for NGOs), such as the China Enterprise Management Association and the 
Shenyang Lawyers Association, are products of state policy and state sanction. As Howell 
further points out, such organisations "enjoy some degree of autonomy from the state 
precisely because it is in the latter's interest to do so" by "relieving the state of its former 
-'Ihid . p.63. 
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responsibilities. ,,74 The Chinese state is, in short, delegating power to quasi-autonomous non-
governmental-organisations (quangos) which "take over functions of service delivery. ,,75 Such 
groups are entirely devoid of popular accountability and represent an already privileged strata 
of Chinese society. Moreover, such groups are partially funded by the state and granted 
licences by the Ministry for Civil Affairs, encapsulating the new political interface between the 
state and entrepreneurs. 
As Anita Chan observed, "the government's strategy is to pursue a policy of co-optation and 
inclusion of the elite groups within society; but vis a vis ordinary people, the leadership 
pursues a policy of exclusion. ,,76 Without what Habermas calls a "critical public sphere"77, 
civil society cannot take root even with the existence of 'formal' institutions. US political 
pressure is unlikely to change China from the outside - even if this were desirable - but it is 
even less likely that democratic forces can emerge when sectors of the US government and 
business support a capitalist/state axis which actively suppresses the grass roots and organic 
expressions of popular democracy. Although this capitalist/state formation involves an 
"implicit. .. battle for hegemony,,7N between the state and China's new capitalists, it is clear that, 
at present, this grouping of state personnel and capitalist elites forms a hegemonic coalition of 
ruling social forces across the state-society nexus. The state provides the stability needed for 
capital accumulation (often maintained through the state's coercive machinery), while the 
private sector continues to deliver the economic growth which maintains the political 
-·1 Ihid. , pp.66-7. 
-, J Howel!. "NGO-State Relations in Post-Mao China" in D Hulme and M Edwards (cds) N(JOs, Slates and 
/)onors: Too Close for Comj(lrt, New York, St.Martin's Press, 1997, p.21l. 
/, A Chan ,"China: the Changing Political Elite", in G Rodan (ed) Political (Jppu.,·l!lOns m Industrrallsmg 
,Isi(l. p.165. 
See J Habcrmas, The Structural Transformation of the Puhlic Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category (!l 
Hourgeois Society. Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1989. 
'x J Howell, "An Unholy Trinity", p.70. 
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legitimacy of the CCP. Hong Kong may be seen as a microcosm of what is taking place on the 
mainland as business leaders on the territory fasten themselves to the CCP and act in open 
hostility to democratic forces within the middle class whilst favouring increasingly oppressive 
measures to deal with the poor. This seems to bear out Robert Cox's view that state 
restructuring under conditions of economic globalisation involves the state assuming enhanced 
"riot control" powers aimed at "minimising the risk of chaos in the bottom layer.,,7'! In China 
today social disorder from those outside the reform process, as exemplified by such activities 
as crime, drug smuggling, prostitution, peasant riots and factory strikes, is viewed as an 
unwanted bi-product of socio-economic change to be contained at all costS.MO While this is an 
understandable position, it is the break up of China's welfare system and the intensification of 
social values based on earning money alone (perhaps more so than in the US due to China's 
largely secular culture) which are allowing such conditions to flourish. Needless to say, this 
hegemony is a fragile one but opposition to it is unlikely to come from the new middle class 
which is more concerned with the safety of their investments, shares and property speculation. 
Rather, as North points out, it is likely to stem "from working people, the rural poor, 
intellectuals and other citizens left behind by the narrow boom."Ml 
Prospects for Democratic Enlargement/Civil Society 
As has been stressed, civil society has been stifled in China and so social forces resistant to 
authoritarian state power have found it difficult to organise in a cohesive and systematic way. 
It is argued here that such movements have not come to fruition in China precisely because 
capitalist reforms have been subsumed within a Confucian tradition of authoritarian rule 
°'1 R Cox, " Democracy in Hard Times: Economic Globalisation and the limits to Liberal Democracy", in A 
McGrew (cd), The Transformation of Democracy?, London, Polity Press, 1997, p.5H. 
XOI Howell, "NGO-State Relations", pp.21O-11. 
xl J North, "Mao's book Turns Green", The Nation, November 10, 1997. 
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which, in turn, have been tailored to the eXIgencIes of the global economy. H2 However, 
Chinese workers, many now ex-workers, have ready-made and organic social groups through 
which to resist the dictates of central government and the party elites which control many of 
China's provincial governments. This is not to apportion priority to productive forces but, 
rather, to suggest that the most obvious conjunctural force willing, and perhaps able, to 
organise for social protection, justice, and democracy is located within a labour force currently 
being systematically dismantled by the reforms of [Chinese Prime minister] Zhu Rongji 
Another source of resistance may come from those ethnic groupings currently being treated 
with great brutality and insensitivity by the CCP (mentioned above). Those indigenous peoples 
whose communities are being ravaged by huge and environmentally damaging projects, such 
as the Three Gorges Dam (which will be discussed further in chapter 5), otTer another 
potential source of political contest. It is these groups, argues David Martin Jones, and not 
the "illiberal"H3 middle classes, who offer the main hope of forging democracy in China. 
Though we here identify possible sources of contestation it should be stressed that only a 
coalition of these forces, at present unlikely, could hope to mount a sustained campaign 
against certain reforms and would necessarily be reliant upon the support of US, and other, 
social forces contesting the extent of the market's role in bringing about change. Moreover, 
such campaigns, of themselves, should not be seen as an alternative to changes in state policy 
which would be needed to implement new welfare provisions in place of the' iron rice bowl' or 
to replace lost jobs through a more Keynesian economic strategy (discussed in chapter 3). It 
~~ For a discusssion, see A Dirlik, "Critical Reflections on Chinese Capitalism as a Paradigm", Jdentilie.\'· 
U/ohal Studies in Culture and Power, YoU, No.3, 1997, pp,303-330. 
~.l For the view that the paradigm of middle class politics in Asia has been to crcate an csscntiallv "illiberal" 
political forcc, see 0 Martin Jones Political Development Pacific Asia, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997. Martin 
Joncs perceptively notes how the middle class in Asia is a creation of the state and did not evolve in opposition 
to it as in the US. For Martin Jones, "it is the middle class products of the state educational system, many of 
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should be noted that we have already discussed ethnic and religious groups at variance with 
state policy in our discussion of US human rights campaigns above. In the rest of this section 
we will focus upon indigenous Chinese groups likely to form part of any future movement 
contesting the policies of the Chinese state. 
Labour in China 
The bulk of China's workers today face a harsh environment. On the one hand, they are losing 
their jobs en masse due to the privatisation of the state sector and, on the other, they are being 
forced to work for low wages for Chinese and foreign-owned companies keen to use this 
cheap source of labour in order to bolster competitiveness. Women sutTer disproportionately 
in the Chinese workplace due to the twin problems of worker exploitation and sexual 
harassment as well as certain cultural traditions in China which continue to demean the status 
of women. 84 T Kumar of Amnesty International, USA, has pointed out the broader hardships 
facing women in China, including continued forced abortions and sterilisation by local 
governments under China's one-child policy, as well as the alleged common sexual abuse and 
rape of women detained by the authorities. tl5 As an ostensibly socialist state China's ill 
treatment of workers, trade unionists and peasants points to the major contradictions between 
professed ideology and political practice which has long characterised China's muddled 
socialist experiment. As mentioned, reform of the SOEs may well engender a groundswell of 
disaffected, and former, workers laying the foundations for labour resistance to state policy 
The New York-based group Human Rights Watch/Asia has recently brought to the world's 
attention a particularly pertinent example of the Chinese state's repressive measures in dealing 
whom subsequently enjoy state employment and patronage, who are expected to respond positively to official 
demands for greater unity.", p.143. 
~·1 G Greenfield and A Lepong, "China's Capitalist Communism: The Real World of Market Socialism", in L 
Panitch (ed) The Socialist Register: J 997 , London, Merlin Press, 1997, p.1 0 1. 
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with dissent. The plights of Li Wenming and Guo Baoshang, two organic labour activists 
attempting to represent vulnerable migrant workers, demonstrate China's hostility to worker 
representation. The two activists have been accused of "crimes" relating to the opening in 
1993 and early 1994 of an ad hoc workers rights education centre and the distribution of an 
unoflicial journal, Workers Forum, in the southern city of Shenzhen. For these activities, they 
face over three years in prison and, up until 1997, have been badly treated while awaiting trial. 
As HRW A's Sidney Jones notes, their offences amount to "nothing more than trying to 
educate Chinese migrant workers about their rights to organise and engage in collective 
bargaining in the workplace. ,,86 Such a case is not isolated but indicative of the broader 
usurpation of basic worker rights, often with the acquiescence of US and other foreign firms, 
as China's economy adapts to the competitive nostrums to the global economy. 
In addition to worker disquiet there is the increasing possibility of peasant revolts as traditions, 
land and identity are uprooted in the name of local and global capital accumulation and as 
great swathes of the interior are frozen out of the prosperity with which coastal China is 
awash. According to Anita Chan, the peasantry are often subjected to "ad hoc taxes" and 
local corruption with little recourse to legal protection. ~7 In 1992 and 1993 peasant uprisings, 
not unlike those motivating the Mexican Zapatistas though without their level of organisation 
or access to weapons, broke out across the inland provinces. In Renshou County in Sichuan 
Province 10,000 peasants occupied government offices and managed to resist the authorities 
for days.~1! Thus repressive conditions in the workplace; new levels of structural 
unemployment stemming from SOE reforms; and the displacement of rural farming 
" T Kumar in APe. Ji'ocus on China, p.16. 
"" "Shcnzhcn Court Sentences Chinese Labour Activists", http://www.hrw.orglhrwlpres.\·/chinaI)76.htm. 
x- Chan. "The Changing Ruling Elite", 176. 
xx Ihid . . p.176. 
205 
communities are all serving to create social groups outside of the reform process - a factor 
which may impact on the behaviour of foreign investors concerned with long-term stability. 
Such unrest has shaken some of the assumptions of US policymakers in terms of the pace at 
which China can realistically liberalise and retain a socially inclusive reform process.!!'> 
The US, China and Human Rights 
Let us now address head on a question which has continually surfaced during this chapter. It 
relates to the efficacy and sustainability of universal claims of human rights by the US and 
counter-claims that universality represents cultural imperialism made by China and other 
Asian states. We need to understand this debate both historically and with reference to trends 
in the global political economy. Samuel Huntington has, in a sense, thrown down the gauntlet 
in terms of appropriating primacy to the role of culture in the post-Cold-War world order. 
Although Huntington offers a characteristically functional approach to the question of 
civilisations he is probably correct to draw attention to the fact that the cultural sphere is an 
important element in determining certain alterations in the configuration of world order. 
Where Huntington goes utterly awry is in his argument that this needs to be viewed in a IIthem 
against us ll manner. 90 We argue here that the Asian challenge to Western values should be 
rejected in its spurious form, as promulgated by Asian and Western nationalists, but does ofrer 
the possibility of recognising that global politics in the post-Cold War era needs to be more 
consensual and inclusive. 
The US has been keen to use the UN to vocalise its objections to Chinese human rights abuses 
which, as Wan notes, allows IIWashington to pressure China without putting US trade and 
X'I Interview. US Department of State (China desk), December 18. 1997. 
'Ill See S Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations'?". Foreign A.ffairs, Vol. 72, No.3. 1993, pp. 22-.P). 
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investment opportunities at risk.,,91 This reflects the US commitment to the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The US has thus far been unsuccessful in 
pushing a motion through the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) which would subject 
China's human rights record to international debate; China has successfully rallied support 
from other developing countries.92 China's market is a pivotal factor in a change of tack by the 
Administration which now acknowledges that progress on human rights will indeed be a "slow 
process", though human rights bureaucrats continue to insist on universal principles and claim 
not "to make anything at all" of the argument surrounding Asian values and cultural relativism. 
Within the State department's human rights bureaucracy "multilateralism on human rights" is 
seen as the best way forward and one official pointed to the ethical stance of countries such as 
Sweden and Denmark with more to lose than the US from applying sanctions to China93 The 
argument put forward most forcefully by the US State Department is the convincing line that 
is refuses to view the rights of Asian individuals as less important than their Western 
counterparts.94 As stressed above, the Clinton Administration has failed to ensure broader 
human rights standards are adhered to by regulating the conduct and practices of US firms 
operating in China. This would avoid any resort to protectionism or sanctions, but would 
impose minimum standards on US firms. As Greider notes, a start in humanising the global 
economy can only be made by "imposing some firm rules on US-based companies - stipulating 
what we expect in their behaviour, what we will not tolerate from toymakers or shoemakers or 
auto and aircraft manufacturers. ,,95 
'II M Wan, "Human Rights and Sino-US Relations", p.244, 
'12 [hid. , p,245. 
'il Interview, Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy, and Labour, 17 November, 1997. 
').\ [hid. 
'J' W Greider, "Saving the Global Economy", The Nation. December IS, 1997. 
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In sum, until labour rights and human rights become an intrinsic component of US corporate 
activities which are bolstered by state policies aimed at enhancing national competitiveness 
(possibly governed by a new set of transnational regulatory mechanisms), China will continue 
to win support in the developing world and be able to portray the US human rights advocates 
as part of a broad US strategy which ratchets up competitive pressures in the global economy 
and then attempts to see off potential competitors by playing the human rights card. 
Asian Values 
As emphasised, then, China's leaders simply do not accept America's definition of human 
rights, claiming it to be a Western construct foisted upon developing countries and 
competitors in order to compound existing global power structures. In the words of one 
Chinese official and axiomatic of the general stance of the Chinese government; "the Western 
countries ... are in no way genuinely concerned about the fundamental human rights of (target) 
countries) ... Rather, their objective is to change these countries social, political and economic 
systems, undermine their sovereignty and independence, and intervene in their internal affairs 
so that they will be subservient to them. ,,96 
Along with countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, China's political leaders have 
promoted a discourse of 'Asian Values' embedded in the rediscovery of a Confucian discourse 
preaching obedience and cultural conservatism. We argue that this discourse simply cannot be 
abstracted from global capitalism and the discourse of "disciplinary neo-liberalism.,,97 China's 
leaders are harnessing an authoritarian history to global economic discipline in an extremely 
convenient way and one which plays down many other religious and spiritual doctrines in 
"" Chinese official quoted in AJ Nathan, "Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy". ?'lIe China Quarter/v. 
Vo1.l39, 1994. p.642. 
'1- Sec S Gill. "Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism", Alillennium: Journal (d 
IlIternalional,",'ludie,\'. Vol. 24, No.3, 1995, pp.622-643. 
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Chinese history and theology less suited to the rigours of the global market place9x It is 
designed to produce a Foucauldian self-discipline, taking the form of a discursive regime of 
truth, in an age when the Chinese state is finding it difficult logistically to police, survey, and 
punish sections of Chinese society deviating from the modernisation project as discussed 
above. Thus power passes from the domain of direct coercive control to a broader self-
regulative discourse of nationalism and essentialist values. 'Asian Values' are those values 
which allow China's authoritarian capitalism to flourish unhindered. Their "other" is 
apparently decadent Western liberalism. China's campaign against so-called "bourgeois 
liberalisation" in the cultural sphere, however, may be seen as a narrow conservatism rather 
than any residue of Marxist social analysis. Ghai puts it this way: "if there is a decadence or a 
sense of alienation in the West, it is not a consequence of rights but of the market economic 
system that dominates family and social relationships." He further notes that it is "that 
economic system, and the technological and organisational forms that go with it" which "have 
been warmly embraced by the prophets of 'Asian Values.,99 This is not to say that China's 
embrace of technology and a new economic system are wrong per st!, but that without a 
strong social element they can exacerbate inequality. 
Another consideration here is the claim of sovereignty posited by the Chinese leadership which 
very much ties in with the concept of 'Asian Values'. Postcolonial analysts correctly assert that 
China's leaders, in this respect, are merely replicating colonial notions of the nation as a fixed 
territorial boundary (now, ironically under question in the West due to globalisation) when, 
throughout history, China was conceived in terms of cosmology, as a spiritual or spatial 
civilisation whose source of legitimacy was the Mandate of Heaven rather than the dictales of 
'IX For a discussion, see Chapter One, "Political Culture and Political Development in Pacific Asia: The 
Evolution of the Developmental State", in Martin Jones, Political Development in Pacific Asia, pp. 3-58. 
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Beijing. It is no coincidence, then, that patriotism is not something motivating China's new 
capitalists nor the overseas Chinese who financed Chinese growth during the 1980s. As yu-
Shiu notes, Chinese sovereignty has historically been rendered unstable by forces from within 
willing to align themselves with foreign powers. Following the Boxer Rebellion of \900, 
"politicians cared less about external sovereignty rights than their own power leverages in the 
domestic political and military arena. Many made shocking concessions to former colonial 
powers in order to receive aid in battling domestic opponenets." 100 Moreover, in the 1950s, 
overseas Chinese were wooed by Mao as "people's capitalists" and now account for more than 
half of all foreign investment in China. lUI In the contemporary context, a subtle change in the 
stance of China's leaders has been noted by several writers. According to Nina Glick Schiller, 
the reification of the idea of "Chineseness" as a transnational identity serves Chinese leaders 
"interested not only in insuring a flow of remittances to China but also in encouraging 
overseas Chinese with considerable amounts of capital to invest in China and protect Chinese 
interests overseas." Glick Schiller points to the case of Johnny Chung, briefly mentioned 
above, who is now imprisoned for making illegal donations to President Clinton's 1996 
election campaign as an example of "transnational state building in an era of globalisation." 
The case also reveals how the strategies of US and Chinese business interests sought to 
subvert US law for mutual gain by attempting to change the laws on the export of US defence 
'J'J Y Ghai, "Human Rights and Asian Values", APe Focus, Double Issue, lanlFeblMarch/ April 1998, No.11 
and 12. 
11111 C yu-Shiu, .. A Postcolonial Reading of the State Question in China", The Journal of Contemporary China. 
Vol? No.17, 1998, p.128. 
lid "Chinese Leaders See Benefits in Courting US Immigrants", The Washington Post, 31 October. 1997. 
I 
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technology.lll2 Thus corporate players from both countries formed an interlocking interest 
against the US state while also subverting the democratic process. 
For this transnational class, mobility is the key and the entire concept of a "Greater China", 
though ethnically defined, certainly does not correlate with the idea of the fixed sovereign state 
but, rather, with a global web of complex and interweaving Chinese communities for whom 
networking and (]uanxi (business by means of establishing contacts) far outweighs 
territorially defined loyalties. \03 In short, the 'Asian Values' discourse has been championed 
principally by the leadership technocrats who are themselves concerned more with their own 
power base than with the generic welfare of their citizens. As many analysts have noted, China 
has never missed an opportunity to attack the US over human rights abuses and, in doing so, 
implicitly accepts the existence of universal standards of moral conduct. 104 
Conclusion 
The first section of this chapter has looked at state-society relations and, specifically, the 
impact of various groups upon the formation of America's China policy within an innately 
pluralistic and fragmented culture. Though the groups discussed do not always determine US 
foreign policy they do have a serious impact upon which policies the Administration can and 
cannot adopt. We note, however, that although they contribute the ethical and moral debate 
on the formation of US-China policy, such groups do not always reach a long-term view on 
III:? N Glick Schiller, "Citizens in Transnational Nation-States: The Asian Experience", in K Olds. P Dicken. 
PF Kelly, L Wong, and H Wai-chung Yeung (eds), Globalisation and the ASia-Pacific, London. Routledge. 
11)1)9. pp. 213-215. 
1111 S Seagrave. Lords afthe Rim: The Invisible Empire of the Overseas Chinese. London. Bantam Press. 191)5. 
11I1As Shill points out "China denies the validity of the Western human rights standards ... based upon its 
sovereignty argument without noticing that the sovereignty argument is also invented and imposed upon China 
by the West." At the same time, "China cannot resist criticising the US human rights performance as if the 
issue can transcend sovereignty on the other hand." Yu Shiu. "A Postcolonial Reading of the State Question in 
China". p.nl. 
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how to devise an American China policy. \05 This is as true for the far right as for left-wing 
human rights and labour lobbies which tend to respond to China issues without any serious 
regard for the costs of isolating China. As argued in our previous chapter, disengagement from 
China could create negative protectionist sentiments and, equally, cause China to adopt a more 
insular and less globally orientated foreign policy. This is particularly pertinent to the stance 
taken by both the left and right in the US with regard to free trade.We agree that China needs 
to be kept within the global economy as argued by the Clinton Administration and that sub-
state groups and NGOs would do better to focus their efforts on environmental and economic 
changes at the global level where new standards and regulations could be enforced by 
multilateral means. In many respects liberal internationalists do have soundly reasoned 
arguemnts in viewing economic ties as, at least, partially regulating China's government. There 
is threfore some truth in Segal's claim that "Beijing can succeed in bumping BBC Television 
news from foreign satellites, but Baywatch and soap operas are let through and in the end are 
far more corrosive of authoritarian values. ,,106 This argument applies also to human rights 
concerns where disengagement over free trade would probably exacerabate China's 
authoritarian tendencies and would certainly worsen the working conditions of Chinese labour 
as well as the position of the persecuted minority groups to which US lobbies tend to attach 
themselves. Interestingly, the Chinese government's argument that economic prosperity comes 
first is, in many senses, supported by the Clinton Administration which has argued that free 
trade will, ultimately, lead to greater freedoms and the gradual erosion of authoritarian rule. 
Our second section problematised the view that trade liberalisation and open markets will 
necessarily engender democracy in China and a strong and open civil society. As research by 
111\ I nterview, Asia-Pacific Centre for Justice and Peace, October 1997. 
III'. G Segal, "Enlightening China" in D Goodman and G Segal (eds) China Rising: Nationalism and 
IlItl'rdependence, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 176. 
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Howell in particular demonstrates, the Chinese state has been highly adept in co-opting 
Chinese NGOs within the state structure and combining capitalism with authoritarianism. 
Moreover, the US, as Robinson in turn has shown, has historically been satisfied with 
polyarchical forms of democracy which institutionalise property rights and the rights of market 
actors but which fall short of full constitutional or representative democracy. Though the 
Clinton Administration's policy towards China is a highly complex balancing act it is clear that 
open markets have taken priority over the existence of an open society and, in China's case, it 
is not altogether clear that economic reform will produce the latter. It is also argued that the 
emergence of popular democratic forms in China would likely create instability and damage 
China's credibility in global markets. In this sense, the overt sponsorhip of democracy in China 
could well be detrimental to overall US interests. Moreover, and as stressed above, too 
precipitous a move to democracy could create a Soviet-type situation where political 
fragmentation creates political and economic inertia and allows criminal and mafia elements to 
take greater control of the economy at the expense of ordinary people. \07 
In sum, though the existence ofNGOs and non-state actors is highly relevant to the US-China 
relationship and worthy of discussion in the present context of economic globalisation, it is 
equally true that it is still, in all probability, likely to fall to states themselves to institute the 
kind of changes NGOs are attempting to instigate. This is likely to take place at the global 
level through the addition of workers rights to the WTO agenda and the establishment of 
new environmental standards. The one exception here would, of course, be the role of 
business as a sub-state actor which is, as noted above, considerable and which cannot be 
undersood in islolation from the role of governnment. Within the US political system business 
leaders and politicians often have interchangable roles and it is this structural advantage under 
)1' J Henderson, "Danger and Opportunity in the Asia-Pacific" G Thomson (ed), h'onomic Dynalllism in the 
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conditions of pluralism, as originally noted by Lindblom lOK, which also stacks the odds against 
other groups in US civil society. The only force which can regulate the conduct of business is 
the US government. Equally, social improvement in China is most likely to come from the 
action of the Chinese government which, under continually changing economic and 
technological conditions in which information and knowledge are ever more diffuse, may have 
to adapt to the reality of politicalliberalisation by stealth . 
. Isia-Pacijic. London, Routledge, 1998, p.380. 
illK Sec C Lindblom, Politics and Markets, New York, Basic Books. 1977. 
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Chapter 5 
US-China Relations and the Environment 
"As long as civilization as a whole, with its vast technological power, continues to follow a 
pattern of thinking that encourages the domination and exploitation of the natural world for 
short term gains, this juggernaut will continue to devastate the earth no matter what any of us 
does" - US Vice President AI Gore. I 
Introduction 
The environmental impact of China's increasing level of industrialisation and development has 
been woefully neglected by a US-China literature too often wedded to outmoded or inept 
terms of reference whether liberal or realist. What interest there has been in the environmental 
impact of China's growth overwhelmingly conforms to a biased US perspective which defines 
ecology and the politics of environmentalism through the lens of market solutions. In this 
sense, environmental relations between the US and China has to be understood within a neo-
Gramscian understanding of US hegemony and, more importantly, the hegemony of neo-
liberal solutions to environmental problems within global institutions and among corporate 
actors. This perspective treats the environment as an adjunct of the narrow neo-liberal focus 
upon market share, market access, and US competitiveness. The neo-liberal perspective also 
views the question of environmental degradation as a technical problem rather than part of the 
systemic haemorrhaging of the global balance between production and consumption. In 
contrast with the dominant approach we argue here that the environment is an independent 
structural issue which must be accorded political primacy and which transcends the short-term 
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outlook of corporate actors and the zero-sum competitive strategies certain players within the 
US state. In policy terms we look to the possibility, however remote at the present time, of 
what John Dunning describes as the "macro-economic organisation of economic activity" in 
the light of a globalisation process which internationalises much of the context within which 
political decisions are made? Moreover, we examine US-China relations in the environmental 
sphere with one eye upon the development of, in Dunning's words, co-operative "cross border 
alliances to exchange information and ideas and, where appropriate, co-ordinate policies.'" 
This approach seems particularly apposite to the environmental sphere where the zero-sum 
competitive shibboleths of economic nationalism undermine the need for a shift to 
transnational modes of governance under conditions of globalisation4 We argue that 
governments still have a key role to play here in institutionalising new forms of national, 
cross-border, and global regulation, the sine qua non for which are long-term criteria related 
to sustainable development and which reconfigure the 'concept of the political' in 
global/spatial terms. 5 Failure to forge co-operative regimes and agreements in the 
environmental sphere will, in the long term, lead to the further degradation of the global 
environment. As Lipietz puts it, "one can have smoking compartments on trains; but there 
cannot be polluting compartments on our planet." 6 
J A Gore, Earth in the Balance: Forging a New ('ommon Purpose, London, Earthscan, IIJY2, p.2CJIJ. 
2 J Dunning, "Government and the Macro-Organisation of Economic Activity: An Historical and Spatial 
Perspective", Review of International Political Economy, Vol.4, No.1, 1997, p.75 . 
. \ Ihid. 
·1 Ihid. 
, RBJ Walker, "The Concept of the Political", in K Booth and S Smith (cds), International Relations Theorv 
r(}d{~v, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995. For Walker this means a recasting of political space whereby politic~1 
decisions are taken with regard to their impact beyond the here and now and existing political norms. The 
environment is surely a norm yet to be approached as an intrinsic part of all political activity. 
/, A Lipictz, Towards a New Economic Order: PostjiJrdism, Ecology. and Democracy. London, Oxford 
University Press, 1992. p.125. 
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The Global/Structural Backdrop to US-China Environmental Relations 
We cannot begin to discuss US-China relations in the environmental sphere without fIrst 
taking into consideration the increasingly globalised ecological debate upon which bilateral 
issues are predicated. From our perspective the ecological debates of the 1990s have been 
characterised by the systematic co-option and dilution of the environmental agenda by neo-
liberal forces. Transnational corporations, working in synergy with OECD governments, have 
ensured the sUbjugation of environmental concerns to those of transnational capital This 
hegemonic strategy emerged from the UN Conference on the Environment and Development 
(UNCTAD) in 1992 and largely remains in place following the Kyoto Summit of December 
1997. This strategy ensures that debates on the environment continue to take place within a 
narrow Western/neo-liberal discourse increasingly defined in terms of economic globalisation. 
It is worth quoting Matthew Paterson: "The emergence of global environmental problems has 
become an important part of the global ising strategy of Western elites. The emergence of the 
environmental crisis in its latest form has become a useful hegemonic project to legitimise 
further globalisation.,,7 The current global environmental agenda, then, constitutes a 
hegemonic strategy propagated by the advanced capitalist countries, the forces of transnational 
capital, and their allies among developing world elites. 
It is also worth considering research by Newell and Paterson which has demonstrated the 
extent to which large corporations, particularly fossil fuel companies, have been able to win 
acceptance for their agendas. The Global Climate Coalition (GCC) (which comprises US 
companies such as the American Petroleum Institute, Du Pont, Dow, Ford, General Motors, 
and Texaco) presents itself as a global lobby "because of the international operating reach of 
many of the companies" and "despite the disproportionate representation of US companies 
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within the 10bbies."N This coalition has been tremendously important in forging "transnational 
alliances with other states ... with which they have clearly consistent interests, but also with 
developing countries in general, trying to persuade them that the adoption of emissions 
limitations by industrialised countries would have severe economic impacts on them, primarily 
through increases in prices for energy and manufactures,,9 Most importantly, "fossil energy 
companies are clearly privileged in state policy-making processes" in that "governments 
routinely consult and take account of the interest of energy lobbies when proposals are being 
formulated." Moreover, because energy industries playa pivotal role in the running of national 
economies "they are, by definition, a force with which governments have to negotiate on 
issues of energy planning and implementation."Jl) Within the US, the government negotiates 
privately with energy companies prior to international summits and usually commits to an 
agenda protective of fossil fuel interests and intent on stressing the scientific ambiguities which 
attenuate climate change. According to Newell and Paterson, "the US government knows the 
intensity of resistance which would greet proposals to limit the supply or consumption of 
energy" and this "makes even the prospect of legislating in this area undesirable." For Newell 
and Paterson this attests to the structural power of energy lobbies in delimiting US 
government strategies in the global environmental sphere. Of course, this is often less the 
fault of US government personnel that part of an inability to force adjustments on US 
consumption levels and to tackle vested economic power. This dynamic of US politics has 
plagued successive Democratic administrations (notably Carter's failed attempt to introduce 
energy conservation proposals in 1977 and Clinton's failed energy tax proposals of 1993.) 
M Paterson, "UNCED in the Context of Globalisation" , New Political Fconomy. Vol., No.1, 1996, p.402. 
x P Newell and M Paterson, "A Climate for Business: Global Warming, the State and Capital", Review of 
IlIlernational Political Economy, Vo1.5, No.4, 1998, p.683. . 
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Moreover, as we observed in chapter 4, the cohesion and organisational unity of business 
lobbies gives them a distinct advantage in promoting their interests within the US political 
system as compared with fragmented NGOs. As again Newell and Paterson put it, "the 
operating scale of [corporate] lobbies means that they are able to organise themselves to put 
pressure on policy wherever their interests are threatened" and "the financial resources that the 
lobbies have at their disposal enable them to work more effectively, by employing the best 
lobbyists and being able to operate in a more professional manner." II 
It is in this context, then, that the global agenda of environmental politics has been en framed 
during the Clinton years and which has, in turn, precluded any radical measures towards US-
China cooperation in stemming their mutually high levels of pollution. Let us now appraise 
the two conferences which have largely defined that agenda in the 1990s and the ways in 
which they inevitably impact upon US-China relations. 
From Rio to Kyoto: A Case of Sustainable Hegemony? 
China's growing power raises key questions which amount to nothing less than a serious 
reappraisal of what we mean by such terms as modern and developed states in a post-
hegemonic era, bearing in mind that the concepts of modernisation and development were 
largely the product of US sociologists in the neo-functionalist mould. China's uneven creation 
of wealth at the present juncture may, in the long term, be ecologically unsustainable and 
certainly incommensurate with social stability. We argue that, at present, the role of the 
United States in China's environmentally damaging developmental trajectory must be 
understood within the context of what Vandana Shiva has cleverly termed "sustainable 
Iii Ihid. , p.684. 
II Ihid. , p.690. 
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hegemony." In Shiva's usage, this term suggests that, as long as control over environmental 
technologies and their availability remains in the hands of those nations and corporations often 
responsible for pollution in the first place, there is likely to be little by way of structural 
change in global environmental politics. 12 That is to say that China's ability to cope with 
potentially damaging environmental conditions relies heavily upon the response of the 
technology-rich United States and the global financial institutions over which it exerts so much 
structural power. We do not, however, necessarily share the pessimistic structuralist 
assessment that current US intransigence necessarily entails non-cooperation over 
environmental matters in the future. As discussed below, key agencies within the US 
government view ecological matters as global and beyond the remit of purely market 
solutions. 13 Moreover, China's approach to environmental issues has also depended, to a 
great extent, upon the outcomes of the Rio and Kyoto Summits and the emergence of a new 
consensus governing global environmental norms in which developing nations play a more 
active role. 
The Rio Summit of 1992 effectively allowed transnational capital to define what we mean by 
environmentalism and sustainable development. In this sense it legitimised a hegemonic 
discourse defining 'common sense' solutions in terms of market rationality and neoliberal 
ideology (which is itself contested). Thus Rio witnessed the promotion of environmental 
strategies which do not impede the free flow of global capital or the ideological remit of global 
institutional structures which promote economic liberalisation. In an excellent critique of the 
neoliberal brand of environmentalism (cemented at Rio) Chatterjee and Finger point out that 
what emerged was essentially a victory for Western science and technology, Western finance, 
12 See V Shiva, "The Greening of Global Reach" in W Sachs (cd), G/oha/ Hc%gy: A Nell' Arena of }'o/ilica/ 
( 'oll/licf, Halifax, Fernwood Books, 1993. 
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and Western technocratic expertise. 14 Moreover, the very social forces which have caused the 
current environmental crisis (encouraging over-accumulation, unsustainable levels of 
consumption, and economic short-termism) were largely exempted from the tinal agreement. 
The activities of TNCs were not curtailed or regulated in any significant way as the agreement 
continued to approach political solutions in outmoded state-centric terms, allowing the forces 
of global capital to steer an often environmentally ambiguous course relatively unchecked. As 
Caroline Thomas demonstrates, Agenda 21 (the requirement that countries evaluate their 
environmental needs and present them to the UN so that local projects may be considered for 
multilateral froms of funding) evolved into a glorified corporate catalogue where the advanced 
economies and the companies based within their ambit sell clean air technologies 15 to 
developing countries whilst continuing to practise and encourage unsustainable levels of global 
economic growth and consumption. 
A key failing at Rio, undermining the arguments of those who viewed proceedings as globally 
representative or inclusive, was the de facto negation of fundamental structural issues within a 
developmental context. As Thomas puts it, "debt repayment, terms of trade, regulation of 
TNCs, IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes [SAPS]. .... - i.e. all the 
underlying economic problems were ... swept under the carpet.,,16 Questions relating to 
Northern (especially US) levels of consumption and the debate over the advanced nations' 
expropriation of finite global resources were largely deflected by shifting the debate onto 
overpopulation or what Paul Kennedy has termed the 'demographic explosion' in the 
I ~ Interview. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington DC, 2 December 1997. 
1·1 See P Chatterjee and M Finger. The Earth Brokers: Power, Politics, and World IJel'elopment, London. 
Routledge, 1994. 
I' C Thomas, "Unsustainable Development", New Political Economy, Vol. I. No.3, 1996. p.406. 
11'lh/(/. • p.406. 
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developing world. 17 This issue is, of course, particularly apposite to China where food and 
water shortages constitute an extremely vexing problem but cannot be divorced from the 
question of consumption - one US negotiators have been unable to engage seriously despite 
the pre-electoral committments of Vice-President AI Gore to further the cause of the global 
environment. An adjunct of shifting the debate onto questions of population was the 
reification, once more, of the idea of the South as "subject" and "problem." More specitlcally, 
as Charlotte Bretherton notes, the focus upon population contains an extremely gendered 
bias. For Bretherton, "despite the more significant impacts of over-consumption in the 
'developed' world, population growth in the South has tended to be identitled by Northern 
commentators as the major problem; and control of Third World women's fertility as the 
solution." IK Ironically, such a focus by neo-Iiberals implicitly bolsters infringements of 
women's rights, such as China's one-child policy. 19 
At Rio, the US shirked any firm commitment to financial and technology transfers of the scale 
required to offset environmental decay in countries such as China. Instead, an agreement 
unravelled which placed Northern OECD countries (the historical polluters) in charge of 
surveillance and enforcement. In terms of logisitics this seems understandable, but it neglected 
the political input of developing world countries. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) (run 
by the World Bank, the UN Development Programme, and the UN Environment Programme) 
is reliant upon the good will of Northern donor agencies and governments. A glaring example 
of the UN's failure to break from the policy prescriptions of neo-liberalism was the thwarting 
of a proposal emanating from the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for 
1- Sec P Kennedy, Preparing/or the Twenty-First Century, London, Harper Collins. 1993. 
IX C Bretherton. "Global Environmental Politics: Putting Gender on the Agenda", Review of International 
Sill ciles, Vo1.24. 1998, p.88. The feminist perspective is a powerful corrective to the 'instnullcntalist 
predilections of liberal institutionalists who often abstract the environmental debate frolll its human context. 
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a Green Fund granting greater autonomy to poorer recipient countries in determining their 
own environmental priorities. Moreover, of the $125 billion needed to even begin alleviating 
the environmental crisis (the UNCT AD Secretariat's own estimate), only around $7 billion 
was pledged at the conference. 2o Moreover, the US and the advanced industrial nations of the 
OECD utilised their hegemonic largesse to block proposals, preceding the 1992 UNCED 
conference, from the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) pertaining to 
specific measures aimed at regulating multi-nationals and making them more accountable and 
transparent. The UNTC was disbanded soon after making its controversial proposals largely, 
we may presume, because it had been critical of the US and its environmental trajectory. This 
move, encouraged most forcefully by the US, occurred despite the fact that the UNTC had 
significant support within the UN from the Group of 77 nations and Sweden representing a 
large swathe of opinion among poorer and more ecologically active nations. 
In the end, it was the Business Council for Sustainable Development which provided the 
blueprint for the Rio agreement and, almost inevitably, what emerged reflected the interests of 
transnational capital first and foremost. Several key member of the Business Council were 
already engaged in efforts to adapt global corporations to new strategies of 'green' capital 
accumulation. 21 The Agenda 21 proposals, then, carried with them an in-built bias favouring 
market solutions to the global environmental crisis which meant that multi-nationals could, in 
effect, cash in on the pollution they were instrumental in creating. 22 Though it must be 
conceded that the Agenda 21 initiative was, in many senses, commendable and potentially 
I') Ihid.. pp.88-9. 
~" D Glover. "Global Institutions, International Agreements. and Environmental Issues". in R Stubbs and GRD 
Underhill (cds). Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, London, Macmillan, IlJlJ4. p.2Kl. 
21 Stephan Schmidheiny, an influential member of the Business Council. mapped out the need for 
transnational capital to tap into environmental concerns and the proliferation of green consumerism in his 
book. See S Schmidheiny. Changing Course, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, IlJl)2. 
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radical, it was not accompanied by 'organisational restructuring' at the UN pertinent to the 
programme's oversight and implementation?3 In neo-Gramscian terms, the co-optive power 
of transnational capital must take centre stage here, given the fact that the UN effectively 
transferred the practical dimensions of Agenda 21 into the hands of social forces concerned 
with finding more sustainable methods of capital accumulation, rather than more sustainable 
methods of development. In short, as long as the institutions of the global economy are 
controlled solely by advanced industrialised nations, primarily the US, a historically 
unsustainable paradigm of consumption and production is likely to continue with opposition 
bought off by piecemeal reforms to the existing system. 24 
Kyoto 
At the Kyoto Summit on global warming in December, 1997, the impasse created by the 
continued hegemony of transnational capital's representatives again failed to be broken. The 
US was, again, able to flex its ideological and institutional muscle exemplified by the Clinton 
Administrations prevarication over the issue of greenhouse gas emissions. At Kyoto the US 
championed the idea of an international trading system for emissions of carbon dioxide which, 
in effect, would allow the US to buy credits from other nations. This involves the US paying 
nations to pollute less so that the US can pollute more. At the heart of this strategy, is the 
Clinton Administration's need to placate domestic interests. Movements such as The Wise Up 
Movement, the Global Climate Coalition (GeC), mentioned above, and the Climate Coalition 
~~ Thomas. "Unsustainable Development", p. 407. 
2.\ The point here is that the Agenda 21 proposals were pioneering in identi~ving environmental priorities and 
the principle that the advanced industrialised nations playa key role in this both individually and vis a vis 
global institutions. However, the fact that the UN retained an essentially lIeo-liberal approach to the 
de\'eloping worlds environmental problems thwarted a new environmental paradigm based on the political 
reality of global ecological interdependence. 
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(CC) have successfully rallied the Administration in favour of vested corporate interests -
corporations which the Clinton administration is, quite understandably, unable to alienate. 
Arguments in defence of maintaining national production levels have meant that such 
coalitions have also won support from unions. Often misleading campaigns on global warming 
are staged through the mass media by business in which it is claimed that it is not happening or 
that it constitutes a fringe concern. Moreover, job security is pitted against environmental 
protection, thereby completely sidestepping questions related to long-term sustainable 
development. Such lobbies have also used their unrivalled structural power to forge 
transnational alliances in the OPEC countries and the developing world, arguing that 
limitations on emissions will result in price-hikes for much needed commodities manufactured 
in the West. Moreover, companies such as Chevron, Mobil, and Texaco can always use their 
largesse to divert investment and to relocate from those countries enthusiastic about adopting 
environmental regulations. 25 The consequence of this strategy at the global level is that the 
US government and US-based TNCs can utilise their greater purchasing power in the global 
economy and effectively buy the privilege of polluting the atmosphere while transferring 
responsibility on to other states to make the necessary environmental adjustments within their 
own societies.26 According to Greenpeace, the 'loophole' which is "hot air trading" means 
that C02 emission in the industrialised nations will only decrease by one or two percent over 
1990 levels, while levels in the developing world will increase dramatically27 This strategy 
constitutes the abdication of global responsibility and hegemonic leadership and thwarts any 
~·I R Henry, "Adapting UN Agencies for Agenda 21: Programme Coordination and Organisational Reform". 
Fnvironmental Polilic.\·, Vo1.5, No.1, 1996, p.4. 
~, Newell and Paterson, "A Climate for Business", pp.683-4. 
2(, R Maddock, "Environmental Politics and Policies in thc Asia-Pacific", in R Maidmcnt, 0 Goldblatt, and J 
Mitchcll (eds). Governance in the Asia-Pacific, London. Routlcdge, 11)98, pp.236-7. 
:- Greenpeace, "US Actions at Climate Summit Endanger the World", at http://www.greenpeace.orw-
clillllltelkdate.\:ldecember. J 2.html. 
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move to common standards of regulation predicated upon a global consensus. It also 
compounds the US refusal to sign the treaty on biodiversity at Rio, mainly due to pressure 
from business. Again, however, it is important to stress the limitations of the Clinton 
Administration in controlling globalised companies free to move their investment in a, more or 
less, autonomous manner. 
A significant feature of the Kyoto Summit, however, was the degree of resistance to US 
policy from the developing world, particularly China. At the summit China's representative, 
Chen Yaobang, stated that "poverty eradication and developing the economy are still the 
overriding priorities of China" and that "it is not possible for the Chinese government to 
undertake the obligation of reducing greenhouse gases until the country develops. "lK This 
contrasted sharply with the position of the Republican-dominated US Congress during the 
Kyoto Summit. One fairly representative member stated that, "unless these [developing] 
nations are included, the Clinton-Gore administration will have no excuse to ask the American 
people to pay higher energy costs for this lopsided and unfair treaty.,,29 Both positions are 
untenable and the Clinton Administration has attempted to straddle these extremes by devising 
an approach which is environmentally active, but pro-business. As we have suggested, this 
approach could be enhanced by infusing US-China environmental relations with a cooperative 
dynamic. Harvard scientists Michael McElroy and Chris Nielsen have argued that "there is a 
clear incentive to build indigenous capabilities and to give China a greater ownership of the 
relevant international science through accelerated joint research.,,30 At Kyoto, however, the 
"' "Gore Pledges US Flexibility At Global Warming Conclave", The Washington Post, December 9, 1997. 
"'I Comments made by Republican Senator, James F Sensenbrenner Jr. "Gore Urges Resolution at Climate 
Talks, The Washington Post, December 9,1997. 
I" M McElroy and CP Nielsen. "Energy. Agriculture, and the Environment: Prospects for Sino-American 
Cooperation", in E Vogel (ed), Living with China: (/,\'-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century. New 
York. WW Norton, 1997. p.24K. 
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US, as the world's biggest C02 polluter, took a largely unilateral line with regard to 
protecting US business and refused to commit to significant action despite the fact that it is 
home to 4% of the worlds population and a staggering 20% of global C02 emissions. Chris 
Yang, of Hong Kong-based Greenpeace China, gave the alternative NGO view when he 
stated that "the US was given a historic opportunity to show real international leadership, but 
all they did was produce rhetoric to protect the US oil industry.",l 
However, it has not been lost on China, and other developing nations, that issues which affect 
the US, such as pollution and climate change, give them considerable bargaining power which, 
if used correctly, may force recalcitrant social forces within the US to concede the necessity of 
moving towards new global environmental regimes faced with threats to Northern lifestyles 
and health standards?2 The current stand-off between the developing world and the US/OECD 
nations can only be resolved, then, in the context of generic moves to re-regulate the global 
economy and to begin devising a co-developmental approach to a global problem overseen by 
multilateral institutions. The current conjuncture of world order precludes unilateral action 
due to the added costs associated with environmental expenditure in the developing world and 
the difficulty in transposing environmental values specific to the West on to a China still 
waiting to reap the material benefits of development. 33 Such unilateral action was largely 
prevented when the Clinton Administration, from its inception, defined US environmental 
strategy in terms of geo-economic nationalism and inter-capitalist competition rather than 
global sustainability and ecological interdependence. Let us now assess that strategy and the 
limited forms of co-operation they have produced in the domain of US-China relations. 
\1 Grccnpcace. us Actiuns at Climate Summit Endanger the World. 
C A Dickson, Development and International Relations: A Critical Introduction, Cambridge. Polity Press. 
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The Clinton Environmental Strategy 
Following the Cold War the US economy was quickly exposed as being dangerously over 
reliant upon defence spending and, thus, in need of reorienting its industries and economic 
strategy to a more competitive global economic environment. Part of this strategy involved a 
'greening' of corporations formerly part of the US military industrial complex. The paradox 
inherent in this turn of events is neatly summarised by Pratt and Montgomery: "many of the 
dominant firms in the environmental technologies industry are involved in competition to clean 
up the hazardous wastes, control the pollution, repair the damage which as resource 
producers, chemical manufacturers and utilities they themselves created - pollution, penitence, 
profits.,,34 Due to right-wing attacks on environmental legislation within the US Congress, as 
well as US government regulations, companies such as Westinghouse, General Electric, and 
Dupont were forced to globalise as they were hit by rising costs and overcapacity. From the 
outset, then, US multi-nationals sought to promote a 'soft' neo-Iiberal variant of 
environmentalism in the developing world whilst fleeing environmental regulation within the 
US. 
In early 1993 the Clinton Administration launched an Environmental Technology Initiative 
designed to "accelerate environmental protection while strengthening America's industrial 
base.,,35 In the words of the Administration, the "investment will aid the transition away from a 
defence-oriented economy, by stimulating the increased use of private sector R&D resources 
for environmental quality-related purposes."J6 An inter-agency group (involving the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of 
11 L Pratt and W Montgomel)'. "Green Imperialism: Pol\ution. Penitence. Profits". in L Panitch (ed) 71u' 
.','oC/o/i.\'t Register 1997, London. Merlin Press, p.76. 
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Energy) was formed and, in 1993, produced an environmental industry assessment entitled 
I~nvironmental Technologies Exports: Strategic Framework for {/S /,eadership. The 
Framework specifically targeted previously earmarked Big Emerging Markets (BEMs) and 
individual Export Market Plans were produced by a Commerce Department working group on 
environmental trade which sought to provide "recommendations on how to operate efficiently 
in this [China's] "rapidly changing market.,,37 Writing in 1995, Peter Montagnon, of the 
Financial Times, estimated that China's energy sector investment requirements would total $1 
trillion up until 2015; $550 billion for electric power generation; $180 billion for the 
exploration, production, refining, and distribution of oil; and $90 billion in order to develop 
the required level of natural gas. 3K Emerging markets such as China's, then, were key targets 
in a new export strategy which sought to identify genuine environmental problems as 
opportunities to bolster profits and secure market share in this most competitive of areas. The 
overwhelming benefactors were the US private sector. That is not to say, of course, tha the 
entire US government was supportive of this strategy or, indeed, that there is any lack of 
forceful debate within US civil society. The US is home to the most vibrant debate on the 
environment in any of the advanced capitalist countries. Moreover, the US Department of 
Energy has taken a lead into undertaking scientific analyses of the impact of cars upon the 
US-China market with great emphasis on developing electric cars which can, at some point, be 
sold to China and avert the 'environmental catastrophe' which may attenuate China's mass 
. . 39 
conversIon to motonng. 
Cooperative Ventures in US-China Relations 
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The activities of the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
have been largely subordinated to the Commerce Department's overall push for greater market 
share, often becoming conduits between business and China's environmental market or 
identifying environmental problems on behalf of the US private sector. In February 1995, for 
instance, Energy Secretary, Hazel O'Leary, led a Presidential Mission on Sustainable Energy 
and Trade to China accompanied by over 100 US executives for a joint summit with a Chinese 
delegation. The joint summit between US and Chinese government delegates on Sustainable 
Development addressed such issues as finance, environment, clean coal technology, oil and 
natural gas, renewable energy, electric power, and energy efficiency.4o The US Department of 
Energy is also involved in such co-operative projects as the Beijing Energy Conservation 
Centre, promoting energy efficiency and a useful information gateway for US TNCs in 
identifying China's energy needs. The Centre is run in co-operation with the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF) (illuminating the co-option of environmental NGOs), the EPA, and the Energy 
Research Institute (ERl) of China's State Planning Commission. 41 The Commerce 
Department, the DoE and the EPA are also collaborating with China in supporting a $2.3 
billion Environmental Park in Yixing near Shanghai. The Chinese government has actively 
encouraged such international partnerships in order to promote domestic environmental 
technologies, but also due to its own dearth of technological expertise and infrastructure, 
thereby making US companies particularly indispensable. 
In March 1997, the US-China Environment and Development Forum was set up during a visit 
by Vice-president, AI Gore, to Beijing. This initiative prioritised co-operation between the two 
I~ Cited in M McElroy and CP Nielsen, Energv. Agriculture and Environment, p.239. 
I') Telephone Interview, US Department of Energy, Washington DC, November 17, 191)7 . 
. \ .• US Department of Commerce, Environmental Technologies Export Market fJlan, p.12X. 
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nations and sought to address local, regional, and multilateral environmental issues. The issues 
given greatest import were climate change, energy and environmental science and technology; 
clean energy trade; and investment and technology deployment over the next five years. 42 A 
key facet of this initiative, cemented at the US-China Summit of October 1997, was China's 
plans for rural electrification (bringing electricity to over 100 million rural Chinese) and 
China's air quality problems. The initiative is co-ordinated within the US by the Department 
of Energy, the Department of Commerce, the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the 
EP A. ", In a joint statement, during the October }997 summit, the Chinese government 
committed itself to greater business participation in meeting China's energy challenge and to 
implement regulator and pricing reforms to improve the prospects of enhanced trade and 
investment. Such measures confirm the fact that environmental co-operation is very often a 
neo-liberal euphemism for further Chinese commitments to market opening and that China's 
market, rather than China's environment, is usually the motivating factor behind any 
investments forthcoming from the US private sector. As Pratt and Montgomery aver, US 
investment usually gravitates towards projects in coastal China which promise quick and 
profitable returns, rather than to areas of more serious environmental degradation and in need 
of long-term investment such as Sichuan.44 
At the US-China Summit of October 1997, US Energy Secretary, Federico Pena, and Vice 
Chairman of China's state planning commission, Zeng Peiyan, also discussed plans for a US-
China Oil and Gas Forum and a possible $50 million commercial credit facility provided by the 
11 Ihitl. 
1" Press Release from the Office of the Vice-President, United States and China Advance Energy anti 
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Eximbank to infuse energy efficiency and renewal projects with the necessary capital 45 Such 
bilateral co-operation has also entailed an element of qUid pro quo, with China possessing 
considerable expertise in the area of fossil fuels on which the US is still largely reliant. China's 
significant experience with bio-gas digestors (over five million in use in 1993) and Chinese 
research on biomass conversion are, according to Douglas Murray of the National Committee 
on US-China relations, a sign that environmental co-operation can be a reciprocal and 
"mutually beneficial" process. 46 Other areas of co-operation include aquaculture (which, 
controversially, includes the issue of developing genetic stocks in order to expand supplies 
for the US market) and agriculture. Moreover, China's massive demand for food has opened 
up a bilateral debate on organic food production and, with US organic farming gaining in 
popularity, China's long record of innovation in this area is seen as being of potential benefit 
to the US. 47 The main problem in all of this is the propensity of US multinationals to patent 
scientific breakthroughs even though they have been made through research in developing 
countries or, at the very least, with their co-operation. This has been highlighted by the recent 
debate over the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAl) which would divert yet more 
structural power into hands of corporations. Moreover, the very nature of the Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) privileges enshrined in the WTO discourage open and honest co-
operation by privatising knowledge which would best serve the public good. If environmental 
co-operation between states is not to become a euphemism for exploitation, then the results 
of all co-operative ventures need to be safeguarded against their monopolisation by the 
private sector. 
l' fhid. 
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Two critical domains of environmental co-operation are in the areas of transport and nuclear 
energy. There seems to be something of a fundamental conflict in the US approach to China's 
emerging transport sector. The Harvard academics, Michael McElroy and Chris Nielson, 
represent one view by urging that China "downplay the role of the personal automobile" and 
"reduce the massive investment required to develop a large-scale system of highways and the 
loss of arable land this would imply.,,48 On the other hand, US companies are eager to tap into 
this potentially massive market with General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler already involved in 
several joint ventures, and with US firms contributing heavily to the $3.6 billion in foreign 
investment over the period 1986-1995.49 However, the Asian Development Bank has decided 
not to appropriate further resources for Chinese road construction schemes until the year 2000 
while the World Bank, under pressure from Western NGOs, is increasingly demanding an 
overarching transport plan which takes into account environmental issues. As mentioned 
above, the long-term issue of transportation in China is bound to become increasingly salient 
as individual ownership of cars increases exponentially in China during the next few decades. 
The US EPA is already extremely concerned about lead and gasoline emission levels in China 
which are adding to health problems in China's major conurbations, especially among children, 
and is co-operating with China to find a solution to the problem.50 Trade in nuclear energy has 
been a further bone of contention in US-China relations during the Clinton era due to worries 
about nuclear proliferation and the potential conversion of civilian nuclear technology for 
military purposes. However, the prospects for nuclear trade in the civilian sector, a multibillion 
dollar market in Chinasl , were enhanced at the US-China summit of October 1997. Companies 
4H McElroy and Nielson, Energy, Agriculture, and EnVironment, p.246. 
49 WJ Xing, "Shifting Gears", The China Business Review, Nov-Dec 1997, p.9. 
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such as Westinghouse Electric stand to gain enormously from President Clinton's decision to 
certify before the US Congress that China had complied with the requirements of the 1985 
Agreement for Co-operation between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy. This allows for bilateral co-operation on nuclear issues (such as 
decontamination and decommissioning), but also allows US companies to make inroads into a 
nuclear power sector projected to grow faster than any other country's in the next century.52 
The environmental implications of expanded nuclear power are clearly of great import as 
environmental NGOs call on China to turn to hydroelectric power, wind power and natural 
gas, which would probably also entail greater self-sufficiency. 53 In sum, US-China 
environmental co-operation must be viewed in terms of the broader global responsibilities of 
the world's two greatest polluters. The US may have to take the greater responsibility as the 
most consistent, and historically pre-eminent, polluter and as architect of a world order in 
which the environment has been long seen as merely an instrument to satisfy the appetite of 
unsustainable levels of consumption. While such co-operation with China is, in many respects, 
beneficial, it is crucial that we keep in mind the fact that the US overwhelmingly participates in 
'technological fixes' and 'end of pipe' solutions to China's vast environmental problems which 
are primarily structural. Instead of encouraging endogenous projects which help China's 
economic development move forward within a specific context of severe ecological restraints, 
the technical approach of neo-liberals instead prioritises the opening up of the Chinese market 
and modes of deregulation which can, in the long term, hamper central government attempts 
to control pollution . Although the US recognises the ultimate inefficacy of subsidising highly 
pollutant industries and encourages actual policy changes on the environment, such changes 
,2 US Department of Energy, Press Release, "US and China Broaden Cooperation on Nuclear Energy and 
Nonproliferation", at http://apo/lo.osti.govldoelwhatnew/pressrellpr97119.html. 
q Friends of the Earth, "Funding Global Warming in China", at http://www.joe.orgiglobaLworldblcoal.hlml. 
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do not relate to China's mode of development as this would challenge the global ideology of 
neo-liberal capitalism. Instead, the US has encouraged a system of market pricing which will 
lead to greater efficiency in the use of energy by lowering its use and creating a move away 
from inefficient coal boilers. Significantly, however, it will also "create an incentive for the use 
of new technologies and allow these new technologies to be effective."s4 The US, 
unsurprisingly, is the leading manufacturer of such technologies and this strategy is inexorably 
intertwined with the WTO agenda of securing greater market opening. Ironically, it is the 
increased competition between Chinese provinces which renders the task of sustainable 
growth so difficult due to the costs associated with implementing environmental standards (as 
will be discussed below). Moreover, though it is true that certain market externalities relating 
to environmental needs may be captured through pricing it is also true that private companies, 
under such circumstances, are likely to pursue short-term strategies dictated by the global 
financial markets, rather than engage in the long-term investment so crucial to China's 
environmental future. 55 A continued role for the state seems crucial here in enforcing such 
commitments, contrary to conventional neo-liberal wisdoms. At present, the US adopts the 
highly contradictory position of condemning the circumvention of environmental standards 
while encouraging China to dismantle the regulatory tools associated with state intervention. 
In the environmental sphere such contradictions cannot remain indefinitely, for the health and 
future of US citizens are at stake if China's environment goes seriously awry. 
,·1 A Frank, "The Environment in US-China Relations: Themes and Ideas from Working Group Discussion 011 
Energy Issues", in Frank (ed), China Environment Series, p.37. 
" H Hughes, "Development in Asia: A Fifty Year Policy Perspective", Asian Development Journal, Vol.\, 
No.\, 1994, p.IS. 
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The Role of US/Western Environmental NGOs in US-China Relations 
The part played by US-based NGOs in determining the nature of America's China policy and, 
indeed, China's own environmental conduct is extremely difficult to ascertain. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the vast majority ofNGOs operating in the US are very much caught up in 
a US political structure characterised by systemic gridlock. The impacy of such groups within 
China, meanwhile, is conditioned by the limited scope for foreign NGO activity due to the 
virtual absence of a functioning civil society (see chapter 4). Thus most US-based NGOs have 
focused upon mobilising opinion among US citizens and politicians in order to block funding 
for projects in China deemed environmentally destructive. Most often, this entails lobbying the 
US government directly or else pressurising members of the government to derail programmes 
from multilateral lending institutions which contribute to damaging the environment. As 
Manuell Castells notes, the "Group of 10" environmental NGOs which gained prominence in 
the 1980s, and include such pivotal environmental NGOs as the Sierra Club and the 
Environmental Defence Fund (EDF), came to define the nature and approach of US 
environmentalism in the 1980s.56 Such groups operate "within reasonable parameters of what 
can be achieved in the present economic and institutional system. ,,57 Thus, they conform to the 
American pragmatic tradition of . muddling through' and display a marked indifference to 
prescribed ideologies. Despite their reticence in attacking the limitations of neo-liberal 
approaches to the environment, such groups do serve an important function within the 
democratic process, especially due to their emphasis on activism and obtaining concrete 
results. In terms of US-China policy, US-based NGOs have been fairly successful in making a 
direct impact on an issue to issue basis. Friends of the Earth (FoE) have been involved, for 
\/, M Castells, The Power of Identity. London, Blackwells. 1997, p.I13. 
" Ibid.. p.114. 
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over ten years, in fighting China's three Gorges Dam project and in convincing the US 
Eximbank to refuse funds to US companies bidding for contracts related to its construction. 51i 
This forms part of a broader monitoring by FoE of US agencies, such as the Eximbank and 
OPIC, to make sure they adhere to environmental considerations. FoE has also been 
extremely critical of World Bank loans to China such as those providing some $750 million to 
build the new Zouxian and Yanshi Thermal Power Stations which are heavily reliant upon coal 
burning as opposed to clean air technologies. 59 NGOs, especially FoE, have also drawn 
attention to the World Bank's funding for highway construction in China - most notably a 
$270 million loan for the Shanghai-Zhejiang freeway. Most significantly, FoE have illuminated 
the fact that since 1990 the Bank has provided five times more money to fund Chinese 
highways than it has to fund Chinese railways. 60 Clearly the role of the US government is 
central here because it, more than any other government, encourages the neo-liberal mindset 
of the Bank and the belief that market activity, on the whole, should not be subjected to 
rigorous controls. This global approach also allows US environmental NGOs to make an 
impact upon China's environment and to challenge neo-liberalism without becoming bogged 
down in the quagmire of domestic US politics. The important point here is recognition of the 
fact that US structural power is as often exerted via global institutions as through the various 
agencies of the US state itself. 
The issue of 'common global environmental standards' has been a constant irritant in US-
China relations but is central to the goals of environmental NGOs. Again, we really need to 
move here beyond analysing US-China relations in bilateral terms, precisely because the long-
term environmental agenda of oppositional social forces is acutely focused upon both the 
'iX "Inventory of Environmental Work in China" in A Frank (ed), China Environment Series, p.R6. 
<", Friends of the Earth, Funding Global Warming in China. 
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global reach of transnational capital and the globalisation of environmental risks. We argue, 
however, that this entails a move by many US-based NGOs towards a more coherent 
structural assessment of the current situation. Otherwise, countries such as China will continue 
to view the entire movement as synonymous with US hegemony. Indeed, it often appears in 
the developing world that environmental NGOs are merely doing the bidding of US 
multinationals selling green technologies. As with the debate over global labour standards (see 
chapter 4), the suspicion of protectionism abounds in China with US producers seen to be 
using NGOs as a vehicle to pass on regulatory costs to the developing world and stave off 
competition. Though this paints a false picture, and underestimates the very real conflicts 
between even mainstream environmentalists and producer interests in the US, it does 
illuminate the need for green movements to link environmental degradation explicitly with the 
deregulating and privatising agenda of certain sectors of the US government and US business. 
So long as these also remain rules of the game at the global level China is unlikely to make the 
changes necessary to avert further environmental disasters. 
The Environmental Defence Fund (EDF), which has championed the idea of common global 
standards, has also drawn attention to the fact that, as with human rights, the US's highly 
organised environmental lobby has often been undercut by European and other governments. 
For instance, when the US Eximbank was persuaded to withhold funds for the Three Gorges 
Dam project, the German company, Hermes, approved $800 million in loans for the project 
while other guarantees from agencies in Japan and other European countries quickly 
followed. 61 In short, the US is probably, if only for institutional reasons, often more 
responsive to environmental lobbies than other democracies where environmental issues are 
(,I.) Friends of the Earth, "Paving the Way for Highways in China", at hllp:/lwww.joe.org/ga/roads.html. 
(,J Environmental Defence Fund, Common Global Environmental Standards Sought, at 
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frequently decided behind closed doors and where information is less readily available to 
concerned citizens. Let us now move on to examine the nature and scale of China's 
environmental crisis to elucidate the need for a more cooperative response from both the US 
and Chinese governments. 
China's Environmental Crisis 
China houses one fifth of the global population and the second half of the twentieth century 
has been one in which China's leaders have sought to grapple with a severe mismatch 
between population growth, on the one hand, and natural resources, on the other. Between 
1958-1961 Chairman Mao attempted to put the people to work during the Great Leap 
Forward and to tailor the Marxist experiment to Chinese conditions, especially its vast rural 
population. The results were disastrous for China as the project developed into an all-out 
attack on modernity, bourgeois technocracy and intellectualism, with China's students being 
taken from urban centres and sent into the countryside to "take root, flower, and bear fruit. ,,62 
Food shortages followed as crops were sewn often without basic levels of agricultural 
expertise, causing long-term soil erosion which rendered land unproductive for years to come. 
Shortages in food, clothing, and fuel also followed as natural disasters (typhoons, floods and 
droughts,) compounded dogmatic ideological decisions in producing exceptional hardships for 
the Chinese people. Up to twenty million people lost their lives. This experiment deviated in 
important respects from conventional Marxism and, as Deng remarked in 1985, "isolation 
landed China in poverty, backwardness and ignorance.,,63 The Cultural Revolution meant that 
recovery was stalled until the early 1970s by which time Mao's power base had begun to wane 
http://www.edJorglpubsIEDF_Letter/J998/Aprlc_dam.html . 
(,c J Teufel Dreyer, China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition, London. Macmillan, 1996, p.96. 
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and conflict with the Soviet Union further opened China to US influence and greater 
pragmatism in developing the economy. Thus, China's struggle to control an often 
inhospitable and highly volatile natural environment has been a continuous feature of the 
CCP's crusade to modernise. Often China's leaders have found themselves operating against 
nature, rather than harnessing its constraints and possibilities to a project which learns from 
some of the West's mistakes of the previous century and the early parts of the present one and 
thereby avoids the type of industrial development which damages the environment irreparably. 
We argue below that the availability of US clean air technologies, among other factors, means 
this no longer need be the case. 
[n 1991 a Chinese scholar, He Bochuan, wrote an extremely provocative book which 
predicted that China's current modernisation, far from solving the problems exacerbated by 
Mao's brand of Communism, is moving China ever closer to the precipice of ecological 
catastrophe. For Bochuan, unrestrained market forces and the drive to short-term profits, like 
Mao's myopic drive to Communist utopia, shows little respect for the natural environment. As 
towns and industries grow in size arable land and water resources are diminishing while soil 
erosion, desertification, salinisation continue to render large swathes of existing land infertile. 
Air pollution levels are now reaching life-threatening proportions in several Chinese urban 
centres with the problem of acid rain (see section on the regional implications below) adding 
to a regional and global crisis which must be solved soon. Much of China's pollution stems 
from high levels of reliance on coal burning in energy production, meaning that some 500 
cities in China now fall short of World Health Organisation (WHO) air quality standards. 
Indeed Beijing, Shanyang and Xian are three of the top ten most polluted cities on the globe. 
(,3 Dcng, quoted in R Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1987, p.294. . 
240 
Coal burning in these urban centres accounts for a staggering 75% of all pollutants entering 
the atmosphere, producing 14.14 million tons of soot, 18.25 million tons of sulphur dioxide, 
and 11. 63 million tons of industrial dust each year. 64 It is further estimated that over 90% of 
urban ground water and 25% of fresh water is contaminated due to inadequate waste disposal 
investment by the Chinese authorities. 65 In 1996, moreover, respiratory disease became the 
primary cause of death in China's rural areas due to searing levels of pollution. 66 Add to this 
the prospect of further climate change and the concomitant problems of natural disasters and. 
in Bochuan's view, a full-scale ecological breakdown may well result. 67 In August 1998 China 
was struck by serious flooding which claimed many lives and will cost the government some 
£ 15 billion in repairing the damage. 68 Such floods are portentous indeed, in the context of the 
debate on climate change, because the Chinese government admitted, in August 1998, that the 
floods were largely caused by deforestation. According to the Worldwatch Institute in 
Washington, 85% of the forests along the Yangtse River basin have now been destroyed. Not 
until 1998 did the Chinese ban logging in the upper Yangtse, though the move is a positive 
69 
one. 
Forests are viewed by many environmentalists as the key to stabilising China's, now fragile, 
ecosystem due to their twin function in stemming flood water and alleviating drought 70 The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) views China as being particularly 
vulnerable to rises in global sea levels concomitant with climate change. Due to the fact that a 
(,·1 "Summary of Working Group Discussions on Energy Issues in China" in Frank (ed), China Hnl'ironmenl 
. ...,·eries, p.4D. 
r" Maddock, Environmental Politics and Policies in the ASia-Pacific, p.222. 
(,r, Ibid., p.224. 
(," See H Bochuan, China on the Hdge, San Francisco, China Books and Periodicals, 1991. 
(,X The financial scale of the flood damage was reported on the BBC's Nine O'clock News, 26 August, 1998. 
(i) Cited in T Radford, "Political Watershed", The Guardian, September 2, 1998. 
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significant proportion of China's population and industries are sited on low-lying alluvial plains 
and the deltas of its major rivers, an increase in sea level of just 50cm could, the lPCe 
predicts, submerge an area of 40,000 square kilometres. 71 Concerns also abound within China 
over the question of food production and the environmental/human impact of future shortages. 
China's government has been largely unwilling to open its agricultural sector to global market 
forces despite much pressure from the US for it to comply with WTO rules . Indeed, state 
control over grain (a staple product which has long been of political centrality to the CCP's 
development strategy) was largely reasserted in 1994 following a brief flirtation with the 
market in the early 1990s. These concerns were fuelled by the neglect of grain sewing in many 
provinces by local entrepreneurs and state governments more concerned with profitable fruit 
and vegetables sold on the global market. 72 The resultant imbalances between population 
levels and sustainable food production was encouraged by the new culture of producing for 
profit alone which has been exacerbated by the strong US push for market opening in an area 
which still requires concerted state intervention. In 1992, the Chinese government did attempt 
to liberalise the grain market but was hit by a crisis when, in 1993, a decline in rice output 
generated panic buying in major cities to which the markets were unable to respond 
Subsequently, the government called a halt to rice and maize exports while announcing a new 
series of state measures to stabilise production and market supplies. 73 
-Ii ihid. 
-, M 8 McElroy and CP Nielsen, Energy, Agriculture and the EnVironment, p.225. 
-~ F Crook, "Grain Galore", The China Business Review, Sep-Oct 1997, pp.8-9. 
-.1 C Findlay and A Watson, "Economic Growth and Trade Dependency in China", in G Segal and D Goodman 
(cds), China Rising: Nationalism and independence, London, Routledge, 1997, p.121. 
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The Three Gorges Dam Project 
The Chinese government's insistence on constructing the Three Gorges Dam is, in many 
respects, symptomatic of a commitment to modernisation and development at all costs. The 
Dam is largely the product of irredentist tendencies within the CCP which view the Dam as a 
national virility symbol. It also provides a specific example of the physical uprooting of 
peoples from their social, cultural, and economic heritage and of China's negation of regional 
and global responsibilities in protecting the environment, given that international opinion is 
firmly set against the plan. The project involves the submergence of up to 15 counties in 
Sichuan under water - a total of 503 square km. It also entails the forced resettlement of over 
1.3 million people living in the proximity of the stretch of the Yangtse River where the project 
is being built. Ancient towns, farmland, and temples will all be lost and those affected have, 
un surprisingly, been given no say on the matter.74 Somewhat perversely, the dam will generate 
electric power for "industrially advanced central and eastern China", with Sichuan gaining "no 
direct benefit from the project." 75 Again, this illustrates the fact that China's poorer regions 
are viewed in solely instrumental terms within the context of a modernisation drive 
augmenting geographical, cultural, and class divides at a heady pace. The effects on the 
indigenous popUlation of Sichuan and traditional methods of agriculture may well be 
devastating, not only because altered water conditions may destroy local methods of 
irrigation, but also due to the fact that the project delinks local communities from established 
political allegiances. 76 The social forces unleashed by such ruptures in the rural way of life in 
China may well unleash oppositional social forces supplementing those discussed in chapter 4. 
-1 "Stopping the Yangzi's Flow", The Economist. 2 August, 1997. 
-, L Hong, "Sichuan", in D Goodman (ed), China's Provinces in Reform: Class. Community, and j'o/ilical 
Culture, London, Routledge, 1997, p.213. . 
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The Three Gorges Dam project is, moreover, only the most visible of a whole series of 
projects and developments which decimate local communities. For instance, the building of the 
Samnexia Dam required the forced migration of some 280,000 people, with over 50% 
remaining in a state of desperate poverty.77 As noted above, the Three Gorges Dam has been 
the focus of sustained campaigns by US-based NGOs which have, largely successfully, sought 
to block funding for the project. A key feature of China's current problems, however, is 
rooted in the unwillingness of the leadership to admit that the macro-environmental process of 
climate change is occurring. These objections are more political than scientific, as will be 
demonstrated below. 
Issues of Climate Change in US-China Relations 
1991 China signed the Montreal Protocol which called for an end to the use of 
chloroflurocarbons (CFCs) by developed nations by 2000 and by developing nations by 20 I O. 
China's leaders, however, have been adamant that such targets are unachievable without 
foreign aid and technology and a truly multilateral approach to solving these problems such as 
acquiring enough clean technology to substitute the ozone-depleting freon gas exuded by 
millions of fridges in China. 78 In many senses, we need to take into account the global 
structures which reinforce China's deep-seated antipathy to many multilateral initiatives. This 
is because China's leaders, up to a point, have a very credible argument. Nowhere is this 
clearer than in the ongoing debate and negotiations over greenhouse gases and climate change. 
As one US Environmental Protection Agency official put it in relation to environmental 
'f) E Young, C Hunt and RG Ward. "The Environment, Traditional Production and Population" in G Thomson 
(cd). Economic Dynamism in the Asia-Pacific. London, Polity, 1998. p.306. 
Maddock, Environmental Politics in the ASia-Pacific, p.230. 
-~ Teufel-Dreyer, China's Political ~:vstem. p.2S2. 
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discussions with China, "when climate change is mentioned the mood changes.,,79 China's 
leaders believe, probably wrongly, that the US and other Western nations are finessing the 
scientific evidence on climate change to curb growth levels in the developing world which 
threaten their competitiveness, thereby transferring the costs of the West's historic 
environmental misdemeanours on to others.80 Thus China has taken a confrontational line on 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) agreed at Rio because it negates the 
West's responsibility for taking the lead on greenhouse gases due to its longer track-record of 
pollution and is viewed as a "mechanism for major industrialised countries to escape 
responsibility for controlling profligate per capita emissions in their own economies."Hl 
Contrary to the impression of many Western observers, however, China acted remarkably 
quickly formulating its Agenda 21 plan and has moved to initiate national environmental 
standards to a far greater extent that other developing countries. Perhaps the key problem is 
one bound up with political decentralisation and the loss of Beijing's control over the 
economic reform process to regional and local elites. This process is, ironically, charaterised 
also by enhanced authoritarianism in the political/ideational sphere which prevents local 
Chinese communities and ordinary people from reasserting control over local environmental 
problems. Thus China's ability to deal with pressing environmental problems is retarded both 
by an outmoded notion of national development (still a largely Fordist conception) wedded to 
a structural inability to react to changes occurring in the global economy and bound up with 
the state's systematic suppression of access to information and knowledge. 
:~ Interview, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington DC. 2 December 1997. 
~II The evidence on climate change is not the issues here. The debate. it seems to me, relates to the fair 
distribution of global responsibilities and the less than credible position of the USA. As one EPA official told 
mc. "the US cannot really preach when its per capita emissions are so much higher than China." Intervicw. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2 December, Washington D.C., 1997. 
~I McElroy and Nielsen, Energy, Agriculture, and the Environment, p.237. 
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Implementing Environmental Reforms in China 
Following the 1992 Rio Conference China, as indicated, was one of the first countries to 
complete its 'Agenda 21' Plan for Sustainable Development. Agenda 21 opened up the 
possibility of multilateral funding for China's environmental clean-up. China's environmental 
response included a 'Priority Programme' of sixty-two projects which required international 
financial assistance - twenty of which had begun by December 1995. 112 In 1994 China's 
National Environmental Protection Agency estimated that $5 billion per year would be needed 
to bring ongoing pollution levels under control, while around $200 billion would be required 
to clean up existing damage. 83 A serious problem for China, however, remains both the overall 
lack of political weight attached to environmental issues and the increasing decentralisation of 
power which seriously hampers China's compliance with, and enforcement of, international 
agreements such as the Montreal Protocol and Agenda 21. As Shirk points out, the Chinese 
leadership have tended to appropriate 'Chinese characteristics' to their approach to 
environmental protection which usually means "an environmental protection policy ... that does 
not impede economic growth. ,,114 As stressed above, the Chinese leadership continues to see 
economic development in terms of large-scale industrial projects. Castells has noted that China 
still equates progress and development with "machines" and national virility symbols, such as 
the Three Gorges Dam (discussed above). The fact that the West is moving to a service 
economy (nearly 80%) based on human and social capital (skills and knowledge) marks a 
break with productivist models engendered by the industrial revolution. tiS US policy towards 
Kc Ihid., p.236. 
K, Teufel-Dreyer, China's Political System. p.252. 
K4 S Shirk, How China Opened Its Door: The Political Success of the PRC's Foreign Trade and Investment 
Reforms, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1994, p.83. 
"' M Castells, The End of the Millennium, London, Blackwells, 1997, p.306. Castells points out China has 
been very slow in developing an indigenous technological infrastructure. It is also handicapped by its closed 
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China, and that of other Western governments, would do well to stress the benefits of 
developing a Post-Fordist economy from scratch which relies upon human capital and which is 
relatively friendly to the environment. 
China's central government cannot hope to regulate semi-autonomous municipal and regional 
governments while it continues to propagate an ideology of unfettered economic growth at the 
macro level. lahiel, then, rightly locates China's environmental malaise at the 
structuraVnormative level: 
the structural and normative emphases on production for profit have affected even those whose task it is to 
protect the environment from the ravages of the market... This will continue to be the case as long as the norllls 
of the social system continue to emphasise economic growth and individual profitability above such other 
values as environmental quality, sustainable development and the collective good.M6 
Taking such trends into account we begin to understand the fissures which exist in China 
between the NEP A and a multiplicity of Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) which 
seek to enforce national regulations (such as the Discharge Fee System which fines polluters 
exceeding certain levels of waste disposal) 87, but are subject to budget and political control by 
local governments hostile to anything seen as threatening economic growth.1I11 With over 50% 
of the Chinese economy now in the private sector, despite a skeletal legal infrastructure, 
government intervention is becoming more problematic. For instance, China's banks, now 
increasingly concerned with the commercial sector of the economy, made clear in the early 
1990s that they were unwilling to maintain their crucial role in seizing owed discharge fees 
political system inimical to the levels of open interaction and feedback necessary in a network societv. This has 
made China structurally reliant upon Western countries to supply the necessary expertise and trainit;g. 
~(, A R Jahiel , "The Contradictory Impact of Reform on Environmental Protection in China, The ('hlnG 
Quarterly, YoU, No.49, 1997, p. 85. 
w' Ihid. , p.85. 
xx McElroy and Nielsen, Energy, Agriculture and the Environment, p.236. 
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from compames contravening NEP A regulations. Thus local EPBs had no administrative 
mechanism through which they could successfully punish enterprises flouting environmental 
standards. 89 The rescinding of central controls over the economy, therefore, may well 
engender dire environmental consequences by creating a political vacuum in terms of 
environmental responsibility. The question is: can Chinese society reassert control over its own 
environment despite political authoritarianism within and the forces of economic globalisation 
without? 
What Role China's Environmental NGOs? 
We have already discussed the fact that the prospect of NGOs functioning as a corrective to 
state power in China is severely limited due to the considerable infrastructural power of the 
state bureaucracy, at both the local and national level, and the growing power of capitalist 
elites with strong links to the forces of global capital (see Chapter 5). It is debatable, then, 
whether or not China's home-grown environmental NGO community will be able to 
manufacture a credible and autonomous voice in the near future or forge necessary alliances 
with other social forces in any future emerging civil society. 
Nascent environmental NGOs within China have, thus far, tended to buttress and legitimise 
Prime Minister Zhu Rongjii's programme of systematically dismantling China's state sector. 
For instance, Chinese environmental pressure groups, such as Friends of Nature (the first 
environmental NGO), have been campaigning to close down state-owned enterprises which 
cause widespread pollution. An example here was a high profile campaign to close down the 
Shougang steel mill in Beijing due to its damaging emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxide, 
X') Jahiel, "The Contradictory Impact of Environmental Reform in China", p.102. 
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carbon dioxide, and damaging dust emissions. 90 This campaign also served, however, to justify 
the privatisation policies announced by Zhu Rongjii at the CCP's 1997 conference. 
Furthermore, we must see this as the real reason why such environmental groups are 
encouraged or tolerated. 
There are, according to Elizabeth Knup, three types of environmental NGOs operating in 
China at present. The first group consists of Government-Organised NGOs (GONGOS) and 
tend to serve as an outgrowth of the state's administrative apparatus often facilitating joint 
projects with foreign NGOs. As Knup notes, "Chinese government agencies cannot sign co-
operative agreements with or raise funds from foreign NGOs, and therefore, they frequently 
form NGOs expressly for this purpose.'.9J Moreover, key personnel within such GONGOs 
tend, overwhelmingly, to comprise members of the sponsoring government agency, thus 
severely compromising any notion of autonomy from the state. Such groups include The China 
Environmental Protection Foundation (CEPF), The China Society of Environmental Sciences 
(CSES); The National Natural Science Foundation (NNSF), and the Heilongjiang Provincial 
Territory Society. According to Knup, the latter organisation is "typical" of the quasi-
governmental NGOs operating in China in that it carries out official policies but in a 
decentralised fashion. The Heilongjiang Provincial Territory Society, founded in 1994, is 
committed to a four-year contract with two US NGOs and two branches of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences in the development of a sustainable land use plan for the Ussuri 
River watershed. The provincial authorities, however, created the Territory Society 
specifically in order to carry out the joint project, allowing them to allocate provincial funds to 
')(, "Dinosaur Rescue: A State Steel makers Painful Makeover", Business Week, October 20, 1997. 
'JI E Knup, "Environmental NGOs in China", in Frank (cd), China Environment Series, p.ll. 
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a notionally non-governmental body. Such NGOs, then, are indistiguishable from the local 
political power structure92 
A second group of NGOs are, using Knup's definition, "individual organised NGOs." These 
groups, though not de facto government agencies, are closely regulated by the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs and rely on sponsorship from the Communist Party's National Environmental 
Protection Agency (NEPA). Such groups are, however, usually formed by individuals 
committed to environmentalism but who, equally, have close connections (guanxi) within the 
CCP at either national or provincial level. Groups, such as Friends of Nature (FON), have 
served the notable function of raising awareness of environmental degradation with magazine 
articles in China Women's Daily and China Youth Magazine and a weekly television slot 
entitled Time For Environment. Other such "individual organised NGOs" include the Centre 
for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge (CBIK); the Beijing Environment and 
Development Institute (BEDI); and the Institute of Environment and Development (IED).9) 
The final group identified by Knup is that of "voluntary organisations" which are not 
registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs and more closely reflect an oppositional force 
functioning in civil society. At present, however, such groups are a loose and informal 
network of "individuals with like interests" who "come together voluntarily on an irregular 
basis to work together towards a common goal.,,94 Such groups, which are still embryonic, 
may in time gain a popular foothold as they form social bonds with indigenous peoples and the 
rural population in particular, as well as those in the urban population suffering from the side 
effects of pollution. Knup notes the work of the Green Earth Volunteers (GEV) who have 
')~ ihid. , p.ll. 
~J ihid, , p.13. 
94 ihid. 
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travelled, using their own finances, to Inner Mongolia to plant trees in the Engebie Desert and 
who have taken time to teach in class-rooms disseminating their environmental knowledge.IJS 
In Gramscian terms, we may view such groups and individuals as organic intellectuals, or 
educators, attempting to articulate, by practical and educational means, the environmental 
disaster which may accompanied China's current drive to modernisation unless it is 
accompanies by greater national and international regulation. However, without the financial 
support of a political organisation and the spectre of an oppressive state the task of such 
voluntary groups will be difficult indeed. 
In sum, though the Beijing leadership is willing to take on board domestic, regional, and global 
concerns about the environment, it is unwilling, and increasingly unable, to break the 
productivist paradigm of economic growth and the consumerist norms which accompany it 
due to China's new commitments to market economics and strengthened ties with a 
competitive global economy. Environmental NGOs form the nucleus of a potential social 
counterforce and an indispensable source of education on environmental issues. However, 
their political bargaining power is, at the time of writing, fairly negligible. This makes the role 
of transnational actors and agencies even more crucial in making sure environmentally 
unfriendly activities are regulated both at the regional and global level. 
The US and the Regional Dimensions of China's Environmental Crisis 
The challenge to US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region may well gather pace as the 
implications of China's economic growth illuminate the need for regional efforts to combat 
environmental degradation. Ecological problems in the Asia-Pacific stem from a rapid increase 
in population and urbanisation, a significant surge in energy demand, and a severe 
~, Ibid. 
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deterioration of natural resources and biodiversity in the region. 96 It is estimated that by 2010 
around 200 cities in Asia will have populations of over 1 million. 97 Such increases in urban 
populations, along with the increased density of rural populations, will require much higher 
levels of "formal public investment" to ensure adequate health standards and environmental 
impact (water and sanitation standards).,,98 An increased regional emphasis on 'spatial 
planning' will become increasingly necessary in order to bring about the kind of self-
sustaining urban regeneration which alleviates the exploitation of marginal land forest, 
watersheds, and fisheries and concentrates instead on technological innovations which do not 
demand further assaults on the natural environment. 99 Yet such measures, at the time of 
writing, are precluded by the process of economic globalisation which deters initiatives likely 
to deter growth or dampen consumption and is tailored to immediate profitability, rather than 
broader developmental needs. In China, for instance, support for environmental research has 
waned due to market forces which increasingly delimit the context of political debate to 
commercial criterion. 1oo This is replicated at the regional level where the US-driven APEC 
project suffers from a dearth of serious environmental research and co-operation 
commensurate with the time and effort given to market research and the endless quest for 
profits. 101 As the architect of APEC, the US has a special responsibility here but, as Lyuba 
Zarsky of the Nautilius Institute which monitors APEC's environmental [non]agenda notes, 
')(, J Park, "APEC and ASEAN: The Future of Asian Environmental Regionalism", Environmental Politics, 
Vo1.6, No.3, 1997, p.163. 
<)7 Hughes, "Development in Asia: A Fifty Years Policy Perspective", p.7. 
'JW Ibid, p.9. 
'1'1 Ibid. 
I'" D Murray, American Interests in China's Environment, p.7. 
1('1 For instance, an official at the EPA told me that it is usually more productive to deal with the PRC, and 
Asian nations generally, bilaterally because APEC "takes forever to get things done." This goes some way in 
confirming our argument that the US approach to Asian regionalism hardly contains an environmental ag~nda 
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"while the official State Department view is that environmental co-operation promotes US 
security interests in Asia, there is little investment in understanding either the ecological issues 
or how best to conduct environmental diplomacy in the region." JIl2 
Due to the ambiguous nature of APEC as an institution and its restricted agenda of market 
opening (reflected by the US preoccupation with narrow economic concerns), no serious 
environmental momentum has emerged in the region. Events such as the 1996 Ministerial 
Meeting on Sustainable Development in Manila ultimately remain talking shops so long as 
environmental action is subjugated to, or co-opted by, the very commercial interests ruining 
the natural environment and, even more crucially, so long as they exclude the marginalised and 
the poor (the usual victims of environmental decay) while upholding the authoritarian and 
bureaucratic power structures of the region's elites. The neo-liberal trade agenda foisted upon 
APEC (which will be discussed at length in the following chapter) has largely circumscribed 
large-scale environmental initiatives at the regional level by promoting an elite and non-
democratic regionalism dictated by US interests. As again Lyuba Zarsky has noted, "the 
agenda-dominating Western APEC ministers tend to construe the environmental issue as 'Asia 
has problems, we have solutions' with the solutions typically involving financial gain in the 
form of exports of environmental goods and services."lo3 Many APEC members have called 
for a focus on development needs, financial transfers and even technological give-aways, while 
the US remains adamant that any solution must be reached through commercial markets. In 
June 1997 China led the way in presenting its own initiatives to the Toronto APEC meeting on 
the environment, raising the possibility of an Asian regional dialogue determined by specific 
at all. Such an agenda, one would surmise, may undermine the core assumptions of neo-liberalism - namely 
that free markets are the panacea to all social, economic, and environmental problems. . 
I"~ L Zarsky, "Heading for the Doldrums? APEC and the Environment", in Connectivi~v: Asia Pacific Trade, 
Fnvironment and Development Monitor, at http://www.nauti/ius.orgltradelmonitorlapec/index.html. 
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environmental needs within the region, rather than America's determination to open markets 
with "a crow bar if necessary" no matter what the long-term costS. 104 At present, however, 
resistance to the institutionalisation of APEC, largely due to suspicion of US hegemonic 
designs in the region, has narrowed the possibility for collective action by Asian states. As the 
results of coal burning in China, and the emission of sulphur dioxide and carbon dioxide (C02 
emissions) into the atmosphere intensify, regional tensions may well grow. In turn, the 
exigencies of ecological interdependence and its consequences, negated by the neo-liberal 
trade agenda of APEC and the geo-politically oriented ASEAN, provide the impetus for new 
Asian cross-border cooperation. However, the inertia thus far at the regional level may prove 
costly, given recent evidence from both South Korea and Japan that the source of many of 
their own environmental problems are located in the PRC. 
China's increasingly worrying emissions of pollutants would be best addressed, then, within a 
regional developmental context in recognition of the fact that pollution recognises no borders 
but also that there are many commonalities between the environments of the Asian nations. lOS 
In this sense the Asian states may have to form their own agenda on the environment despite 
US protestations. Japan has already taken a fairly responsible lead with respect to China's 
environment, even if this lead is infused with a large degree of enlightened self-interest. Under 
the auspices of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITl) a Green Aid Plan 
was set up in the early 1990s and has fostered long-term joint ventures and licencing 
agreements with Chinese business'. As Pratt and Montgomery stress, this strategy, unlike that 
of the US, "emphasizes support for less costly, simplified technologies, while Japan's Overseas 
1"3 Ihid. 
104 Ihid. Comment made by anonymous US official and quoted by Zarsky. 
I{J~ In the stampede to development the four tiger economies, China, and Indonesia have all experienced severe 
industrial pollution and threats to public health on a scale previously unknown in human history. 
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Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) has provided long-term and low interest loans."lo6 
Thus Japan, though undoubtedly seeking to procure market share in China in advance of 
competitor economies such as Germany and the US, must also be seen to be doing so on terms 
far more sentient to the long-term nature of China's environmental problems. This is a similar 
story to the wider geographical scope of Japanese FDI discussed in chapter 3. In sum, new 
models of development must increasingly reflect local and regional factors rather than a global 
neo-liberal ideology which is blind to distinctive social, cultural, and institutional traditions. 
China's environmental crisis may well be a defining issue in encouraging regional leaders to 
seek Asian solutions to Asian problems despite the reservations ofthe US. 
Conclusion 
The environmental malaise which accompanied the drawing to a close of the twentieth century 
derives from a commitment to unfettered economic growth and global consumption levels 
which are, ultimately, unsustainable. In important respects, of course, socialist nations 
mirrored this exploitation of the natural world in their mimesis of productivist models of 
industrialisation and their inability to break the cycle of centralised and bureaucratic economic 
strategies which destroyed indigenous communities and ravaged the environment. Ironically, 
it is the US and the capitalist countries which have partially broken this course of events 
through the progressive development of post-Fordist production which relies more and more 
on services and technology than heavy industry. The continued hegemony of the US in terms 
of the development of technology gives it continued leverage to dictate environmental politics 
at a global level and, as we have seen with regard to clean-air technologies, the power to 
diffuse environment-enhancing knowledge on its own terms. In this sense, US structural 
\1)(, Pratt and Montgomery, Green Imperialism, pp.90-91. 
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power in the global economy will playa huge role in whether, or not, China is able to emerge 
as a green economy. In this sense China represents a litmus test for the US and the West in 
terms of whether they are mature enough to view China's problems beyond the territorial 
mindsets of national competition and, instead, to view China's environment as a global 
challenge which cannot be solved by recourse to a form of politics fast diminishing in its 
efficacy under conditions of economic globalisation. 
The environmental debate, then, is an innately global one and, as we have already established, 
it is becoming increasingly problematic to discuss bilateral relationships in terms of state actors 
who belong to circumscribed political communities. Thus environmental standards must be 
taken out of the domain of bilateral relations and moved to the transnational/global level. The 
goal here would be new regimes of global regulation reached by consensual means and 
informed by public values rather than the geo-economic nationalism associated with the 
competitive trading system under neoliberalism. Herein, lie the reasons why the Rio and the 
Kyoto Summits were failures. They reified existing power structures and failed to link the 
questions of environment, development, population and consumption in a holistic way. Only 
such an explicit linkage could reflect the reality of one eco-system under threat from each of 
the aforementioned trends at the level of world order. This involves the bringing together of 
multiple perspectives on the environment - especially the perspectives of those most reliant 
upon the land and most affected by economic and social upheavals. Moreover, the idea that 
China can, somehow, be talked out of industrialisation, as well as environmentally damaging 
methods of attaining economic growth, without equal access to the institutions which 
determine the politics of the global economy is wholly illusory. The environmental debate, so 
polarised in the context of US-China relations, manifestly highlights the need for a new 
political strategy which, in the words of Joachim Hirsch, "should fight for the global 
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enforcement of a political form that transcends the dichotomy of' nation-statehood and world-
statehood', a form that would be characterized by completely new and more complex linkages 
between regional and global as well as central and decentral political organization."l!)7 In 
terms of actually attaining such a radical upheaval of global institutions and the cooperative 
spirit needed to underpin them it is probably apt, at the current juncture, to follow Gramsci in 
proclaiming a pessimism of the intellect and an optimism of the will. 
1' )7 J Hirsch, "Nation-state, International Regulation and the Question of Democracy", Review of international 
/)o/itical Economy, Vol. 2,No.2, 1995, p.282. 
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Chapter Six 
US-China Relations within the Context of Asia-Pacific Regionalism 
Introduction 
This thesis has so far argued that, though US hegemony has given way to an era of US 
preponderance, US structural power remains substantial given US ideological control over the 
economic rules undergirding global institutions. Here, we seek to place US-China relations 
within the context of Asian regionalism and to assess the extent to which the US regional 
project in the Asia-Pacific has been successful in drawing China towards the regional free 
market. We argue that the region's evolution is currently an indeterminate process which 
straddles global pressures towards trade liberalisation and local regional trends towards state 
intervention. Drawing on the historical-sociological theories set out in the opening theoretical 
chapter we also argue that certain geo-political factors also remain important, especially the 
issue of Taiwan and the nationalist agenda of the Chinese government. 
US Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific 
According to Stanley Roth, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific in 
the second Clinton Administration, it is erroneous to evaluate US foreign policy strategy 
during the Clinton years in terms of bilateral relationships. This would be to misappropriate its 
ideational underpinnings and the broader thrust of the Clinton Administration's policy goals. I 
Roth's comments confirm the fact that following the Cold War the US has consistently been 
attempting to persuade governments to accept values and norms the US has already 
I S Roth, Asia Strategy in Clinton's Second term, Speech before the Asia Society, US Department of State. 
Washington D.C., 12 December, 1997. 
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institutionalised (or is in the process of institutionalising) at the global level and to transmit 
these rules and norms through various global and regional fora. 
The US has viewed the Asia-Pacific as a 'laboratory' for its Post-Cold-War vision and the 
transition from a system of Cold-War strategic alliances (still largely in place) to a system in 
which peace is secured through economic interdependence between states and markets. Such 
interdependency is viewed as a means of socialising states such as China by tying its leaders to 
regional structures and liberal norms viewed as inimical to conflict? There is, of course, an 
implicit utopianism and chauvinism in the view that the adoption of American rules, social 
values and economic policies will, of themselves, efface differences based on historical and 
rivalries - between Asian states and the US and between Asia-Pacific states themselves. In 
many senses Asia-Pacific regionalism, in its neo-liberal guise, is a hegemonic discourse which 
makes a priori assumptions about the future trajectory of the region without recognising the 
validity of alternative models of social and economic organisation or the plurality of interests 
within the constituent states themselves. 
Much realist thinking on the Asia-Pacific region, however, is concerned with the need for a 
new balance of power following the Cold War. China is viewed as a potential military 
challenger to the US in regional and global terms, while US foreign policy, it is argued, should 
be largely based upon a new realpolitik which caters to the needs of the powerful and 
assuages the worries of the major powers - the US, China and, to some extent, Japan3 . We 
argue that this approach is flawed, for it completely ignores new and emerging configurations 
of power in the region both above and below the levels of nation-state. It makes a priori 
" A McGrew, "Restructuring Foreign and Defence Policy: the USA", in A McGrew (ed), ASia-Pacific in the 
.\'ew World Order. London, Routledge, p.181. 
3 D Stuart and WT Tow, "A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific", Adelphi Paper No. 299. London, International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995. 
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assumptions regarding national interests and foreign policies without questioning who such 
interests and policies represent. Realism is, thus, an inappropriate normative theory for 
understanding Asian regionalism precisely because it constitutes a discourse of the empowered 
and refuses to countenance the idea of regionalism as an alternative narrative through which 
the worst excesses of globalisation may be mediated. Likewise, neo-liberalism shares the 
realist propensity to view the Asia-Pacific region's elite power structures as given and to view 
national interests and foreign policies mainly in terms of those values and norms which 
correlate with neo-classical models of market rationality. We follow a growing number of 
scholars who have conceptualised the region as a highly diverse and complex one in which a 
number of cross-cutting social and economic processes are taking place simultaneously, often 
mediated by local, or national, institutions and state-society structures.4 
Neo-liberalism and Asian Regionalism 
The neo-liberal agenda in the Asia-Pacific, which puts the issues of trade Iiberalisation and 
market access at its apex, has been reflected in the evolution of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation CAPEC) forum. In this sense, APEC's ideological and normative underpinnings 
also mirror those of the WTO, discussed in Chapter 4, in that the constitutive economic rules 
and regulations suffusing both APEC and the WTO are largely the result of US policy 
preferences. For neo-liberals, "regional pacts tend to broaden and deepen GATT [now WTO] 
trade reforms, and in so doing often provide useful models for strengthening multilateral 
disciplines. liS Frank Gibney, in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article, claimed that APEC defuses 
protectionist tensions in bilateral relations with China and further draws China towards the 
1 See M Bernard. "Regions in the Global Political Economy: Beyond the Local-GlobalfDividc in the 
Formation of the East Asian Region". New Political Economy, YoU, No.3,1996, pp.335-355~ and R Higgott, 
"Ideas, Identity and policy Coordination in the Asia-Pacific", The Pacific Review, Yol. 7, No.4, 1994, pp. 
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global economy. For Gibney, APEC and NAFTA should be viewed as indistinguishable in as 
much as they both serve the purpose of promoting 'open regionalism' and a new phase in US 
relations with the Asia-Pacific.6 Like the WTO and NAFTA, APEC has been used to erode 
national protectionism and to promote extensive trade liberalisation, deregulation, and 
privatisation. However, unlike those organisations, APEC's loose and informal nature gives 
member governments a great deal of latitude in determining its future. In this vein, it cannot be 
simply viewed as an American imposition upon a recalcitrant region because neo-liberal 
initiatives can be blocked by Asian governments. Whether the political will exists to challenge 
US dominance is another matter which will be broached, in reference to the Asian tinancial 
crisis, later in the chapter. 
The US strategy is a sophisticated one which cannot be taken at face value even though neo-
liberals and neo-realists would have us approach the organisation's evolution from a geo-
economic or geo-political perspective which reduces the region to a II narrow, ahistoric, 
acontextual. .. collection of 'national units."7 At the centre of any analysis trying to shed light 
on the APEC forum are questions of power, politics and ideology and the ways in which they 
are constructed in the region. It is imperative that any critical enquiry asks who is driving 
APEC and for what purpose?8 We argue that the United States, by implanting itself firmly 
within the political economy of the region, is trying to prevent a rival power bloc from 
emerging led by either Japan or China. 9 By tying individual Asian nations to US markets and 
, JJ Schott, "Towards Free Trade and Investment in the Asia-Pacific" in BA Roberts (ed). New Forces In (he 
World Economy, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1996, p.224. 
(, F Gibney, "Creating a Pacific Community", Foreign AfJairs, Vol.72, No.5. 1993, pp.20-2S. 
, Bernard, "Regions in the Global Political Economy", p.337. 
H Ibid. , p.341. 
'j M Walker, Clinton: The President They Deserve, London, Fourth Estate. 1996. In broad global terms 
Walker states that the "elegance of the Clinton strategy was that the Pacific. the European and Western 
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global financial discipline (so vividly demonstrated during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
98) the US seeks to avert counter-hegemonic tendencies towards greater regional and national 
autonomy by Asian states whilst also supporting those social fractions which coalesce with the 
interests of transnational capital. to In this vein, Peter Preston has argued that APEC is still 
shaped by Cold-War thinking and reflects the fact that the US continues to view the region as 
"economically threatening" and in need of being "ordered according to US agendas." 11 
Although there is little question that APEC is designed to project US power, it is also the case, 
however, that APEC represents the devolution of US hegemony and a strong element of 
inclusiveness which was missing in the Cold War. As Higgott points out, there are serious 
discrepancies between the continued 'hegemonic mentality' of the US and the reality of 
'hegemonic defection' whereby US military forces have been downgraded and Asians have 
been encouraged to take a more proactive role. 12 Thus, it is best that we perceive the region in 
terms of a shift from US hegemony to new methods of sustaining US structural power in the 
global economy. 
With regard to China, therefore, APEC can be conceived as a subsidiary of the WTO agenda 
and a further mechanism through which to socialise China into a liberal world order. Indeed, 
as part of the Bogor agreement on trade liberalisation, assented to by APEC members in 1994, 
and the Osaka Action Agenda, agreed by APEC members in 1995, China pledged further 
Iiberalisation of its economy which Stuart Harris views as in effect a 'down payment' on 
Hemisphere blocs should all have one thing in common; Clinton's America was locking itself steadily into the 
heart of each one" in order to "sustain American global influence far into the next century." p.286 . 
III MT Berger, "A New East-West Synthesis? APEC and Competing Narratives of Regional Integration in Post-
Cold War Asia-Pacific", Alternatives. No.23, 1998. p.3. 
11 PW Preston, Pacific-Asia in the Global S~vstel1/. London, Blackwells 1998, p.24. 
1: See Higgott. "Ideas, Identity and Policy Coordination in the Asia Pacific". 
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existing bilateral issues in US-China relations. 13 As Harris further notes, China has consistently 
used the APEC forum to push its case for WTO entry (it is, as of November 1999, in the 
process of full accession) though not to an extent which has disrupted the APEC consensus. 14 
Thus, APEC's role in US-China relations is more than congruent with the neo-Gramscian 
contention that US hegemonic power has diffused to a number of regional and global 
institutions embedding itself as the rules and norms which underpin their functioning. 
Moreover, US structural power over these organisations and their representative elites, more 
than state to state relations, is the means by which neo-liberal political economy maintains 
itself as the dominant global form of capitalism. Let us now discuss the APEC forum itself in 
greater detail. 
The APEC forum came into being in 1989 on the initiative of the governments of Australia 
and Japan and was viewed as a forum for the discussion of organisational issues between 
individual economies. However, since 1993 and the rise of regionalism as an adjunct to the 
wider process of globalisation, APEC has come to be viewed as a key force in advancing the 
US national interest in the area of trade liberalisation and been viewed as mirroring 
developments in the Uruguay round of GATT which resulted in the creation of the WTO. At 
the Bogor Summit of 1994, it was agreed that APEC nations should agree to the goals of 
open trade and investment by the year 2020 for the less developed countries and 2010 for 
industrialised APEC members. IS This agenda was taken forward at the 1995 APEC summit in 
Osaka, Japan, when most APEC nations committed themselves to far- reaching steps towards 
13 S Harris, "China's Role in the WTO and APEC", in D Goodman and G Segal (eds), China Rising: 
Nationalism and inderdependence, London, Routledge, 1997, p.143. 
14 Ibid, p.139. 
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trade liberalisation thereby placating US demands and harnessing APEC to the goals of the 
WTD. China, for instance, agreed to reduce over 4,000 tariff lines which constituted an 
average 30% reduction in all tariffs. 16 The Osaka Action Agenda moved this process forwards 
in terms of providing guidelines designed to influence policy makers in the APEC countries. 17 
At the Manila meeting of APEC leaders in 1996, the Manila Action Plans for APEC (MAPA) 
were adopted and, unsurprisingly, gave a primary role to the new APEC Business Advisory 
Council (ABAC) in securing the implementation of the action plans on trade liberalisation 
along neo-liberallines. 18 
In terms of understanding the politics of APEC and the agents driving it forward we must 
establish empirically the region-wide social forces determining this process. We follow Higgott 
in identifying a "tripartite policy community" comprising "governments, companies, policy 
brokers and research brokers." 19 Arguably, the US has been fairly successful in fostering an 
elite coterie of politicians, business leaders and academics in the construction of APEC 
regionalism along neo-liberal lines. As argued above, APEC is not simply a US imposition, 
but also involves forms of consensual power in which US ideas are taken up by Asian elites. 
The most important players have been ostensibly non-governmental organisations with 
symbiotic links to the US government. 20 These include such elite groupings as the APEC 
Business Advisory Council (ABAC), briefly mentioned above, which consists of senior 
business leaders in the APEC nations and whose US Chairman, Robert Denham, informed a 
I~ J Caesar Parrenas, "ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation", The Pacific Review, Vo1.ll, No.2. 
1998, p.239. 
16 Ihid. , p.240. 
J7 I Yamazawa, "Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific Region". in G Thomson (cd). EconomIc /)vnamislII 
111 the ASia-Pacific, p.165. . 
IX Parrenas, "ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Cooperation", p.241. 
1'1 R Higgott, "The Pacific and Beyond: APEC, ASEM and Regional Economic Mangcment". in G Thomson 
(cd), Economic Dynamism in the Asia-Pacific, London, Routledge, 1998. p.340. 
264 
House of Representatives Committee of his personal economic interest in APEC, stating that 
"my company, which is Salomon Inc, benefits greatly from economic liberalisation and 
enhanced trade as new opportunities for ourselves and our clients. ,,21 Denham's remarks tell us 
a great deal about APEC's overriding function and its appeal among sections of the US 
business community. Moreover, the current APEC agenda of open regionalism and the push 
for "concerted unilateral liberalisation" stems originally from the private Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (PECC) and emerged at a 1992 PECC meeting in San Francisco. PECC 
was founded in 1980 by US businessmen as a means of forging business linkages across the 
Asia-Pacific, although it should be noted that Japanese business was also a very active 
participant in the 1980s. 
Despite representing elite business interests the, PECC Open Regionalism: A Pacific Model 
for Economic Cooperation came to define APEC's agenda as one of tying regional economies 
to an "overriding interest in a rules based multilateral trading system" underwritten by the 
US. 22 Thus the question of powerful self-interest among representatives of corporate America 
and their key role in APEC's unfolding cannot be overstated. This also goes some way 
towards accounting for APEC's rather hollow social basis and its dearth of legitimate 
institutional structures. Moreover, this hollow version of regionalism excludes Asia's people in 
a way which would be unthinkable for the European Union with its continued attempts to 
bridge the 'democratic deficit.' This reflects Asia's authoritarian tradition, but also the fact, 
already noted chapter 4, that the US is willing to acquiesce in palpably non-democratic 
practices in order to secure the broader goal of free trade. 
21) It is more fitting to view business NGOs as de facIo diplomats under extant global conditions. 
21 Testimony of Robert E Denham, President of ABAC, before the House Subcommittee on Asia and the 
Pacific, November 6, 1997. 
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APEC is driven also by the forces of economic globalisation and the emergence of historic 
changes in production, finance, and production which have brought regional economies closer 
together under new patterns of trade and foreign investment. For Higgott, globalisation 
represents a de facto explanation of APEC and a macro-level explanation as to why the 
economies of the region have become increasingly interdependent in correlation with patterns 
of production pioneered by Japan. APEC, we argue, is an elite and exclusionary political 
forum ensuring political rewards for the powerful at the expense of addressing the real socio-
economic and environmental needs of the majority of the region's peoples. APEC has 
thwarted popular-democratic movements in the region by forging transnational alliances 
between authoritarian hegemonic elites in the Asia-Pacific (state elites and capitalists) and US 
neo-liberals, ensuring that local, regional, and indeed global power structures are upheld in an 
Asian region made safe for capital. In this sense APEC, or neo-liberal regionalism, is an 
artificial western construction which has little social or institutional basis. As the Chinese 
scholar Wang Jisi puts it, "this concept is seen as reflecting Washington's new regional 
strategy that tries to build a linkage between NAFTA and APEC or to expand NAFT A to 
Asia." The creation of an Asia Pacific Free Trade Area (APFTA) serves to "restrain Japan's 
economic expansion in the region" and "after establishing an American centred and American 
guided APFT A", Jisi states, "the next American aim will be to contend with a unified 
American community.,,23 Though Jisi's views are closely tied with the political authorities in 
Beijing, as are the views of most Chinese social scientists, they do, at least, illuminate the 
extent to which China's leaders are aware of the co-optive strategies which play such a 
prominent part of US regionalism. 
~~ J Bennett Johnson, President US-PECC, Testimony Submitted to the House Committee on International 
Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, November 6, 1997. 
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Of course, as will be elaborated later, profound contradictions arise due to the varying state 
strategies selected by individual governments in securing legitimacy for their regimes of 
accumulation. Thus very different models of capitalism have evolved between the US and the 
Asian states, reflecting "the continued power of national hegemonies in terms of national 
symbols and local particularities.,,24 Nationalism often remains the key reference point for 
Asian people in making sense of their lives and in appropriating a sense of meaning to the 
world unfolding around them. Thus, historical, cultural and social differences preclude the 
wholesale adoption of neo-liberal policies by Asian states whose post-war development 
stemmed from state intervention in all spheres of social and economic life. 
We should briefly mention the counter-hegemonic form of transnational politics which has 
emerged in opposition to APEC and which is represented by a host of NGOs in the US and 
throughout the region. The term open regionalism has, invariably, meant the creation of a 
region open to the forces of transnational capital in the economic sphere and the region's elites 
in the political sphere.25 Ironically, this openness and non-discriminatory approach to global 
trade and global financial markets may be termed closed regionalism in respect of democracy 
and the representation of Asia's people. APEC has consistently sidestepped questions of 
social and economic representation and all those issues concomitant with popular democracy 
There is a profound need to take heed of those social groups marginalised by a corporate/state 
agenda which defines the region only in terms of the socially powerful and privileged. In 1995 
a summit was held in Kyoto to discuss a counter-agenda to that of the official APEC summit 
taking place in Osaka. This forum urged that human development be prioritised over narrow 
23 Wang Jisi, "The United States as a Global and Pacific Power", The Pacific ReView, Vol. 10, No.1, )997, 
pp.5-6. 
24 Bernard, "Regions in the Global Political Economy", p.349. 
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economIc growth and that freedom and democracy be gIven equal billing by APEC 
governments and a Kyoto Declaration was enunciated setting out this alternative agenda. In 
1996 over 10,000 protesters were the subject of repressive state action during the Subic Bay 
APEC summit in the Philippines. This time the Manila People's Action Forum issued a 
declaration and detailed plan of action followed by groups such as the Asia-Pacific Labour 
Network calling for better working conditions, sustainable development and trade union 
representation within APEC. As Woods demonstrates, the APEC governments have so far 
refused to recognise these elements of the NGO community and, at the ] 997 APEC summit in 
Vancouver, Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chretien, even claimed that human rights had no 
place in a summit concerned with economic issues. 26 Indeed, the one point upon which all 
APEC leaders have consistently agreed is that politics and economics should be addressed 
separately, allowing the US and Asian leaders to downplay the role of ethics in determining 
their agenda. Significantly, the 1997 People's Summit and a 'No to APEC gathering were 
highly successful in gaining media attention and raise the question of just how APEC will 
respond to a burgeoning community of transnational social forces contesting APEC both in its 
neo-liberal form and the neo-colonial implications of any US-inspired regional project at all. n 
What we can extrapolate from the above, then, is that APEC is an essentially US, or Western, 
conceptualisation of regionalism which rides roughshod over national divergence in the socio-
economic sphere. It attempts to explain regionalism as a purely economic process without 
2<; See R Garnaut, Open Regionalism and Trade Liberalisation: An Asia-Pacific Contribution to the World 
Trade System. Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996. 
2(, I thank Yen Neralla of the Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace and a delegate at the Vancouver 
people's summit for raising this point. From conversations I also found out that the APEC leaders at the 
conference were surrounded by barbed wire and police armed with dogs - hardly indicative of a transparent 
process. It is worth pointing out that riot control is now an intrinsic part of APEC summits - usually to keep 
democratic grassroots forces at bay. 
27 L Woods, "Regional Cooperation: The Transnational Dimension", in A McGrew and C Brook (cds), Asia 
Pacific in the New World Order. London, Routledge, 1998, pp.28l-84. 
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taking into account indigenous institutional and societal variables impinging upon the 
developmental trajectories of countries such as China. 
Significantly, the 1998 APEC summit in Kuala Lumpur has been viewed as signifying the 
politicisation of the organisation, a fact acknowledged even in mainstream circles. The 
November 1998 summit in Malaysia brought to the fore political differences between the host 
nation and the US with Vice-president, AI Gore, castigating Dr. Mahathir's government for the 
arrest and detention of Anwar Ibrahim, the former Malaysian foreign minister. Significant also, 
in symbolic terms at least, was the absence of an emasculated US president besieged by a sex 
scandal and, in the admittedly prurient assessment of many Asian leaders, in no position to 
lecture anyone on moral conduct. The summit, however, also signified a deeper change in the 
nature of APEC and vividly illuminated cracks in the US hegemonic consensus. Both Japan 
and China withstood calls for further trade liberalisation in the light of the Asian crisis, while 
APEC itself, and the neo-liberal presumptions upon which it has thus far been premised, 
seemed utterly irrelevant in addressing the deep-seated regional and global questions arising 
from Asia's recessionary slump.28 We have argued that the region has reached a turning point 
in its ideological, economic, and political trajectory following the Asian crisis which may usher 
in alternatives to neo-liberal economic strategies but which, in the interim, are likely to lead to 
instability and destabilising uncertainty over the future. Below we emphasise the counter-
hegemonic possibilities latent in the process of regionalism and the specific problems and 
possibilities China's growing regional power postulates for both US hegemony and the region 
as a whole. One highly significant development is that of a Chinese cultural-economic sphere 
facilitated by the Chinese regional diaspora and its connections with the Chinese homeland. 
Greater China: A Challenge to APEC? 
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As indicated, this chapter is explicitly concerned with examining a number of, as yet, 
indeterminate social, political and cultural processes which point to the emergence of 
alternative regional power configurations within Asia-Pacific during a period when US 
hegemony is giving way to more multilateral forms of power. One possible scenario is the 
emergence of Greater China as a regional, as well as global, challenge to US hegemony. The 
regional backdrop to China's development and modernisation breaches the fixed territorial 
mindsets which accompanied the Cold War. Its dynamics are, at once, local, regional, and 
global and may represent the nearest thing we now have to a model of capitalism for the 
informational age of technological innovation and a global network society?9 Thus analysing 
US-China relations in terms of the Chinese mainland, the Chinese state, or localised capital 
negates a key socio-cultural variable which impacts heavily upon China's role in the regional 
and global political economy. 
Conventionally, adherents of the "Greater China" concept have concentrated upon the 
interconnections linking the economies of Macau, the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and, to 
some extent, Singapore. Though important, this represents a somewhat reductionist, and state-
centric, spatial framework. Nevertheless, there is some significance in the emergence of China 
during the 1990s as a potential regional rival to both the Japanese regional model of economic 
development and global neo-liberalism of the US variety. Taken collectively, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and the PRC, along with regional financial networks, seem to contain all the necessary 
ingredients for economic dynamism. Taiwan is rich in technological and manufacturing 
capability with one of the largest foreign currency reserves in the world; Hong Kong possesses 
an indigenous entrepreneurial culture wedded to widespread expertise in marketing and 
2~ For a good discussion see, "Shattered Summit",Asiaweek, November 27,1998, p.2S. 
29 See M Castells, The Rise of the Network Society. London, Blackwells. 1996. For a nco-liberal endorsement 
of this view, sec J Naisbitt, Megatrends Asia. London, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 1994. 
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services; Singapore's economy, dominated by ethnic Chinese, provides a ready-made 
communication network and pool of financial capital (Asian crisis notwithstanding); and the 
PRC is rich in land, resources, and cheap labour. 30 In 1992, Hong Kong's trade with the PRC 
stood at $80 billion while Taiwan's stood at $7.4 billion. Taiwanese investment in the PRC 
stood at $6.7 billion while Chinese investment in Hong Kong stood at $20 billion. Total cross 
investment between the three economies stood at some $40 billion. 31 There has even been talk 
of a Chinese free trade area and a Chinese economic community based on the mobility of 
capital and labour, the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies and the creation of 
Ie: I" 32 common we lare po lCles. 
It is wise to sound a cautionary note at this juncture. Much of the talk of Greater China's 
evolution into an economic bloc is not only mere conjecture but rests on the reductionist 
tendencies of neo-liberals and Western economists. Firstly, it fails to take into account the 
deep social and political fissures which exist between and within the composite parts of 
Greater China. For instance, if we are talking about the mainland integration only really 
includes Guangdong and Fujian provinces which are the home to China's financial classes. 
Secondly, it deploys the metaphor of expansion (evoking Japan's Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere) and is, thus, a convenient epithet for US mercantilists and realists who 
view Chinese power as a threat. Indeed, Chinese elites have steered clear of using the term for 
fear of unsettling the US, Japan and the ASEAN nations. 33 It is also the case that capitalist 
development within Greater China is far more laissez-faire that neo-liberal capitalism. It 
VJ M Weidenbaum, "Greater China: The Next Economic Colossus?" in Roberts (ed), New Forces in the World 
Economy, pp. 54-55 . 
. 11 H Harding, "The Concept of Greater China: Themes, Variations, and Reservations", the China Quarterlv, 
No. 136, 1993, p.664 . 
. le Ibid. • p.668-69. 
lJ Ihid. , p.670. 
271 
shares none of the regulatory regimes which underpin even US capitalism. As Ling-Sum notes, 
"to compete for capital from Hong Kong and Taiwan, coastal communities undercut each 
other by providing low-cost and low-protection labour systems. Most workers ..... are engaged 
in what one can call a highly 'flexible-taylorised' process" secured by adjusting hours and 
wage rates in a "capital-controlled hire-and-fire procedure" underpinned by "lax interpretation 
of labour standards/laws in the region." 34 The point here is that the Greater China economy is 
not necessarily a progressive alternative to US style capitalism which is reigned in by federal 
law and legal Unions. Nevertheless, more credence must be given to the nascent networks of 
overseas Chinese communities and families - "a secretive, sophisticated network" which is 
"pan-Asian, increasingly global, and family and education oriented. ,,35 According to Naisbitt, 
there are 57 million overseas Chinese - 53 million in Asia alone. Moreover, overseas Chinese 
communities and families now control 70% of the Indonesian economy, 60% of Thailand's, 
and 70% of the Philippines. 36 Overseas Chinese are also the largest cross-border investors in 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, while accounting for some 80% of all 
. 'Ch' 37 Investment m ma.· 
Due to the neo-liberal obsession with quantitative trade figures and a legalistic conception of 
political economy there has been a profound inability to conceptualise the qualitative aspects 
of spatial reconfigurations within the region and the de facto creation of an ethnic Chinese 
commercial space which differs markedly from neo-liberalism. Due to China's vast size and 
historical aversion to Western-style legal frameworks (though this is in the process of 
.l4 N Ling-Sum, "Rethinking Globalisaton: Re-Articulating the Spatial Scale and Temporal Horizons of Trans-
Border Spaces", in K Olds, P Dicken, PF Kelly, L Kong and H Wai-chung Yeung (cds), Glohalisation in the 
ASIa-Pacific: Contested Territories, London, Routledge, 1999, p.140. 
\, Naisbitt , Megatrends Asia, pp. 2-3. 
it, Ibid. , p.4. 
\- ihid. 
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changing), an informal system grew based on guanxi - connections which incorporate 
ancestral and familial ties. It was through this system that overseas Chinese were better able 
than Westerners to penetrate China's opaque economic system. According to Sterling 
Seagrave, around 30% of Hong Kong currency circulates on the mainland through guanxi 
while around $4 billion in Taiwanese investment is located in ancestral districts. 31! Indeed, 
Taiwanese capital is treated as 'special domestic capital' in mainland China and Taiwanese 
interests have, for many years, been allowed to pursue business interests such as banking, 
wholesale and retail which, up until China's WTO agreement with the US in 1999, had been 
closed off to foreign capital. Moreover, around 9,300 Taiwanese firms have moved production 
facilities to the mainland involving $8.6 billion in investment as of 1993.39 Many of these 
connections were founded on little more than trust, or what T onnies conceptualised as 
gemeinschaft - informal bonds of trust, kinship, and affection as opposed to contractual 
relations. The "borderless" overseas Chinese economy now represents the third largest 
economy in the world and is likely to exert a great deal of structural power within the financial 
sector of the global economy in the years ahead. Moreover, because of the diffuse nature of 
this new supra-national capitalist class and its opaque sources of power leverage traditional 
modes of social scientific analysis are unlikely to capture their impact. 
More attention must also be paid to the cultural implications of Greater China and here we 
need to get beyond the rather narrow geographical connotations which many analysts have 
applied to the concept. A transnational Chinese economy naturally feeds into the revolution in 
communications which has accompanied the end of the Cold War. As Harding notes, direct 
satellite broadcasting is creating a "Chinese television global village" and a pan-Chinese 
lH S Seagrave, Lords of the Rim: The Invisible Empire of the Overseas Chinese. London, Bantam Press, 1995 
p.274. 
1'1 Ling-Sum, "Rethinking Globalisation", p.137. 
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culture" or "civilisational community." For Ling-Sum, Greater China is partly a response to 
enhanced trading relations with the US as well as the broader issue of restructuring the 
Chinese economy in the light of globalisation. Globalisation requires an added emphasis on 
capital investment and the Greater China concept links Taiwan and Hong Kong to "Chinese 
strategies for growth and reunification." As Ling-Sum further notes, this is evidence of 
China's pragmatic interim strategy of encouraging 'patriotic' Chinese elements to 'invest in 
the motherland' without confronting the long-term problems associated with questions of 
democracy and nationalism.4°As stressed in chapter 4 Chinese nationalism is transnational in 
scope and has been successful in uniting communists and capitalists alike into a state strategy 
of 'national salvation. ,41 The historical-sociological turn in international relations theory, 
outlined in chapter 1, is instrumental in demonstrating how states are capable of mobilising 
resources based on dominant narratives and culturally selective projections of national 
purpose. In short, Greater China becomes a euphemism for business networks keen to share 
in China's growth but often ignoring long-term political issues. Thus, it is perhaps not 
surprising that neo-liberals have also been keen to utilise a term which really denotes private 
business activity rather than a deeper institutional or political process involving all of the 
peoples of the 'Greater China' territories. 
There are two fundamental caveats to consider when evaluating the concept of Greater China. 
The first is that this unregulated economic phenomenon often exists in symbiosis with an 
informal sector of the Chinese economy characterised by corruption, exploitation, drug 
trafficking, prostitution, and organised crime syndicates. The regional growth of networks 
often feeds off extant inequalities within Chinese society and a de facto caste system which 
\1, Ihid. , p.136. 
11 See C Hughes, "China and Liberalism Globalised", Millennium: Journal oj international Studies, Vo1.24, 
No.3, 1995, pp.l03-125. 
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the CCP has striven to deny due its incompatibility with an ostensibly Marxist government 42 
In this sense, the goals of the CCP and those of the Guomindang on Taiwan are increasingly 
compatible in that they both champion entrenched traditions, elite interests and a capitalist 
elite which is global in outlook. 43 In short, the Greater China concept, in many respects, 
constitutes a capitalist narrative as to who is considered Great in China. The concept does not 
include the poor, the unemployed, migrant workers, and the marginalised rural peasantry who 
make up the vast bulk of Greater China's population and who are far from intimately 
connected with their financier comrades in Hong Kong. Thus, though the term is empirically 
useful in studying capitalist development in these economies and explaining the mobile nature 
of the social fractions driving the process forward, it is also innately exclusionary and fails to 
account for the consequences of highly uneven capitalist development. The second caveat is 
that we should not play down the Chinese state too much or we risk throwing out the baby 
with the bathwater. As Castells argues, such networks rely on highly authoritarian and 
centralised hierarchical structures concerned with long-term planning strategies while, 
paradoxically, these hierarchical structures buttress the short-term, and often irresponsible 
quest, for profit. 44 Harding has noted that it was the role of the Chinese government in 
creating Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the Chinese coastal provinces and the political 
conversion to the doctrine of "one country, two systems" which actually facilitated the 
increased interdependence of the Greater China economies. 4s The state is still imperative in 
adapting Chinese society to regional and global trends, such as coordinating research and 
development, accruing knowledge of global markets, and sponsoring large-scale technological 
:: The Confucian tradition views certain sectors of society as being naturally poor and subservient. Indeed, the 
IIlIand poor arc often derogatorily referred to as "muddy legs". See Seagrave, The inl'isihie I~·mpire. p.2X5. 
" See J Henderson, "Danger and Opportunity in the Asia-Pacific", in Thomson (cd), FCllnmnic lJynamism in 
IiiI' .·!sia-Pacijic. p. 380. 
; 1 Castells. Rise of the Network SOCiety. p.178. 
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innovations. 46 Moreover, the job of holding in place China's social fabric is still very much the 
responsibility of the state and its symbolic hold on power, ideas, and ideology. Having 
discussed Greater China as a potential challenge to neo-liberal hegemony and of APEC 
regionalism let us now turn to the nascent, and infinitely complex, relationship emergmg 
between China and Japan as a counterweight to US power in the region. 
Japan-China Relations in the Asia- Pacific: Implications for US Regional Power 
The Japanese model of regional production and Japan's high levels of foreign direct investment 
(FOI) in the Asia-Pacific region have, at the functional level at least, brought China and Japan 
closer together. Despite historic enmities rooted in Japan's activities in China before and 
during World War Two, compounded by Japan's inability to apologise for atrocities, Japan's 
regional developmental model has had profound implications for China, as elsewhere in the 
region. China's leaders followed the four Tiger economies in pursuing a strategy of export-led 
growth coupled with state interventionism and the protection of infant or core industries (see 
chapter 4). Nevertheless, Japanese FDI in China rose to $500 million by 199247, while Japan-
China trade levels stood at $39 billion in 1993 48 Japanese investment and aid are extremely 
important in the ongoing modernisation and development of China's infrastructure, though 
there are clearly questions which arise from China's subordinate role in the regional network of 
production or what many analysts have called the "flying geese" model 49 For example, one 
Japanese retail outiet, Yaohan, has boasted that it can employ twenty eight Chinese workers 
I' Harding, The Concept of Greater China. p.668. 
,.. /hid, p.178. 
1 P Gangopadhyay, "Patterns of Trade and Investment in the Asia-Pacific Region", in Thomson (cd) 
l'clIl/omic Dynamism in the Asia-Pacific, p.33. 
'" W Hu, "China and Asian Regionalism: Challenge and Policy Choice", The Journal I!l( 'onremporary ('llIlIll, 
~. II. 1996, p.54. 
" Sec G Hook, "Japan and the Construction of the Asia-Pacific", in A Gamble and A Payne (cds), Re~i()lIalism 
lind If 'oriel Order, London, Macmillan, 1996. 
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for every one Japanese worker. 50 This elucidates the fact that highly exploitative capitalism is 
not the preserve of US-style neo-liberalism. Indeed, certain members of the CCP in China have 
clearly been worried that China was becoming subsumed into a vertical division of labour in 
Asia whereby China enjoys short-term prosperity at the expense of technological innovations 
further up the production scale. Thus, China's position in the regional production structure, 
engendered by Japan, may well impede overall development and structurally subjugate China 
to the whims of Japanese capital. 5 1 Any source of perceived structural largesse wielded by 
Japan via China is regarded by political forces in Beijing as dangerous. We must also consider 
the fact that China's sheer size and economic importance preclude its being absorbed into the 
flying geese model of regional production. The reason for this is that within China itself there 
exist several co-existing economic models, regions and sub-regions, each fulfilling widely 
different roles in the current economic process - indeed some are entirely marginalised from 
the process. The development of a Greater China sphere, discussed above, infuses the political 
economy of the region with yet more complex dynamics which cannot be captured by 
analysing the orbit of Japan's economic influence alone. These processes are at once distinctive 
and interactive with Japan's macro-economic strategies (export-led growth, flexible 
specialisation, just-in-time supply) filtered through local Chinese practices such as Klllll1xi . 
Moreover, continued tensions between Japan and China were underscored during a historic 
summit meeting in November 1998 when Jiang Zemin travelled to Tokyo. China is perturbed 
by the fact that Japan refuses to acknowledge the word "invasion" in its apology for war-time 
atrocities and the fact that Japan will not make further moves to derecognise the independence 
of Taiwan. On Japan's part, there is a resentment of the fact that China has been widely 
' ... J Faust and J Kornberg. China in World Politics, Bouldcr. Lynnc Ricnner, p. 191. 
'j Hu. "China and Asian Regionalism", p.SO. 
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praised by the US for resisting any devaluation of the Yuan, while Japan continues to feel the 
wrath of the US Treasury Department for refusing to liberalise its economy speedily enough 
despite ploughing some $30 billion into those countries worst hit by the recent financial 
. . 52 
cnsls. 
The broader political implications of the Japan-China relationship in the economic sphere arc 
polarised by the fact that both countries have incurred the wrath of US trade policy in the form 
of sanctions - a constant reminder of US hegemonic power no matter how ephemeral it 
appears in the 1990s. It was against a backdrop of US sanctions that Japan's leaders and 
Japanese corporations made significant inroads into winning confidence among China's elites. 
In 1993 Japan became the first industrialised nation fully to resume relations with China 
following the Tiananmen Square massacre, restoring a $5.9billion loan package which had 
been suspended in 1989. 53 The Japan-China relationship has been further consolidated by the 
networks of overseas Chinese (discussed earlier) with loyalties to both Japanese capital and 
the Chinese state. The informal structural power of an overseas Chinese business class which 
traverses the region has been invaluable in allowing Japanese TNCs to permeate markets and 
in opening them up to Japanese investment and trade generally. 54 It is an interesting irony that 
the US State Department, throughout the 1980s, encouraged Japan's burgeoning official 
development assistance (ODA) to China in the belief that it would help open China's markets 
in the long term - a development conducive to US interests. 55 By the mid 1990s, however, the 
spectre of inter-capitalist rivalry and divergent capitalist models had introduced the possibility 
that China and Japan will, over time, supersede US regional dominance should they forge 
': J Watts, "Beijing Waits for Japan's Apology", The Guardian, 25 November. 191)X. 
'i Hsiung. "China' Omnidirectional Diplomacy", p.577. 
'.1 Faust and Kornberg, China in World Politics, p.191. 
" Q Zhao. Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 19%. p.l:'Il. 
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satisfactory grounds for cooperation. Indeed, by December 1994 Japan and China had agreed 
an aDA package worth $5.8 billion over the period 1996-1998, thereby strengthening 
economic ties between the two nations. 56 The key factor here, moreover, is that Japan is not 
asking China to relinquish state controls nor to comply with Western cultural norms as a pre-
condition of economic interaction. Moreover, as Richard Cronin has observed, "Japan's 
capital flows to China are dominated by government lending, not private direct investment" 
and are, thus, somewhat immunised from short-term fluctuations in global markets. 57 This tics 
in with our argument in chapter 3 that US market share in China over the long term may be 
disadvantaged by over-reliance on investments tied to the coastal provinces and less motivated 
by China's growth as a whole. Finally, Sino-Japanese relations were given something of a 
filip by the Asian financial crisis which, in some senses, has served to harmonise the interests 
of Asian nations, even though the political will to directly challenge US regional supremacy 
remains largely absent. 
Jhe Political Consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis 
The Asian financial crisis raised important questions about the trajectory of the Asian region 
and feeds into debates about the emergence of a Japanese-Chinese accommodation as a 
counter to US hegemony and the orthodoxy of the IMF and the US Treasury. It also sheds 
light on China's professed aim of securing a multipolar region secure against the hegemony of 
anyone power. In relation to the financial crisis China's fairly rapid move to supply financial 
aid packages to the afflicted countries, amounting to $1 billion overallS\!, stood in stark contrast 
to the US where President Clinton was initially referring to the hardship of millions as "a few 
"lhid. ,p.153. 
',' RP Cronin, Japan, the United States, and Pr().\pectsjor the Asia-pacific Century, New York, St Martin's 
Press. 1992, p.35. 
'x Higgott, "The Pacific and Beyond", p. 340. 
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little glitches on the road" to trade liberalisation. 59 Thus, China seemed to be developing an 
awareness that its relationship with other Asian states represents a possible counterweight to 
US dominance.6o Without downp\aying the historic tensions between China and Japan, both 
countries feel aggrieved by US aggression in the trade sphere and, according to one Chinese 
academic, there is considerable sympathy and even support for Japan's position vi.\' " vi.\' the 
USC" Both nations now have significant structural power in the financial sphere of the global 
political economy which could, quite conceivably, thwart US-sponsored policies in key areas. 
As we noted in chapter 3, this was vividly demonstrated in June 1998 when President Clinton 
travelled to the PRC in a visit where he was largely preoccupied with trying to persuade 
China's economic reform chief, Zhu Rongji, to rule out any devaluation of the Chinese Yllan 
likely to precipitate region-wide competitive devaluations with catastrophic implications for 
the global economy.62 The realisation that the US was, in fact, unable to prevent such action 
represents a new era of power relations in the region and the global economy generally, 
compounded by the resentment engendered by the US Treasury-lMF handling of the Asian 
financial crisis. 
The Asian financial crisis, then, precipitated a two-pronged movement by both China and 
Japan to find an Asian solution to Asian problems which, though perhaps insutftciently attuned 
to the global nature of the crisis, must be given political credence because it illuminated 
dissatisfaction with the US-IMF programme and that of global neo-liberalism generally. We 
have already mentioned China's appropriation of significant funds for affiicted nations. Japan's 
proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) and promise of vast funds to retlate the affiicted 
", Cited in "President Upbeat about Asian Economic Woes", The Washington Post, 25 November. J l)1)7. 
'" Ihe I~'conol/list, "Why China Wants to Cuddle", November 15, 1997. 
II Jisi. "The Role of the United States as a Global and Pacific Power", p.R. 
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economies was effectively vetoed by the US Treasury which saw the crisis instead as an 
opportunity to enforce neo-liberal restructuring policies on Asian nations by tying them to 
IMF loan conditions63 Such a strategy subjected Asian people to market forces through wage 
freezes, high interest rates, and curbed public spending, while exempting the domestic elites 
and the transnational speculators responsible for siphoning funds into ill-advised property 
development and chasing quick-fix profits without regard for the human consequenccs(,.j 
The US decision to block the AMF must be understood in broad structural terms, with 
associated implications for the distribution of global political power. Any institution likely to 
give China and Japan more autonomy, even in the regional sphere, directly challenges US 
power and was indeed viewed as a step towards Japanese regional hegemony by the US 
Treasury.65 The political momentum behind the Japanese proposal was that of controlling the 
activities of foreign investors and legitimising stronger modes of government intervention. Put 
simply, the US was unwilling to cede or delegate power prerogatives which might have 
undermined the free flow of capital. The crisis not only encouraged China's leaders to retain 
currency controls and, if temporarily, put the brakes on trade liberalisation (see chapter 3); it 
also elucidated key areas where Japanese and Chinese interests are shared. Realists have 
conspicuously played down this congruence of interests due to an obsession with geo-political 
power alone. That is not to imply, however, that geo-political matters have simply evaporated. 
Bilateral disputes over territory and weapons proliferation continue to temper US-China 
,,: J Gray. "Bill in a China Shop", The Guardian, 26 June 1998. 
I.' For a good discussion. see R Higgott, "The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentlllent". 
\'('It' Political Economy. Vol.3, No.3, 1998, P p.333-357. 
'.' W Greider. "Saving the Global Economy", The Nation. December 15,191)7. 
" Sec R Bevacqua. "Whither the Japanese ModeJ? The Asian Economic Crisis and the Continuation of Cold 
War Politics in the Pacific Rim". Review of International Political Economy. Vo1.5, No.1. 199M, pp.4 10-424. 
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relations, while the ambiguous nature of China's regional ambitions are a very real source of 
regional instability throughout South East Asia. 
Sino-US Disputes as a Source of Regional Insecurity 
The question of regional security in the Asia-Pacific region and geo-political power struggles 
in the region have been inadequately accounted for within critical IPE partly because they are 
viewed as reifying a realist discourse which has. for too long, dominated discussion of the 
region. Yet arch realists such as Buzan and Segal have a point when they attack neo-liberal 
approaches to the region as "an attempt to avoid confronting the consequences of the end of 
the Cold War." In short, the question of power reconfigurations in the region has still to be 
addressed and, though we avoid the 'balance of power' discourse of the realists, a 'rea\' debate 
must take place on the possible emergence of a realignment of power relations within the 
region which could gradually supersede the era of unrestrained US hegemony. 66 This is likely 
to occur first at the state level with Asian elites challenging the US on issues from human 
rights to trade (see chapters 3 and 4) to its continued military presence in the region. Let us 
now analyse the situation at the current juncture, focusing on US-China relations but feeding 
them in to the wider debate on the region itself. 
The US, China and the Intractable Taiwan Question 
The highly volatile question of Taiwan and its pivotal role in the US-China relationship has, if 
anything, been exacerbated by events during the Clinton years. This issue challenges the liberal 
internationalist assumptions of Washington policy elites and opens up the debate on the 
irredentist tendencies of China's leadership and the wider role of nationalism as an alternative 
strategy of regime legitimation for the CCP. As Hughes puts it, such a "nationalism translates 
/,(. B Buzan and G Segal. "Rethinking East Asian Security", ,\"urvival. Vo1.36, No.2. 1994. p.IS. 
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into a very particular type of security for individuals" and "while it may offer security from the 
US navy, it does not offer security from agents of the Chinese state. ,,67 The ability to shift 
focus on to some external threat from the US, then, deflects from the coercive 
authoritarianism of the Chinese state. Nevertheless, nationalism is a key resource for China's 
leaders in the post-Cold-War world and wariness against what Jiang has termed "colonial 
culture" continues to find resonance among the educated and elites. The intractability of the 
Taiwan question, then, must be understood within both an historical context and the decline 
of Marxist-Leninist ideology which means that China, rather interestingly, is shedding its 
recent ideological identity only to reach further back in history and reassert itself as a great 
civilisation. 
Two specific events have brought tensions between the US and Taiwan into polarisation 
during the Clinton years and point to underlying ambiguities as to how, or whether, China will 
conform to a world order defined under conditions of US hegemony. The first flashpoint took 
place in July 1995 when US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, reversed a decision, 
supported by President Clinton, to prevent Taiwan's president, Lee-Teng-Hui, from entering 
the United States and gave him permission to speak at Cornell University where he had 
studied. The Chinese leadership saw the issue in stark nationalistic terms, viewing Teng-hui's 
accreditation for a US visa as usurping America's 'One China Policy' - certainly the views of 
Congress and the views of the Clinton Administration seemed to have bifurcated when a 
resolution was passed in Congress (97-1 in the Senate and 360-0 in the House) urging that 
Ten-hui be granted entry to the US and forcing the Clinton Administration's reversal of policy 
noted above. 6K The domestic dimension of the Taiwan issue (touched upon in Chapter S) is 
, C Hughes. "Globalisation and Nationalism: Squaring the Circle in Chinese IR Theory", Millennium: Journal 
(if International Studies, Vo1.26, No.1, 1997, p,123. 
'. N Holloway. J Baum, L Kaye, "Shanghaied by Taiwan", Far Eastern Economic Review, June I. 19<)5, p.IS. 
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of great import here. Significant lobbies on Capitol Hill (particularly on the Republican right) 
have been keen to support wealthy clients in the Guomindang (KMT) government of Taiwan. 
Moreover, Teng-hui's avowed Christian faith has won him friends among the Christian 
Coalition. 
A second dimension to the problem exists within Taiwan and its more assertive push for 
international recognition and UN membership despite the protestations of the Beijing 
government. When Teng-hui became president in 1988 he was the first Taiwanese native to 
hold the post. Under Teng-hui the KMT embarked upon a policy of "indigenisation" or 
"Taiwanisation" which entailed promoting more members of the native Taiwanese political 
class into government positions. We should note that this strategy was largely co-optive on 
the part of the KMT and designed to legitimate and safeguard entrenched interests. As Martin 
Jones alludes, "Lee Teng- hui reflected the incoherence of this confused Confucian-democratic 
experiment when he characterised any opposition attempt to change the mandate of heaven as 
a threat to 'violate the constitution' and destroy the country. ,,6'1 Thus, the Congressional 
supporters of Taiwan were hardly aligning themselves with democratic forces. Though we 
should not dismiss Teng-hui's reforms, it is also the case that US Republicans have long 
courted Taiwan's democratically unaccountable oligarchs despite their former suppression of 
democracy. 
It was China's response to these events which merits special attention as regards China's 
challenge to US hegemony and, indeed, to its regional neighbours. China's leaders described 
Lee's admission as "naive towards history" and reaffirmed the fact that "nothing is more 
important than China's national unification and sovereignty. II The Clinton Administration was 
accused of viewing Taiwan as "an American aircraft carrier" and "part of their own 
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territory."711 Significantly, China's leaders were not averse to taking provocative measures to 
register their disquiet, including cancelling all bilateral meetings, recalling their Washington 
Ambassador for consultation, and announcing missile and military tests in the Taiwan Strait 71 
The broader significance of the Taiwan question surely lies in its undermining of neo-liberal 
assumptions embedded in APEC and the concomitant illusion that free trade and unrestricted 
capital flows entail the vaporisation of geopolitical matters with historic and political roots 
How serious China's leaders are about such matters was demonstrated vividly in February 
1996 when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted missile tests close to Taiwan's 
shore in a pugnacious attempt to influence the Taiwanese elections. China warned Lee against 
any dilution of links to the mainland in the most tense stand-off between the PRC and Taiwan 
since the Chinese bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu in 1957. The crisis elicited a rapid US 
response with the dispatch of the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Straits and underscored the uneasy 
territorial fault lines which demarcate the region - however anachronistic this may seem to 
Western globalists in an era of globalisation. China's foreign minister, Qian Qichen, stressed 
that the entire exercise was warranted if "people have forgotten that Taiwan is a pal1 of China 
and not a protectorate of the United States."72 It should also be noted that China does possess 
detailed plans for the invasion of Taiwan should this conflict prove unamenable to peaceful 
evolution. 73 This serves as a reminder that, for the realpolitik nationalists of the CCP, the 
rebuilding of China as a global power can, and often does, take priority over capitalist 
development in the short-term precisely because, unlike the socially atomising side-effects of 
1'1 D Martin Jones. Political Development in Pacific Asia. Cambridge. Polity Press, 191)7. p . .tX. 
" Holloway. Ballm. and Kaye, Shanghaied by Taiwan. p.IS. 
-I K Licbcrthal, itA New China Strategy", Foreign Affi1irs, Vol. 74, No.6, Nov/Dec, )995, pp_ l'J-40 . 
. Cited in M Walker and A Higgins, "Clinton Pressured into Bolstering Taiwan Fleet". 'O,e (Juarcliall. March 
12. 1 ')l)(). 
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capitalism, it provides a raison d'etre for national unity and a focal point for a leadership quite 
aware that economic developments are outstripping the reach of state power. It is for this 
reason that the leadership has promulgated a fairly odious machismo on security matters which 
is dangerous in that it may engender unnecessary tensions in a region which, in other respects, 
is moving towards a mature cosmopolitanism. 
Arms Proliferation and Security Cooperation 
It would be historically foolish to stop talking about issues related to arms altogether, 
especially in the Asia-Pacific region where territorial and nationalist questions which now 
appear anachronistic to many Western observers have, if anything, been brought to the fore by 
the end of the Cold War. Let us first look at such issues within a US-China context (with 
obvious regional repercussions) and then focus on China's regional relations and how they may 
impede or promote US interests. 
A major issue influencing the policy debate in the US, and fuelled by the right-wing media, is 
the issue of China's role in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and alleged sale of materials 
to Pakistan and Iran. China signed the Military Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the 
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty in 1992; the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993; and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWA) in July 1996, along with the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) and the announcement of a moratorium on all nuclear tests. As such, China 
has largely complied with US requirements and international law. However, China's alleged 
transgression of such agreements has become a focal point for the right-wing anti-China lobby 
within the US Congress which views China as an endemic threat to US regional interests. This 
nascent unilateralism challenges the neo-liberal consensus and resulted in the China Policy Act 
\ This fact was conveyed to me at an inteIView at the Bureau of Intelligence and Security. US Dcpanmcnt of 
Slale. December 1997, Washington D.C. 
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of September 1997 which committed the US to the imposition of sanctions on Chinese military 
companies engaged in proliferation. 74 Specific issues leading to the act included the sale of ring 
magnets, reported in early 1996, to Pakistan which could be used to enrich uranium involving 
the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation. Strong protests from Westinghouse Electric 
and Boeing Aircraft mitigated the extent to which sanctions were applied and only briefly did 
the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, suspend EX 1M Bank financing for commercial 
deals with the Chinese nuclear sector. 75 Thus, these issues directly impact upon the political 
economy of the relationship, particularly the US imposition of sanctions on China, discussed 
in chapter 3, which hurt US trade. 
A second key issue to arise involved the alleged Chinese sales of nuclear technology to Iran in 
supposed breach of the NPT. CIA Director, John Deutsch, named China as a "key supplier" of 
I rani an nuclear material in June 1997. Though such matters are clearly of some concern we 
should note the extra-territorial mandate the US Congress is claiming in relation to such sales 
despite the fact that it is unwilling to subject US companies to the same scrutiny under 
international law. Under the NPT peaceful nuclear cooperation is permitted and the US 
Congress has actually invoked US laws, such as the Iran-Iraq Non-proliferation Act, the Arms 
Export Control Act and the Export-Import Act, to justify its stance. Indeed, during the 1990-
94 period the US built up global weapons sales ten times as large as China's, making, it the 
world's number one exporter. Moreover, the Pentagon predicts that the US share of global 
weapons sales is likely to rise from 50% in 1993 to 63 % in the year 2000.7(, 
-1 S A Kan. "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction". em,,' Issue HrielfH9205fJ, Congressional 
Research Service. Library of Congress, Washington D. c.. September. 1997. p. 15. 
, Ihld. . p.2. 
I. D Lampton. "A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing and the Global Order", in E Vogel (cd). 
I./I,tn~ With China: US-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century, New York, WW Norton. p.I33. 
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The Clinton Administration has also attempted to harness China's burgeoning global power to 
the resolution of two regional disputes whose origins are embedded in the Cold War. The first 
of those disputes was in Cambodia where the Maoist Khmer Rouge and other factions 
continued to wage war upon one another. In 1991 the Bush Administration managed to elicit 
Chinese cooperation in passing the UN Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian 
Conflict. The Security Council resolution involved the deployment of 22.000 UN 
peacekeepers and the demobilisation of all warring factions. China's links to the Khmer Rouge 
were viewed as instrumental in brokering an agreement and, in 1993. the Beijing government 
announced an end to military support for Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge rump whilst committing an 
engineering battalion to the UN effort. 77 A key by-product of this agreement was a 
rapprochement between China and Vietnam - another enmity rooted in Cold-War geo-political 
conflict. 7K In 1993 the Vietnamese leader, Le Duc Anh, and Jiang Zemin went so far as to 
suspend opposing sovereignty claims on the Spratly Islands. 79 All of these proceedings must 
be viewed as congruous with broad US interests in the region. 
The US has also encouraged China to defuse tensions on the Korean peninsula where nuclear 
tensions have been exacerbated in the 1990s following the death of Kim II Sung and the 
political instability of the world's last Stalinist state. The US has managed to persuade China 
mto participating in Four Party talks to secure a "durable" peace - a commitment reatlirmed by 
both sides during the 1997 US-China Summit in Washington. 110 However, Chinese 
acquiescence in this dispute has often been far more reluctant than US sources would lead us 
-. R Foot. The Practice of Power: US-China Relations 1949-1995, Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1995. 
p251. 
, Martin-Jones. Political Development in Pacific Asia, p.185. 
-I Hsiung. "China's Omnidirectional Diplomacy", p.578. 
" White House Press Release. lfc\'-China Joint Statement, October 29, 1997. 
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to believe. China strongly objected to US plans to impose UN sanctions on the Pyongyang 
regime despite pressuring North Korea's leaders to comply with and to accept the inspection 
of its nuclear facilities by the UN. China continually emphasised its limited intluence (perhaps 
reflecting China's championing of developing world sovereignty which has largely continued 
beyond the Cold War) and the desirability of regional solutions to the problems in North 
Korea. K1 Hints that the US is willing to take military action against North Korea in order to 
topple the regime of Kim Jong-il may stretch Chinese co-operation to the limit, if not induce a 
backlash against the US.!l2 
China's Regional Agenda 
In many respects China's long-term goals towards the regIOn are almost impossible to 
decipher at the current historical juncture. What does seem clear, however, is that any 
significant contlict would appear inimical to the leadership's long-term development goals, 
though it may nevertheless be said that China's regional conduct to date has been both 
benevolent and bellicose. China, along with several Asian states, is suspicious of US intentions 
for APEC and has sought to align itself with the authoritarian capitalist politics of Singapore 
and Malaysia. Thus, China broadly supports the Asian elite discourse of' Asian Values' which 
arc, of course, equated with the values of dominant groups within Asian societies (see chapter 
4) Thus, building bridges in its bilateral and multilateral relations in the region has taken high 
priority and has manifested itself in what has been termed zhollhian (circumference) 
diplomacy. This strategy is much ignored by realists and neo-liberals keen to stress either 
China's recalcitrance in complying with America's regional agenda or to play down China's 
pursuit of its own regional agenda. 
-I Foot. The Practice of Power. pp.258-9 . 
• ~ J Gittings. "US Thrcallo Invade North Korea", The Guardian, November 26, JlJ9H. 
289 
While it is true that China's leaders have displayed pernicious irredentist tendencies and a 
desire to claw back territory surrendered to the imperial powers in the nineteenth century, this 
sits alongside a broader resentment of hegemony in general. For all the faults of the Chinese 
government it does not appear, at this stage, willing to embark upon such a path. The end of 
the Cold War left China feeling somewhat isolated from its Asian neighbours and ended the 
raison d'elre for US support of China's geo-political challenge to Soviet influence in the 
region. Thus the process of refashioning a regional role has been imperative for the cep 
leadership. An important area of rapprochement has been with the ASEAN countries (often 
referred to as middle powers in the realist jargon) who share important political and cultural 
similarities with China papered over by the Cold War. 
The ASEAN countries elites share with China's a resentment of US hegemony, a commitment 
to Asian values and a penchant for political authoritarianism often articulated though the neo-
Confucian discourse of the "Asian Way".IB ASEAN's shift from US satellite status during the 
Cold War to a grouping with pan-Asian tendencies has not gone unnoticed by China and, in 
July 1992, the PRC and the ASEAN leaders signed a treaty at the Post Ministerial Conference 
(PMT) of ASEAN in Manila pledging a new commitment to trade and cooperation. ~4 Since 
that time there has been a notable confluence of cultural attitudes between nations such as 
Malaysia and Singapore (with large ethnic Chinese popUlations) and China pertinent to 
questions of human rights and development. Malaysia's Dr. Mahathir has been particularly 
vocal in championing 'Asian Values', cultural relativism, and a pugnacious defence of 
~l The "Way", or daa, has its origins in Chinese Confucianism and the belief in the divine wisdom of mlers 
who embody, rather conveniently, a hamlOnisation of the best interests of the ntlcd. 
,I Hsiung, "China's Omni-Directional Diplomacy", p.577. 
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sovereignty very much in line with the views of Jiang Zemin and the Chinese leadership, X'i 
China supported Mahathir's proposal for an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) excluding 
the US and even welcomed Japan's participation in such a grouping - though Japan was 
reluctant to join and risk offending the US,H6 However, China's support for such initiatIves 
should not deflect from a deeper scepticism among China's leaders regarding the etlicacy of 
greater regional multilateralism. 
China's seeming willingness to encourage the fashioning of a common Asian heritage and set 
of values sits, rather uneasily, alongside fierce expositions on the inviolable sovereignty of 
China's territorial borders and on reclaiming those territories relinquished in the 19th century 
to colonial forces. This has, understandably, perturbed smaller states in the region unsure of 
the exact nature of China's regional designs. It is notable that China's leaders have taken little 
interest in such initiatives as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security 
and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. 1I7 As Hu points out, "on one hand, it [China] does not 
want to engage in a multilateral dialogue with Southeast Asian countries over territorial issues; 
but, on the other, if it does not, the spread of the 'Chinese Threat' would mobilise other Asian 
countries into an anti-Beijing alliance. ,,1111 The full ramitications of China's actions are 
extremely far-reaching in the way they intersect with the diminution of America's global and 
regional power in the post-Cold-War period. The course of action China ultimately pursues 
regarding such territorial issues may well be a key variable in determining the future of the 
region and whether an "Asian Way" can, in fact, replace the security umbrella of the United 
States, The Clinton Administration has declared that it is determined to prevent China's pursuit 
"' 0 Roy, "Restructuring Foreign and Defence Policy: the People's Republic of China" in A McGrew and C 
Brook (cds), Asia-Pac~fic in the New World Order, p.138 . 
." Jisi. The (J.I.; as a Glohal and Pacific Power, p.g, 
" Ro~'. Restructuring Foreign and Defence policy: the People's Republic of( 'ilina, p.148, 
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of a "19th century Agenda"H9 stemming from the "Century of Shame" and China's 
determination to reassert its grandiose territorial outreach. What is fascinating is that analysts 
of all political hues have written off territorial disputes at a time when a formerly colonised 
civilisation is challenging Western power. Despite many flaws, realists are correct in 
underscoring the pivotal importance of territorial and nationalist issues in the political strategy 
of the CCP and in offering a counterweight to the economic fixations of neo-liberals and many 
radicals. Though China is undoubtedly constrained by the forces of globalisation and 
nationalism, state-building remains a pivotal source of power for the CCP and a pernicious 
brand of state-sponsored nationalism may be unleashed in the future should Beijing's leaders 
begin to feel insecure domestically. 
It would not be an exaggeration to assert that Jiang Zemin's regime has come to regard the 
entire South China sea as part of the Middle Kingdom's historic geo-political domain 'XI 
Following the Cold War, the dispute in the Spratly Islands Archipelago (involving China, the 
Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan) has been increasingly polarised despite 
attempts to reach an amicable agreement. China has already used force in the area against 
Vietnam (in 1988), taking control of several islands. However, it was the building of 
installations on islands belonging to the Philippines, and the arrest of Filipino sailors, in )995 
which raised tensions in the region to their current levels. China's conduct breached the 
agreement reach on Chinese-ASEAN cooperation in 1992 and went a long way in eroding 
confidence among other claimants. 
"" Hu. "China and Asian Regionalism", p.54. 
,'1 Rcmarks by S Roth, America's Asia Strategy in the S'econd Clinton Administration. US Dcpartmcnt of Siale. 
12 December. 1997. 
',. R Ross. "China and Southeast Asia: The Challcnge of Economic Compctition", in D Wurfcl and B BIII10n 
(cds). Southeast Asia in the New World Order: The Political Fconomy (!f a I~vnamic Rt',I!.uiN. St Martin's 
Press. New York. 1996, p.159. 
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The dispute takes on added significance because of the seemingly intractable dispute between 
Japan and China over the Diaoyu (China's name)or Senkaku (Japan's name) Islands and the 
much greater tensions which exist between China and Japan genera1\y. Irredentism in China 
and right wing nationalism in Japan were exacerbated when Japanese nationalists erected a 
lighthouse on the islands in 1996. Both governments refused to rescind their claims of 
sovereignty and, though temporary accommodation was reached towards the end of 1996, 
little has been done to remove the underlying source of these tensions.'ll Though we discussed 
the potential confluence of Sino-Japanese interests above within an international political 
economy context, there are, as mentioned above, still areas of great distrust especially in 
security matters. A key source of tension has been the renewal, in 1996, of the US-Japan 
Mutual Alliance Treaty. Under the Treaty's auspices Japan has been asked to playa more 
proactive role in Asian and, indeed, global security.92 China's leaders object to any enhanced 
role for Japan's military and view the alliance as a ruse by which the US can artificially 
elongate its dominance in the region. Japanese complicity is viewed, in classic realist terms, as 
a way of thwarting Chinese ascendancy.93 For realists, a post-Cold-War strategic triangle is 
being fashioned, but this time China is on the receiving end and is subject to a containment 
policy. This view fails, however, to entertain the very real efforts made by the Clinton 
Administration to delegate military security, partially through necessity, to Asians themselves 
in order to maintain competitiveness in the geo-economic sphere. It also plays down the fact 
that, despite complaints about US arrogance, ASEAN, Japan, and China have all stated their 
desire for some form of US presence in order to assuage their anxieties concerning each other. 
In short, though US dominance is not popular among the elites of the region there is an acute 
',j A Goldstein. "China in 1996: Achievement, Assertiveness. Anxiety". Asian Survey. Vo1.17. No.1. 1997. 
p.H 
" McGrew, Restructuring Foreign and Defence Policy: the USA, p.176. 
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awareness that the regional hegemony of anyone Asian power is even more unacceptable. 
Moreover, the current lack of any regional institutional infrastructure, saving one which has 
been foisted upon the region by the US, makes the emergence of regional multilateral 
structures seem highly improbable. 
Conclusion 
The US role to the Asia-Pacific region IS, at present, fairly clear. APEC represents a 
reorientation of policy from geo-politics to geo-economics and an attempt to further socialise 
China into liberal norms and neo-liberal economic rules. It also represents a shift from regional 
hegemony to regional dominance and the pursuit of multilateral means of achieving US policy 
goals. In this sense, though US structural power continues to dominate the region politically. 
negotiation and agreement is required to satisfy policy requirements. 
That said, the future of APEC is fairly ambiguous given the nationalist aspirations of the 
Chinese Communist Party, its territorial disputes with Asian neighbours, and historical 
enmities with Japan. As we have seen, APEC is a largely artificial construction which tends to 
promote a narrow form of regionalism along neo-Iiberal lines and which disembeds economic 
interaction from its underlying social and political context. Geo-political tensions, combined 
with the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, raise serious questions for orthodox 
approaches to the region and may even point to a turning point in US regional dominance as 
state intervention is reasserted to stem capital outflows and to regulate the activities of 
footloose global capital. We have argued that Japanese-Chinese cooperation is central to any 
challenge to US regional power, though it would be wrong to be too sanguine about the 
political and historical obstacles to such cooperation. Moreover, we have argued that 
regionalism must be viewed dialectically as a potentially alienating discourse championed by 
'11 Z Yanling. "Changing Sino-US-Japanese Relations", The Pac~fic Review, Vo1.lO. No.4. 1997. pASS. 
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the empowered of the region and backed by a US elite keen to thwart popular movements 
seeking to assert social and economic justice which may threaten local property and capital as 
well as the current untrammelled power of global capital more generally. The fact that 
people's representatives during APEC meetings are usually ringfenced by barbed wire or 
hemmed in by baton-wielding police officers is evidence enough of this. 
Gerald Segal noted that it is becoming increasingly tenuous to include China in the "Flying 
Geese ll model of regional economic development led by Japan, given the fact that certain areas 
within China, notably Guangdong province, "are already at levels that would qualify them for 
membership of the first flock of geese." Indeed, as Segal further notes, China has developed its 
own flying geese pattern on the mainland and represents "not so much a goose as an entire 
new flock. ,,94 Thus, however complex the concept may seem, it is clear that a regionalism 
within a regionalism is developing as Chinese power begins to rival that of Japan and the US in 
terms of political and cultural largesse. (China is far closer to other Asian countries on the 
subjects of authoritarian rule and the discourse of Asian values than either Japan or the US) 
and as a centre of regional economic gravity). The prosperity of the entire region, even the 
global economy, is now inextricably bound up with Chinese monetary policy especially the 
possibility of a competitive devaluation of the Yuan. 
Walden Bello points out that there is also a growing perception within the region that Japan is 
unable to break with the "psychology of the Occupation II and risk offending the US - a fact 
demonstrated during the Asian crisis when Japan backed down fairly rapidly over its AMF 
proposals and failed to embark on a new reflationary economic trajectory encouraged by 
',I G Segal, "The Asia-Pacific: What Kind of Challengc'r'. in McGrew and Brook (cds). Asia Pacific in (he 
Sell' World Order, p.321. 
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several Asian leaders95 While true, it is equally important to note that Japan's historical 
journey to economic dynamism is, in no small part, due to the openness of US markets and the 
post-war US security umbrella. It is the US, not China, which has been Japan's long-term 
partner in the region and in the world economy. In sum, though the US is no longer 
hegemonic in the region it still exerts sufficient structural power via APEC and a continued 
political and economic role which make it the most powerful regional actor. Moreover, in 
Gramscian terms, the diffusion of market ideology in the region and in China, in particular, 
has been instrumental in advancing US interests without necessarily involving the US state. As 
noted above, however, this is tempered and complicated by certain nationalist sentiments in 
China far more pernicious than anything we could associate with US power in the region. 
'I~ W Bello. "The Asian Economic Implosion: Causes, Dynamics, Prospects", Race and ('lass, Vo140. No.2/). 
I ')!)X/I)I). p.D 7. 
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Conclusion 
Moving Beyond US-China Relations? 
Introduction 
This thesis has, in essence, attempted to place US-China relations within a historical and 
structural international political economy context. In a sense, this entails problematising 
the very notion of US-China relations as a hermetically sealed object of 'specialist' inquiry 
somehow impervious to the encroachments of global forces whether they be economic or 
political. Our conclusion, then, seeks to do four fundamental things. Firstly, it asks what 
the preceding analysis tells us about the changing nature of US structural power in the 
post-Cold War world and the extent to which the so-called 'Rise of China' alters our 
perception and understanding of US power and dominance at the level of world order. 
Secondly, we ask what alternative form of power the rise of China may precipitate with 
particular reference to the greater degree of multilateralism and delegation already evident 
in the US's management of the world economy during the I 990s. Thirdly, we discuss the 
contested nature of US-China policy from within and the extent to which our 
understanding of what is meant by 'foreign policy' has to be rethought in the light of new 
actors and agents within civil society with the political capacity to act transnationally, 
and also with regard to the plurality of actors within the US state often pursuing 
contradictory policy positions. Fourthly, we place the overall conclusion within the 
context of globalisation and the extent to which the process is likely to engender 
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economic, social, and cultural homogenisation or to produce alternative narratives though 
still within a grand narrative of global capitalism. 
US-China Relations in the 1990s: Implications for US Structural Power 
Conceived in neo-Gramscian terms hegemony is both a coercive and consensual form of 
power and, within international relations, more often entails a subtle blend of these two 
elements. Understanding the unfolding of US-China relations at the macro-level of 
structure, then, involves an appraisal of the way in which US hegemony has transmogrified 
in the 1990s into a form of dominance which transcends the functions of the US state. Put 
simply, though the material power of the US state has declined in relative terms, US 
power over global institutions and the ideology which underpins them has remained fairly 
intact. Moreover, the appeal of US culture and values continue to grow exponentially even 
in the historically anomalous 'socialist market economy' of China. As in the case of the 
Soviet Union towards the end of the Cold War, the mass appeal of higher material 
standards of living and the move away from the bland conformity of authoritarian rule 
does pose a threat to the integrity of the Chinese state as presently configured. Yet the 
arguments made by right-wing nationalists within China about 'bourgeois liberalisation' 
and a US policy of 'peaceful evolution'), which undermines the Chinese state by 
sponsoring fractious indigenous groups, ignores the fact that Deng Xiaoping \'()llIlI1ari~v 
opened the Chinese economy to the West. Viewed historically, moreover, US-China 
relations have not been characterised by enmity and geo-political rivalry. Indeed, the Cold 
War was an aberration in this regard. Rather, as we mentioned in chapter 2, the US acted 
to prevent 'spheres of influence' emerging in China during the period of imperial 
I Thl' l~con(lmisl, " Now Comes the Hard Part", AprilS, 2000. 
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domination and following the First World War, while also preserving an 'open door' 
policy on trade. In this sense, there are satisfactory grounds tor seeing a great deal of 
historical continuity in the strategy of the US towards China throughout the twentieth 
century. None of this is to suggest that the US has not been pursuing its own material 
interests in China during the Clinton years. 
The penetration of the Chinese market has been a key part of foreign economic policy but 
the nature of US power, conceived in the neo-Gramscian sense, means that there is a large 
element of satisfaction given to the submissive partner in return for acceptance of global 
economic rules. In China's case, this has been the provision of a huge export market in 
the 1980s and 1990s which has helped fuel growth and which has allowed China to 
maintain significant levels of domestic protectionism along the way. As William Keegan 
points out, "the United States is borrowing some $1 billion a day from the rest of the 
world to finance its insatiable appetite for imports" acting as a "locomotive tor the rest of 
the world economy.,,2 That said, export-led growth does create a type of dependency as 
evidenced by the Asian financial crisis following which Chinese exports fell by 1.5%.' As 
pointed out in chapter 3, failure to develop human capital as an alternative to export-
driven growth using unskilled manual labour leads to structural problems in developing 
technology and the economy overall. 
A second point here is the fact that key economic fundamentals associated with neo-
liberalism have been accepted by the Chinese leadership. The deregulation of economic 
activity, the privatisation of the state sector and the gradual creation of a legal framework 
guaranteeing property rights have all been key features of Chinese economic policy in the 
: W Keegan. "When the Magic Starts to Wear Off", The Ohserver. 16 April. 2000. 
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1990s. The impact of US foreign policy combined with economic globalisation have 
entailed the restructuring of the Chinese state. indeed, in the Spring of 1999 guarantees 
which acknowledge the private sector for the first time were written into the Chinese 
constitution. 4 This all points to a fairly successful China strategy on the part of the Clinton 
Administration despite the many bilateral antagonisms which tend to fuel issue-oriented 
sections of the US press and certain interest groups. 
It is within the structural context above, then, that the Clinton Administrations's policy of 
'comprehensive engagement' towards China has to be understood. The linkage of 
bilateral, regional and global policies have all served the purpose of bringing China within 
the ambit of the global political economy and tying its government to a set of rules and 
norms which preclude any serious deviation from market principles. China's move closer 
to the WTO, in November 1999, is clearly the most crucial development in US-China 
relations since the reinstatement of relations in 1972. Membership of the WTO will allow 
US firms to penetrate the China market in new ways and. importantly, creates new 
markets for service industries. banking. telecommunications and the Internet - all of which 
are more closely embedded in the activities of financial markets and speculative capital 
than firms involved in traditional modes of trade involving manufactured goods. Of 
course. China has been pushing for GATT entry since 1986 and the WTO agreement will 
also be beneficial to China in allowing Chinese firms to enter the global market on the 
same terms as competitors. As noted in chapter 3, WTO entry lifts bilateral disputes into 
a multilateral forum thereby placing US trade policies under scrutiny particularly as 
regards MFN which must be extended to all WTO members. Moreover. the opacity of 
-----------------------------_._----_._ .. _ .... -
\ r Godcmcnt, The Downsizing of Asia, London, Routledge, 1999, p.179. 
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China's economy has been a major obstacle in clarifYing the extent of trade disputes and 
in dissuading long-term Western investors (due to lack oflegal guarantees) from the type 
of investment undertaken by the Japanese government. Participation in the WTO will 
provide greater transparency in this regard and, again, may alleviate much of the 
misunderstanding which has produced yearly wrangles over MFN. 
In the structural context, there remain, of course, matters of real contention between 
China and the US in the way the global economy unfolds. APEC, for instance, remains a 
contested form of regionalism and could develop as a counterweight to US regional 
power given the differing trajectories of Asian economic growth and the impact of Japan 
upon the regional economy.s With China now inside the WTO and pursuing a largely 
capitalist economic policy the question, therefore, moves to the type of capitalism which is 
adopted by the state and whether 'open regionalism' and trade Iiberalisation of the neo-
liberal variety can be sustained in the post-Asian crisis era. In April, 2000, APEe 
policymakers met in Seoul to discuss the need for improved social safety nets in the wake 
of the crisis and expressed concerns for the proliferation of regional inequality. In many 
respects, this takes APEC into the new territory of social and public policy thereby 
challenging the homo economicus view of APEC's development among business elites 
Once again, the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund was mooted proving that the political 
fallout of the Asian crisis will continue to shape thinking about the future of the region.1> 
As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, cooperation between China and Japan may welI be 
, The Fconomist, "Now Comes the Hard Part." 
, H Dieter. "APEC and the WTO: Collision or Cooperation". The Pacific Review, Vol. 10. No.1. IlJl)7. 
p25. 
t, At a meeting of APEC governments in March. 2000, a strong commitment to indigenous welfare 
policies was discussed. See" Asia pays the Social Price of Boom and Bust", The (iuarclial1 . 4 April. 20()(). 
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crucial in an Asian developmental context if there is to be an alternative to US economic 
dominance. 
Another key structural issue emerging from the thesis revolves around the role of the US 
in global environmental politics, as discussed in chapter 6. If the most pessimistic sources 
are to be believed then China may well be entering the endgame with regard to countering 
rising pollution levels and, like Beckett's Hamm and Clov, China's leadership cannot 
postpone forever the gravity of what lies before them. It is for these reasons that forging a 
cooperative basis of understanding on this issue at the g/oha/ level is so important. 
Currently, the US emphasis on finding market solutions to these problems holds sway as 
does the emphasis on population levels in the developing world over consumption in the 
advanced capitalist countries. This ensures disagreement between China and the US over 
the fundamentals such as greenhouse gas emissions, which China disputes are occurring, 
and tends to confine cooperation to trade in environmental technologies and scientific 
knowledge. In turn, US dominance in the world market for green technologies makes 
China a lucrative prospect for US firms. Our argument here is that the environment is an 
area where short-term competitive gains may have to be overridden by a long-term 
perspective which views environmental decay as the transboundary issue it most certainly 
is. Indeed, this is the radical interpretation of the environnmental question which was set 
out by prospective US President, AI Gore, who has advocated a 'global Marshall plan' on 
the environment involving a 'strategic environmental initiative' which provides detailed 
policy targets for pollution outputs in specific regions. Interestingly, this would also 
involve "massive efforts to design and then transfer to poor nations the new technologies 
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needed for sustained economic progress,,,7 While perhaps overly idealistic such a plan 
dovetails which much of the thinking behind post-Cold-War liberal institutionalism and 
moves towards global regimes of regulation. The key question in US-China environmental 
relations will be the extent to which new bilateral and global initiatives are tied to US 
dominance in the global market or, conversely, whether a genuinely multilateral modlls 
operandi can be forged between the two nations in line with other governments and 
NGOs seeking a sustainable development agenda. This leads us nicely into discussing the 
ways in which US-China relations intersect with nascent forms of multilateral power. 
US-China Relations and the Prospect of a more Multilateral World Order 
This thesis is not motivated by hypothesising the denouement of US global power but III 
asking critical questions as to just what a more cooperative world order would look like, 
A key element of our theoretical chapter was the idea of counter-hegemony or, at least, 
alternatives to the status quo. Rather than viewing China's economic growth in state-
centric terms akin to realism, we view China's emergence as elucidating the need for 
greater global cooperation which builds upon existing institutions Throughout the 
twentieth century it has been taken as almost axiomatic that Western powers should 
define the nature and scope of global institutions. Arguably, this state of atTairs is unlikely 
to continue indefinitely. 
There are a number of arguments being put forward with regard to the development of 
more multilateral forms of power as an alternative to the existing system. The best 
argument which has so far emerged IS Robert Cox's conception of 
'Middlepowermanship' which he has investigated in particular relation to Japan but which 
, A Gore, Earth in the Balance: Towards a New Common Purpose, London, Earthscan, J 1JlJ2, pp.295-,j(,O, 
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can be treated, more broadly, as relating to the collegial management of the world-
economy congruent with the process of structural change.x Two elements of Cox's 
schema are particularly relevant to our conclusion. The first is the notion of "world-
economy management by the G7 major capitalist powers including Japan but expanded to 
include some form of participation by a more market-oriented Soviet Union [now Russia] 
and China." The second is the idea of a "multi-level order with a wide ditTusion of power 
among nations and social groupS.,,9 The first element is based on greater mutual 
responsibility between the major capitalist powers and the closer coordination of macro-
economic policy and exchange-rates. Writing in 1989, Cox thought this an unlikely 
scenario but, as we discussed in chapter 3, China's currency has recently taken on a 
greater role in the global economy and control of its exchange rate was pivotal in 
preventing any escalation of the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, leading financial 
speculators have encouraged government intervention, e.g. Soros, and greater macro-
economic management as essential to the future development of the world-economy and 
the aversion of financial crises. Stewardship of the IMF's International Monetary and 
Financial Committee by British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown. in 1999 and 
2000 has involved greater emphasis on new modes of governance and regulatory 
intervention III which, sooner or later, would have to include China especially as it moves 
to full WTO membership. In short, US-China relations have to be recontextualised within 
a multilateral or global setting reflecting post-hegemonic conditions. I( in the future. 
W R Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and the Future of World Order", in RW Cox with T Sinclair. 
Approoche.\' to World Order, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1996. pp. 241-275. 
'J Ihid .. p.253. 
I" Gordon Brown, speaking on Newsnight. 13 April. 2000, stated that he wished global institutions to be 
Illorc conccrned with cooperation between national government's than in imposing solutions. 
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China is to remain compliant with US Treasury appeals to maintain the value of its 
currency for the sake of global economic stability, then equal input to global institutions 
may well be a pre-requisite for cooperation. 
The second scenario, outlined by Cox, is somewhat more generic and underscores his 
personal political commitment to the democratisation of the global economy. The rise of 
China as Middle Power would certainly raise the profile of developing countries given 
China's 'dual economy' which straddles the divide between advanced capitalism and semi-
feudal agrarianism. In this context it is worthy of noting that China's leaders have 
maintained strong links with African states which "perceive the PRC as their 
representative in the Security Council, as sharing similar problems." 11 China has continued 
to support a New International Economic Order (NIEO), if less vociferously than during 
the Cold War, as well as increased international aid and the removal of trade restrictions 
on developing states by industrialised countries. 12 Seen in a positive light, then, China's 
greater presence in multilateral institutions would ensure that development issues form a 
more intrinsic part of decision making among the world's most powerful governments. 
Seen in a less positive light, China's current stance may reflect a transient preoccupation 
with using the African issue to attack Western governments rather than a principled 
stance in favour of greater global economic equality. The repository for a more 
democratic world order would seem to be the UN. \3 The idea of the UN as a forum for a 
more diffuse dispensation of global power also lies in the fact that the UN has post-
nationalist credentials and claims to represent the peoples of the world as opposed to 
II RJ Payne and CR Veney, "China's Post-Cold War African Policy", Asian ..... 'un'ey, YoU8, NO.1), 11)1)8. 
p.871. 
Ie Ihid.. p.870. 
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simply national governments. In this way, human rights issues afflicting persecuted 
minorities, labour rights and a host of other key elements in US-China relations would be 
brought under the focus of a global organisation less susceptible to the preferences of US 
policymakers or to cries of 'hegemony' from China's leaders whenever US politicians and 
NGOs raise concerns about China's human rights record. 
Ronald Dore suggests that inter-capitalist rivalry has witnessed an aggressive US 
unilateralism on trade centered around blaming Chinese and Japanese protectionism for 
US economic ills. Dore further notes that the result may be "to force Japan and China into 
a sort of defensive alliance" given the shared nature of their trade quarrels with the US. 
For Dore, the creation of a more multilateral UN is the key to preventing "Japan-China v 
US-Europe scenario on trade" in that it would give these powers an equal stake in 
securing a multilateral world order. In short, creating a stake for these countries in 
stability is the key. Jisi has pointed to the growing affinity between China and France in the 
belief that US domination of the global order should be replaced with a more cooperative 
stance. Indeed, Qian Qichen, China's foreign minister, told a Chinese newspaper that 
"China does not agree with the view that after the Cold War a new world order should be 
established under the leadership of one power .... In this respect, there are common 
grounds between China and France.,,14 One key factor missing here, however, is that US 
hegemony and US universalism have, as Cox argues,15 been based on the exclusively US 
ability to generate a world culture based not on narrow nationalism, ethnicity, or what 
divides peoples, but on aspirations, which the left now recognises, towards higher 
1\ R Cox. "Civilisations in World Political Economy". New Pulitical Fc()n()lIIY. Vo!.l. No.2. 19%. p.I4i-t. 
1·\ W Jisi, "The United States as a Global and Pacific Power: A View from China". n,l' J'adJic /(el';(,II', 
VoI.IO. No.1. p.15. 
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standards of living. Moreover, the dangers of so-called 'alternative' forms of global 
power must also be recognised. China has extreme nationalist and irredentist tendencies, 
sometimes verging on racism and fascism, while France has well documented problems 
with the far-right. Indeed, it is for this reason - preventing backward nationalist 
movements - that the US may need to consider greater multilateral ism in the global 
economy. 
The Contested Nature of US-China Policy 
A third element to our conclusion surrounds the fact that US 'foreign policy' has been 
reconceptualised in this thesis to include a range of actors across the state-society nexus as 
well as the role of foreign actors in determining US state policy. In the first Clinton 
Administration (1993-1996), for example, inter-bureaucratic rivalries on China policy 
were pronounced whereas during the second Clinton Administration (1996-2000) there 
has been much more cohesion and a willingness to accept that the US has limited leverage 
over China in the bilateral setting. 16 Throughout the Clinton tenure in the White House, 
Congress has ensured that a vibrant political debate has occurred on China from the 
sponsorship of pro-Taiwan policies and pro-Tibet legislation (see chapter 4) by 
RepUblicans, to calls, from both left and right, for protectionism, unilateral sanctions 
(many of which are still in place) and greater emphasis on human rights. Thus, the Clinton 
Administration has not simply advanced some innate US policy based on the obviousness 
of maintaining US market share. The US state has had to develop political strategies to 
accommodate forces arguing for moral and ideological stances far removed from 
I' Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan and the Future of World Order". p.256. 
II. Interview. us Department of State, Bureau of Dcmocracy, Human Rights. and Labour. 17 November. 
1 ')1)7. 
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economic self-interest or some form of economic determinism. The politics of US-China 
policy is also evident in US civil society where human rights NGOs, trade unions, and 
Chinese immigrants have contested the efficacy of engaging an authoritarian, and still 
Communist, regime hostile to civil liberties, as well as environmental matters relating to 
the US role in China's development. 
The role of political agents is also important with regard to China itself. US policies are 
not simply imposed upon a static Chinese state but are refracted through a Chinese 
political system in a process of constant evolution. Most importantly, Chinese politics are 
becoming more diffuse with new economic actors emerging within China's regions and a 
greater role being given to entrepreneurs and those institutions generating wealth. Political 
loyalties are often diverted from the state to transnational capital or family networks which 
span the Asian region. Moreover, disenfranchised economic and ethnic groups are less 
likely to view their aims as congruous with a state which has, in the process of capitalist 
restructuring, shed many jobs and created growing disparities in wealth which are clearly 
delineated in geographical terms. While the broader questions involved here belong to 
'China specialists' or practitioners of comparative politics these changes impact heavily 
on the international political economy of US-China relations because they mean that trade 
agreements with leaders in Beijing are only one dimension of relations. Implementing and 
enforcing change, especially on an issue such as Intellectual Property Rights, is often very 
ditlicult for a Chinese state slowly but surely divesting much economic power to the 
private sector. In short, globalisation pressures reconfigure the role of the state vis a vis 
society - a trend as true for China as for the US. 
Conclusion: Globalisation and US-China Relations 
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As we noted in our theoretical chapter, globalisation is not simply an apolitical process 
driven by the invisible hand of the market. The process has its foundations in neo-liberal 
policies instigated by the Reagan Administration in the 1980s and the attempt to reassert 
US hegemony in the world economy. Helleiner states that, "by the early 1990s, an almost 
fully liberal order had been created across the DECO region, giving market actors a 
degree of freedom they had not held since the 1920s ... ,,17 The Clinton Administration has 
promoted globalisation as a key tenet of foreign policy and, in 1997, US Trade 
Representative Charlene Barshefsky, spoke of the need for the US to retain "20% of 
global wealth" arguing that the US was at the "pinnacle of influence" in ensuring the 
"transmission of US values.,,11! The means to do this, she suggested, was through free 
trade and the promotion of high-tech sectors of the economy in which the US clearly 
maintains comparative advantage. However, this policy has also been secured through 
championing an ideological discourse of globalisation which encourages governments 
across the world to accept the maintenance of low inflation and reduced state spending as 
if there were' no alternative.' 
A senior US policymaker recently stated that contemporary international competitiveness 
also entails "free access to global information and markets" and that such attributes do not 
"conform to a highly authoritarian system.,,19 This echoes the neo-Gramscian arguments of 
William Robinson, noted in chapter 5, concerning the promotion of polyarchical political 
forms by the US government. Moreover, it is for this reason that the success of US firms, 
I" E Helleiner, "From Bretton Woods to Global Finance: A World Turned Upside Down" in R Stubbs and 
GRD Underhill (cds), Political Economy and the Changing (i/obal Order, London. Macmillan. 1994. 
p.170. 
IW C Barshefsky, Speech on Renewing Fast Track Trade Legislation, The Brookings Institution. September 
21. 1997. 
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with regard to high-tech technology in China, will be increasingly important. As Strange 
puts it, the importance of keeping control over products and processes, or both, are as 
integral to the strategies of firms as short-term profit. Moreover, considerations of power 
in the global economy are key motivating factors for securing market share in areas likely 
to produce a large yield of political influence in the long-term. 2o Thus, capturing the 
Chinese Internet market will be a major source of leverage for US tlrms and will also have 
major implications for the Chinese state and its control of information so instrumental to 
one-party rule. The structural implications of information technology, then, reach far 
beyond what we normally associate with trade relations. Indeed, in September 1995, 
Chinese premier, Jiang Zemin, met with Bill Gates of Microsoft to discuss market access 
and as part of China's new emphasis on developing its own electronics industry. It is 
arguable that following China's full entry to the WTO such meetings will carry as much 
weight as those with any US President as the clamor for independent information by 
. . . 21 Chmese cItizens grows. 
In chapter 3 we also discussed Breslin's research relating to the vulnerability of China's 
reliance on export-led growth and resultant dependence on the vagaries of globalisation. 
The strategy adopted in parallel with globalisation among Western governments has been 
that of developing the indigenous technological base, augmenting educational opportunity 
and developing human capital. 
I'J The Economist. "Now Comes the Hard Part." 
~II S Strange, "The Future of Global Capitalism; Or, will Divergence Persist Forever')" in C Crouch and W 
Strccck (cds), Political Economy oj Modern Capitalism: Mapping ConverRencl! and I )i\'ersi~I', London, 
Sage. 199R, p.185. 
:1 Research Institute for Peace and Security, A.vian .I,,'ecurity, London. 8rasscy's. 11)97. p.72 
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In 1996, moreover, the People's Daily went online - though Internet access continues to 
be controlled by the Ministry of Public security.22 Again, WTO membership is likely to 
induce greater global activity by Chinese state firms such as the Lian Xiang Group 
(specialising in computers) as well as speeding up the way in which the informational 
economy transforms the relationship between the Chinese state and the international 
political economy. In short, globalisation dictates a rate of technological change that 
heightens the prospect of outcomes favourable to the US in its dealing with China as the 
Chinese government is forced to adapt to the wishes of indigenous consumers in order to 
maintain legitimacy. 
As we noted in chapter 3, US FDI in China has become synonymous with the performance 
of the Chinese economy. In terms of both imports and exports this raises profound 
question as to whether the Chinese economy is Chinese at all?3 US structural power over 
the WTO and the opening of new markets to US firms under the 1999 agreement suggests 
that economic interdependency between the two nations will continue to grow and deepen 
despite spats between the two governments at the bilateral level. Clearly, as pointed out in 
earlier chapters, there are areas where state policy continue to matter pal1icularly in regard 
to China's careful approach to liberalising its capital account. However, one is forced to 
conclude that China is moving inexorably towards policies which place politics 
increasingly at the sufferance of global markets. As stressed throughout this thesis, in 
order for governments to control globalisation action will be needed at either the regional 
or global levels and would involve some degree of coordination in macro-economic 
l~ IMC/ .• p.73. 
311 
economic targets between the world's most dynamic economies. These arguments, 
propounded most convincingly by Hirst and Thomson's study of globalisation, would 
require a great deal of time to be realised and would be especially difficult if they are to 
involve economies as divergent as China and the US. 
In this vein, however, US-China relations can increasingly be approached in the context 
of greater multilateralism rather in the realist tradition of viewing the US as the dominant 
world power and China as the ascending challenger to the status quo. The neo-Gramscian 
approach, then, is necessarily complicated and not without its own contradictions but does 
possess the theoretical range to capture relations between two state-society complexes 
themselves undergoing structural change from both above the state (globalisation) and 
below the state (new social forces and democratic pressures). Moreover, globalisation 
demonstrates that the traditional conception of nations-states and 'US-China relations' is 
overly simplistic, negating the internationalisation of finance and production as well as the 
interpenetration of economies and politics. 
~l Strange, 'The Future of Global Capitalism." As Strange puts it, "to survive in power, governments in 
these (developing) societies have been obliged to find the means to raise living standards and rates of 
economic growth." p.186. 
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